Okinawa has not had sovereignty for over 100 years, and now it is being made to accommodate the interests of two governments interested in maintaining a strong presence in international affairs.
By IndraStra Global Editorial Team
Introduction:
After its
unconditional surrender to the United States (U.S.) in 1945, stripped of military capabilities,
Japan has had only the U.S. to rely on for national security. Since Article 9
of the largely U.S.-written constitution declared that Japan would never again
maintain “land, sea or air forces or other war potential,” a Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security was reached in 1952 to ensure Japan’s safety from
foreign threats, stipulating that the U.S. would help defend Japan against
external enemies, while a Japanese defense force would handle internal threats
and natural disasters.
The treaty
allowed the U.S. to have military bases across Japan in order to
preserve regional security. There are currently around 50,000 U.S. military
personnel stationed in 23 military bases across Japan. During the Vietnam War,
Japanese bases acted as strategic and logistical posts for American troops.
More recently, the U.S. has used the bases to deploy long-distance
surveillance drones over China and North Korea. Japan’s constitutional
constraints on military action, combined with the pacifist sentiments deriving
from the still-anguishing nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have
led to the rejection of any measure that might alter the status quo. And the
rhetorical and tangible security commitments that U.S. has made to Japan has
warded off threats, leading to 70 years of peace.
The Past - "It was all about Okinawa":
The first annexation of Okinawa by the Japanese government ended with the Battle of Okinawa—the only ground battle fought in Japan[1] --in June of 1945. This battle ended in the death of 25 per cent of the Okinawan population. Twenty-eight thousand Japanese soldiers and civilians in the military and 94,000 civilian residents made up 61 per cent of the all the deaths on both sides.[2] The death toll paints a grim picture of how many human lives the Japanese military was willing to sacrifice in order to stay in the War even though defeat was imminent.
Image
Attribute: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen reviews
Japanese Self-Defense Force troops during a welcoming ceremony at the Ministry
of Defense in Tokyo, Japan, July 15, 2011. Photo: Petty Officer 1st Class Chad
J. McNeeley / U.S. Navy / Wikimedia
During the days of desperation towards the end of the battle, Japanese soldiers
stole Okinawan civilians’ food and drove them out of their homes and hiding places
in caves and tombs, saving their own lives at the expense of the people. The
Japanese army forced civilians to commit suicide so the would not be captured
by the U.S. military.[3] The memory of the Battle of Okinawa that still haunts
the island’s conscience, and has made many opposed to militarism, symbolized
today by military bases and the thousands of servicemen stationed in Okinawa.
The American Occupation post World War II also brings into question whether Japan valued
Okinawa as a part of the nation or as leverage in international relations. U.S. Occupation officially ended in 1952, but only on the mainland and the larger
islands; Okinawa remained under the U.S. military jurisdiction for an additional
twenty years.[4] The Japanese agreed to keep military bases in Okinawa despite
the people’s aversion to war and militarism because it was distant from the
Japanese mainland. This arrangement allowed the Japanese to comply
with America’s wishes but still remain minimally affected by the presence of the
U.S. military.[5] The U.S. was and still is interested in Okinawa because its
proximity to Korea, Southeast Asia, and Russia has made it even more valuable
since the Cold War began.[6]
Japan has used
its control of Okinawa as a way to prove its dominance in Asia and deference to
the West while neglecting to incorporate Okinawans socially and culturally. The
construction of a Japanese national identity that does not include Okinawans
has put them in a place where they must adopt and/or emphasize Japaneseness and
deemphasize Okinawanness in order to be incorporated into the mainstream and
avoid inferior social status.
Seventy-five
per cent of U.S. military facilities in Japan are located in Okinawa, and bases
occupy 20 per cent of the land on the main island. American Occupation and the
continuing presence of the military bases has led to Okinawan organizing and
advocacy for equitable treatment and more sovereignty in political affairs. The
movement to actively claim civil rights and better conditions from the U.S. military
and Japanese government cannot be divorced from the construction of Okinawan
identity.
One major
grievance about the military bases is that they are ruining the environmental
conditions for citizens. Warfare and later the construction of military bases
and hotels have destroyed beaches, ancient shell mounds, and old graves.[7]
Okinawan culture places a very strong importance on the honoring of the dead,
and the sacredness of the graves and shell mound sites were violated in order
to accommodate military. The Japanese government also proposed a heliport in
Nago, a city in the northwest part of the main island. The construction of the
heliport would endanger a coral reef and threaten the dugongs, sea animals that
inhabit the coast of Okinawa. The city council immediately passed a bill
against the heliport, and a referendum ended with 78 percent of voters opposing
the heliport. A campaign calling for a stop to the construction was organized
and reached Parliament in Tokyo. However, the organizing efforts were not
successful, as the expansions to the base have continued in the same area.[8]
Another major
problem for Okinawans is the restructuring of the economy to support the bases.
