By Juliette Bird Abstract NATO’s contribution to the global approach to Counter Terrorism was expressed publically in the NATO...
By
Juliette Bird
Abstract
NATO’s
contribution to the global approach to Counter Terrorism was expressed
publically in the NATO Policy Guidelines on Counter Terrorism endorsed at the
2012 NATO summit. The evolution of NATO’s approach is described and NATO’s
current contribution is detailed, including recent examples of activities that
reflect progress against the Counter Terrorism Policy Guidelines. Looking
ahead, beyond agreed roles for NATO, the Alliance’s relevance to work against
Foreign Terrorist Fighters and to Countering Violent Extremism is examined.
Finally, new ways are suggested to assist the UN and use NATO’s existing assets
more flexibly in the field of Counter Terrorism. Adoption of these would,
however, require a change in Allies’ ambition for the use of NATO in Counter
Terrorism and hence a change in mandate.
Keywords:
NATO, Counterterrorism, United Nations.
Introduction
In
today’s febrile climate where terrorism has become a topic of importance, not
only for terrorism ‘experts’ but for the average citizens of many countries,
there has been a huge amount of soul searching and summit summoning in search
of an adequate response. Terrorism, in addition to being subject to what has
been referred to as the ‘politics of labelling’[1], is not monolithic; it has
no single trigger or context and its manifestations are many and varied. Thus,
as the United Nations’ Global Counter Terrorism Strategy[2] recognises, there
are roles for a broad spectrum of actors in taking action against it. The
perpetrators of terrorism and those that support terrorism as a legitimate
strategy are the base level actors who must be countered. The responsibility to
monitor, engage, deter or punish such individuals—as nationals of particular
countries and members of specific communities, lies predominantly with
nations—whether these actions are taken through governmental bodies or civil
society. The range of counter terrorism relevant roles is wide and was well
described in the 2011 U.S. National Strategy for Counter Terrorism which speaks
of the need to harness ‘every tool’ of national power.[3] The idea is refined
in the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy which counsels use of the military,
of diplomacy, development, science and technology and people-to-people
relationships within a long term perspective.[4] The military are an asset to
be used within a coherent, comprehensive approach whilst remaining conscious
that, as President Obama underlined in 2013,“force alone cannot make us
safe.”[5] In addition to tasks within all national fields, the UN strategy also
sets out tasks for organisations at the regional, multinational and
international level and here, as a political/military actor, NATO has a part to
play within the global approach.
NATO’s
Historic Involvement in Counter Terrorism Activities
There
is little residual public awareness that NATO, a brand memorable for its three
Musketeer-like approach of ‘all for one and one for all’, has invoked its
Collective Defence response under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty only once,
in 2001, as a reaction to the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks perpetrated against the
United States. Allies clearly believed in this key instance that NATO could act
usefully in the field of Counter Terrorism (CT).
Prior
to 2001 NATO had generally considered terrorism as an issue of marginal
relevance to the Alliance. In 1991 the Strategic Concept[6]—the in-depth review
that Allies take every 10 years or so of the current security picture and the
intended Allied response—mentioned terrorism as a valid threat but effectively
placed it at the bottom of NATO’s ‘things-to-do’ list.[7] By 1999, the time of
the next review, terrorism had become a topic of generally higher profile, due
to the activities of a variety of groups in Allied nations and beyond.[8] In
the 1999 Strategic Concept[9] terrorism was placed at the top of the list of
non-military threats of relevance to NATO[10] and the potential for terrorist
use of non-conventional weapons was noted.[11] However, no move was made to put
in place any guidance as to what NATO’s own role might be in the face of such a
challenge and neither civilian nor military staffs were organised to focus on
the topic.
