By Dr. R. Evan Ellis, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
2026 is likely to continue the transformation of Latin America and the Caribbean and the U.S. approach to engagement with the region that began in 2025. This work is the author’s personal analysis of the possible evolution of the strategic environment in the region in the new year.
The political, economic, and other dynamics
of Latin America and the Caribbean may be understood as a complex interdependent system in which small perturbations and different outcomes
on key events can cause reinforcing effects that send the region on
dramatically different potential trajectories.
Nonetheless, it is possible to discern likely tendencies in the
trajectory of the region based on the interactions between influences,
conditions, and strategic inflection points such as elections.
Predicting the course of interdependent
human, institutional, and external events, even for a year, cannot be done with
the mathematical precision once famously hypnotized by science fiction author
Isaac Asimov in his “Foundation” series of novels.
The following essay is thus this author’s postulation
of one group of “reasonable” futures for Latin America and the Caribbean in
2026 based on his interpretation of how those complex events seem likely to
play out.
Overview
Latin America and the Caribbean enters 2026
with an unprecedented number of governments oriented to work with the U.S. and support its policies, strengthened by the possible
addition of multiple additional U.S.-friendly governments through elections in
the year to come. At the same time, most
states in the region will continue to deepen commercial and other engagement
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), trying to do so in a fashion that
will not spark the ire of the current U.S. administration, even while engagement in areas such as transportation,
digital, electricity and financial infrastructure, commodity exports,
“people-to-people” and institutional engagement may quietly deepen PRC influence
in the region in real terms.
Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah will likely
continue to have a minor presence in the region, limited by U.S.attention and resistance to extra-hemispheric actors in the region. Russia’s continuing absorption by its invasion
of the Ukraine and the profound disruption of Hezbollah and Iranian power by
Israeli actions in the Middle East during the preceding two years are also
likely to limit their advance in the region.
Beyond these extra-hemispheric actors, the
European Union, Middle Eastern countries, and India will also likely have
opportunities to expand their commercial engagement in the region in important
ways in 2026 due to the connectivity of the region with the rest of the world and the region’s efforts to diversify its commercial partners in response to new U.S. tariff and other policies.
As the region navigates between the U.S.
and various extra-hemispheric actors, its deference to the U.S., currently
strong, may be eroded by its perception of U.S. success or difficulties in its broader global agenda. These may include the region’s perception
(whether or not accurate) of:
·
U.S.inability to put an end to Russian aggression in Ukraine
· Expanding distrust of the U.S.
and a decreased willingness to cooperate with it among its partners in both Europe
and Asia;
· The U.S. not prevailing in its
strategic technology competitions with
the PRC in artificial
intelligence, quantum
computing, space,
renewable
energy;
·
the PRC is prevailing over the
U.S. in its control of the supply chains for critical
minerals;
·
an erosionof the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the international financial system;
·
a slowingof the U.S. economy and an erosion of its international trade position dueto tariffs;
·
the U.S. is suffering stagflation
and growingU.S. debt.
The contribution of international
circumstances to an eroding U.S. capacity to enlist cooperation or discourage
cooperation with US rivals notwithstanding, anti-U.S. sentiments by governments
in the region could shift from the overtcriticism by some governments to more subtle resistance. The Brazilian government of Luis Ignacio
“Lula” da Silva will likely continue to be the most significant actor working against U.S. interests, including its deepening engagement with the PRC in military,
space, and sensitive technology sectors; trade in rare earth elements; and collaboration
with the PRC and others to dethrone the dollar and oppose US initiatives in the
BRICS forum. Yet, because of Brazil’s
own historic position of moderation, ties to the West and democracy, and its
strategic interest in not excluding the country from the community of centrist
democratic nations, Lula will likely continue seek to avoid becoming the overt
leader of any anti-U.S. movement in the hemisphere.
Governments in Latin America and the
Caribbean that may have significant differences with U.S. policies will likely
generally attempt to keep those differences private in order to avoid a
significantly negative response from the U.S. that could include the imposition
of tariffs,
sanctions
or other consequences.
Overtly anti-US governments, including Nicaragua
and Cuba, will likely continue in “survival mode” under U.S. attention and
pressure, enlisting help from Russia,
China, and possibly Iran.
