An American-Iranian entente that leaves Teheran with the capability to produce nuclear weapons and which strengthens the Iranian drive for regional hegemony is the most serious challenge to Israel’s national security in the near future. For Israel, none of the other Mideast upheavals and uncertainties pose nearly as great a threat.
By Prof. Efraim Inbar
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: An American-Iranian entente that leaves Teheran with the capability to
produce nuclear weapons and which strengthens the Iranian drive for regional
hegemony is the most serious challenge to Israel’s national security in the
near future. For Israel, none of the other Mideast upheavals and uncertainties
pose nearly as great a threat.
The
Middle East is in great turmoil. The statist order that has underpinned the
region for a century has collapsed. Several states have lost their monopoly
over the use of force and are no longer able to provide law and order. This is
especially true of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. Even Egypt, the only
historic Arab state, has had difficulties effectively enforcing its sovereignty
over its territory. Many of the militias challenging these state entities have
a radical Islamist ideology, reflecting the rise in the appeal of political
Islam in the Arab world. In contrast to the leaders of these states, who are
inefficient and corrupt, the Islamists actually deliver services to the people
and have a reputation for being brutal but honest. However, the likes of Al
Qaida in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or the so called Islamic State (IS) are
hardly the proper agents for modernizing their environments and their
popularity dooms the Arab world to continuous ignorance and poverty. For this
and other reasons, Israel will need to remain vigilant in the years ahead.
Outside
Looking In
The
decline of the Arab world has been paralleled by the rise of non-Arab Muslim
powers – Turkey and Iran. Both countries fare better on development indices and
display nowadays an ambitious foreign policy fueled by imperial and Islamist
impulses. Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ‘zero problems’ approach to
foreign policy, Turkey has gradually distanced itself from the West. In 2003,
for example, Ankara rejected the United States’ request to open a “northern
front” against Iraqi forces. More recently, Turkey has opposed sanctions levied
by the United Nations and the West against Russia and Iran.
For
its part, Iran has successfully advanced its nuclear program despite the
displeasure of the international community. Comparatively, recent developments
in the Middle East and beyond have also allowed Tehran to establish a ‘Shiite
Crescent’ stretching from Tehran to the eastern Mediterranean. This has
provided Iran with countless opportunities to project power into the Middle
East and Balkans, much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and others. Indeed, the
successes of Iranian Shiite proxies in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa
underscore the Tehran quest for hegemony in the Middle East.
By
contrast, US influence around the Middle East appears to be in decline,
primarily as a result of the Obama administration’s foreign policy outlook.
Correcting Washington’s overextension in the Islamic world is indeed necessary,
but insensitivity to the concerns of its allies such as Egypt, Israel and Saudi
Arabia is destructive to the regional balance of power.
In
this respect, Washington’s efforts to strike a deal with Iran that basically
legitimizes its nuclear breakout status and awards Tehran the role of the
regional policeman will be viewed by Cairo, Riyadh and Jerusalem as a colossal
strategic mistake. The inevitable result will be further nuclear proliferation
as none of these countries are likely to want to stay behind in uranium
enrichment capabilities. Moreover, the regional instability could lead to more
bloodshed. Relying on a radical and revisionist regime in Tehran to provide
stability is the height of strategic folly.
The
View from Jerusalem
The
implications of the Middle East’s ongoing turmoil for Israel’s security are
mixed. Like Iran and Turkey, a democratic and politically stable Israel is also
a rising non-Arab power and a player in the regional balance of power. The
power differential between Israel’s national might and its neighbors has
further increased, given that it has managed to prosper economically and
develop a high-tech powerful military. In addition, the strong armies of Iraq
and Syria have disappeared, decreasing the chances for a large-scale
conventional encounter with Israel. Moreover, the pro-Western Sunni states such
as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia see Israel as an ally against a rising Iran,
as well as against radical Islamist movements. This also comes at a time when
the United States is viewed in many quarters as a less dependable ally.