Thus,
when the twin towers fell and an attack directed from abroad was officially
deemed to have taken place, fulfilling the conditions necessary for an
invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty[12], NATO had no official
doctrine or expertise to call on. Article 5 calls for Allies to take ‘action
deemed necessary’ in response to an attack upon one of their number. This does
not equate to military action unless specifically called for. In this case the
United States required back filling of its air surveillance capability having
deployed its own assets to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. NATO’s
response was Operation Eagle Assist whereby AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control
System – i.e. surveillance planes) assets of other nations were made available
to fill the more routine roles for the United States. In parallel, there was a
need to ensure that terrorist groups did not obtain new and more lethal
capabilities so Operation Active Endeavour, involving maritime patrols of the
Mediterranean to prevent shipments of arms and non-conventional materials, was
launched in 2002.[13]
The
first NATO summit after the declaration of Article 5, held in Prague in 2002,
officially put in place the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism[14],
a document somewhat hurriedly drawn up after September 11, 2001. In Prague and
at the next summit (held in Istanbul) Allies also took measures in other areas
where NATO could contribute to the CT effort; these included enhanced
intelligence sharing and CBRN efforts, new outreach to partners to cooperate on
terrorism, establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit and
identification of a budget to promote capability building against asymmetric
threats (the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work).[15] New initiatives
in Civil Emergency Planning, crisis management and Special Forces followed.
If
a search is conducted for references to ‘terrorism’ in NATO’s internal
documents from 2001-2005, it is difficult to tell which parts of the NATO
structure led on the issue; it was the hot topic and most sections/divisions
wrote on it, confident they had something relevant to offer. Thus it was that
many of NATO’s core activities were often labelled ‘CT’. NATO undoubtedly
contributed useful activities to the international approach over a 10-year
period but, when a review of NATO’s CT posture was called for in 2011[16], it
was clear that coherent action was needed to determine where NATO could add
value.
The
Refocusing Process
By
2011 the terrorism context had changed significantly from that of 2001. Even
before Usama bin Laden was removed from the scene on May 2, 2011, Al Qaida was
already viewed as a greatly reduced opponent. The Al Qaida ideology was rightly
recognised as an ongoing threat but its manifestations had reduced in scale,
particularly in Allied nations, and were increasingly seen to be tied to local
situations and perhaps of somewhat less international concern. There was a
feeling that terrorism might have been contained sufficiently to be lived
with[17]; in Iraq, Zarqawi was dead and full-blown war was over so, despite continued
violence from a variety of terrorist groups[18] many of whom took some
inspiration from the AQ ideology, and there was a tendency to look with hope
upon the evolving changes in the Middle East and North Africa.
Similarly
on the international CT scene, whilst little progress had been made on a
universal legal definition of terrorism, the UN had added to the range of
individual instruments under the General Assembly and the Security Council
addressing specific aspects of terrorism[19] an overarching approach to be
implemented by all. In 2006 the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS)
was agreed and set a framework for nations and organisations to work within. An
April 2011 NATO Defense College paper usefully summarised NATO’s need to move
forward in the field of CT and discussed some options available.[20]
Under
the UNGCTS tasks are divided across four pillars. Two of these, ‘measures to
address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism’ and ‘measures to
ensure respect for Human Rights for all and the Rule of Law as the fundamental
basis of the fight against terrorism’ have little to do with NATO’s mandate or
ability but the other two, ‘measures to prevent and combat terrorism’ and
‘measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism’, require
actions that speak directly to NATO’s strengths (such as aspects of CBRN
response and protection, denial of safe havens, sharing of information and best
practices and protection of vulnerable targets). Here NATO, with its unique
combination of political and military strengths, can add significant value.
So
it was within this context that in December 2011 Allies considered the first
draft of a policy accompanied by a staff document providing a comparative
analysis of how the European Union, Council of Europe and the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe contributed to the UNGCTS and where NATO
could add particular strengths and expertise. By early 2012 agreement had been
reached on NATO’s CT Policy Guidelines and these were endorsed by Heads of
State and Government at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.[21] Extensive comment
on the Guidelines was published later in the year by the U.S. National Defence
University.[22]
Allies
first put in place three principles for NATO action in the field of CT:
whatever it does must be legal and within the UN framework; NATO should support
Allies rather than lead CT efforts; and, particularly given the economic
climate, NATO should seek to avoid duplication and promote complementarity with
nations and with other international organisations. It is perhaps worth setting
out the first two principles verbatim:
Compliance
with international law – NATO continues to act in accordance with international
law, the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The UN Global CT Strategy, international conventions and protocols
against terrorism and relevant UN Resolutions provide the framework for all
national and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism, including those conducted
by the Alliance.
