Eisenkot's bid to reverse Netanyahu-era policies faces coalition hurdles, while Israel's core security doctrine may remain largely unchanged.
Those bills came with a parallel contest over who runs the chamber, and the security agenda intruded on the same day. Before the swearing-in, the change bloc's party leaders agreed to nominate Matan Kahana, a former minister and No. 5 on Yashar's list, as speaker in place of Likud's Amir Ohana, and to give Avigdor Liberman of Yisrael Beytenu the chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. On the same day, Netanyahu's office rejected criticism from the Board of Peace, the United States-backed body overseeing the Gaza plan, which had called Israel's response to flooding in Gaza's tent camps "insufficient." The office said that "Hamas alone is responsible" for the suffering in Gaza and that disarmament remains essential for reconstruction. That pairing captures the argument of this analysis. Eisenkot's promise to reverse Netanyahu's policies is real, and the first evidence of it is already on the Knesset's table. But the reversal faces hard limits from coalition arithmetic and from the overhaul laws already in force. On Gaza, Lebanon and Iran it runs into a consensus about threats that the change bloc largely shares. The likely result is a change in how Israel is governed and how security decisions are checked, not in the security doctrine itself.
The arithmetic that sets the first limit is now official, and it is less favorable to both camps than election night suggested. The Central Elections Committee (CEC; ועדת הבחירות המרכזית) approved the final results on November 4 by 15 votes to 2, with 14 abstentions, after a review of records from 9,069 polling stations found no evidence that the outcome had been altered. Likud is the largest party with 27 seats. Yashar has 21, B'Yachad 12 and the Joint List 11; the Democrats and Ra'am have 8 each, and Yisrael Beytenu, Otzma Yehudit and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) have 7 each. Shas and Religious Zionism have 6 apiece. Lists needed 3.25 percent of valid votes to win seats, and the Reservists list fell short. The partial count that gave Netanyahu's camp 63 seats on election night, examined in this publication's analysis of the vote, did not survive the full count. Netanyahu's bloc finished at 53, Eisenkot's four-party bloc at 48, and the Arab-led lists at a record 19, as Chart 1 shows.
Chart 1: Final seat allocation for the 26th Knesset by party and bloc. Source: Central Elections Committee final results approved November 4, 2026, as reported by Israel National News and Ynet; Netanyahu-aligned bloc includes UTJ for electoral bloc arithmetic; UTJ's decision not to recommend a candidate during the presidential consultations, as recorded in the President's statement.
The final totals explain why Eisenkot holds the mandate without holding a majority, and the formation rules determine how long that can last. Under Basic Law: The Government, the designated member has 28 days, and the president may extend that by no more than 14, which sets Eisenkot's deadlines at December 6 and December 20. If he fails, the president can give the task to another member, most likely Netanyahu, and a further failure points toward new elections. A government does not need 61 votes to take office. Investiture requires only more votes for than against, so a minority government is legal. The same Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) analysis notes the catch: 61 members can still bring such a government down by passing a law to dissolve the Knesset, so it survives only with regular outside support. Those rules turn the recommendation tally into a question about which partners would actually vote together. That question has no comfortable answer.
The positions taken since the vote show why each route to a governing majority meets resistance. The following table records what each party has said, which differs from how it was counted in the campaign's bloc labels.
Table 1: Party positions on an Eisenkot-led government (as of November 11, 2026)
Party (seats) | Recommended to the president | Stated position |
|---|---|---|
Yashar (21), B'Yachad (12), Democrats (8) | Eisenkot | Core of the proposed "national emergency government"; partners must accept Yashar's four principles. |
Yisrael Beytenu (7) | Eisenkot | Will not support a government dependent on Arab parties; dropped its veto on ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties but demands a draft arrangement. |
Ra'am (8) | Eisenkot | Willing to join an Eisenkot-led coalition. |
Joint List (11) | Eisenkot | Offers parliamentary support from outside. |
United Torah Judaism (7) | No candidate | Negotiating; demands a draft arrangement for yeshiva students and preservation of the religious status quo; no agreement. |
Shas (6) | Netanyahu | "Shas is part of the right-wing bloc." |
Likud (27), Otzma Yehudit (7), Religious Zionism (6) | Netanyahu | Netanyahu calls for a unity government under his leadership. |
Sources: President's statement; JTA; Ynet; BBC; The Jerusalem Post (UTJ talks); The Jerusalem Post (Shas statement).
