Yunus’ High-Wire Act: Can Bangladesh Escape Its Authoritarian Past?

By IndraStra Global Editorial Team

Cover Image Attribute: The file photo of Muhammad Yunus with Bangladesh COAS General Waker-uz-Zaman / Source: AFP

Bangladesh is in the midst of a significant transition, seeking to replace an autocracy with a hoped-for democratic renewal. The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, has been tasked with steering a nation of 173 million through a delicate period of political and social upheaval. Since assuming power in August 2024 following deadly student-led protests that ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Yunus’ administration has faced mounting challenges. Protests from civil servants, teachers, and political parties, coupled with military pressure and a banned political party, have deepened the country’s uncertainty. Efforts to establish democracy are being challenged by competing demands for swift elections, institutional reforms, and stability — all of which threaten to derail progress. How effectively the interim government manages to forge unity and deliver on its assurances will determine if Bangladesh can weather this crisis and emerge resilient or succumb to deeper instability.
The unrest began almost immediately after Yunus took the helm. The student-led uprising that toppled Hasina’s 15-year authoritarian regime marked a turning point, raising hopes for democratic renewal. Yet, the transition has been anything but smooth. The interim government has reopened political and civic spaces, particularly at universities, and has taken steps to reform key state institutions. According to a recent report, Bangladesh improved slightly in Freedom House’s index on political freedoms and civil liberties, moving from a score of 40 out of 100 last year to 45. This progress reflects the government’s efforts to remove restrictions on some political parties, release political detainees, and commit to judicial reforms aimed at increasing accountability. The appointment of new election commissioners and the establishment of advisory commissions for judicial and anti-corruption reforms signal an institutional reset in motion. However, these gains remain fragile, overshadowed by persistent violence, political retribution, and a deteriorating law and order situation that fuels public anxiety.
The most immediate challenge facing Yunus’ government is the wave of protests sweeping the country. Primary school teachers, under the banner of the Primary Assistant Teachers’ Unity Council, launched an indefinite strike on Monday, May 26, 2025, demanding a wage hike and reforms to the national pay scale. Their three-point demands include setting their starting salary at the 11th grade, resolving issues related to obtaining higher grades after 10 and 16 years of service, and ensuring faster promotions, including filling all headteacher positions with assistant teachers. The strike, which began partially on May 5, has been unevenly observed across the country. In Dhaka, areas like Sutrapur, Demra, and Gulshan saw partial participation, with many teachers conducting classes but refraining from administrative tasks. In contrast, the eastern cities of Chattogram and Rangamati witnessed more widespread abstention from teaching duties, while Rajshahi and Rangpur experienced a mix of full-day and partial strikes. Barishal, however, remained largely unaffected. These protests, reported by outlets like Prothom Alo and NewAgeBD, highlight the depth of discontent among public sector workers, who feel neglected by a government struggling to balance multiple crises.
Civil servants have also taken to the streets, with protests entering their fourth day on Tuesday, May 27, 2025. Their grievances center on a controversial ordinance issued on Sunday, which allows the Ministry of Public Administration to dismiss public servants for misconduct within 14 days without lengthy procedures. Described as “repressive” by the bureaucracy, the ordinance has sparked outrage, with the Bangladesh Secretariat Officers-Employees Unity Forum, led by co-chairman Nurul Islam, threatening to expand agitation to government offices nationwide if demands for its withdrawal are not met. The interim government’s attempt to dissolve the National Board of Revenue and replace it with two divisions under the finance ministry further fueled unrest, though the order was withdrawn on Sunday, leading to the strike’s cancellation. These concessions demonstrate the government’s precarious position, forced to backtrack under pressure while trying to maintain authority.
The political landscape is equally volatile. The suspension of the Awami League’s registration this month, effectively barring it from contesting future elections, has redoubled concerns about inclusiveness. Yunus’ press secretary, Shafiqul Alam, described the situation as “war-like,” claiming that the ban prompted attempts to destabilize the government. In a Facebook post, Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Wazed, accused Yunus of pursuing a “politics of vengeance,” further inflaming tensions. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, has intensified its push for elections by December 2025, staging large-scale protests in Dhaka and accusing the government of delaying polls to cling to power. The BNP’s stance was echoed by Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman, who last week called for elections by year-end and expressed dissatisfaction with the political situation, including controversial decisions like the Rakhine Corridor plan, which has raised fears of a civil-military confrontation.