By
contrast, low intensity challenges might intensify. The domestic problems
plaguing weakened Arab states make them increasingly susceptible to radical
Islam and more prone to terrorist violence. As their leaders lose their grip
over state territory and borders become more porous, armed groups and
terrorists gain greater freedom of action. Moreover, as weakened states lose
control over their security apparatus, national arsenals of conventional (and
non-conventional) arms become increasingly vulnerable, which may result in the
emergence of increasingly well-armed, politically dissatisfied groups that seek
to harm Israel. For example, following the fall of Gaddafi, Libyan SA-7
anti-air missiles and anti-tank RPGs have reached Hamas in Gaza. The IS even
fights with American weapons captured from the Iraqi army.
Similarly,
in the event of the Assad regime collapsing, Syria’s advanced arsenal of
conventional weapons could easily end up in the hands of Hizballah or other
radical elements. This, in turn, raises the prospect of an emboldened Hizballah
and Hamas – both of whom are Iranian proxies located along Israel’s borders –
renewing their campaigns of violence. In recent years, the fallout from the
Arab Spring has helped to detract attention away from the Palestinian issue. In
addition, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) ability to harm Israel in order to
reignite international interest is also very limited. As a result, a weak PA
has come under increasing pressure from the popular Hamas. A Palestinian
strategic miscalculation, leading to the eruption of another round of violence,
is a possibility that Israel cannot ignore. Nevertheless, so far Israel has been
successful in containing the threats from sub-state groups and in limiting
their potential damage.
The
emergence of an uncertain and unstable strategic environment is conducive to
strategic surprises. Israeli intelligence is challenged by a plethora of new
actors and leaders whose modus operandi is far from clear. Israel has a large
and sophisticated intelligence apparatus. Yet it is not immune to surprises.
Therefore, it would be wise to prepare for worst-case scenarios, rather than
succumb to rosy assessments.
Looking
West (in more ways than one)
The
turmoil in the Arab world is also changing the strategic landscape in the
Eastern Mediterranean basin, where elements of radical Islam are gaining
control. Tunisia, Libya, Sinai in Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey all
play host to groups with Islamist tendencies, thereby threatening the currently
unrestricted access to this area by Israel and the West. Approximately 90
percent of Israel’s foreign trade is carried out via the Mediterranean, making
freedom of navigation in this area critical for Israel’s economic well-being.
Moreover, its chances of becoming energy independent and a significant exporter
of gas is linked to Israel’s ability to secure free passage for its maritime
trade and to defend its newly discovered hydrocarbon fields, Leviathan and
Tamar. These developments require greater Israeli efforts in the naval arena.
Indeed, Israel is engaged in building a robust security system for the gas
fields and has procurement plans for additional vessels.
As
with other parts of the Middle East, the assessment in Jerusalem is that the
key factor in the developing regional balance of power is Iran’s
nuclearization. This would be a “game changer” that only Israel has the
capability to prevent. Netanyahu’s recent electoral victory left in power the
only leader that might have the political courage to order a military strike to
obstruct the Iranian progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, his
victory was quietly welcomed in the capitals of the moderate Arab states that
are terrified of Iran and have little time for Obama. Saudi Arabia and Egypt
are good examples.
Accordingly,
Israel is watching with growing bewilderment the endeavor of the Obama
administration to implement a “grand bargain” with Iran. This puts Jerusalem on
an inevitable collision course with its most important ally. Israel continues
to benefit from a large reservoir of sympathy among the populace of the United
States, and most notably within the Republican controlled Congress. Yet, while
Obama is not popular, as president he can extract heavy costs in the military,
diplomatic and strategic arenas. The remaining 22 months until he leaves office
must be weathered with minimum damage to the American-Israeli strategic
partnership, particularly if Israel chooses to make good on its threat not to
allow Iran to become a nuclear power. With this in mind, the American-Iranian
nexus is the most dangerous challenge for Israel’s national security in the
near future.
This
article was originally published in The International Relations and Security
Network, ETH Zurich on April 13, 2015.
About the Author:
Efraim
Inbar, a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, serves as the
director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies and a Shillman/Ginsburg
fellow at the Middle East Forum.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family.