Summing the final seats across those positions shows that no configuration reaches 61 without crossing a line someone has drawn. The totals in Chart 2 are modeled sums, not commitments or forecasts.
Chart 2: Modeled seat totals for possible configurations, using final CEC seats. Sums are IndraStra Global arithmetic; obstacles as stated in Table 1. Source: Israel National News (seats).
The two routes that clear 61 without Likud depend on partners who have so far refused them, and neither can be treated as the decisive one. If the Arab-led parties joined the 67 members whose factions recommended Eisenkot, they would constitute a comfortable parliamentary majority. Liberman, however, wrote on November 8 that he would "not lend a hand" to a government that relied on Ra'am and the Joint List. Eisenkot's fourth principle also requires partners to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization, which neither Arab party has done publicly. With UTJ and Shas, the change bloc reaches exactly 61, and Likud officials privately concede that a draft arrangement acceptable to UTJ's rabbis could make that happen. Yet UTJ has not agreed, its Agudat Yisrael faction has voiced reservations, and Shas called reports that it would join "complete fake news". Eisenkot's third principle, mandatory military, national or civilian service for all, cuts directly against the exemption the Haredi parties want. The unity route offers the largest potential majority, at 75 seats, but has the least political agreement. Eisenkot has ruled out serving under Netanyahu, while Yashar maintains that Likud would first have to dissolve its alliance with parties it describes as extremist and accept a government led by Eisenkot. He has also acknowledged that his path is "extraordinarily complex" and described ousting Netanyahu as a national emergency that could require breaking campaign promises.
The same fault line that blocks a coalition also shapes the bloc's fallback plan, which is to legislate before any government exists. The plan relies on a 2020 Supreme Court precedent under which a demand signed by 61 members forces a vote to replace the speaker. The bloc submitted more than 61 signatures, and Ohana set the vote for next Tuesday, November 17. Because the four change-bloc parties hold only 48 seats, every such majority depends on Arab-party votes, although signatures can be filed faction by faction, so no party has to sign a joint document with the Joint List. Even so, the composition of the Arrangements Committee, which sets up the temporary committees, became a fight on November 11. Under the formula of one seat per five members, the change bloc would hold 9 seats, Netanyahu's bloc without UTJ 8, the Arab-led parties 4 and UTJ 1, and the right has demanded a Jewish majority on the panel. A Likud negotiator claimed that Liberman did not want to be seen as appointed by Arab votes. Table 2 sets out the posts at stake.
Table 2: Key Knesset posts during government formation (as of November 11, 2026)
Post | Incumbent or nominee | Status |
|---|---|---|
Speaker | Amir Ohana (Likud), incumbent; Matan Kahana (Yashar), nominee | Replacement vote scheduled for November 17 following a majority petition. |
Arrangements Committee chair | Roy Folkman (Yashar) | Seat formula disputed in the plenum on November 11. |
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chair (temporary) | Avigdor Liberman (Yisrael Beytenu) | Agreed upon by change-bloc leaders; committee membership subject to Knesset approval. |
Finance Committee chair (temporary) | Liran Avishar Ben-Horin (B'Yachad) | Agreed upon by change-bloc leaders; committee membership subject to Knesset approval. |
Sources: The Jerusalem Post; Anadolu Agency; JFeed; Israel Hayom (Hebrew).
Control of those posts matters because the second limit, the overhaul laws already on the books, can be undone only through slow parliamentary work. The bloc's targets are specific. A law that took effect in January makes the attorney general's legal opinions non-binding on the government. Another moves the Police Internal Investigations Department, which investigates misconduct by police officers, from the State Attorney's Office to the justice minister, and much of it is due to take effect within months. The changes to the Judicial Selection Committee replace the Israel Bar Association's two members with coalition and opposition appointees and end the judges' effective veto over Supreme Court appointments; they were scheduled to enter into force when the new Knesset was sworn in. A recusal amendment that limits removal of a prime minister to physical or mental incapacity was delayed by the High Court of Justice and comes into effect in the 26th Knesset. Two of the overhaul's measures were thus set to become operative just as the opposition took the floor. Repealing them requires private members' bills to pass a preliminary reading and three further readings with committee debate, and the former governing parties, now in opposition, can slow each stage through filibusters and procedural reservations.