NATO’s
support to Allies – Individual NATO members have primary responsibility for the
protection of their populations and territories against terrorism. Cooperation
through NATO can enhance Allies’ efforts to prevent, mitigate, respond to and
recover from acts of terrorism. NATO, upon request may support these efforts.
The
policy focuses Alliance efforts in three main areas:
Awareness:
ensuring shared awareness of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities (achieved
through consultations (at NATO but also through outreach to experts), enhanced
intelligence and information sharing, analysis and assessment).
Capabilities:
striving for adequate Alliance capabilities to prevent, protect against and
respond to terrorist threats (in accordance with NATO’s level of ambition as
defined in Political Guidance).
Engagement:
continuing to engage with partner countries and other international actors to
promote common understanding of the terrorist threat through enhanced
consultations and practical cooperation through existing mechanisms. Emphasis
is placed on raising awareness, capacity building, civil emergency planning and
crisis management.
These
pillars could be summarised as: ensuring that Allies (and where possible
partners too) share a common view of the threat of terrorism and agree on how
to address it – 69 nations (i.e. the 28 NATO Allies and their partners)
constitute roughly one third of the world so a common approach can be immensely
powerful; ensuring that NATO can continue to conduct its business despite the
threat of terrorism (much work has been done in response to requirements
derived from operations in theatre, particularly in Afghanistan where terrorist
actions against ISAF forces were commonplace); and engaging with partners to
push back the geographic boundary of the terrorist threat, beyond the Alliance
territory of Europe and North America, by ensuring a common approach and, where
possible, sharing NATO’s strengths to build the capacity of others.
Allies
concluded the Guidelines with a paragraph on implications for potential future
operations:
NATO
will maintain flexibility as to how to counter terrorism, playing a leading or
supporting role as required. Allies’ capabilities represent an essential
component of a potential response to terrorism. Collective defence remains
subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council.
The
Outcome: NATO’s CT Contribution Today
Since
May 2014, NATO has an agreed Action Plan that lists and assigns the tasks
flowing from the policy guidance.[23] Examples of actions undertaken regarding
each of the pillars over the past two years include:
Awareness
Intelligence
reporting based on contributions from Allies’ internal, external and military
services; sharing of experiences and views with political and intelligence
experts from partner countries affected by terrorism: discussions with EU, OSCE
and UN CT experts and also with the Global CT Forum whose work in the field of
Foreign Terrorist Fighters for the Iraq/Syria theatre is at the cutting edge of
international cooperation.
Capabilities
Projects
supported by the Defence Against Terrorism programme of work respond to
requirements identified in theatre against asymmetric threats, e.g. hardening
of aircraft against MANPADs[24], biometric identification systems, detection
and destruction of Improvised Explosive Devices and associated route clearance
procedures. Relevant work has also been done on better preparing military
forces for new operational environments – one important aspect of CT for the
military is to avoid, inadvertently, creating the next generation of terrorists
by insensitive or culturally unaware behaviour. NATO’s Centres of Excellence
have been important contributors to many projects, bringing their expertise to
bear in areas as diverse as military engineering for route clearance,
explosives disposal, cultural familiarisation, network analysis and education
on terrorism and how to counter it. A new Centre dedicated to strategic
communication should be able to contribute to future communication approaches
during operations – this too can be an important aspect of CT for the
military.[25]
Engagement
NATO’s
links to its partners have grown stronger and more mature since the Partnership
Action Plan on Terrorism was put in place in 2002 to promote an exchange on
terrorism between NATO and its partners. It should be recalled that cooperation
with partners is upon request only, it is not a unilateral outreach from NATO
and most certainly is not imposed. With the advent of Individual Partnership
Cooperation Programmes that list areas of mutual interest for NATO and each
partner, the adoption of the CT Policy Guidelines that identify NATO’s areas of
added value in CT and the transformation of partner cooperation mechanisms by
the adoption of the Berlin partnership package in April 2011[26], counter
terrorism has been mainstreamed into relations with partners. Evidence of this
can be seen in the cooperation projects underway or recently completed under
both the Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) and the Defence
Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). With Egypt, Phase I of a land mine
clearance project has recently been completed. This involved a technical review
of available solutions, equipment trials, training of personnel and assisted
procurement. Phase II, which will enable Egypt to locate deeper mines, is now
underway. Iraq has been provided with training on IEDs and explosive disposal
and a larger scale approach is currently under consideration. With Mauritania,
NATO has a multi-year SPS project to set up a civilian Crisis Management Centre
(with associated equipment, communications and training) which will enable
effective handling of both natural and man-made disasters anywhere in the
country.
