India is a growing market for Chinese goods, but trade ties remain shaped by investment rules, strategic controls and geopolitical tensions.
On July 8, 2026, India's government cleared a planned joint venture between Dixon Technologies and the Indian arm of the Chinese smartphone maker Vivo, with Dixon holding 51 percent and Vivo 49 percent. The approval came under rules New Delhi had eased four months earlier, and its terms carry the whole relationship in miniature. Chinese capital, equipment and know-how were admitted, and control stayed in Indian hands by design. Beijing, for its part, has made comparable trades of its own, easing some supplies while keeping licensing power over others. The central question of whether India is China's next growth opportunity can be tested against that record.
The size of the market comes first, because the case for India as a destination rests on it. In 2025 China exported goods worth RMB 972.3 billion to India, according to the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC; 中华人民共和国海关总署), out of total exports of RMB 26.99 trillion. In dollar terms, Chinese customs data put the India figure at about US$135.9 billion and the global total at about US$3.77 trillion. India's share works out to 3.6 percent (author calculation from the GACC table). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) accounted for 17.6 percent, the European Union 14.8 percent and the United States 11.1 percent. Shipments to India grew 13.4 percent in RMB terms, more than twice the 6.1 percent rise in China's total exports that the customs administration reported for the year. India is therefore among the faster-growing destinations for Chinese goods while remaining a mid-sized one.
Chart 1: China's goods exports by destination, share of total, 2025. Source: General Administration of Customs of China, December 2025 country table (archived copy); author calculations.
That growth gap matters more because of conditions inside China. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported that retail sales rose 0.4 percent year on year in October 2026 and 1.0 percent in the first ten months, while fixed-asset investment fell 8.1 percent. The bureau's own assessment is that "the domestic imbalance between strong supply and weak demand is acute." China's trade surplus in 2025 reached almost US$1.2 trillion, according to customs data. Chinese producers with output to place abroad have an evident commercial interest in large markets that are still growing.
India's growth record and population make it one of the largest of those markets in prospect, if not yet in purchasing power. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects real growth of 7.0 percent for India in 2026, against 4.5 percent for China. Its per capita figures set the limit on that comparison: about US$2,750 per person in India in 2026, against about US$15,370 in China, so average Indian output is roughly 18 percent of the Chinese level (author calculation). The United Nations expects India's population to peak in the early 2060s at about 1.7 billion, while China's population has already peaked. India's own count is still under way; population enumeration for the Census runs until February 28, 2027 in most states. The demographic case points to future demand, while the income data show that the market remains modest on a per-person basis.
Bilateral trade already shows how that demand is being met, and the imbalance runs one way. India's exports to China were US$21.3 billion in fiscal year 2021-22 (April to March) and US$14.3 billion in 2024-25, according to the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S). Imports from China rose from US$94.6 billion to US$115.1 billion over the same years. The Department of Commerce's quick estimates for April to October 2026 show the trend continuing on both sides. Exports to China rose 36.1 percent to US$11.4 billion, while imports rose 30.6 percent to US$96.6 billion. That leaves a seven-month deficit of about US$85.2 billion, against US$65.6 billion a year earlier (author calculation from the same tables). Indian exports are growing from a much smaller base, so faster percentage growth still produces a wider gap in dollars.
Chart 2: India's merchandise trade with China, fiscal years 2021-22 to 2025-26 and April–October 2026-27, US$ billion. Sources: DGCI&S Indian Trade Journal country profile; Department of Commerce quick estimates. The two series use different data vintages.
The widening trade gap has also become a point of discussion between the two governments, although each sees the underlying problem differently. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said on October 16, 2026, that "non-tariff barriers are the biggest hurdle in the trade between India and China," citing limited access for generic medicines, bovine meat, vegetables and other perishables. China's foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning replied the same day that "China never aims for trade surplus" and that Beijing stands "ready to work with India to address each other's economic and trade concerns in a balanced way." The two statements agree that each side has concerns and disagree on where the obstacle lies.