The U.S. Administration’s decision on whether to take decisive military action in Venezuela will
powerfully shape the trajectory of not only Venezuela, but the entire
region. Taking such action opens a path
for the legitimate, democratically elected government of Edmundo Gonzalez to
take power in a way likely not possible if the US instead continues its current
coercive diplomacy approach
More broadly, during 2026, the region is
likely to experience expanding levels of corruption
and violence related to transnational organized crime and the related phenomenon of gangs,
access to arms, new technologies, and expanding covert payment and laundering
options. Those pressures will likely support
the turn to right-oriented governments, although dissatisfaction, polarization,
and distrust in government in general will continue to put pressure on democracies
across the region.
The region as a whole is likely to experience
a continuing erosion of democratic norms, freedom of expression, and the protection of
individual rights through the combination of anti-crime campaigns, new
technologies, and political cultures of increasing intolerance, as well as
populations that may privilege security over individual rights and freedom of expression.
During 2026, the trajectory of the region will
also likely be shaped by one or more strategically significant external or
internal events. These could include a
major international financial crisis, the escalation of conflicts in the Middle
East, Europe and Ukraine,
or the Indo-Pacific, generating major market and logistics disruptions. Such strategically significant events could
also include global computer viruses, a new international pandemic with debilitated international systems for monitoring and coordination, use of a nuclear weapon somewhere in the world, or a war involving the PRC in the
Indopacific, possibly involving Taiwan, Japan, or other actors, with major impacts on not only
international commerce and finance, but possibly PRC military activities in the
Western Hemisphere.
Closer to the U.S., as noted previously, the
dynamics of the hemisphere will be shaped by the Administration’s course of
action with respect to Venezuela and how that conflict plays out, as well as
U.S. decisions regarding how to proceed with its counterdrug engagement with
Colombia and Mexico, and the ability to secure a successful renewal of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Free Trade Agreement. Other key uncertainties that could have
outsized impacts on regional dynamics include the ability of the Rodrigo Paz government
in Bolivia to overcome economic and political challenges and stay in office, a successful political transition in Honduras, Ecuador’s ability to continue to manage its security crisis, and presidential elections in Peru in April, Colombia in May, and Brazil in November.
Influences, Trends, and Change Drivers
In 2026, multiple forces continue to present
new strategic risks and erode faith in the effectiveness of democratic
governance. These include challenges
associated with organized crime, new information dynamics, and the impact of
the PRC on the region.
Organized Crime. Organized crime will
continue to become more difficult to control despite individual victories in interdicting drug boats and impacting the leadership and finances of individual gangs,
cartels, and other groups.
Groups operating in the region have become
increasingly fragmented
and internationalized. An increasingly
complex tapestry is emerging across the region involving collaboration between
local gangs and other entities, to include regionally-based groups with
international reach such as the Mexico-based Sinaloa
and Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) cartels, and Brazil’s First Capital Command (PCC, Primeiro Comando da Capital) and Red Command (CV, Comando Vermelho), among others, plus extra-hemispheric
criminal entities facilitating flows of drugs and other contraband, including ‘Ndrangheta
and the Camorra mafia of Italy, and the Albanian mafia, among others. Chinese triads
and other Asia-based criminal groups also increasingly have ties in the region
involving illicit activities from the supply of precursors for fentanyl and
other synthetic drugs, to human trafficking, to illegal mining, to trafficking
in exotic wildlife, to money laundering, among others.
Criminal groups operating in the region also
have access to ever more sophisticated technologies, including underwater and
unmanned vehicles for moving drugs to unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance, transport, and attack. Such vehicles have been used from Catatumbo,
Colombia to Michoacan, Mexico to smuggle drugs, conduct surveillance in support
of smuggling and combat operations, and to strike targets ranging from
terrorizing populations to combatting rival groups and authorities.
Combatting money laundering has also become
more complicated, with emerging options for criminals to use
less-than-transparent PRC-based banks and companies as well as cryptocurrencies,
requiring levels of both training and coordination not always available to
Latin American law enforcement.