On
a slightly more academic basis, SPS is supporting a project to review
transitions from military operations to civilian-run CT strategies and to draw
from these suggestions for the future. Other projects look at radicalisation in
the context of military operations (particularly those involving Special
Forces’ activity), review developments in CT strategies across North Africa in
the wake of transitions from dictatorships, research detection systems for
explosives and chemical/biological agents and work with experts on resilience
and crowd behaviour to improve crisis response.
Education,
training and exercises – as an aspect of standardisation and improved
interoperability – are fundamental activities for NATO and are relevant to both
Allies and partners. Building partner capacity in defence education is a
relatively new approach for NATO but, in addition to the courses provided at
NATO School Oberammergau and elsewhere, the DEEP now works to improve teaching
skills and curricula. This can include efforts in the field of CT and COIN if
and when this is requested by partners. Uzbekistan and Mauritania have both
shown interest in being able to educate their personnel in these topics. The
first 3-year arrangement with Mauritania has just been completed and was
commended both by the defence college (Ecole Nationale de l’Etat Major) and the
Office of the Mauritanian Chief of Defence Staff.
NATO’s
relationship with the United Nations on CT has become much closer over recent
years; CT is now an element of the annual staff talks and the UN is kept
abreast of developments in NATO’s Centres of Excellence and of courses
available through NATO’s education and training facilities. Working with Allies
and partners it is now possible to establish targeted cooperation activities
contributing directly to evolving UN requirements. NATO’s expertise in
explosive management, Civil Emergency planning, Small Arms and Light Weapons
sequestration and destruction, etc., make relevant contributions to UN lines of
effort. There is scope for more to be done with both the OSCE and the EU,
particularly where NATO’s strengths are complementary. North Africa, the Sahel
and Central Asia seem prime opportunities for NATO to offer its expertise, to
be delivered through or with existing assets such as the OSCE Border College in
Dushanbe or EU projects in the Sahel.[27]
Looking
Ahead
The
terrorism environment is far from static and major developments over the past
two years have had an impact on the Alliance, even though NATO has no new
mandate for action in theatres where terrorism is rife. At the Wales Summit in
2014, awareness of the threat from terrorism (given the situation in Syria,
Iraq, Libya and elsewhere) pervaded most meetings, although no one session was
exclusively focused on the issue. This was reflected in the Summit
Declaration[28] which, in addition to condemning the situation in Iraq/Syria
and calling for a coordinated international approach, recognised terrorist acts
and trafficking across the Sahel-Sahara region as a threat to wider security
interests and underlined NATO’s role in fighting terrorism including through
military cooperation with partners to build their capacity to face terrorist
threats. It noted that partners already work with NATO in combating terrorism
and pointed to the inclusion of ‘response to terrorism’ in the Individual
Partnership Cooperation Programme with Iraq. Counter terrorism related work
(particularly information sharing, education and training, capacity building
for crisis management and CBRN preparedness) is relevant to both the Defence
Capability Building Initiative and the Readiness Action Plan which were
elaborated at the summit.
