By Andreas Fabian The last two decades have seen a growing trend towards describing India and China as rivals, potential adversa...
By Andreas Fabian
The
last two decades have seen a growing trend towards describing India and China
as rivals, potential adversaries and dangerous maritime powers playing a
strategic and often hazardous game in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The words
of Alfred Thayer Mahan – “whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia”[1]
– and the words of another well-known strategist K.M. Panikkar who described
the Indian Ocean (IO) as being “truly Indian”[2] seem to be still important and
deep-rooted in nowadays Indian strategic thinking about the waters surrounding
India and the littoral states of the IOR.[3] With a growing economic and
political importance of China and its ever expanding sphere of influence, India
has begun to feel threatened by cunning intentions of its long-term challenger
in the IOR.[4] As Walgreen puts it, the IO “features a high level of strategic
value in terms of location, resource potential, and political development,”[5]
which could not have gone unnoticed by the Chinese, whose strategic involvement
in the IOR has reached an unprecedented level. And it is not only China that is
fast-growing and expanding its control and domination. India has also entered
the stage of a competent great power which is predicted to affect the security
apparatus of the international system.[6] Since India, as Holmes and Yoshihara
argue, is not willing to “allow any outside power to police the region,”[7] and
since “the Chinese aspire to expand its influence and to ultimately dominate
the strategic environment of the IOR,”[8] the region is appearing to be a
dangerous place on earth where competition is expected to further escalate in
the years to come.
Before
making future predictions about this tense situation, it is of a great
significance to closely look and examine both countries’ intentions, strategic
plans and tactics they use at sea that can give us a clue whether their
strategies collide or not, and whether we can expect a clash in the form of
contention or even conflict. The main aim of this paper is to investigate
whether China and India are on a collision course by analysing their maritime
strategies in the IOR. By examining the China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy and
the India’s ambitions and its ‘Look East’ policy, the central argument of this
essay has been developed – the Chinese and Indian maritime strategies and their
aspirations have disposed two powers into a collision course in the IOR. First
of all, the strategic significance of the IOR is highlighted, with an emphasis
put on the importance for both China and India. In the subsequent section, two
already mentioned strategies and countries’ ambitions are analysed. The next
part looks deeper into the strategies and indicates a collision course. The
last part of this essay concludes.
The
Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean Region
In
his article, Kaplan noted that geography dictates and determines the “critical
trends in world politics.”[9] When we look at the map of the IO and if we keep
today’s trends of consumer societies in mind, one quickly realizes the reason
why the region has become increasingly salient within the scholarly and policy
debates in the recent decade. When talking about the IO, first and foremost,
scholars and strategic analysts point out the fact that the world’s most
important water passages – Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el Mandeb and
Strait of Malacca – are all located within the IOR.[10] Moreover, the IO’s
linkage with the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans through the maritime routes only
adds to its geostrategic significance.[11] With the total of “90% of global
commerce and about 65% of all oil that travel by sea, the IO accounts for fully
half the world’s container traffic and 70% of the total traffic of petroleum
products.”[12] As Cordner emphasizes, “more than half of world’s oil production
is transported through the IO and more than 80% of this oil passes through the
three IO straits: Hormuz, Malacca and Bab-el Mandeb.”[13] In addition, the
majority of the commerce passing through the IO does not terminate within the
region, but goes further to reach non-IOR states.[14] From the aforementioned
statistics, it clearly appears that the IO bears not only economic but also
political significance, and not only for the IOR littoral states, but also for
outside powers. In order to ensure the smooth flow of goods necessary for
world’s economic prosperity and to secure states’ national sensitive interests
in the IOR, it is of utmost importance to inject enough power to fully
safeguard the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) to avoid any unexpected and
unwanted disturbance.[15] China and India have particularly been injecting the
power into the IOR, which is for both countries essential for a number of
reasons explored in the following part of this paper, which separately looks at
the core motivation of these two rising powers.