In order to accommodate the huge influx of servicemen, the Okinawan labor market
changed dramatically. More administrative and service industries emerged in
order to cater to the needs of the bases. Brothels and prostitution also
increased in popularity with the advent of US military forces.[9] Okinawa has
also been created into a popular vacation destination, complete with beautiful
beaches and seaside resorts. In order to stimulate the economy and encourage
tourism, Prime Minister Hashimoto celebrated the 25th anniversary of Okinawa’s
reversion to Japan by creating a free trade zone system that helped
corporations and duty free shops and simplifying visa regulations and
initiating tax incentives. Many infrastructural and public works projects
sponsored by the government have been implemented to aid the tourist industry.
Like the construction of military bases, the development of resorts and
commercial business has also violated the natural landscape.
A third
grievance held by Okinawans is the prevalence of crimes committed by American
servicemen. The classic case cited by writers who study Okinawa and the “base
problem” is the rape of a 12 year-old Okinawan girl who was kidnapped, beaten,
and raped by three American servicemen in 1995. The incident became an
international crisis. The crime was made into a symbol of the US exploitation
of Okinawa, and galvanized citizens to actively oppose the US military
presence. However, although servicemen have been involved in gruesome and
disturbing crimes, the proportion of crimes committed by American military is
actually smaller than their proportion of the total Okinawan population. Crimes
committed by servicemen, particularly those of African American descent, are
the ones that are covered most often in the media.[11]
Okinawa has
not had sovereignty for over 100 years, and now it is being made to accommodate
the interests of two governments interested in maintaining a strong presence in
international affairs. The multi-pronged maltreatment of Okinawans inspired the
reversion movement to pressure the U.S. to return Okinawa to Japan, which began as
early as 1951. Though the Japanese did not do a thorough job of incorporating
Okinawa culturally or socially, Okinawans were willing to support reversion to
Japan at the cost of the absence of the United States military. Anti-base
activism is a means for Okinawans to a) reclaim their space by restricting the
construction of bases, b) reshape the job market by de-commercializing and
de-industrializing the economy, and c) influence the population’s demographics
by decreasing the sexual interactions between Americans and Japanese. Anti-base
and anti-American military sentiment puts many people of Okinawan and American
parentage in an uneasy position because they can see and understand the
problems caused by the bases and simultaneously acknowledge that they are alive
because of the U.S. military presence.
The Present - "It's all about Abe":
Again, despite
analysts calling the defense relationship a “mutual” one, the U.S.-Japan
alliance has always hinged more on support from the U.S. than from Japan. [12] In
1990, the lack of involvement of Japan’s military forces in the Gulf War was
widely criticized by the U.S., when Japanese assistance to Kuwait was limited
solely to cash because of domestic opposition to military deployment.
A decade
later, however, Japan deployed 600 soldiers in humanitarian capacities during
the Iraq War, a decision that attracted fierce domestic opposition and numerous
unsuccessful lawsuits. Sending the first foreign deployment of Japanese troops
since World War II to build water purification facilities in Iraq would seem to
have little connection to Japan’s self-defense, the only constitutionally
acceptable reason for military activity. But as Gavan McCormack, a professor at
the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National
University, wrote in 2004, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made his decision
not because he supported President George W. Bush’s regional agenda, but
because he needed to ensure that the alliance that guaranteed Japan’s security
was upheld.
Abe, The Game Changer
With the commencement of Prime Minister Abe's second term. he sought to revise or broaden the interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution in order to permit Japan to maintain de jure military forces. He
had stated during his first term that "we are reaching the limit in narrowing down differences
between Japan's security and the interpretation of our constitution".[14]
and during the same period as prime minister he upgraded the Japan Defense Agency
to full ministry status.
On July 1,
2014, the Japanese government announced that it had devised a policy dubbed
"collective self defense" that would allow it to use armed force to
defend allies. Abe had originally proposed to give the military even more
leeway, but resistance from lawmakers in both parties of the governing
coalition led to the softening of the language. With Abe's coalition a majority in both houses
of parliament, the language was expected to be passed into law later in the
year 2015 and which eventually happened.
Lifting the
ban on collective self-defense, or the right to defend an ally under armed
attack even if Japan itself is not, was long considered banned by
war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution. So instead of formally amending
the Constitution, which was considered politically unfeasible, Abe simply had
the government’s long-standing interpretation of Article 9 altered to allow
collective defense.
Abe has argued
that the Japan-U.S. alliance would be critically damaged if Tokyo refused to
defend the U.S. during operations aimed at protecting Japan. Under the
Japan-U.S. security treaty, the U.S. is obliged to defend Japan in a
contingency but Japan does not have to defend the U.S. Instead, Tokyo is
obliged to grant Washington routine use of military bases in Japan.
The
legislation is scheduled to become effective in March 2016. One of the first
applications of the legislation was to authorize the JSDF peacekeeping team in
South Sudan to aid UN or foreign country personnel under attack in the country.