One
additional and important area reflected in the Wales Declaration was the
Allies’ commitment to enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on
returning foreign fighters. This is a difficult area for the Alliance as most
of both the threat and the workload related to returning foreign terrorist fighters
is faced by nations themselves. Not only is it predominantly a national role,
but it involves the activities of domestic intelligence and law enforcement
agencies and civil society mechanisms, none of which are within NATO’s purview.
Thus, while nations remain extremely concerned about this terrorist phenomenon,
NATO’s role at present falls firmly under the Awareness pillar of the NATO CT
Policy Guidelines. Within the Alliance Turkey briefs often on the numbers of
Allied (and other) nationals stopped and sent back from the Turkish border,
many in response to bilateral intelligence inputs. However, subsequent action
against those detained takes place on a national basis. Were NATO forces at any
time to be mandated to act in Iraq, Syria or perhaps Libya they would be likely
to find themselves facing fellow Alliance nationals who have joined the ranks
of the jihadist groups. It seems reasonable to suppose that at that juncture
NATO would take on a more precise and active role in the global effort against foreign
terrorist fighters who would then be designated as enemy combatants. But this
is not currently on NATO’s agenda.
At
present the cutting edge work undertaken by the United Nations (UNSCR
2170(2014), 2178(2014) and 2199(2015)) and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum
(through the Hague-Marrakech Memorandum and the work of the Foreign Fighters
working group) is of intense interest at NATO and consideration is continuously
given to potential future roles for NATO. Matters are complicated by NATO’s
need to decide by consensus. Differing national positions and levels of
involvement in the current threat picture mean that discussion of terrorism
does not take place from a common baseline. For example, the Baltic states
focus naturally on the neigbouring Ukraine/Russia situation, whereas Turkey, as
a major transit country for those fighting in Iraq and Syria, has its attention
firmly fixed on the need for a comprehensive solution to the threats from the
South. Each Ally has its own optic, be it humanitarian issues, Libyan arms, the
dynamics of the Sunni/Shia/Kurd relationship, developments in Sub-Saharan
Africa or the need to remove Bashar al Assad. Without a unifying driver such as
a UN mandate or a direct threat to the Alliance (rather than to individual
members) and clear added-value for NATO involvement, overcoming such differing
approaches to take large scale action at the Alliance level will remain
difficult.
Although
a recent paper from the NATO Defense College[29] spoke of a tentative role for
NATO as a discussion forum for issues relating to the countering of violent
extremism, Allies themselves have been reluctant to touch on this issue within
the NATO context unless a substantive military relevance can be
demonstrated.[30] To date the countering violent extremism and Foreign Fighter
issues appear better suited to action within the European Union, where
Ministers of Interior and Justice, Social Welfare and Education can meet (only
Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs meet within the NATO framework) and
tools such as Europol, Eurojust and the Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness
Network are available. Much hope has been pinned on the sharing of lead
information on suspected Foreign Fighters via Interpol whose computer system
links all UN members’ law enforcement structures. Here too, NATO is poorly
positioned as such data is predominantly national and NATO’s own data exchange
with Interpol is, as yet, in its infancy within the context of Operation Ocean
Shield and the potential transfer of biometric data.
NATO
CT into the Future
Despite
the high profile of terrorism at present and the commission of recent terrorist
acts on the territory of NATO Allies (e.g., France, Denmark) with plots foiled
in many others (e.g., Italy, UK, Spain) it is, to date, only Turkey that has
turned to NATO for terrorism-related assistance. NATO has provided protection
against missiles at the Turkish-Syrian border[31] given the threat from ISIL
and other groups as well as the capabilities of the Assad regime. NATO’s crisis
response clearinghouse (the Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination
Centre) is available to Allies and partners should a major attack occur and
Articles 4 (Consultation) and 5 (Collective Defence) remain options for the
Allies.
Cooperative
projects to improve partner capacity are clearly the way forward from the Wales
summit. These include more work with Iraq; joint efforts with Jordan and
through other ‘Enhanced Operational Partnerships’; CT relevant support to
Afghanistan under NATO’s Enduring Partnership; and progress in UN-agreed
projects in Libya when conditions permit. But what else might NATO consider
should Allies seek to raise their level of ambition for the Alliance in the
field of CT?