New Information Dynamics. Beyond the deleterious
effects of new criminal dynamics, the information space underpinning Latin
American democracies is becoming more fragmented and less reliable through the
consumption and transmission of information via social media, compounded by the power of artificial intelligence to fabricate content, including falsely attributing actions
and statements to public persons. This
uncertainty, and the ability of social media tools to tailor content to audiences with particular interests or viewpoints, is also contributing to
the polarization of Latin American societies, undermining tolerance, and further
complicating the process of reaching consensus and supporting elected leaders
and their decisions, all of which are vital to a robust, healthy democracy.
Expanding engagement by the PRC. China’s growing activities
in and with the region are directly impacting the economic and political
dynamics and discourse there, creating risks for the U.S. and also indirectly undermining
democracy and market economies.
The PRC is the number
one or number two trading partner of virtually every country in the region
south of Mexico, generally ahead of the United States. Its companies have invested over $200
billion in projects in the region, and its government continues to engage
with Latin American governments at the bilateral, multilateral, and subnational
level. That engagement extends to military
and police cooperation, space and science and technology cooperation, as
well as engagement in a number of sensitive
sectors from telecommunications and cloud computing to electricity and
financial infrastructure.
The PRC pursues a broad range of “people-to-people”
engagements across the region that create opportunities for relationships
of influence and even espionage. It
brings thousands of people to China on paid trips and robustly
interacts with persons in the region through local China-facing business
councils, friendship societies, congressional caucuses, and relationships with
local Chinese ethnic communities.
Although the 2025
U.S. National Security Strategy commits to working against influence by
extra-hemispheric U.S. rivals such as China and acting to deny them control of
military facilities and strategic infrastructure, the PRC’s newly released 3rd
Policy White Paper toward Latin America and the Caribbean commits to
doubling down on its advances in the full range of areas, including military,
space and technology cooperation, “people-to-people” engagements, and critical
infrastructure projects likely to be problematic for the U.S.
The perceived example of PRC economic success, order, and security, conditions often lacking in Latin America, arguably undercuts the conventional Western argument that democracy, limited government, and empowerment of the individual is the best vehicle to achieve positive outcomes. The resources that the PRC and its companies and financial institutions often make available to their Latin American counterparts without conditionality regarding democracy, respect for human rights, or good governance amplifies this problem by undercutting efforts by the US government and its investors and lenders to use access to loans and investment to oblige local partners to adhere to such practices. Finally, the spread of Chinese surveillance and control architectures, including “smart cities,” arguably shifts the balance by empowering government surveillance and control at the expense of individual liberty and privacy.
Regional Outlook
Mexico. In 2026, the government of
Claudia Scheinbaum will likely continue to have modest
progress against organized crime groups including the Sinaloa
and Jalisco Nueva Generation (CJNG) cartels, although without
substantially reducing levels of corruption and the reach of the criminal
economy in all levels of government in Mexico.
Her government will likely also navigate cooperation on drug
trafficking, migration, trade, water rights, limitation
of PRC-based companies investing in Mexico, and other issues to avoid
significant conflict with the U.S. government.
Mexico will likely succeed in avoiding unilateral
U.S. military action on Mexican territory and also prevent a breakdown of USMCA
negotiations. Notably, a failure on
either count could lead Mexico to a far more nationalistic posture, moving away
from cartel and migration cooperation and trade integration with the U.S. and abandoning
its restraints in its embrace of China, Russia and other actors, creating an enormous
security challenge for the U.S. on its southern border.
Central America. With the exception of
Nicaragua, the region will continue to closely cooperate with the U.S. and
generally support its policy initiatives.
Costa Rica’s popular,
pro-U.S. leader Rodrigo Chaves, will likely be replaced by Laura
Fernandez Delgado of Chaves’ own Social Democratic Progress Party (PPSD) in
the first round of that nation’s election on February 1st.
Honduras. In Honduras, the nation’s
disputed December 2025 election will likely be resolved in favor of the
National Party candidate Nasry Asfura.
President Trump’s strong endorsement
of Asfura in the campaign and his granting of a pardon to prior National
Party candidate Juan
Orlando Hernandez, previously convicted in the U.S. of major drug
trafficking, will likely make the incoming Honduran leader one of the United
States’ strongest collaborators on security and policy issues in the region.
