Australia’s recently released 2016 Defence White Paper is premised on a strategic outlook that overlooks the nuclear threat in our own backyard.
By John Tilemann
(via Australian Institute of International Affairs)
Australia’s recently released 2016 Defence
White Paper is premised on a strategic outlook that overlooks the nuclear
threat in our own backyard. The
Indo-Pacific region is the global vortex of nuclear weapon threats with six of
the world’s nine nuclear-armed states involved. India, Pakistan and China are
trapped in a three-way nuclear weapons relationship that had no parallel in the
Cold War strategic rivalry, which makes Australia’s strategic region that much
more dangerous and unpredictable. North Korea continues to defy international
opinion by developing nuclear weapon and ballistic missile delivery systems.
The established nuclear powers (China, Russia and the US) ultimately back their
regional strategies with nuclear deterrence.
The White Paper says little about these threats presumably on
the grounds that Australian Defence Force capabilities are not able to deal
with them. We learn two thirds of the way through the White Paper in Chapter
5.20 that Australia’s only defence against nuclear threats is ANZUS and US
extended deterrence. However there is a growing body of opinion that questions
the reliability of deterrence and extended deterrence. To put unquestioned
reliance in the US nuclear umbrella deprives Australia of policy flexibility
and the moral right to lead efforts to fashion an alternative world order where
mutually assured destruction is not the ultimate guarantor of our existence. Australia
would be wise to acknowledge regional nuclear threats and do more to help
mitigate them.
South Asia
The US umbrella has no relevance to our nearest nuclear threat
in South Asia. The White Paper acknowledges that “tensions” between India and
Pakistan could affect Australia’s security, however references to cooperation
with Pakistan and India in Chapters 5.70 and 5.72 make no mention of nuclear
issues. With the deployment of tactical as well as strategic weapons in the
region and the past history of conflicts, Australia and the world should become
more engaged. Defence engagement should support broader security and foreign
policy interests in managing and restraining nuclear tensions between China,
India and Pakistan. An officials-level ‘strategic dialogue’ is not sufficient.
Instead of brushing off the issue as it was in the recent rush by nuclear
suppliers – including Australia – to access India’s nuclear power program,
Australia should attempt to make the matter more mainstream.
North Asia
The situation in North Asia is equally fraught given the
significant likelihood of Australia being drawn into conflicts. The White Paper
in Chapter 5.67 refers to cooperation with South Korea on non‑proliferation but
does not touch on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats that Australian
forces would face in any but the most optimistic scenarios for conflict in the
region. The world has struggled for decades to avert conflict on the Korean
Peninsula and with the added nuclear element the risks are higher than ever.
Containing DPRK nuclear and missile threats and dampening a seemingly growing –
if still small – interest in nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea must
remain one of Australia’s highest security priorities.
Non-proliferation norms and the Rules–based
Global Order
The White Paper’s comments on cooperation with South Korea
highlight the perception amongst Australian defence strategists that non‑proliferation,
disarmament and arms control measures are simply tools to uphold the
rules-based global order. Rather, the highly-developed and highly-effective
global counter-proliferation regime should be seen as a critical component of
the global order that the White Paper asserts so frequently and properly.
Indeed, it should be a central objective of Australia’s defence posture.
Countering Nuclear Threats: Policy and
Capabilities
The White Paper foreshadows in Chapter 2.106 that Australia will
continue to do its ‘part’ in countering nuclear threats; the Indo-Pacific
strategic outlook dictates it do more. Australia has historically been a
prominent supporter of global efforts to contain and end WMD proliferation, but
its reputation is eroding. Resource pressures have reduced the effort and
expertise across government, while the international response to WMD threats is
becoming more complex and harder edged.
Despite Australian WMD expertise and personnel playing an
important role in assessing the WMD inventories of Saddam’s Iraq, no such
contribution was made to the UN-led and US backed international project to destroy
Syria’s chemical weapon stockpile. Australia has a WMD response capability to
support domestic situations and for the development of chemical, biological and
radiological protection equipment for the armed forces (Chapter 3.15). This
expertise should be enhanced and made available to properly-mandated
interventions. The expertise could also be used for strengthening the
international WMD control machinery.
In elaborating the role of one of Australia’s key intelligence
facilities, the White Paper notes its contribution to intelligence on
‘priorities’ such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (Chapter 5.24). Good intelligence is vital to the detection and
disruption of proliferation supply networks. What the paper does not discuss
however is the use made of this intelligence. As Australia appears to be
downgrading the priority of WMD issues, it is likely that proliferation
intelligence will only be used for the purposes of information trading.
Instead, Australia should be making a greater contribution to regional counter
proliferation efforts including by utilisation of all available intelligence
sources and expertise across all government agencies.
Facing the Realities
Considering the range of security threats that Australia will be
facing over the next twenty years, it would be wise to recall how different the
strategic outlook might have been if not for the game-changing commitments of
Australia and its regional partners in the 1970s to forego nuclear weapons and
sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If not for those decisions,
the White Paper would have had a very different starting point.
With the UN Security Council now committed to stronger sanctions
on North Korea, including inspection of shipping, Australia will be expected to
contribute, either by offering assets of its choosing or waiting until asked.
It would be quite consistent with Australia’s commitment to increase the tempo
of regional defence engagement for a share of that increase to have a WMD focus,
though the Proliferation Security Initiative and bilaterally. For a tiny outlay
in the context of overall defence spending Australia could help reclaim its
reputation for leadership on global WMD arms control and non-proliferation
efforts.
About The Author:
John Tilemann is a former diplomat whose
postings included the International Atomic Energy Agency and as Ambassador to
Jordan. He is currently the Director of Research for the Asia Pacific
Leadership Network on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the
Australian National University. This article is published under a Creative
Commons Licence. It can be republished with permission.
This article was originally published at AIIA's website on March 9, 2016
under Creative Commons License 4.0
