Pakistan’s recurring bailouts reveal how military influence and foreign financing hinder lasting economic reform.
A US$1 billion deposit sitting at the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) was meant to cease being a debt. Following talks with the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Islamabad, Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar said in December 2025 that Pakistan wanted to convert the UAE deposit into equity, possibly in companies linked to the Fauji Fertilizer group, with the Fauji Foundation (FF) "taking the lead" and partial disinvestment by Fauji-linked and other companies. "They will be acquiring some shares, and this liability will end," Dar said, setting March 31 as the target. A market analysis published days later described a mechanism in which the central bank would create a rupee counterpart of about Rs280 billion for a new fund owned in equal partnership with FF, which would contribute shares of its companies of equal value. The liability ended in a more conventional way. By April 23, 2026, the SBP had repaid all US$3.45 billion of UAE deposits, including a final US$1 billion to the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. The deposit that was to become equity therefore no longer exists. A business report in September still described the UAE's US$1 billion commitment to a Fauji fund as a plan for new projects, but no official statement has clarified whether the original proposal lapsed or took a different form.
That unrealized transaction compresses a pattern that a simpler story about soldiers and bailouts would miss. Pakistan has converted strategic relevance into external money under military rulers, elected governments and caretakers alike, so regime type alone cannot explain why the money keeps returning. The constant across those governments has been a military establishment whose constitutional role and formal place in investment policy have expanded during the current stabilization, while its commercial interests have become more closely connected to the privatization and competition reforms that lenders say would end the cycle. Proximity is not proof that policy has been bent, and the public record does not yet settle that question.
The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) lending history offers the first test of the regime-type explanation, and it does not support it. Its record shows 24 lending arrangements for Pakistan since 1958, leaving aside the 2020 Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) and the 2025 Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), which runs alongside the current program. When matched against the periods of direct military rule identified by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), seven of those arrangements were approved under Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq or Pervez Musharraf, and 17 under elected or caretaker governments. Pakistan drew about 66 percent of the money agreed under the seven and about 70 percent under the 17, a difference too small to suggest that one kind of government was consistently more successful in completing its programs than the other. Completion has varied more by decade than by regime. The eight arrangements approved between 1988 and 1997, all under elected or caretaker governments, drew about 45 percent of what was agreed, as programs were repeatedly interrupted; the 2013 Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the 2023 Stand-By Arrangement, also civilian, were drawn in full.
Chart 1: Pakistan's 24 IMF lending arrangements, amount agreed versus drawn, in Special Drawing Rights (SDR). SBA is a Stand-By Arrangement, EFF the Extended Fund Facility, ECF the Extended Credit Facility and SAF the Structural Adjustment Facility, as labeled by the IMF. Source: IMF, History of Lending Commitments: Pakistan, as of October 31, 2026; government type at approval classified by IndraStra using CRS IF10359.
Bilateral money followed strategic events more closely than it followed constitutional form. In 1981, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Washington and Islamabad agreed on a US$3.2 billion military and economic assistance program, announced as a six-year program running through fiscal 1987; a second, US$4 billion program for fiscal years 1988 to 1993 followed in March 1986. Both began under Zia, yet the second did not run its full course: on October 1, 1990, more than two years after military rule had ended, the United States suspended military assistance and new economic aid under the Pressler Amendment. US economic obligations fell from about US$357 million in fiscal 1990 to US$101 million in fiscal 1991 in the US Agency for International Development's (USAID) Greenbook data, read from an archived copy of the official dataset. The second surge came after September 2001, again under a military ruler, and outlived him. The CRS counts about US$11 billion in economic aid and nearly US$8 billion in security aid for fiscal years 2002 to 2016, plus about US$14.6 billion in Pentagon reimbursements known as Coalition Support Funds (CSF), which the CRS notes are technically not foreign assistance. That surge ended on its own strategic terms, with the suspension of security assistance in January 2018 and the Pentagon's decision in September that year to reprogramme US$300 million in CSF.