The composition of India's purchases explains why the deficit has proved hard to shift. In 2024-25, four electronics lines (components, telecom instruments, computer hardware and electronic instruments) accounted for about US$37.5 billion, or 32.5 percent, of imports from China, according to the DGCI&S commodity table (author calculation). Industrial machinery, organic chemicals, plastics and bulk drugs follow. Many of these goods are inputs for Indian factories rather than finished consumer products. Indian assembly growth therefore tends to pull in more Chinese parts and equipment, which is why the joint venture in the opening example belongs to the same trade pattern.
Chart 3: India's ten largest import lines from China, fiscal year 2024-25, US$ billion and share of total. Source: DGCI&S Indian Trade Journal country profile, Table 5; electronics grouping by author.
India's opening to Chinese capital and business visitors since 2025 has been concrete but conditional. Press Note 3 of 2020 required government approval for investment by an entity of a country sharing a land border with India, or beneficially owned from one. On March 10, 2026, the Union Cabinet amended that regime. Non-controlling beneficial ownership of up to 10 percent from such countries now enters through the automatic route. Proposals in capital goods, electronic components, polysilicon and ingot-wafer manufacturing are to be decided within 60 days, provided "majority shareholding and control" stays with resident Indians "at all times." India introduced an e-B-4 visa on January 1, 2026, for Chinese business visitors on tasks such as installing and commissioning equipment. The Ministry of Power told Parliament that four entities with substantial ownership from land-border countries may bid for power projects for two years from June 24, 2026, subject to domestic-content and cyber-security testing. Direct flights resumed in October 2025, when IndiGo began a Kolkata–Guangzhou service.
India has also kept limits in place. The June 2020 order blocking 59 mobile applications, among them TikTok and WeChat, remains in force, Huawei and ZTE remain excluded from India's 5G program, and a proposed link between Alipay+ and India's Unified Payments Interface (UPI) has stalled on security grounds, according to an assessment published on November 5, 2026. India opened 18 anti-dumping and countervailing probes between July and September 2026, more than any other country, with China the largest target, according to Global Trade Alert data cited in a recent explainer. New Delhi has made room for Chinese capital and technicians where they serve Indian production, and has kept data, payments and telecommunications networks off the table.
China's record follows a similar pattern of selective opening. After licensing requirements for rare-earth magnets took effect in April 2025, licenses for some Indian companies resumed at the end of October that year. By late December about 50 applications were still pending, and an official tracking the matter described issuance as slow. On October 19, 2026, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM; 中华人民共和国商务部) announced export licensing for shield tunneling machines and related items from November 18. The ministry described the items as "clearly dual-use in nature" and said it "will approve applications that meet the requirements." The measure applies to all destinations, not India alone, although Indian infrastructure projects, including the high-speed rail line, use such machines. China has also challenged India's battery, automobile and electric-car incentive schemes at the World Trade Organization (WTO), where a panel in dispute DS642 was established on February 24, 2026, and composed on May 28. Beijing, like New Delhi, keeps control over the inputs and rules it regards as strategic.
Set side by side, the measures taken since mid-2025 show both sides opening some channels and holding others.
| Date | Government | Measure | Effect on commerce |
|---|---|---|---|
| July 2025 | India | Tourist visas for Chinese nationals resumed | Opened |
| October 2025 | China | Some rare-earth magnet licenses issued to Indian firms; about 50 still pending in December | Partly opened |
| October 15, 2025 | China | WTO consultations requested on India's battery, auto and electric passenger-car incentive schemes (DS642) | Contested |
| Late October 2025 | Both | Direct flights resumed (Kolkata–Guangzhou) | Opened |
| January 1, 2026 | India | e-B-4 production-investment business visa | Opened |
| March 10, 2026 | India | Press Note 3 amended: 10 percent automatic route, 60-day decisions, Indian majority control | Opened with conditions |
| June 24, 2026 | India | Four entities with land-border ownership allowed to bid for power projects for two years | Opened with conditions |
| July 8, 2026 | India | Dixon–Vivo joint venture (51:49) approved | Opened with conditions |
| July–September 2026 | India | 18 trade-remedy investigations opened, China the largest target | Restricted |
| October 19, 2026 (effective November 18) | China | Export licensing for shield tunneling machines, all destinations | Restricted |
| Unchanged since 2020 | India | Mobile-app bans; Huawei and ZTE outside 5G; Alipay+–UPI link stalled | Retained |
Table 1: Selected India and China measures affecting bilateral commerce, July 2025–November 2026. Sources: as linked in the text.
