By Nader Habibi & Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee The sudden launch of Russia’s military operations in Syria late last month caught ...
By Nader Habibi & Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee
The sudden launch of Russia’s military operations in Syria late last month caught the United States and regional players by surprise.
It began with an announcement
that defined the primary objective of the mission as a confrontation with the
Islamic State (ISIS) in cooperation with the Syrian government of President
Bashar Assad.
The strategy involves three
components. First, Russia is expanding its military facilities in Syria.
Second, Russia remains committed to the survival of Assad’s regime and its
fight against ISIS in Syria. Third, Russia announced an intelligence sharing
and flight corridor agreement with Iran and Iraq.
So far, Western governments and
commentators have focused on the first and second components of the new Russian
strategy. The third part, however, is equally significant for the course of
geopolitical developments in the region and deserves a more detailed analysis.
The balance of power tilts
This agreement serves two
important objectives. It enhances the capability of all three governments in
their fight against ISIS. It also creates a valuable flight route between
Russia and Syria. Since some European countries, such as Bulgaria, have closed
their space to Russian military flights, access to Syria via Iran and Iraq is
crucial for Moscow’s Middle East strategy.
Russia has already used the air
space of Iran and Iraq not only for flights to Syria but also to fire cruise
missiles from the Caspian Sea at several Syrian targets.
While so far the objective of
this Russian cooperation with Iran and Iraq is relatively modest, it can have
significant implications for US relations with both countries. It will also be
significant for Turkey and the relative balance of power in the ongoing proxy
war between Iran and Saudi-led Sunni countries.
The impact of this Russian
strategy in Iraq will be mostly on domestic politics and the relative balance
of power among competing factions in Baghdad. For Iran, on the other hand, the
cooperation with Russia will primarily affect the foreign policy environment
and the dynamics of its ongoing tensions with United States and Saudi Arabia.
Let’s look at some of these implications in more detail.
Iraq: a battle of benefactors
Iraq’s decision to participate in
this agreement was supported by only some factions in Iraq’s fragmented
political scene.
The disagreements about joining
this accord represented the latest episode of the struggle between Iraq’s
Shiite prime minister, Haider Abadi, who seeks stronger coordination with the
United States, and his Shiite rivals, who are suspicious of the American role
and prefer to rely on Iranian (Shiite) support. These factions believe that the
US could have done more to fight ISIS and Sunni militants. They also advocate
closer ties with Iran and now Russia.
During the last couple of months,
Abadi sought to strengthen his position by adopting a reformist agenda and
increasing coordination with the US military in the battle of Anbar. He was
getting closer to adopting a version of the US plan to establish the Provincial
National Guards as an autonomous Sunni force. Iranian-backed militias in the
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rejected this initiative and even issued a
common statement opposing further American involvement in the military effort
against ISIS.
In this context, the agreement
seems to have challenged the course that Abadi has recently taken, which raises
serious questions about the extent to which the prime minister controls major
military decisions. A report published on September 30 by the Lebanese
newspaper al-Akhbar, which is known for being close to Iran-backed Hezbollah,
confirmed the escalating tension between Abadi and his rivals.
According to the report, Abadi
was trying to minimize the scope of cooperation in this agreement and reduce it
to the exchange of intelligence. He also insisted on having full authority in
appointing Iraq’s representatives in the common committee that was established
in Baghdad and included military representatives from the four countries
(Russia, Syria, Iraq and Iran).
This report also claims that the
committee will be headed by Iran’s military consul in Baghdad. In turn,
powerful groups within the PMF, such as the Badr Organization and other
Iranian-backed Shiite militias, demanded to have the right to choose their own
representatives.
Russia itself has long sought to
restore its strategic and military relationship with Iraq.
In recent years, Russia has
offered a large array of military hardware to Iraq that the US has refused to
sell it (such as military helicopters in 2013 and Su25s fighter aircraft). If
Russia proves effective in enhancing Iraq’s security against ISIS and Sunni
militants, its military and economic ties with Iraq will be strengthened at the
expense of pro-Western factions of the Iraqi political elite.
