The flourishing new relationship between Israel and her two Hellenic neighbors in the eastern Mediterranean – Greece and Cyprus – is important on its own merits. But equally important, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance seeks to block Turkey’s ambitions of regional hegemony, while at the same time offering Ankara a key place in the new Mediterranean political order, if and when she comes to her senses.
By Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
The flourishing new relationship between Israel and her two Hellenic
neighbors in the eastern Mediterranean – Greece and Cyprus – is important on
its own merits. But equally important, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance
seeks to block Turkey’s ambitions of regional hegemony, while at the same time
offering Ankara a key place in the new Mediterranean political order, if and
when she comes to her senses.
Two events,
apparently unrelated, yet interwoven in unpredictable ways, demonstrated last
month that regional dynamics in the eastern Mediterranean are at a new and
possibly formative stage.
Turkey downed
a Russian fighter operating in Syria, which raised fears of a broadening
conflict, and placed two of the world's most headstrong leaders on what seemed
like a collision course. Meanwhile, despite his roots in the country’s
traditionally anti-Zionist left, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras paid a
short and warm visit to Israel. So did Cypriot President Nikos Anastasiades.
When visiting
Israel, Tsipras went so far as to recognize that Jerusalem is, and will
continue to be, "the eternal capital of the Jewish People" (while
offering similar recognition to the putative Palestinian "state").
Both these
visits, as well as the Russian conflict with Turkey, reflect – directly or by
inference – aspects of the growing cost of Turkey's vaulting ambitions under
President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu.
Whether or not
the term "neo-Uthmanism" serves any explanatory purpose, there was
clearly an open bid by Ankara in recent years to use the regional turmoil, the
so-called "Arab Spring" (perhaps the mother of all misnomers…), as a
springboard for the assertion of Turkish leadership and even hegemony. This was
shaped by the ideological imperatives of the AKP leaders and their sense of
affinity and obligation towards the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, such
as the Hamas regime in Gaza.
As Syria
descended into civil war and disintegrated, Erdogan – who once upon a time
tried to position himself as Bashar Assad's friend – turned into a stern
supporter of the insurgency. Even if one doubts the claims of Turkish-Islamic
State connivance now put forward by the Russians, there is reason to believe
that the relevant Turkish agencies were not too choosy when offering help to
Assad's various enemies (including the buying of oil and gas from rebel-held
areas). Meanwhile, Turkey sustained her traditional nationalist stance towards
the Cyprus question, and tensions with Greece did not abate.
The results
are now very much in evidence. As has been said all too often, from Davutoglu's
promise of "zero problems with the neighbors" the road led very
quickly to "zero neighbors without problems."
However, the
escalation of Russian-Turkish tensions need not be taken too far. Neither
President Vladimir Putin nor Erdogan seem to desire war, despite the bravado
and the sanctions. Some opportunities for sober dialogue are now being set up
(despite Putin's refusal to meet his Turkish counterpart in Paris).
But the
shooting did demonstrate just how far apart Ankara and Moscow are on the future
of Syria, making it quite unlikely that the current multilateral diplomatic
efforts can come to fruition. This may change only if Turkey will be isolated
and ignored by the other key players (which would be a dangerous game to play)
– or alternatively, if she is given other good reasons to change, and at least
modify, her strategy and her priorities. Otherwise, it will continue to be very
difficult to bring about even an interim reduction in the intensity of the
Syrian conflict, let alone resolve it.
Neither Israel
nor Greece was necessarily looking at the Turkish challenge alone when they
embarked on a trajectory of intense cooperation in recent years. There are
excellent reasons to improve relations, not the least of which is the hope for
joint energy projects, which is scheduled to be the key item at the planned
tripartite Greek-Cypriot–Israeli summit.
The two
countries have helped each other at times of forest fires and natural
disasters, and have drawn closer in military matters too. The Israeli
government stood by Greece at her hour of need, willing to encourage Israeli
investment and tourism. There is a broad scope for technological cooperation,
in vital fields such as renewable energies and water conservation.
Indeed, in
Athens this proved by now to be an enduring aspect of national policy, across
party lines, including PASOK (social-democrats), ND (conservatives), and
Syriza left-wing leaders alike. As the positive interactions of Tsipras
with young Israelis during his visit made manifest, there is also an
underpinning of cultural and historical affinity to this sense of partnership.
(The Israeli liberal daily newspaper Haaretz even dedicated
the leading essay in its cultural supplement to the long-lasting love affair of
Israelis from all walks of life with modern Greek music).
The long
shadow of Turkish policies, however, is never too far away. Israeli awareness
of the potential benefits of closer association with the Hellenic world grew
exponentially after the collapse of Israeli-Turkish relations. The same could
be said for the other side of the coin: For many years, Israel's image as
Turkey's friend and military ally did little to endear her to Greek and Cypriot
public opinion.
This changed
almost overnight after the Mavi Marmara incident, which made manifest to all a
breach that has been brewing for some time. At the most obvious level, this
realization on both sides was reflected in the welcome extended by Cypriots and
Greeks to tens and even hundreds of thousands of Israelis who were no longer
willing to avail themselves to "all included" Turkish hospitality in
the Mediterranean resorts such as Antalya.
There is much
more to the Turkish impact, however, than likes and dislikes. Greece and Cyprus
helped, after 2011, in preventing similar maritime provocations. Moreover, the
need to offer an effective counter-balance to the ambitions of Ankara has come
to dominate reactions, in all three countries, to events and developments in
Egypt.
If reactions
to the change of government in July 2013 are the litmus test of ideological
affinities in the region, then Israel, Cyprus and Greece have all aligned
themselves on one side in favor of the al-Sisi government, while Turkey is on
the other side (still refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Mohamad Morsi's
removal from power, and in 2014 conniving with Qatar to control the endgame of
the Israeli confrontation with Hamas so as to wrest this important lever away
from Sisi's Egypt).
Even with
Syriza in power – with some of its older leaders still bearing memories and
scars from military repression after the 1967 coup in Greece – the powerful
realization that Sisi is the barrier left standing against a descent into
Islamist hell remains a driving force in Greek regional policy.
There is a
"variable geometry" Mediterranean strategy. Greece and Cyprus will be
joining with Egypt on December 9 for another tripartite summit, this time in
Athens. Greek and Cypriot cooperation with Israel flourishes; and once Israel
resolves her internal wrangles over gas production, there will be growing
prospects for energy cooperation.
Image
Attribute: Cyprus-Greece pipeline, fed by Israel's gigantic Leviathan gas
field, that could also involve a link-up with Libya
None of this
should be read as being designed to harm Turkey or isolate her. After all, Greece
maintains a tense but workable relationship. Cyprus seems eager to move forward
with the quest for a solution. And Israel largely increased commercial
relations with Turkey, and serves as a conduit for Turkish exports in the
region. Thus, the new geometry should not be a tool to harm Turkey.
What the
Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance does do is seek to block Erdogan's ambitions of
regional hegemony, while at the same time offering Turkey a key place in the
new Mediterranean political order, if and when she comes to her senses. As the
leadership in Ankara settles down for a sober assessment of recent events – and
seeks to strengthen its position within NATO and with the EU – the prospects
for such a transformative change may well improve.
About The Author:
Col.
(res.) Dr. Eran Lerman is a senior research associate at the BESA Center. For
the past six years he served as deputy for foreign policy and international
affairs at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's
Office. For 20 years prior to that, he held senior posts in IDF Military
Intelligence, and also was Israel director of the American Jewish Committee.
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 321
BESA Center
Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg
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