While the legislation is expected to allow Japanese and U.S. forces to work
more closely together, such as by forming integrated naval task forces to repel
an invasion of Japan,
The Future - "It's all about China":
Led by nationalist
President Xi Jinping, who took over in 2013, China has grown to become the
second-biggest military spender in the world. In 2015, it announced that it was
boosting its defense budget more than ten percent to $145 billion, almost three
times larger than that of Japan’s Self-Defense Force. While the growth of
China’s military capabilities can be attributed largely to its economic growth,
what truly worries Japanese leaders is China’s increasingly powerful
nationalist movement. These sentiments have been indoctrinated into the
population by a 20-year “patriotic education” campaign that asserts China’s right
to dominate East Asia and vilifies Japan’s “evil” actions during its colonial
rule. The atrocities of Japanese colonialism have been used to justify the
defense budget increase; as one Chinese official was quoted in Foreign Affairs,
“Our lesson from history—those who fall behind will get bullied—this is
something we will never forget.” Perhaps what epitomizes the Chinese quest for supremacy in the region is the September 3 Beijing's Victory Day Parade, which was led by 12,000 troops, celebrating China’s victory over Japan in World War
II. Xi’s “Chinese Dream” extends far beyond “rich nation, strong army,”.
In response,
Japan announced its biggest defense budget ever in January, totaling $42
billion – the third straight year of budget increases after more than a decade
of cuts. Jun Okumura, a scholar at the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs in
Tokyo, told The Guardian that while the budget increases were partly due to
concern over increased North Korean belligerency, they were largely in response
to China’s dominance: “China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the East
China Sea and air space, plus, of course, its overtly hostile actions against the
Philippines and Vietnam in South China Sea certainly have a major influence on the direction of
Japan’s military spending, the thrust of its military doctrine and its approach
to security alliances.”
In response to
U.S. idea of balancing China through Japan has invited strong reactions both from
the Chinese Government as well as the media – warning Japan to avoid any
tensions. Rejecting the participation of new actors, Chinese foreign ministry
spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded that: “Countries outside the region [U.S. and
Japan] should respect the efforts of countries in the region to safeguard peace
and stability, and refrain from sowing discord among other countries and
creating tensions”. However, the Chinese media’s response came much stronger as
Global Times argued that in such circumstances China could declare a South
China Sea ADIZ, quickening or expanding land reclamation efforts in the South
China Sea or strengthening military cooperation with Russia in Northeast Asia.
Similarly, Xinhua specified that Japanese patrols would raise tensions with
China and that with Japan’s commissioning of a new surveillance plane, the P-1,
with an 8,000 kilometer range, signifies its military capability to conduct
these patrols in the South China Sea.[15]
Conclusion
The future course of U.S. - Japan strategic relationship is going to focus more on containing China 's regional-cum-global aspiration and Prime Minister Abe's leadership has already pointed the whole country to that very particular direction, which itself calls for serious security implications in
the region. As such a strategic move awaits greater security dilemmas in the
China-Japan rivalry. It is likely that with such anomalies, China is going to
be more assertive in its actions and that Japan too would take up a bigger role
in Asia to counter China.
References:
1. Asato,
Eiko. "Okinawan Identity and Resistance to Militarization and
Maldevelopment." Island of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and
American Power. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2003. 228.
2. Toshiaki,
Furuki. "Considering Okinawa as a Frontier." Japan and Okinawa
Structure and Subjectivity. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 29
3. Fieldwork,
Okinawa. This information was gathered at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace
Memorial Museum.
4. Hook, Glenn
D. and Richard Siddle. “Introduction." Japan and Okinawa Structure and
Subjectivity. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 1-18.
5. Higa,
Mikio. "Okinawa: Recent Political Developments." Okinawa: Recent
Political Developments 3 (1963): 416
6. Higa, ref.
23 above
7. Inoue,
Masamichi S., John Purves, and Mark Selden. "Okinawa Citizens, US Bases,
and the Security of Asia."Economic & Political Weekly 33 (1998): 264
8. Asato, ref.
20 above, p. 236
9. Inoue,
et.al. ref. 25 above
10 Tobe,
Hideaki. "Military Bases and Modernity: An Aspect of Americanization in
Okinawa." Transforming Anthropology 14 (2006): __.
11 Takeuchi
Cullen, Lisa. "Sex and Race in Okinawa." Time Magazine 21 Aug. 2001.
Time Warner. 31 May 2009 .
12 US Power wane as Japan Reboots Military, TheTower.org
13. Otani, Stephanie, Positioning
American Japanese in the Context of Japanese and Okinawan Nationalism and
Ethnicity, SSJAS, 2009
14 New Japanese
Leader Looks to Expand Nation's Military , NewsHour, 20 September 2006.
15 Is South China
Sea to be the New Hot-Spot of China-Japan Rivalry ? by Amrita Jash, IndraStra Global
