A Historic Crossroads: The PKK’s Dissolution and the Path to Peace in Turkey

By IndraStra Global Editorial Team

Cover Image Attribute: The file photo of Kurdish PKK Guerillas, Dated: August 14, 2014 / Source: Wikimedia Commons

The announcement on May 12, 2025, that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) will dissolve and disarm marks a pivotal moment in Turkey’s history, potentially ending a four-decade conflict that has claimed over 40,000 lives. This decision, driven by the call of the group’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, to lay down arms and pursue democratic politics, reflects a convergence of domestic and regional dynamics that could reshape Turkey’s relationship with its Kurdish population and influence Kurdish aspirations across the Middle East. While the move offers hope for peace, it also raises complex questions about implementation, the future of Kurdish rights, and the broader geopolitical ramifications. The path forward demands careful navigation, mutual trust, and a commitment to dialogue from all stakeholders to transform this historic opportunity into lasting stability.
The PKK’s decision to disband follows a series of diplomatic efforts initiated in October 2024, sparked by an unexpected proposal from Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a key ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In a parliamentary speech on October 22, Bahceli suggested that Öcalan could be considered for early release if he renounced violence and dissolved the PKK. This overture, coming from a hardline nationalist, signaled a shift in Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish conflict, which has seen intermittent peace efforts, most notably between 2013 and 2015, collapse amid violence. The October proposal broke a decade-long freeze in contact with the PKK, setting the stage for renewed engagement. Öcalan’s first prison visit in 43 months, from his nephew Omer on October 23, allowed him to send a message asserting his ability to shift the Kurdish question “from an arena of conflict and violence to one of law and politics.” This message laid the groundwork for subsequent steps, including four visits by the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) delegation to Öcalan, ending his political isolation and facilitating his public call on February 27, 2025, for the PKK to disarm and disband.
Öcalan’s February letter, read out by the DEM delegation in Istanbul, was unequivocal: “I am making a call for the laying down of arms, and I take on the historical responsibility of this call.” The PKK responded swiftly, declaring an immediate ceasefire two days later and formally accepting Öcalan’s appeal. The group’s 12th Congress, held May 5-7 in the Kandil mountains of northern Iraq, culminated in the decision to dissolve the PKK’s organizational structure and end its armed struggle. The congress, which included contact with Öcalan via videoconference, was described by the PKK as making “decisions of historic importance” based on Öcalan’s call. The group’s statement, carried by the pro-Kurdish Firat News Agency, emphasized that the PKK had “completed its historical mission” by elevating the Kurdish issue to a level where it could be resolved through democratic politics. This sentiment was echoed in the PKK’s assertion that “rebuilding Turkish-Kurdish relations is inevitable,” reflecting a belief that the Kurdish question can now be addressed through political means rather than violence.
The Turkish government has cautiously welcomed the PKK’s decision, framing it as a victory for Erdoğan’s “Terror-Free Turkey” initiative. The Turkish presidency stated that the move indicates the process “has gained strength and come to an important stage,” pledging to take “necessary measures” to ensure its progress. Omer Celik, spokesperson for Erdoğan’s Justice and Development (AK) Party, described the decision as a potential “turning point,” but stressed that it must be fully implemented, applying to “all PKK branches, affiliates and illegal structures.” Celik’s remarks underscore the government’s insistence on comprehensive disarmament, including PKK affiliates in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, though the PKK’s statement did not clarify whether its decision extends to these groups. Erdoğan himself, in a February address, called the PKK’s potential dissolution a “historic window of opportunity,” urging his “dear Kurdish brothers” to seize it. On May 12, he hailed the announcement for promoting “peace and fraternity” in Turkey, signaling his intent to leverage this moment to strengthen his political standing, particularly among Kurdish voters.
For the Kurdish community, the PKK’s dissolution represents both an opportunity and a challenge. The group’s statement expressed confidence that the Kurdish people “will understand the decision to dissolve the PKK and end the armed struggle method better than anyone else,” calling on Kurdish political parties and democratic organizations to develop “Kurdish democracy” and ensure the formation of a “Kurdish democratic nation.” This vision aligns with the growing inclination among younger Kurdish leaders, such as Selahattin Demirtas, the jailed former leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), to prioritize political participation over armed struggle. Demirtas, who backed the peace initiative during a January visit from the DEM delegation, has attracted significant socio-political support, as have DEM co-leaders Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan, who advocate for democratic processes to assert Kurdish identity. DEM spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan emphasized the importance of making this “historic opportunity” permanent, urging that “weapons must give way to dialogue” and calling for mutual steps to establish the political and legal groundwork for lasting peace.