Honduras could also reverse its 2023 diplomatic recognition of the PRC and switch
relations back to Taiwan, the first such reversal for a large, non-island
country since Nicaragua’s
de-recognition of the PRC in 1990.
El Salvador. The government of Nayib
Bukele in El Salvador will continue to be another of the current U.S.
Administration’s closest allies, particularly on help with the receipt and
internment of criminal migrants deported from the U.S. to El
Salvador’s CECOT prison, even while the Bukele government continues to
cooperate closely with the PRC on a number of major projects including the
national library and stadium.
Panama. Similarly, the government
of Jose Raul Mulino in Panama will continue to cooperate closely with the U.S. on
security matters, even while the legal process for the removal of the Hong Kong-based
firm Hutchinson from its Panama concession will continue
to be delayed, and even while Panama’s leading businesspersons will
continue their embrace
of business with the PRC.
The three greatest areas of uncertainty in
Central America are arguably outcomes in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.
In Honduras, there is a minor risk that the
leftist populist governing Libre party will succeed in using doubts about
irregularities in the November 2025 election, in conjunction with support from
the Libre-aligned military, to force an invalidation of the election, in
order to remain in power. Such an
invalidation would put the Libre government on course for a major collision
with the Trump Administration, which promised significant
consequences if the election outcome was reversed.
Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, the declining
health of Daniel Ortega, and the possibility of a successful U.S. effort to
end the Maduro regime control of Venezuela, could make the Ortega dictatorship
the next target for political change in the Americas.
Guatemala. In Guatemala, although the
government of Bernardo Arevalo has been supportive of
U.S. policy pursuits, its left-of-center orientation and alignment with the
prior U.S. Administration have made its relationship with the current U.S. Administration
uncomfortable, while President Arevalo’s Semilla party continues to be in
a precarious position in Guatemala’s legislature and the President
continues to be locked in a bitter political
fight with Guatemalan Attorney General Consuelo Porras and some Guatemalan
elites.
The strong advocacy taken by the current
U.S. Administration for the Nationalist Party in neighboring Honduras, and the
pardon of Juan Orlando Hernandez there could conceivably embolden Guatemalan
elites to bring down the Arevalo government through legislative and legal
maneuvers. Such a situation would open
up the possibility of political instability and political violence in the
country. It could possibly lead to a
populist left party coming to power in the next election, similar to what
happened with the Libre party’s election in Honduras. As in Honduras, such a new government would
not only undercut Central American support for the U.S., but could open the
door for such a government to recognize the PRC and open a new door for PRC
influence in the region.
South America. In South America, like
Central America, 2026 is likely to feature a continuing evolution toward
right-oriented U.S.-friendly governments, albeit ones that nonetheless seek to
do business with the PRC and with important prospects for instability and
change.
Argentina. In Argentina, the government
of Javier Milei has successfully implemented difficult and draconian policies that
stopped the economic freefall caused by the disastrous policies of prior Peronist
governments, including important cuts to federal government size and spending, including
limiting discretionary transfer payments to the provinces and cutting subsidies
for public utilities and transportation, effectively balancing the budget.
In its first year in power, the Milei
government sharply devalued the Peso and reached important agreements with the
International Monetary Fund, solving its liquidity crisis and creating the
basis for a reliably stable, convertible peso to attract capital. Although the devaluation was initially
inflationary, it brought inflation under control.
In the October 2025 mid-term elections, the
Milei government faced resistance due to concerns over the economic pain caused
by reform and the scandals tainting key Administration figures, including the President’s sister Karina. Nonetheless, with the
help of a strong financial support package and endorsement of the government
from the U.S., including from President Trump himself, Milei and his La Libertad Avanza party emerged positioned to
continue their pro-market policies through the country’s strongly
Presidentialist system in a way likely to give the country stability through at
least the end of Milei’s term.
The success of Milei’s economic reforms,
his political ability to continue them following his strong midterm victory,
and Milei’s close personal relationship with U.S. President Trump, including
attending and even hosting a Conservative Political Action Committee (CPAC) meeting in Buenos
Aires, makes Argentina positioned to continue as a strong and stable ally of
the U.S. in the region in 2026.