The legal route each item must travel also sets the size of the majority it needs. The table below sorts the agenda accordingly, and adds the security files where the obstacle is not procedure but consensus.
Table 3: Eisenkot-bloc agenda items by the route they must travel (as of November 11, 2026)
Agenda item | Legal vehicle | Main constraint |
|---|---|---|
Replace the speaker | Plenum vote following a 61-member petition | Requires Arab-party votes; vote scheduled for November 17. |
Repeal the attorney general law (in force since January 2026) | Ordinary law | Four readings, committee time and risk of a filibuster. |
Repeal the police investigations unit transfer | Ordinary law | Same procedural requirements; much of the legislation is not yet in force. |
Restore the previous Judicial Selection Committee rules | Amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary and the Courts Law | Due to take effect on November 10; requires four readings and committee stages. |
Repeal the recusal amendment | Amendment to Basic Law: The Government | Section 44 requires 61 votes at the first, second and third readings. |
Eight-year limit on a prime minister's tenure | Amendment to Basic Law: The Government | Same 61-vote requirement; an earlier version stalled after its first reading. |
Knesset-initiated state commission of inquiry into October 7 | New law; a 61-member trigger under discussion | Provisions have not been finalized. |
Bar an indicted member from forming a government | New law | Retroactivity concerns and disagreement within the bloc. |
Gaza, Lebanon and Iran policy | Government decisions, not legislation | Caretaker government retains security authority; shared threat assessment (Table 4). |
Sources: Ynet (repeal targets); Ynet (bills filed); Basic Law: The Government, section 44 (Knesset unofficial translation); IDI (recusal amendment); Globes; Los Angeles Times (AP).
The 61-vote rule for Basic Law: The Government is where the procedural limit and the arithmetic limit meet. Section 44 states, in the Knesset's unofficial translation, that the law "cannot be changed save by a majority of the Knesset Members," and that majority is needed at each plenum reading. Term limits and the repeal of the recusal amendment, itself an amendment to that Basic Law, each need 61 votes three times. With 48 change-bloc votes, that means voting with the Arab-led parties, or with Haredi or Likud defectors, on the measures most clearly aimed at Netanyahu personally. The ordinary-law repeals need only a majority of those participating in the vote, with abstentions not counted, which makes them the likeliest early wins. Even there, the timetable is tight. One assessment of the plan warns that if Eisenkot fails and the mandate passes to Netanyahu, the bloc could lose the Arrangements Committee chair and with it the parliamentary machinery for advancing its legislative agenda. Some in the bloc oppose the bill to bar an indicted member from forming a government, fearing it would strengthen Netanyahu if Israel is forced into another election.
The security files face a different kind of limit, because there the change bloc's diagnosis largely matches the government it wants to replace. On Gaza, Eisenkot's fourth principle commits any partner to dismantling Hamas's military and governing capabilities. Yashar's main charge against Netanyahu is that he did not succeed in dismantling Hamas rule, which is a complaint about failure to achieve a shared aim rather than a different aim. Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), the military body that handles aid, says reconstruction "can only begin after Hamas fully disarms". On Lebanon, an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) finds that the June 26 framework between the United States, Israel and Lebanon makes Israeli redeployment conditional on verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, with no agreed verifier. When reports circulated that Eisenkot was planning a withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Yashar called them "pure fabrication", according to a Lebanese account of the party's statement. On Iran, Netanyahu told the new Knesset that the only way to remove the threat permanently is "the downfall of the Ayatollah regime", and Defense Minister Israel Katz said on November 8 that "the mission against Iran has not been completed." Analysts interviewed after the vote argued that an Eisenkot-led government would not necessarily approach the Iranian threat significantly differently.
A shared assessment of threats does not imply agreement on how they should be addressed. The differences between the two camps are more visible in the sequencing of decisions, the diplomatic framework surrounding them and the institutions responsible for enforcing policy. That distinction is easiest to see side by side.