Chart 2: US assistance to Pakistan by type, fiscal years 1979–2020, current US dollars. Source: USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), obligations, data prepared August 9, 2022; CRS, Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan (2008, 2014 and 2019 editions), CSF actual payments by appropriation year. Package dates from the U.S. State Department Background Note on Pakistan, November 1997.
As American money receded, Gulf and Chinese deposits took its place, and their form matters as much as their size. Saudi Arabia's 2018 package combined a one-year US$3 billion deposit with a deferred-payment oil facility; in April 2026 the kingdom pledged a further US$3 billion and extended its US$5 billion facility until 2028, and on November 4 the finance minister said the additional US$3 billion had been extended "for a reasonable period" without giving a date. The last one-year deferred oil facility, signed in February 2025, has expired without a confirmed renewal, and Pakistan is now asking for a 15-year arrangement that the IMF has not counted in its projected inflows. The UAE, by contrast, chose repayment over another rollover: the US$3.45 billion returned in April combined US$2 billion placed in 2018 and rolled over every year since, US$1 billion from 2023 and a US$450 million facility dating back to 1996–97. China's US$4 billion in deposits carry interest above 6 percent, against 4 to 4.5 percent on the Saudi money, and its RMB 30 billion currency swap line is fully drawn and due to expire in 2027. The Makkah Agreement for Joint Defense signed in August 2026 has no published financial clause, and the April deposits preceded it; no public document links the two.
Calling all of this a bailout blurs instruments that carry very different obligations, and Table 1 sorts the main channels by their legal form.
| Instrument | Main source | Period | Scale | Repayable? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grants and project aid | US economic assistance | 1982–1990; 2002–2016 | About US$11bn appropriated, FY2002–16 | Mostly no |
| Military aid and credits | US security assistance | 1983–1990; from 2002 | Nearly US$8bn appropriated, FY2002–16 | Grants no; credits yes |
| Reimbursements | Pentagon Coalition Support Funds | FY2002–2016 | US$14.57bn paid | No; payment for services |
| IMF purchases | 24 IMF arrangements | 1958–present | SDR 22.1bn drawn of SDR 31.9bn agreed | Yes, with interest |
| Central bank deposits | Saudi Arabia, China, formerly UAE | 2018–present | About US$12bn Saudi and Chinese held now | Yes; repayable at maturity |
| Rollovers | Same depositors | Annual or multi-year | Saudi US$5bn and Chinese US$4bn counted in FY2025-26 borrowing | Defers repayment; does not cancel it |
| Deferred oil payment | Saudi Fund for Development | 2019–2026 | US$1.2bn in the last one-year facility | Yes, at about 6 percent |
Table 1: The legal form of Pakistan's main external support channels. Sources: CRS R47565 and CRS aid table; IMF lending history as of October 31, 2026; Ministry of Economic Affairs provisional FY2025-26 report as reported in July 2026; finance and economic affairs ministry statements; IndraStra classification.
The money has bought stabilization, and the numbers since mid-2023 are substantial. SBP reserves rose from US$4.45 billion at the end of June 2023 to US$9.39 billion a year later, US$14.51 billion in June 2025 and US$21.59 billion on November 13, 2026. Part of that buffer came from domestic market purchases: the central bank's annual report records net foreign exchange purchases of US$8.1 billion in the 2025-26 fiscal year. Yet Saudi and Chinese deposits alone amount to about US$12 billion, or roughly 56 percent of the central bank's latest total, and official figures compiled from the Ministry of Economic Affairs' provisional report and other announcements show that of US$27.2 billion in foreign borrowing in 2025-26, including rollovers, about US$24 billion went to budget financing, debt repayment and reserves, while about US$3.4 billion financed projects.
Chart 3: SBP foreign exchange reserves, US$ billion. Sources: SBP figures as reported July 5, 2024, July 2, 2025 and November 19, 2026; deposit stocks from the Ministry of Economic Affairs provisional FY2025-26 report and Finance Ministry statements in November 2026. The 56 percent share is an IndraStra calculation.