With respect to Argentina’s relationship
with China, although the Milei government has restricted PRC activities in
sensitive sectors such as military and space cooperation, it appears to continue to export its soy and agricultural
goods to China in
competition with U.S. farmers, as well as continue to host broad Chinese activities in the oil, transportation, electricity and
telecommunication sectors, among others.
Paraguay. The Santiago Peña
government in Paraguay has positioned itself effectively as a reliable partner
on policy issues in the region as well as on security cooperation and
commercial matters. The strong and principled stance of the Peña government not to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan
to the PRC further strengthens Paraguay’s strategic value as a bulwark against
PRC expansion in the hemisphere. The Peña
administration’s effective marketing of the country as a stable, conservative,
pro-business environment with inexpensive electricity, ample land, and low
factor input costs will likely continue to yield results in 2026 in attracting
investors to Paraguay, with the facilitation of the U.S. government. The U.S. lifting of sanctions against former Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes, President
Peña’s political mentor and patron, further solidifies President Peña’s success
in putting the country on the strategic map for U.S. policymakers, with
deepening positive political, security and business cooperation likely in 2026.
Bolivia. The new center-Right government
of Rodrigo Paz has dramatically changed the country’s political orientation, opening
doors to the reconstruction of a warm relationship in business and security cooperation with the U.S, including
general alignment with U.S. policies toward the region . U.S.support announced in initial meetings between President Paz and senior U.S.
Administration personnel will continue to bear fruit in terms of new finance,
security cooperation, and other initiatives in 2026, including resumption of long sensitive U.S.-Bolivia counterdrug cooperation as well as U.S.
support for Bolivian access to financing from Western institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to help the country to overcome the
liquidity crisis caused by two decades of bloated government spending,
corruption, and neglect of investment in the petroleum industry, which is
Bolivia’s principal mechanism for earning hard currency.
Paz will face a number of serious challenges during the year which could paralyze or even bring
down his government if managed poorly, including reducing government spending
affecting politically mobilized communities, getting dollars sustainably into
the Bolivian economy to resolve difficulties in importing basic goods and
factor inputs for the Bolivian economy.
Paz will also be challenged to alter the orientation of the country
without running awry of the complex myriad of mobilized indigenous groups and
radical leaders with a political interest in paralyzing his government. He will also likely find it challenging to
push back on Bolivian institutional corruption and deeply embedded Chinese
interests in the country without undermining the necessary contribution of the
PRC as an investor in key sectors such as lithium, its role as a local employer, and its purchases of
Bolivia’s commodities.
Chile. Chile’s new President Jose Antonio Kast, will likely move forward with aggressive new
policies seeking to clampdown on crime and tightening laws and their enforcement on immigrant issues,
while strongly orienting the country as an ally of the U.S. on both security
policies and social issues from immigration and crime to the role of religious
values in society.
Kast will likely have a sufficient coalition in the legislature to push through important agenda items in
those areas in 2026, but he will have to negotiate with more centrist
politicians nonetheless.
Kast’s policies and tone will likely increase
polarization in the country, appealing to conservative, and largely Catholic
Chileans, while inspiring the ire of the Chilean left. He will also have to balance an orientation
to align Chile with the U.S. by avoiding significant engagement with the PRC in
areas such as military and space cooperation while managing Chile’s dependence
on the PRC market for the vast majority of its copper, potassium nitrate and
other exports. He may similarly struggle
with Chile’s politically influential business elites in pushing back on China’s substantial leverage in key sectors like telecommunication and energy,
among other sectors.
Peru. The high-profile crackdown on crime by interim Peruvian President Jose Jeri will likely
continue in 2026. It is not likely to substantially
reduce high rates of urban gang crime and extortion nor illegal mining and
narcotrafficking in remote areas.
Nonetheless, the positive resonance of Jeri’s actions among Peruvians
frustrated by overwhelming levels of crime may open the door for the election
of a conservative candidate in Peru’s fragmented political system.
Whoever is inaugurated as Peru’s new
President on July 28 the country will likely to continue to pursue a balance
between political alignment with the United States and a strong PRC presence in
sectors from mining to construction to ports to electrical and digital
infrastructure.