Yunus has attempted to navigate these pressures through dialogue, holding marathon talks with major political forces, including the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP), over the weekend. The NCP, formed in early 2025 by leaders of last year’s uprising, has emerged as a significant player, advocating for a “second republic” with a new elected constituent assembly and constitution. While the party enjoys organizational support and tacit backing from the interim government, its broad ideological umbrella risks diluting its message and blurring distinctions with the BNP. The interim government’s National Consensus Commission (NCC), a seven-member panel, has reported broad support for some reforms, such as restoring the caretaker government system and ensuring judicial independence. However, sharp disagreements persist over more complex proposals, including constitutional reform, a two-chamber parliament, and judicial decentralization. A second round of talks is scheduled for the first week of June, but the lack of consensus threatens to stall progress.
Amid this political deadlock, Yunus has faced speculation about his own tenure. Last week, a top student leader claimed Yunus hinted at stepping down if political parties could not agree on reforms and an election timeline. However, Planning Adviser Wahiduddin Mahmud firmly denied these claims, stating, “We are not going anywhere till our job is done.” Mahmud emphasized Yunus’ commitment to holding a fair election, though the timeline remains contentious. Yunus has suggested elections could be held by June 2026, a delay that has drawn criticism from the BNP and the military. The interim government’s challenge is to balance the competing demands for swift elections and comprehensive reforms, all while maintaining stability in a country reeling from economic and social challenges.
From an economic perspective, Bangladesh continues to deal with the aftermath of Hasina’s regime, which weakened the banking system through corruption and pushed key institutions to the brink of bankruptcy. Yunus has appointed competent officials to stabilize the economy, but high inflation and slow job creation, particularly for the youth, continue to dampen investor confidence and fuel unrest. The deteriorating law and order situation further exacerbates public anxiety. Street crime is rising, and minorities, particularly the Hindu minority, face growing harassment. Women, too, feel increasingly unsafe, with weak law enforcement and victim-blaming allowing violence to flourish despite strong laws on paper. The police force, tainted by its association with the Awami League, struggles to maintain order, and the former police chief faces charges of crimes against humanity. The military’s expanded policing role has raised concerns about overreach, while harassment of Awami League supporters by protesters persists.
On the global stage, Bangladesh is increasingly isolated. India, once a close ally of Hasina’s government, has distanced itself from the interim administration, and the United States has suspended nearly US$1 billion in USAID funding committed from 2021 to 2026. These developments compound the challenges facing Yunus, who enjoys significant popularity as a trusted figure but faces questions about the interim government’s legitimacy. The BNP argues that the government lacks a democratic mandate to implement meaningful reforms, while radical Islamist forces exploit the political vacuum, exacerbating tensions between Muslims and minorities. Media freedom, too, remains constrained, with reports of the interim government targeting hundreds of journalists over the past eight months, undermining claims of democratic progress.
The rise of the NCP offers a glimmer of hope for Bangladesh’s politically engaged youth, who are determined to reshape the political landscape. However, the party’s success depends on its ability to consolidate its base and avoid being co-opted or outflanked by established players like the BNP or Jamaat-e-Islami. The interim government’s broader challenge is to deliver sustainable reforms without prolonging the transition period excessively. As one report notes, Bangladesh remains classified as an “electoral autocracy,” with its democratic institutions still fragile and its global democracy ranking worsening in 2024. The question looms: can Bangladesh afford electoral democracy now, or must stability take precedence, with democracy deferred until institutions are rebuilt?
Yunus’ leadership has been a stabilizing force, but his government is caught in a delicate balancing act. The protests, political divisions, and economic challenges underscore the complexity of Bangladesh’s transition. The interim government’s promise to hold free and fair elections is a cornerstone of its legitimacy, but delivering on this promise requires navigating a minefield of competing interests. The ban on the Awami League, while aimed at addressing past wrongs, risks alienating a significant portion of the population and fueling accusations of exclusion. The military’s growing influence, coupled with the BNP’s aggressive push for early elections, adds further pressure. Meanwhile, the demands of teachers and civil servants reflect a broader public yearning for fairness and economic security, which the government cannot ignore.
To ensure stability, Bangladesh’s interim government should prioritize negotiation and consensus as it advances. The planned second round of talks in June offers an opportunity to bridge divides, but success will depend on the willingness of all parties to compromise. Yunus’ commitment to a fair election, as reiterated by Mahmud, must be matched by tangible progress on reforms and a clear timeline that satisfies both the public and political stakeholders. The alternative—prolonged unrest and a failure to deliver on democratic promises—could deepen the crisis, leaving Bangladesh vulnerable to further instability. For now, Yunus must confront the real challenges of his current role, hoping that his leadership will guide Bangladesh toward a more inclusive and stable future.
With reporting by The Conversation, India Today, and Reuters.

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