These economic openings have taken place alongside a gradual improvement in diplomatic engagement, although the underlying questions remain unresolved. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping in New Delhi on September 12, 2026, the Indian readout recorded agreement that "differences should not become disputes" and set out Modi's "three mutuals" of respect, sensitivity and interest. The two leaders, it said, underlined the need to address "structural trade imbalance and supply chain issues, and facilitation of meaningful and predictable market access." The Special Representatives on the boundary question held their 25th round in Beijing on August 25, 2026, and agreed to meet for the 26th round in India in 2027. The same statement records Modi's emphasis that peace in the border areas "remains an essential basis" for the wider relationship, which ties economic progress to the border.
The border itself produced fresh friction in October, and the two governments described it differently. After reported face-offs in Arunachal Pradesh and public remarks by the head of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA; विदेश मंत्रालय) said on October 23 that the situation "gets disturbed from time to time when Chinese forces diverge from established patrolling patterns." It added that the two sides had agreed to discuss ways to improve understanding of the Line of Actual Control in appropriate areas. China's foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on October 26 that China "conducts normal border patrol and control activities to safeguard its territorial sovereignty," and that the two countries "maintain communication through diplomatic and military channels," according to the ministry's transcript. Both accounts confirm that the established mechanisms are in use. Neither suggests the incidents have changed the trade measures already in force.
Pakistan forms a second constraint, and each government has stated its position on the record. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) runs through Gilgit-Baltistan, which India regards as part of Ladakh. The MEA said on January 9, 2026, that India does "not recognise the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor," describing it as passing through Indian territory "under forcible and illegal occupation of Pakistan." China's foreign ministry responded on January 12 that the corridor is "an economic cooperation initiative" that does "not affect China's position on the Kashmir issue." The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that China supplied 80 percent of Pakistan's major arms imports in 2021–25, up from 73 percent in 2016–20. That relationship sits outside any trade negotiation, and neither side's economic measures address it.
The United States adds a third variable, and it affects both economies at once. Most Indian goods face a 10 percent US tariff under Section 301 after the US Supreme Court struck down earlier tariffs imposed under emergency powers. An India–US trade deal remains unsigned, and India is among the countries named in a US investigation into excess capacity, India's Commerce Secretary said on November 18, 2026. US pressure on Chinese exports can make other markets more attractive to Chinese firms. US scrutiny of Indian production can also make Indian buyers more cautious about Chinese content in goods bound for the United States. It is not yet clear which effect will dominate.
On the available record, the title's proposition holds only in a qualified form. India is one of the faster-growing major markets for Chinese goods, and its growth outlook and population support continued demand for Chinese machinery, components and chemicals. However, with 3.6 percent of China's exports and output per person at about a fifth of China's level, India is not large enough to offset weak domestic demand in China on its own. The terms on which Chinese firms can enter are also set by Indian rules on control and by Chinese rules on licensing. Commerce has advanced in exactly the places where both governments judged the gain specific and the exposure manageable. It has not reached data, payments, telecommunications networks or the critical inputs each side licenses, and nothing in the record shows the border, Pakistan or US policy loosening those limits.
Data due in December will give the first reading of how far that bounded commerce extends. Chinese customs data for November, due in early December, will show whether shipments to India are still outpacing China's total exports. India's quick estimates for November, due in mid-December, will show whether Indian exports to China are keeping up their faster growth from a small base. The first license decisions under the tunneling-machine rule will indicate how China applies its stated requirement that applications meet the necessary conditions for Indian projects. The pace of approvals under Press Note 3, the WTO panel in DS642 and the 26th round of boundary talks in 2027 will then reveal whether either government is prepared to move its limits as well as its openings.
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