The
Importance of the IOR for China
Over
the past several years, the IOR has attracted a great level of attention of
many Chinese scholars, strategic thinkers, and decision and policy makers. Even
though the region is not on the top of the Chinese national security list, it
still preoccupies China to a great extent due to its mounting dependence on
it.[16] In his article, Scott shows that the Chinese motivation in the IOR is
twofold: on the one hand, China has high economic stakes which are mostly
related to its energy resources, and on the other hand, China aims to prevent
India from dominating the entire region.[17] The past decade has seen the rapid
development of China and the dramatic increase in country’s quest for energy
imports that are vital for its economic expansion. [18] The United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA) has ranked China on the first place in
terms of consumption of energy, and on the second place in consumption and
importation of oil.[19] As Khurana indicated, almost 80% of oil that China
imports is “sourced from West Asia and Africa and these are transported through
the Indian Ocean.”[20] The most critical water passage China is mostly
concerned about is the Malacca Strait, through which more than three quarters
of all oil has to transit from the IO to reach the Chinese territory.[21] The
situation of such a huge amount of oil that needs to traverse the Malacca
Strait has become to be known as ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and the term was coined when
the Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed his concerns.[22] Since then, it has
been widely used not only by scholars within academia, but also by the Chinese
strategists and policy makers. Apparently, China is greatly dependent on the IO
and in order to secure its interests, China keeps, as Holmes and Yoshihara
emphasize, “anxious eyes on the sea lines of communication and the security of
the waterways stretching from China’s coastlines to the IO has taken on special
policy importance for Beijing.”[23] In addition, recent developments in India
have even heightened the Chinese interests in the IOR. China is well aware of
the fact that there is a high likelihood for India to become “the engine of
economic integration in the IOR”[24] which might create a potential threat to
Chinese interests, therefore, China has expressed even more eagerness for its
expanded presence in the region. One of the conclusions that can be drawn from
this observation is that the more China imports, the more it is dependent on
the IO, therefore, the more power it needs to inject to secure its interests.
…and
for India
The
importance of the IOR for India takes the character similar to that of
China.[25] Besides being dependent on goods and energy resources originating
from or passing through the IO, the additional meaning that has been attached
to the Ocean by India, as highlighted in the introduction, seems to be of a
great significance as well. India is one of the world’s top five
fastest-growing economies and with almost three quarters of oil coming from
abroad, the strategic nature of the IOR has become vital for India.[26] In
terms of trade, India is almost fully dependent on sea transport and as
indicated by Pant, “any disruption in the Indian Ocean can have a potentially
catastrophic impact for Indian economy and societal stability.”[27] By saying disruption,
the abovementioned water passages of the IOR are those that first come into the
mind of Indian strategic thinkers. The one that is the most significant for
India is the Strait of Hormuz, where approximately “US$200 billion worth of oil
transits annually.”[28] Similarly to China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’, a large and
growing body of literature has begun to make references to ‘Hormuz Dilemma’
that India has to face as a result of its dependence on this critical waterway
and other crucial reasons that will be later revealed in this paper.[29]
Although it is true that India features with geographic advantage by enjoying a
closer proximity to critical water passages compared to China, this does not
necessarily ensure that its shipping routes will be fully secured.[30] On what
it mostly depends is the maritime strategy being deployed. In the following
part, this essay looks at what strategies both China and India use to secure
their own national interests, and investigates whether these strategies
collide, or not.
China
towards the West, India towards the East: China’s String of Pearls and India’s
Look East Policy
The
primary goal of both countries is obviously to secure their national economic
interests at sea. To do so, India and China have adopted provoking and often
intrusive strategies that are unwelcome by each other. Recent evidence suggests
that strategies China and India use go far beyond of having economic character
only. Rather, their strategies of safeguarding trade and communication routes
aggressively penetrate to each other’s spheres of influence by making close
contacts with each other’s adversaries and by making their presence in
sensitive places, which is consequently undermining their already tense
relationship. As a result, their strategies have put them into a collision
course which, unless properly managed, might pose a serious threat not only to
regional, but also to international security.