Yet, the credibility and success of the PKK’s decision remain uncertain, clouded by historical mistrust and logistical complexities. Öcalan’s call for disarmament, made while in solitary confinement on Imrali prison island, has raised concerns about possible duress, though the DEM’s repeated meetings with him since October lend some legitimacy to the process. The PKK’s statement did not outline how disarmament will be carried out, who will monitor it, or what will become of its fighters, leaving critical questions unanswered. Celik’s warning that the decision must apply to all PKK affiliates highlights Turkey’s concern about Kurdish forces in Syria, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have ties to the PKK but have stated that Öcalan’s ceasefire call does not apply to them. The SDF’s role in Syria, where the fall of the Ba’athist regime in December 2024 has opened possibilities for formalized Kurdish autonomy, complicates the regional picture. Similarly, the PKK’s bases in northern Iraq, long a source of tension with Turkey, pose challenges for disarmament, as does the group’s presence in Iran, where Kurds face state suppression.
The regional context has been a significant factor in the PKK’s decision, as shifting geopolitics have made continued insurgency increasingly untenable. The PKK’s statement noted that “current developments in the Middle East” influenced its decision, likely referring to the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, and the changing political landscape in Syria. In Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s president, Nechirvan Barzani, praised the PKK’s decision for demonstrating “political maturity” and laying the foundation for lasting peace, while Iraq’s Foreign Ministry welcomed it as a step toward regional stability. These endorsements reflect a broader regional desire to reduce tensions, particularly as Turkey’s military operations against PKK targets in Iraq and Syria have escalated in recent years. The PKK’s acknowledgment that its insurgency had become counterproductive for the broader Kurdish movement suggests a strategic pivot, driven by the recognition that political gains in Syria and Iraq could be jeopardized by continued violence.
Domestically, the PKK’s dissolution offers Erdoğan a chance to address the Kurdish question in ways his predecessors could not. The conflict, which intensified after the collapse of the 2013-2015 peace process, has left southeastern Turkey economically and socially scarred, with 7,152 deaths reported by the International Crisis Group since July 2015, including 1,492 Turkish security personnel, 4,786 PKK militants, 646 civilians, and 226 unidentified individuals. Erdoğan’s earlier efforts to court Kurdish voters, such as granting more rights and easing language restrictions, contrast with the sweeping crackdowns on pro-Kurdish parties like the HDP in recent years, accused of links to the PKK. The current peace initiative, launched after a deadly PKK-claimed attack on Turkish Aerospace Industries in October 2024, which killed five and injured 22, reflects a pragmatic response to rising casualties and political pressures. However, as academic Mesut Yegen notes, Erdoğan faces a “long and difficult process” to enact legal changes addressing the status of former militants and expanding Kurdish cultural and educational rights, demands that remain central to Kurdish aspirations.
The absence of disclosed concessions from the Turkish government adds uncertainty to the process. While pro-Kurdish politicians hope for expanded rights, no new legislation appears imminent, and Erdoğan’s warning of “harsh consequences” if the PKK delays disarmament signals a hardline stance. The PKK’s call for Turkey’s Parliament to participate in the disarmament process, led by Öcalan, underscores the need for a transparent, inclusive framework, but the lack of public details about the peace initiative raises concerns about its sustainability. Historical baggage, including the ethnic and cultural tensions since the Republic of Turkey’s formation, complicates efforts to acknowledge Kurdish identity, particularly among Turkish nationalists. Yet, the generational shift in Kurdish leadership toward democratic engagement offers hope that a political resolution is possible, provided both sides commit to dialogue.
The PKK’s dissolution could have far-reaching implications beyond Turkey, potentially fostering cooperation rather than conflict with Kurds in Syria and Iraq, as Yegen suggests. In Syria, the possibility of a formally autonomous Kurdish region under the SDF could be bolstered by reduced tensions with Turkey, while in Iraq, the disarmament of PKK bases could ease cross-border conflicts. However, the fragmented nature of Kurdish movements across the region, coupled with state suppression in Iran and challenges in Iraq post-2017 referendum, underscores the difficulty of achieving unified Kurdish aspirations. The PKK’s decision reflects a broader shift toward political participation and civil society activism, a pragmatic response to the regional flux since the Arab Spring.
At this decisive stage for Turkey, the peace process’s progress hinges on collective steps toward mutual respect and unity. The PKK’s dissolution is a bold step, but its legacy will depend on whether it leads to genuine dialogue, respect for Kurdish identity, and a resolution of the Kurdish question through democratic means. For Erdoğan, it is a chance to cement his legacy as a peacemaker, but only if he navigates the complexities with transparency and inclusivity. For the Kurds, it is an opportunity to redefine their struggle through politics, not violence, in pursuit of a future where their rights and identity are fully recognized. The door to a new era is open, but the journey through it will test the resolve of all involved.
With reporting by Al Jazeera, CNN, and the New York Times.

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