Table 4: Shared positions and differing policy prescriptions (stated positions and attributed assessments, as of November 11, 2026)
File | Shared position or threat assessment | Where prescriptions differ | Type of difference |
|---|---|---|---|
Gaza | Hamas must lose its military and governing power. | Analysts expect an Eisenkot government to be less obstructive toward the United States' plan; humanitarian aid access remains the immediate dispute with the Board of Peace. | Implementation and international coordination |
Lebanon | Hezbollah must be disarmed before Israeli forces redeploy. | Yashar denies plans for withdrawal; analysts expect a negotiated, pragmatic approach, with no withdrawal if security is at risk. | Sequencing and diplomacy |
Iran | Iran's nuclear and military programmes constitute a threat that must be confronted. | Netanyahu seeks regime collapse; a secondary report of Eisenkot's remarks indicates that, until a new government forms, he would support military action only against "direct and immediate threats." | Caretaker legitimacy and risk tolerance |
West Bank | Jewish-led parties oppose Palestinian statehood. | Eisenkot describes settler violence as "Jewish terror" and has pledged a crackdown. | Law enforcement and institutions |
Sources: BBC; franceinfo; Annahar; Iran International; The Jerusalem Post; The Guardian.
The Iran row in that table holds the most revealing difference, and it concerns authority rather than strategy. Eisenkot's statement that he would support military action only against direct and immediate threats until a new government is sworn in rests on a secondary report of his remarks. Even so, it treats the caretaker period as a question of democratic legitimacy, not of whether Iran is a threat. Netanyahu, meanwhile, keeps full authority over national security as caretaker, and the latest signals from Washington show how much of the timing lies outside the Knesset. On October 31, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said President Donald Trump had not decided whether to resume military action. Democrats then swept the midterm elections on November 3, and Herzog's own mandate speech listed contending with "a new political situation in the United States" among the next government's tasks. None of these are votes the change bloc can win in the plenum.
The strongest objection to this reading is that institutional change can become strategic change, and it deserves full weight. A state commission of inquiry into October 7 could reshape how the military and intelligence services plan and who leads them. An attorney general whose opinions bind the government again would constrain security decisions as well as domestic ones. A government that depends on Arab-party votes, even from outside, would change the domestic politics of every security decision. On Gaza, the dispute with the Board of Peace shows that implementation can matter as much as aims: the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says more than 150,000 tents were waiting outside Gaza, and a government more willing to coordinate with the United States-backed plan could change conditions on the ground without changing its stated goal. All of this is plausible, and over time it could add up to a different strategic posture. But each of these paths runs through institutions, coordination and law enforcement first. On the record reviewed here, none of the change-bloc leaders has advocated accommodation with Tehran, an unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon or Palestinian statehood. The counterargument therefore supports the thesis that the reversal will first be visible in governance. Whether governance change eventually alters doctrine is a question for the next government's record, not its formation.
The period leading to December 6 will be shaped by a small number of observable tests, each tied to one of the limits. The speaker vote on November 17 will show whether the 67 who recommended Eisenkot can act together on the floor, and how Yisrael Beytenu handles a majority that includes the Joint List. The fate of the attorney general and police-unit repeals in the temporary committees will show whether ordinary-law reversals can move faster than coalition talks. Any agreement with UTJ on conscription will need to be weighed against Eisenkot's third principle and Liberman's demands, and against how Shas responds if UTJ reaches an agreement. Any security decision the caretaker government takes on Iran or Lebanon before a new government exists will test how far the change bloc's procedural objection goes in practice. In Gaza, the Board of Peace's call for shelter and sanitation equipment offers the most immediate way to see whether a new government would implement the United States plan differently.
Those tests matter beyond Israel's borders, and for external partners the practical implication is to separate the two tracks. Governments in Washington, Europe and the Gulf that hope for a softer line on Iran or Lebanon have little basis for that expectation in the change bloc's stated positions. Those concerned with the rule of law, the independence of the attorney general and the handling of settler violence have far more reason to watch the plenum. For Israeli voters and institutions, the evidence suggests that the most consequential reversals within reach are the ones that restore checks on executive power. Repeals of ordinary laws are the likeliest, while Basic Law changes that need 61 votes three times are far harder. Eisenkot's agenda can change who checks Israel's security decisions well before it changes what those decisions are.
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