The new government may run into tensions
with a more assertive Washington D.C. over its level of military personnel
exchanges, acquisitions, and people-to-people collaboration with the PRC, which
is higher than most, particularly as the U.S. government pursues nominating Peruas a major Non-NATO ally. Nonetheless,
continuing corruption and political fragmentation is likely to prevent the
country from significantly changing its policy direction or fundamentally
addressing the criminal economy.
Ecuador. The pro-U.S. government of Daniel Noboa will continue to struggle with controlling narcoterrorism, fueled by expanding drug flows
out of a neighboring Colombia, powerful
but fragmented local gangs, and external criminal financiers and coordinators from Mexico’s Sinaloa and CJNG cartels
to Italy’s Ndrangheta.
The Noboa government will likely continue
to strongly support Washington and expand security cooperation with it, even
while PRC-based companies continue to expand influence in the petroleum, mining, digital,
and other sectors. The inability to control
violence, including in the country’s own prisons, coupled with corruption scandals and push-back from the left
over President Noboa’s perceived authoritarian style, are likely to continue to
create political problems for the regime, although it should probably be able
to maintain physical and political control of the country throughout the year.
Colombia: The country is likely to spend most of 2026 in a cycle of violence and continuing political paralysis, expanding cocaine production,
illegal mining, and other forms of criminality that will continue to corrupt government
at all levels. The country will continue
to suffer from escalating violence from well-armed and financed criminal groups
in a fragmented political environment.
During 2026, the Petro government is likely
to sink deeper into a cycle of rhetorical battles and reduced cooperation with
Washington, escalating U.S. sanctions against Petro and his supporters
personally and the possible continued reduction of security cooperation funding
from the U.S. At the extreme, it is
conceivable, although not likely, that the U.S. could conduct unilateralmilitary actions against narcotrafficking groups on Colombian territory.
If the political right manages to unite behind a single candidate for the May 2026 presidential
election, the country could dramatically reverse course with a resumed
alignment with Washington and an associated re-initiation of close security
cooperation, although it will take time to get violence under control.
The PRC will likely continue to deepen influence with Colombian elites and will likely expand military, political,
space, and people-to-people cooperation with the Petro government during the first
part of the year, yet the country’s high levels of violence and administrative
chaos will likely slow Chinese progress on most major infrastructure projects,
mining, petroleum, digital sector, new energy, and other investments.
Uruguay. The center-left Yamandú
Orsi government in Uruguay will continue to keep a low profile and a cooperative tone with the current U.S. Administration.
It will seek to avoid rhetoric and policies that grab the attention of
the U.S. government. Nonetheless, it
will continue to pursue an increasingly close economic and political relationship with PRC, including significant agricultural exports
to the country and involvement by PRC-based companies in electricity and other infrastructure projects, among others.
Brazil. The Lula government will
seek to maintain a balance between pursuing its ambition as an large, non-aligned
global player, increasing dependence on the PRC market for its agricultural and mining exports (including rare
earth elements); manufacturing, technology, financial, digital and electricity
sector investments; and military and space cooperation. Lula will nonetheless likely attempt to avoid
becoming the visible leader in political opposition to the policies of Washington in the
region.
The run-up to the country’s November 2026
national election will likely be highly polarizing, with the fight between a
now octogenarian Lula da Silva and Flavio Bolsonaro, son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, championing his
imprisoned father’s conservative social mantle against the President whose
government imprisoned him and fought to keep him in jail as long as possible.
Caribbean. In the Caribbean, the issue of narcoviolence
and the U.S. military presence will likely continue to dominate the agenda
through 2026, with decisive U.S. military action that may open the door to a
political transition possible
by early in the year, but far from certain.
The subjects of concern for governments of the region will continue to
include high rates of violence in the region, which are fueled by the interaction
between narco funding, local gangs, and access to guns. Each will be affected by U.S. decisions on the
employment of military force in the Caribbean, and possibly in Venezuela, in
the coming months. The U.S. decision
will also likely impact migration of Venezuelans and others from the region, as
well as tourism flows.
Whether or not the U.S. acts militarily
against the de facto Maduro leadership in Venezuela, the strong commercial
presence of the PRC in countries like Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica,
Dominica, Grenada and Barbados will likely continue.
Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic will
continue
to position itself as the key
U.S. political and security ally in the region, as well as an increasingly
important strategic commercial partner due to the significant quantities of
rare earth elements found in the island.
The country will also continue its commercial and other outreach to its Caribbean
Community and Common Market (CARICOM) neighbors.
The question of crime and migration from
the ever-deteriorating situation in Haiti, with which the Dominican Republic
shares the island of Hispaniola, will continue to be a problem. Nonetheless, a less judgmental posture by the
U.S. government toward the Dominican Republic regarding its treatment of Haitian
migrants, coupled with its increasing isolation from the problem through its
border wall, will make the Haitian challenge more politically manageable for
the Dominican government domestically and in its relationship with other
countries in the region.
Haiti. The economic, security, and humanitarian
situation on the island will continue to deteriorate. Presidential elections will not
be held. Gangs will continue to
consolidate control over different parts of Port-au-Prince and surrounding
areas. Outmigration will expand. Still, the formation of a new “Gang
Suppression Force” with U.S. leadership holds promise that the situation in
Haiti could eventually be brought under control.
Trinidad and Tobago. The United National Movement
(UNM) government of Kamala Persad Bissessar could become increasingly popular
for its alignment
with the United States on Venezuela, particularly if the U.S. acts
decisively producing a restoration of democracy in Venezuela with minimal
adverse effects on Trinidad and Tobago.
The Persad-Bissessar government is also likely to strengthen its
political position through perceived progress on gang
and crime issues. Despite such
positive perceptions, however, gang
violence in Trinidad and Tobago will likely continue to be a problem, and the
issue of the government’s posture toward the United States will continue
to be divisive within the country.
Guyana. The PPP government in
Guyana will continue to reap the economic benefits of expanding oil production
and associated secondary investment. The
strong U.S. military presence in the region will likely decrease domestic
concern over Venezuelan
aggression against Guyana’s Essequibo region.
Despite the positive security outlook and
strong relationship with the U.S., Guyana’s People’s Progressive Party (PPP)
government will likely continue to deepen its commercial and other ties with
the PRC, including
in the petroleum sector, retail, ports, digital and electricity
infrastructure, construction, and mining and forestry, among other areas.
Suriname. The National Democratic
Party (NDP) government of Jennifer
Geerling Simmons will likely continue to maintain a low political profile
and cautious international posture.
High rates of corruption and
criminality, including a significant problem with illegal mining in the
interior, will continue to be a problem in the country. Engagement with neighboring Guyana may cool
slightly due to latent disputes over the country’s shared interior border,
among other matters.
PRC economic presence in Suriname will continue
to deepen, fueled by construction activities, mining investments, the
substantial ethnic Chinese community, and new money coming in through the oil
sector, although the country’s debt overhang from prior projects with PRC-based
companies will continue to be a problem.
Venezuela. The choice the U.S. takes
regarding how to manage Venezuela will decisively shape dynamics in the
Caribbean and the rest of the region, as argued previously.
There is a minor chance that, in the coming
year, the Maduro regime may reverse course and offer a significant deal that
presents the U.S. with a clear policy victory, presumably involving the
immediate departure of key Chavista leaders and a transition to the legitimate
democratic government.
There is arguably also a small possibility that,
faced with imminent major U.S. military action that is deemed probable to
succeed, senior military officers will take matters into their own hands,
turning against Maduro and pledging loyalty to the legitimate democratic
government in exchange for pardons to save themselves. The fear among many military and other
leaders currently aligned with Maduro, however, of liability for past criminal
activities and their involvement in human rights violations currently being
investigated by both the Organization of American States and the United
Nations impedes them from turning against the regime. That impediment is further compounded by the
penetration of the military by both Cuban
intelligence and Venezuelan military counterintelligence (DGCIM).
The most probable scenario in Venezuela is
arguably a continued escalation of pressure from the United States through
actions that may include a strengthened embargo of sanctioned oil tankers,
strikes against land targets, or other military options, possibly escalating to
a decisive
military operation to capture or eliminate the senior Cartel de los
Soles leadership.