In
regards to the Chinese maritime strategy, there has been a new term created
over the past decade – the ‘String of Pearls’ – used to describe the Chinese
strategic posture towards the IOR.[31] In order to pursue its interests,
Khurana explains that “Beijing’s efforts have been directed at assisting some
IOR littorals located strategically along arterial sea-lines to build ports and
shipping infrastructure.”[32] China is well aware that India perceives its
presence in the IO undesirably, therefore, seeks to establish ties with
surrounding countries whose relationships with India are not the best and which
are likely to welcome Chinese presence in the region.[33] In addition to
building ports and infrastructure, China also supplies countries with armaments
– according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
roughly 70% of arms are sold to three countries in the IOR – Myanmar, Pakistan
and Bangladesh. [34] Basically, China is ‘buying’ sympathy of several IOR
littorals. To date, the real intentions behind the String of Pearls strategy
have been widely speculated. Whether it is merely the protection of critical
sea routes or it is also aimed at pushing back India’s expansionist approach,
the one outcome that has become clear is that this strategy is strengthening
China’s strategic position in the IOR which is not gladly received by India.[35]
Similarly, Khurana also emphasizes that it is still “unclear whether China’s
strengthening ties with regional littorals are merely politico-diplomatic and
economic endeavours, or driven by military-strategic imperatives.”[36] However,
only the mere presence of China, whether it is diplomatic of military, is met
with resistance by India, which has openly expressed its fear of being
“strategically encircled”[37] by China. Therefore, the Chinese strategy is
likely to get into collision with India.
At
the beginning of the 1990s, India adopted the ‘Look East’ policy aimed at
strengthening ties with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries in order to sustain economic prosperity.[38] Besides India’s economic
interest in Southeast Asia, the Chinese element also played a significant role
while moving eastward, and with the continuing rise of China, the policy soon
became “a demonstrable pillar of Indian foreign and defence policy.”[39] The
strategy India pursues is somehow similar to that of China’s – penetrating to
the Chinese sphere of influence by “stepping up military ties with countries
traditionally wary of China’s power.”[40] The past couple of years have
witnessed a growing interest of India in one of the most contested seas in Asia
– the South China Sea (SCHS). The statistic Scott brings to his article
indicates why. With more than half of its total commerce passing through the
Strait of Malacca, and with the growing importance of China in the SCHS, India
is cautious and keeps its eyes wide open on this gateway to the IO.[41] India
is conscious of what consequences it would have if China would be one to rule
the entire SCHS, therefore, seeks its enlarged presence in the region which is
likely to encounter with opposition by China, which is very sensitive when it
comes to issue of the SCHS.[42] As part of its strategy, India has gone even
further and reinforced strategic relationships with South Korea and Japan what
the Chinese find rather provocative.[43] Moreover, the Prime Minister Narendra
Modi introduced at the ASEAN meeting last year a new name for the India’s
strategy – known as ‘Act East’ policy – demonstrating the growing interests
India has in its eastern neighbourhood.[44] The present strategy of India
clearly indicates that the more India penetrates to the east, the more likely
it is to meet with the Chinese opposition.
It is
evident that strategies India and China use take the similar character. While
China infiltrates to the IOR by sponsoring IOR littorals, India penetrates to
the east by making strategic connections with Southeast and East Asian
countries. Apparently, both strategies enter each other’s spheres of influence,
which both countries are likely to find intrusive. Hence, these strategies are
set in a way that puts countries into a collision course. To further justify
this, the next part of this paper looks deeper into both strategies and
investigates particular ties countries have recently made.
The
Chinese ‘Pearls’
One
of the most significant current discussions about the Chinese ‘pearls’ is
primarily directed at China’s relationship with Pakistan. In addition to the
abovementioned arms sale to Pakistan, China is taking part in building of a
strategically located port in Gwadar that provides China with enormous benefits,
one of which is close proximity to critical water passages.[45] Consequently,
by being present in this strategic place, Khurana argues that it will allow
“monitoring of all shipping activity and military movements.”[46] The Chinese
presence in Gwadar has attracted much attention and has opened up the debate
whether the port will serve a military function or it is being solely built for
commercial purposes.[47] Regardless of whether there is a military presence of
China or not, the Chinese growing ties with and its presence in Pakistan –
India’s long-term adversary – is all seen by India as an attempt to balance
against its endeavour for maritime preponderance in the IOR.[48] This part of
the Chinese strategy significantly adds to the ‘Hormuz Dilemma’ and because it
is undesirably perceived by India, it clearly indicates a collision course.