Could
NATO offer more to the Global Effort on CT?
The
UN could use NATO more effectively if the Alliance’s cooperation activities
were less geographically limited. The UN’s efforts on Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW), and explosive remnants of war and mine clearance, are
worldwide; their drive to counter the Boko Haram message in Africa requires
international support; and their work with the African Union to implement good
CT legislation and appropriate security structures is slow and difficult. Can
NATO’s resources be brought to bear on any of these issues in support of the
UN? Or must the provision of such help remain a bilateral issue for Allies? Is
there any appetite to use NATO as the vehicle to feed national assistance into
the UN CT effort? Would any more resources be made available if so?
Could
NATO use its existing assets better?
Is
there any more flexibility (or capacity) to be found in NATO’s Centres of
Excellence, NATO School or Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs)
all of which can wear both national and NATO colours? Likewise NATO’s Special
Forces Headquarters (another Memorandum of Understanding body rather than a
part of NATO’s core structure) can field CT trainers and advisors but are they
as yet being used to maximum effect in cooperative security with partners?
…or
should NATO remain content with its role as an information sharing platform?
In
contrast to the EU, intelligence services can meet within the NATO framework
(Article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty puts the intelligence agencies, together with
National Security, beyond the mandate of the EU). Bringing together the North
American and EU military and civilian intelligence picture on terrorism (and observations
on the effect of recent CT measures) is a powerful asset but, in this
particular field, perhaps serves more to inform Allies than to prepare the
Alliance as a whole for action. Nevertheless, such a wide and strategic
overview can offer some value in addition to the much more in-depth and
focussed one-to-one intelligence exchanges that exist between Allies and
between Allies and partners. Input from partners, especially from those nations
where some Allies may not have an extensive diplomatic or intelligence
presence, can add usefully to the general strategic picture as well as
increasing the size of the community which views the threat through the same
lens.
Conclusions
As
an Alliance, NATO necessarily exists for the benefit of its members. However
engagement with partners, both individual nations and international
organisations, has become more important over time and is a key way to ensure
mutual benefit. NATO’s 2012 CT Policy Guidelines focus on a shared threat
awareness and possession of relevant capabilities for Allies, but also focuses
equally on engagement with partners to push back the threat boundary and
enlarge the like-minded community facing it jointly. Progress over the past two
years on the tasks cascading from the Policy Guidelines has been satisfactory
but more remains to be done in adjusting policy (crucially the Military Concept
for Defence Against Terrorism) so that the NATO CT approach is coherent. It is
also important to work on improving CT education and training in line with the
new Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation overarching policy.[32]
Beyond this the focus should be on ever-improving cooperation projects and
defence capacity-building with partners.
But
the situation has evolved since NATO put its CT Policy Guidelines in place.
Allies have yet to express any increased ambition for NATO in the CT field, but
there are areas where NATO might be able to add to the global CT approach,
particularly in support of the UN. The current hot topic in CT is Foreign
Terrorist Fighters who are leaving many nations to fight (or to offer
themselves as wives) in Iraq and Syria, predominantly in the service of
ISIL/Da’esh. Groups pledging support to ISIL/Da’esh (e.g., in Sinai, Libya,
Nigeria and Afghanistan) are also of concern but to date NATO has no formal
role, military or otherwise, in countering ISIL/Da’esh or any of its offshoots.
NATO continues to reflect on how best to contribute to the evolving global CT
effort in the absence of an official mandate. This Policy Note points to the
seemingly unique strategic information-sharing role of NATO at 28 and wonders
whether existing assets such as multinational Special Forces and Centres of
Excellence might be able to contribute more. Answers to the questions must
await Allied discussion but at present indications of willingness to go beyond
the current mandate and level of ambition are slight. NATO has untapped
potential which, given the scope of the terrorist threat, it would be wise of
Allies to use better, and more often.
About
the Author:
Dr Juliette Bird has, for the past four years, held the post of
head of NATO HQ’s Counter Terrorism section within the International Staff.