Stabilization of that kind has not yet turned into growth, which is where the lenders' own diagnosis begins. The World Bank's October update, "Attaining Escape Velocity," puts growth at 3.7 percent in the 2025-26 fiscal year, and its country director said real per capita growth "remains stuck at around 1.6 percent." The update itself argues that upgrading policies and institutions toward the average of middle-income countries could lift growth to as much as 6.2 to 6.9 percent a year, and it names "the government's large presence in commercial sectors, delays in privatization, and a complex business environment" as sources of "credibility gaps" that deter investment, alongside vacancies at the Competition Commission. An IMF official listed the same priorities in November, asking for reforms to enhance competition and overhaul state-owned enterprises, while staff estimates put gross external financing requirements at nearly US$19.1 billion in 2027-28, rising to almost US$29.9 billion in 2029-30. The staff-level agreement of October 7 on the fourth review, worth about US$1.2 billion across two facilities, still awaits a Board meeting that the Fund expects in December. Neither the World Bank update nor the IMF spokesperson's November statement mentions military-associated enterprises.
That silence matters because the reform agenda now passes through institutions in which the military has a formal place. Pakistan is not under military rule: an elected coalition governs, and the president appoints the service chiefs on the prime minister's advice. But the 27th Amendment, passed in November 2025, made the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) concurrently the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), concentrating command of the armed forces in the office held by Field Marshal Asim Munir, and extended lifelong rank, privileges and immunity from criminal proceedings under Article 248 to officers promoted to field marshal, marshal of the air force or admiral of the fleet. The Defence Forces Act, enacted in August 2026 but deemed effective from November 13, 2025, gave the CDF operational command and control of the armed forces and made the office the prime minister's principal military adviser. Economic policy had already acquired a military seat in June 2023, when the government created the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC). Its founding notification gives the Chief of Army Staff a place on the apex committee "by special invitation," installs a National Coordinator from the Pakistan Army, assigns army representatives to its defense, agriculture, minerals, technology and energy divisions, adds the Frontier Works Organization to the energy division, and directs the council to focus on "investment and privatization."
The military's commercial presence, however, is older and better documented than its policy role. Ayesha Siddiqa's Military Inc., first published in 2007 and revised in 2016, defined "Milbus" as military capital "used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity," outside the defense budget and normal accountability procedures, and reported that only nine of 96 projects run by the four main welfare foundations were listed with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). Siddiqa also wrote that the scarcity of data made an exact valuation of that economy difficult. Part of that transparency gap has narrowed since, because the Fauji group's largest firms are listed and audited, and its bank carries an AAA rating. What has grown alongside that disclosure, however, is concentration. The Fauji, Shaheen and Bahria foundations each describe themselves as charitable trusts under the Charitable Endowments Act of 1890, while stakes keep moving within the group: in the first half of 2026, Fauji Fertilizer Company (FFC) took full ownership of a power company by acquiring FF's 25 percent through a share swap. In August 2026, the Army Welfare Trust (AWT) transferred 51 percent of Askari General Insurance to FF at carrying cost, and the company's filing said the move did not alter ultimate beneficial control.
Table 2 sets out the entities this argument relies on, by legal form, with the latest financial figures each has published.