In
addition to Pakistan, China has engaged with at least three more ‘pearls’ to
form the string. In recent years, China has linked with Myanmar, another
‘troubled’ state to which China has poured an enormous amount of money to build
infrastructure, including several ports along the coast.[49] As with the
previous case, the Chinese military activity in Myanmar has been much debated
and despite the fact that no evidence has been found, Walgreen still thinks
that “Chinese-financed port facilities are designed to accommodate vessels that
Myanmar does not possess, but China does.”[50] Any future possibility of a
military presence by China in the IO would be hardly seen by India in a
positive way. The same strategy has been used in Sri Lanka, where China is
cooperating with Sri Lankan authorities to build a port in Hambantota that is
believed to serve Chinese strategic interests due to its close proximity to
critical sea routes.[51] Investments in Hambantota seem to bear little economic
prospect for China, yet the only benefit China enjoys is its presence in the
strategically significant IOR.[52] The last pearl presented in this essay is
Bangladesh where the Chinese have expended money in building a port in
Chittagong with the expectations of achieving a strategic presence, if not
military.[53]
As it
appears, it is very difficult to read and clearly understand Chinese intentions
behind their strategy. The investments China has made could be understood in
various ways and although it is difficult to prove the militarily-oriented
thinking while building ports and financing infrastructure in various IOR
littorals, what has become clear is that China has significantly expanded its presence
in the region, the presence that the Indians are specifically worried about.
India perceives this strategy as being created to “restrict India’s freedom to
manoeuvre in the region.”[54] Thus, this situation is almost certain to cause a
disagreement between the two rivals.
India’s
‘Eastern Friends’
Recent
developments in China and its growing presence in the IOR have obviously led to
a renewed interest in India not to allow its counterpart to dominate the region
and to control significant sea routes upon which both countries are dependent.
To do so, India set up its Far Eastern Command in the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands in 2001 to make the entry to the IOR difficult in order to keep the
level of the Chinese penetration to the region at minimum.[55] In 2012, India
constructed a new military port called INS Baaz which is frequently used by
India for purposes of policing the area.[56] Being militarily present in less
than 100 miles from the Strait of Malacca, India is in a great position of
maintaining surveillance over this significant water passage.[57] Even though
China does not perceive India as an immense threat, India’s exercise of power
in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is a clear sign of the “potential challenge
to China’s maritime ambitions.”[58]
Following
the Look East policy, India has strategically linked with Vietnam. Both
countries have found themselves sharing the same attitude towards China and
their relationship has become to be seen as a reaction to Sino-Pakistani
partnership.[59] As already mentioned above, it is crucial for India to prevent
China from dominating the entire SCHS region and one way of doing so is to
assist Vietnam with military modernization process, focusing particularly on
Vietnamese maritime capacity and its air forces.[60] India’s engagement with
Vietnam has not yet reached the level that China would need to be worried
about, however, China has already become interested in this strategic
partnership because in the case of possible future confrontation in the SCHS,
Vietnam would be able to find a strong support in India, the fact that might
diminish China’s success to win.[61] Besides Indo-Vietnamese partnership, India
has gone further and reinforced its eastern ties in the form of “naval
exercises with Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia.”[62] Obviously, India is
moving in a direction in which it is likely to gain a strategic leverage, thus
likely to run into a collision with China.
Conclusion
The
world is changing, many new powers are emerging, population is rising and
demands are increasing. Natural resources are becoming scarcer and rivalry is
mounting. Many states have already been exposed to competition for the same
objectives or for superiority in the same region, or for both. China and India
represent the most profound example of such competition. Their growing dependence
on the IOR and their national interests have been widely discussed, yet the
future direction of their tense relationship remains uncertain and mostly
dependent on their practices at sea. The main purpose of this study was to
investigate whether China and India are on a collision course by looking at
maritime strategies they follow. This essay has shown that stakes both China
and India have in the strategically significant IOR are high and that
strategies these countries have deployed collide. Through the String of Pearls
strategy, China has entered the IO and has made strategic contacts with various
IOR littorals, most importantly with Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh, which collides with India’s ambitions to achieve “pre-eminence in
the region.”[63] On the other hand, India has moved to the east and as far as
to East Asia which is becoming a new element that is likely to foster the
competition in the future.[64] As this essay has shown, India’s military
presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands might endanger China’s national
interests in the IOR, and the growing ties with Vietnam might jeopardize the
Chinese maritime claims in the SCHS. Consequently, both countries’ strategies
are far from being harmonious and free from disagreement, rather, this essay
argues that their actions clearly show signs of a collision course. To avoid
conflict and real confrontation, the burden falls on the United States, the
only power capable of keeping the situation under control.[65]
About the Author:
Andreas Fabian,a student at King's College London has written this analysis as a part of university degree assessment for Dr. Alessio Patalano. It was first submitted in April 2015 to the University and re-published at "E-International Relations" on Sep 6, 2015
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Footnotes
[1]
Holmes and Yoshihara, “China and the United States,“ 43. See also Brewster, “An
Indian Sphere of Influence,“ 2.