This Policy Note reflects the author’s own views and opinions which do not
necessarily correspond to the official position of NATO on the topic.
End Notes
[1]
Lee Jarvis, University of East Anglia, ‘Can Maths combat Terrorism? Frontiers
BBC Radio 4, 17 December 2014 http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04v4sxd
[2]
UNGCTS (2006): A/RES/60/288 of 20 September 2006 http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/60/288
[3]
U.S. National Strategy for Counter Terrorism (June 2011) (accessed 27 March
2015)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf
[4]
Fact Sheet: The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy (and link to full
document) (accessed 27 March 2015) at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/fact-sheet-2015-national-security-strategy
[5]
Remarks by the President at the National Defence University (accessed 12 April
2015)
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university
[6]
1991 Strategic Concept
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm
[7]
‘Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature,
including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow
of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage’
[8]
The 1990s saw terrorist attacks by the LTTE, Irish Republican Army, Red Army
Fraction, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Sikh Babbar Khalsa group and Chechens as
well as in Algeria, Colombia, Serbia and Jammu/Kashmir etc.
[9]
1999 Strategic Concept
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
[10]
‘Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature,
including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the
disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large
numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also
pose problems …’
[11]
‘The proliferation of NBC (nuclear, chemical and biological) weapons and their
means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. …. Non-state actors have
shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.’
[12]
Washington Treaty http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
[13]
Operation Active Endeavour http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm
[14]
Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (MC 472):
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69482.htm
[15]
Prague declaration: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm and Istanbul
declaration: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-097e.htm
[16]
North Atlantic Council Statement of 12 September 2011:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_77926.htm?selectedLocale=en
[17]
Despite the Madrid attacks of 2004, London attacks 2005, London/Glasgow bombs
2007, Fort Hood 2009
[18]
E.g. Al Shabaab in Somalia, Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Boko Haram
(who began military attacks in 2009) in Nigeria amongst others
[19]
Instruments relating to aircraft, hostages, nuclear material, explosives etc
see www.un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml and specifically for General
Assembly instruments: www.un.org/en/terrorism/ga.shtml and Security Council
www.un.org/en/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml
[20]
NDC Research paper No 66 April 2011: ‘NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism. Where do
we stand?’ Claudia Bernasconi. ISSN 2076-0957 Available for download from
http://www.ndc.nato.int/about/search.php?icode=2
[21]
NATO CT Policy Guidelines: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87905.htm
[22]
http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-13.pdf
INSS Strategic Perspectives 13: The new NATO Policy Guidelines on
Counterterrorism:Analysis, Assessments, and Actions Stefano Santamato with
Marie-Theres Beumler, edited by Nicholas Rostow February 2013
[23]
This document is classified and hence not available for public consultation
[24]
Man portable air defence system
[25]
Jihad Trending: a comprehensive analysis of online extremism and how to counter
it. Ghaffar Hussain and Dr Erin Marie Saltman 13 May 2014,
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf
[26]
Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security, item on Berlin partnership
package ‘towards a more efficient and flexible partnership’ www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm
[27]
Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (long and short term components)
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/announcements/news/20140403_en.htm including the
College Sahelien de Sécurité http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/mid-term-review-ct-sahel-2014-final-report_en.pdf
[28]
Wales Summit Declaration
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
[29]
NDC Research paper No 104 September 2014: “The Home Game” Countering Violent
Extremism within NATO Jacqueline Page. ISSN 2076-0957 Available for download
from http://www.ndc.nato.int/about/search.php?icode=2
[30]
As in the SPS projects cited in paras 18 and 19
[31]
See www.aco.nato.int/nato-deployment-of-patriot-missiles-to-turkey.aspx and related
video article ‘Turkey’s border threat and NATO’s role’ 14 October 2014
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/76706.htm
[32]
MC 0458/3 whilst unclassified is not a public document
Publication Details:
This article was first published at Perspectives
on Terrorism,
a journal of the
Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies
ISSN 2334-3745 (Online) Vol
9, No 2 (2015) / Original Link
Note: Embedded is Video from Official NATO YouTube channel for the reference purpose.