Furthermore, if the conflict
escalates and Russia demands more logistical and ground force support from
Iraq, the ability of the government to accommodate both US and Russian military
involvements and maintain a coordinated anti-ISIS strategy would be greatly
weakened.
The Shiite-dominated government
might use the Russian involvement, which comes without obligations on its
internal politics, to confront US pressures to adopt a more inclusive policy
toward the Sunnis. But if Iraq increases its dependence on Russian support,
Abadi’s pro-US position may be weakened and so might his ability to survive
politically. Hence, if this coordination does not yield quick results, it might
well cause further internal divisions.
All smiles, but Abadi’s pro-US
position may be weakened by Iraq’s cooperation with Putin. Reuters
Iran: growing leverage over
Russia and the region
Differences exist between
hardline conservatives and the more pragmatic faction led by President Hassan
Rouhani over the extent of cooperation between Iran and Russia. Yet there
appears to have been little opposition to the agreement to share intelligence
and permit Russian military aircraft access to Iranian airspace.
Through a number of high-ranking
military visits in recent months, Iran encouraged Russia to take a more active
role in support of the Syrian regime. It was also instrumental in securing
Iraq’s cooperation.
If Russian involvement in Syria
intensifies, which seems to be the case, it will have to expand its military
cooperation with Iran. This will give Iran more leverage in its economic and
military relations with Russia.
There are already indications
that Russian air operations against opponents of the Assad regime will be
complemented by additional ground troops that Iran and its regional allies will
provide. Under these circumstances, Russia will be more likely to accept Iran’s
longstanding request for the S-300 air defense system and other advanced
systems.
Access to advanced Russian (and
perhaps Chinese) weapons reduces Iran’s risk of facing a surprise military
strike by its regional adversaries (Israel and Saudi Arabia).
Furthermore, if the US concludes
that Iran has violated the recent nuclear agreement, it will find it more
difficult to seek Russian support for a new round of international sanctions as
long as Russia relies on Iran for the success of its operations in Syria. For
the same reason, Russia is likely to boost Iran’s defenses against any attempt
by the US to carry out military operation against Iran’s nuclear assets if the
deal fails.
Russia’s need for Iran help in
its effort to save Assad may give the latter more leverage if the recent
nuclear deal goes south. Reuters
Iran’s cooperation with Russia
will also strengthen its position in the ongoing proxy war with Saudi Arabia
and its allies. Not only will it become more difficult for Saudi Arabia and
Turkey to remove the Assad regime, but they will be more hesitant to escalate
the level of current tensions with Iran.
Previously, if the proxy war with
Saudi Arabia were to escalate into a direct military confrontation, the Saudis
would have had the upper hand militarily by relying on the support of the
United States against an isolated Iran.
It is for this reason that Iran
has carefully avoided an escalation with Saudi Arabia and refrained from
confronting its military operations in Bahrain and Yemen.
Closer military ties with Russia
and access to advanced Russian military hardware might, however, alter the
balance of power and make Iran more willing to challenge Saudi operations
against its allies.
Finally, Iran might also be able
to secure Russian support for several other demands.
For more than a decade, for
example, Iran has sought to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as
a full member, but Russia and China have accepted it only as an observer
nation. Russia now is more likely to support Iran’s bid for full membership. If
Iran is admitted as a full member, then it will be able to rely more on
strategic support from Russia and China in future tensions with the US and its
European allies.
The bottom line
For as long as Russia’s military
operations in Syria continue, it will have to rely on the cooperation of Iran
and Iraq. As a result, it will have to be more sensitive to these countries'
demands for diplomatic and military support.
This Russian support, in turn,
will strengthen the regional position of Iran and its allies in Iraq, and is
likely to weaken Prime Minister Abadi and reduce his influence in domestic and
foreign policy decisions.
About The Authors:
About The Authors:
Nader Habibi, Professor
of the Economics of the Middle East at the Crown Center for Middle East
Studies, Brandeis University
Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, Fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies- Brandeis University , Brandeis University
Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, Fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies- Brandeis University , Brandeis University
This article has been first published at The Conversation - US Pilot on October 15, 2015