| Entity | Legal form | Military link | Latest published figures |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fauji Foundation | Charitable trust, Charitable Endowments Act 1890 (founded 1954) | Ex-servicemen welfare; parent of Fauji group | Consolidated accounts not located |
| Fauji Fertilizer Company | Listed company | FF is holding company | 2025 profit Rs73.6bn (about US$266m); Rs110.07bn in taxes and levies; January–June 2026 profit Rs41.8bn |
| Askari Bank | Listed bank | FFC 64.72 percent, FF 7.19 percent; FF exercises control | 2025 profit Rs22.8bn (about US$82m); rated AAA in July 2026 |
| Mari Energies | Listed exploration company | FF about 40 percent | 2025-26 profit Rs87.1bn (about US$315m) |
| Askari General Insurance | Listed insurer | 51 percent moved from AWT to FF, August 2026 | Transfer at carrying cost |
| PIA Equity Limited | Special-purpose vehicle (incorporated January 2026) | FFC 33.99 percent | FFC investment Rs30.6bn (about US$111m) by June 30, 2026 |
| Shaheen Foundation | Charitable trust, Charitable Endowments Act 1890 (1977) | Air force welfare; chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff | Total assets "close to Rs 11 billions," per its website (undated) |
| Bahria Foundation | Charitable trust under the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (established 1982) | Navy welfare; chaired by the Chief of the Naval Staff | No financial statements located |
Table 2: Military-associated entities discussed in this article, by legal form. Sources: company filings and websites (FFC, Askari Bank, Mari Energies, a Fauji group company site, Shaheen and Bahria foundations); Pakistan Credit Rating Agency, July 20, 2026; Pakistan Stock Exchange notices. Dollar conversions at Rs276.52 per US$, interbank close of November 19, 2026.
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) shows how the reform agenda and that commercial footprint now meet in a single transaction. The World Bank calls the airline's sale a welcome development. After a consortium led by Arif Habib Corporation won the auction, FFC's shareholders were asked in February to authorize up to Rs67 billion (about US$242 million) for not less than 33.99 percent of PIA Equity Limited, the special-purpose vehicle buying the airline, plus up to Rs11 billion in sponsor support. At the first closing in late June, the consortium paid Rs10 billion to the government and injected Rs80 billion into the airline, with a further Rs45 billion investment due within 12 months and have notified its intention to exercise the call option on the remaining 25 percent. FFC's half-year accounts record an investment of Rs30.6 billion and 169.95 million shares, and the company says this represents 22.6 percent of the airline through the vehicle. A privatization meant to shrink the state's commercial footprint has thus given FFC, the flagship of the Fauji group, an indirect holding of more than a fifth of the national carrier.
None of this establishes that those firms receive favors, and the best case for them is strong. FFC paid Rs110.07 billion (about US$398 million) in taxes and levies in 2025 and says its local production saved about US$1.2 billion in imports, while Mari reports Rs129.08 billion (about US$467 million) in contributions to the exchequer in 2025-26; both are profitable, audited and partly owned by public shareholders. The PIA sale was run by the Privatisation Commission through a bid it describes as competitive, with ministries, regulators and foreign advisers completing its conditions. Civilian governments signed 17 of the 24 IMF arrangements, and the fiscal and energy-sector imbalances those programs addressed built up under them as well as under military rule, while the floods and the oil shock that the central bank cites for 2025-26 had nothing to do with corporate structure. Public data do not show preferential tax treatment, cheaper credit or privileged access to contracts for military-associated firms, and with no consolidated FF accounts publicly available, such claims cannot be tested either way.
The governance problem lies in the overlap of roles rather than in proven advantage. The same establishment now commands all three services through a single office and sits by invitation on the council that steers investment and privatization. It is also linked, through welfare trusts, two of which are chaired by serving service chiefs, to firms in fertilizer, banking, energy, insurance and now aviation, in an economy where lenders are asking for more competition and private participation. When a sovereign deposit was nearly turned into equity in a Fauji vehicle, the first public account of the conglomerate's role came from the deputy prime minister, and a market analysis asked in what capacity a government official was speaking for a non-government group. Arrangements of that kind leave external partners unable to tell whether reform is widening private competition or moving assets between public and quasi-public owners, and they leave domestic investors with the same uncertainty.
The coming months offer concrete tests of that distinction. If the IMF Board completes the review in December, as the Fund expects, its conditions on competition and state-owned enterprises will matter more than the disbursement. PIA's second closing, due by June 2027, will show whether FFC's share rises and on what disclosed terms. China's swap line expires in 2027, and the extended Saudi US$3 billion still has no published maturity. If the UAE idea of swapping deposits for Fauji equity returns, publishing its proposed valuation, governance arrangements and the SBP's role before signing would tell lenders more about the direction of reform than another rollover can.
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