If such an operation were undertaken, it
would likely involve massive, coordinated strikes by missiles, stealthy
aircraft from the Continental United States, and special operations forces to
eliminate air defense and command and control sites, Venezuelan combat
aircraft, and other significant threats.
Such a strike might logically be followed by high volume sorties
launched from the U.S.S. Gerald Ford Aircraft Carrier, the U.S. airbase at Roosevelt
Roads, Puerto Rico, and other locations, as well as multiple near-simultaneous
operations by U.S. Special Forces and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary
Unit, both by aircraft and landing craft (LCACs), in order to temporarily seize
key objectives such as where Cartel de los Soles leaders were being
held.
The principal risk of such an operation
would not be its initial success, but rather, would likely be afterward, with
the U.S. action facilitating the assumption of power in the country by the democratically-elected
government of Edmundo Gonzalez, presumably with the help of Venezuelan military
units that had switched loyalties in exchange for pardons.
In such a scenario, the newly empowered
legitimate government would likely face a concerted campaign
of terrorism and sabotage by entrenched Bolivarian National Guard elements,
other radicalized Chavistas, terrorist elements such as the National Liberation
Army (ELN), and Russian and Cuban agitators.
Following the assumption of power by the
legitimately elected Gonzalez government in Venezuela, the later might
logically invite the U.S. to continue military operations against Cartel de
los Soles terrorist elements trying to destabilize that legitimate
government. Such U.S. support would not
necessarily involve putting U.S. “boots on the ground” for the long-term, but
rather, support through airstrikes, special operations activities, training,
and other forms of support.
The most significant risk of a decisive
U.S. military action, under the scenario contemplated here, would be that the
combined forces of the legitimate government and U.S. and other supporters,
would not be able to sufficiently protect the country against the sabotage of
the cash-earning oil industry and other terrorism, leading to economic collapse
and outmigration. Even with such risks,
however, this course of action would have the advantage of giving the U.S.
Administration a clear symbolic triumph with the restoration of democracy to
the country, as well as giving the U.S. an element of control in deciding how
to take on the terrorists and maintain order.
As the principle alternative to decisive
U.S. military action, if it decided this course was too risky, it might
logically seek to continue various other forms of military and economic
pressure short of war, possibly including attempting to cut the regime off from
its oil revenues through a “blockade.” Such continued limited actions, however, would
not necessarily be less risky than decisive action. Indeed, significant economic pressures would also
risk significantly impairing the Venezuelan economy that could also trigger a
massive outmigration of refugees. The
latter course of action, however, would not give the U.S. an option to claim
victory for the restoration of democracy to Venezuela if it didn’t result in a
deal with Maduro. Nor would it give the
U.S. as much ability to control the internal destabilization and associated
political dynamics that occurred in the country afterwards.
Whatever course of action was taken, a
perceived U.S. “success” would greatly strengthen its influence in the
Caribbean and elsewhere in the region.
It would also fortify the political fortunes of those governments
closely binding themselves to the U.S., including the Dominican Republic and
Trinidad and Tobago. Conversely, it
might tee up Cuba, Nicaragua, and other uncooperative regimes to become the next
major focus of U.S. attention. In
fact, current pressure on Venezuela is having an impact on Cuba already.
On the other hand, a perceived “failure” of U.S. intervention or inaction in Venezuela could paralyze the U.S. in action elsewhere in the region, give its friends pause, and embolden its opponents.
Conclusion
2026 is likely to be a decisive year for
Latin America and the Caribbean. The
year is likely to be shaped by one of the largest groupings of U.S.-friendly
governments in recent times, and the political expansion of that grouping. Nonetheless, it is important for strategic
analysis of the region to recognize that the nature of pro-U.S. alignment may
be more tentative and fragile than it might appear. Moreover, there is no guarantee that such a pro-U.S.
configuration will be inherently enduring.
It will be up to U.S. policymakers to ensure that those countries tying
their fates to collaboration with the U.S. are able to achieve their security
and prosperity goals, lest the current “U.S. friendly moment” is swept away by
populations disillusioned by an insufficient payoff for their faith in the
promise of U.S. democracy, principles, and generosity.
About the Author:
R. Evan Ellis is a Latin America Research Professor with the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed here are strictly his own.
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