India Tightens Control Over Indus Waters With Regular Dam Flushing Operations

By Chetna Gill

Cover Image Caption: Confluence of the Indus and Zanskar Rivers at Sangam Point, Ladakh

India has intensified its control over the waters of the Indus River system, escalating tensions with Pakistan by implementing regular flushing operations at hydropower projects in Jammu and Kashmir and suspending the long-standing Indus Water Treaty. The move, prompted by a deadly terror attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, that killed 26 people, marks a significant shift in India’s water management strategy and its diplomatic relations with its neighbor. As India conducts a flushing operation without notifying Pakistan, Islamabad has responded with a diplomatic overture, seeking to restart talks on the treaty, though India remains firm in linking any dialogue to an end to cross-border terrorism.
The Indus Water Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 under the mediation of the World Bank, has governed the sharing of the Indus River system’s waters between India and Pakistan for over six decades. The treaty allocates the waters of the eastern rivers—Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi—to India, while Pakistan has rights to the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—though India is permitted to use these for non-consumptive purposes like hydropower generation. The agreement has been a cornerstone of water diplomacy in the region, surviving multiple conflicts, but India’s decision to hold it in abeyance following the Pahalgam attack has upended this framework.
India’s new strategy involves regular flushing operations at hydropower projects on the western rivers, a process that releases large volumes of water to clear accumulated sediments. Three sources familiar with the developments confirmed that India plans to conduct these operations at least monthly during the monsoon season, when high water flows facilitate desilting. “Flushing will be a regular affair now as and when it is technically required, most likely once every month during the monsoon season. It will be done across all projects,” one of the sources said. In the past two weeks, desilting has already been carried out at three major projects—Salal, Kishanganga, and Baglihar—located in the Indus basin.
These projects, part of approximately 20 hydropower facilities in Jammu and Kashmir with a combined capacity of 3.5 gigawatts, are critical to powering three million households. However, under the treaty, India was required to seek Pakistan’s approval for flushing operations, as the released water and silt flow downstream into Pakistan. In some cases, such as the Salal project, flushing had not occurred for years due to objections from Pakistan. “With the pressure of water flow remaining high in the Monsoon season, it is easier to carry out the operation during this period. These projects do not have large water holding capacity as this was not permitted under IWT. Post flushing the operational storage would somewhat increase,” another source explained.
The suspension of the treaty has freed India from these obligations, allowing it to conduct flushing operations without prior notice or data sharing. This shift has both operational and strategic implications. Flushing enhances the efficiency of hydropower projects by clearing sediment that can impair turbine performance and slightly increases water storage capacity. Abhay Kumar Singh, former managing director of the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), emphasized the strategic advantage: “Flushing is very much required for these projects now. The non-requirement of informing Pakistan of the water releasing, holding or flushing activity would always keep them concerned and alert. This gives India a strategic upper hand. So far, although the land is ours, water is ours, the dam is ours, Pakistan used to have the major say but with the treaty now in abeyance India can take decisions on its own for its own benefit.”
The Indus River system is vital to both nations, with an estimated average annual runoff of 136 million acre feet, of which 40% originates in India. India’s decision to assert greater control over its share of the waters comes as it also explores accelerating hydropower development on the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, and their tributaries. Two of the sources indicated that the government is considering new projects in these basins, a move that could further strain relations with Pakistan, which has historically raised concerns about India’s hydropower designs, alleging they could disrupt downstream flows.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has sought to de-escalate the water dispute through diplomacy. On May 8, 2025, Pakistan’s Secretary of Water Resources, Syed Ali Murtaza, sent a letter to India’s Water Secretary, Debashree Mukherjee, expressing willingness to restart talks on the Indus Water Treaty. The letter, described as “polite” by a source familiar with its contents, requested India to nominate representatives to engage with Pakistan’s Indus Commissioner. Notably, the letter did not address India’s unannounced water releases from the Baglihar and Salal dams on May 5, nor did it mention other recent tensions, such as reported airstrikes.
India’s response to Pakistan’s overture has been cautious, reflecting its broader stance on bilateral relations. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, addressing journalists on May 15, 2025, reiterated India’s position: “The Indus Waters Treaty is held in abeyance and will continue to be held in abeyance until the cross-border terrorism by Pakistan is credibly and irrevocably stopped.” India has consistently linked the treaty’s status to Pakistan’s actions on terrorism, a stance reinforced since the Pahalgam attack. Since January 2023, India has written to Pakistan four times to initiate talks on revising the treaty, but sources say Pakistan’s responses were unsatisfactory. A previous Pakistani offer to meet at a neutral venue was rebuffed by India, which proposed Islamabad as the venue, leading to a months-long silence until the recent letter.
Under the treaty, the Permanent Indus Commission, comprising representatives from both countries, typically handles water-sharing discussions. However, India halted these meetings in September 2024, insisting that any renegotiation must occur at the government-to-government level. The last commission meeting took place in Delhi in May 2022. “India’s position is that re-negotiation of the treaty could be done only government-government and not by Indus Commission representatives,” a source familiar with Murtaza’s letter said. India has not yet decided how to respond to Pakistan’s latest proposal, with officials indicating that no immediate action is planned.
Pakistan’s letter also raised objections to India’s suspension of the treaty, arguing that it violates the agreement’s terms. The treaty restricts India from creating significant storage on the western rivers, requiring run-of-the-river projects like Kishanganga and Baglihar that divert water for power generation without halting flows. Over the years, Pakistan has accused India of modifying project designs to control river flows, claims India has denied, asserting that its actions aim to optimize project performance. The unannounced water releases in early May, which Pakistan did not mention in its letter, have likely heightened concerns about India’s intentions.
The suspension of the IWT and India’s assertive water management policies reflect a broader recalibration of its approach to Pakistan. The Pahalgam attack, which India attributes to cross-border terrorism, has galvanized New Delhi’s resolve to leverage its geographical advantage as the upper riparian state. By conducting flushing operations and planning new hydropower projects, India is signaling its intent to maximize the use of its water resources, even at the risk of escalating tensions. Pakistan’s diplomatic outreach, while measured, reflects its dependence on the Indus waters and its desire to avoid further disruptions, particularly to its agriculture, which relies heavily on consistent river flows.
The prolonged stalemate between India and Pakistan leaves the IWT’s future uncertain, but how much of this deadlock is posturing versus genuine conflict? India’s push to tie water negotiations to ending terrorism—a demand rooted in its security concerns—clashes with Pakistan’s call for dialogue, raising doubts about either side’s willingness to compromise. Talk of broader diplomatic breakthroughs sounds optimistic, yet the entrenched mistrust suggests resolution is far off. For now, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers flow as they always have, though their management is increasingly politicized in South Asia’s long-standing rivalry. Both nations claim to represent the millions dependent on these waters, but whether their policies truly prioritize those livelihoods or merely serve strategic agendas remains an open question.
With reporting by The Hindu and Livemint

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