[2]
Pannikar, India and the Indian Ocean, in Pant, “India in the Indian Ocean,“
281.
[3]
Pant, ed., The Rise of the Indian Navy, 3-4.
[4]
Lou, ”US-India-China Relations,“ 625.
[5]
Walgreen, “China in the Indian Ocean Region,“ 66.
[6]
Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,“ 17.
[7]
Holmes and Yoshihara, ”China’s Naval Ambitions,” 385.
[8]
Pant, “India in the Indian Ocean,“ 288.
[9]
Kaplan, “Center Stage,” 16.
[10]
Pant, “Sino-Indian Maritime Ambitions,“ 188. See also Venkatshamy, ”The Indian
Ocean Region,” 17.
[11]
Paul, “Emerging Security Architecture,“ 28.
[12]
Kaplan, “Center Stage,” 19.
[13]
Cordner, “Rethinking Maritime Security,“ 69.
[14]
Pant, “Sino-Indian Maritime Ambitions,“ 189.
[15]
Vasan, “India’s Maritime Core Interests,“ 416.
[16]
Holslag, “The Reluctant Pretender,“ 42., and Pant, “Rising China,“ 5.
[17]
Scott, “India’s Aspirations and Strategy,“ 505. See also Khurana, “China’s
String of Pearls,“ 16.
[18]
Zhao, ”China’s Global Search,” 207-208.
[19]
“China.”
[20]
Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls,“ 2.
[21]
US Department of Defense, in Brewster, ”An Indian Ocean Dilemma,” 2.
[22]
“China’s Unarmed Arms Race.”
.
See also Khurana, ”China’s Maritime Strategy,“ 56., or Bhaskar, “China and
India,“ 313.
[23]
Holmes and Yoshihara, ”China’s Naval Ambitions,” 369.
[24]
Mohan, ”India and the Balance of Power,” 22.
[25]
Hornat, “The Power Triangle,“ 7-8.
[26]
Berlin, “India in the Indian Ocean,“ 65.
[27]
Pant, “Sino-Indian Maritime Ambitions,“ 189.
[28]
Indian Maritime Doctrine, in Holmes and Yoshihara, “China’s Naval Ambitions,“
383.
[29]
Kaplan, “Center Stage,“ 21. See also Bhaskar, “China and India,“ 313.
[30]
Brewster, “An Indian Ocean Dilemma,“ 3.
[31]
Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls,“ 3. See also Paul, “Emerging Security
Architecture,“ 34., or Brewster, “An Indian Sphere of Influence,“ 5.
[32]
Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls,“ 3.
[33]
Holmes and Yoshihara, “China’s Naval Ambitions,“ 377.
[34]
“Trends in International Arms Transfers.”
[35]
Kapoor, ”India’s China Concern,” 667., and Pant, ”India in the Indian Ocean,”
287-288.
[36]
Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls,“ 4.
[37]
Indian Maritime Doctrine, in Yoshihara, “Chinese Views of India,“ 492.
[38]
Cohen, Emerging Power, 252-253.
[39]
Pryce, “The Indian Navy,“ 4.
[40]
Rehman, “Keeping the Dragon at Bay,“ 129.
[41]
Scott, “India’s Role,“ 53-54.
[42]
Ibid.
[43]
Pant, ed., The Rise of the Indian Navy, 113-114.
[44]
“Modi Unveils India’s Act East Policy.”
[45]
Rehman, ”Keeping the Dragon at Bay,” 118.
[46]
Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls,“ 12.
[47]
Dixon, ”From Pearls to Arrows,” 392.
[48]
Walgreen, ”China in the Indian Ocean Region,” 60.
[49]
Kapoor, “India’s China,“ 668.
[50]
Walgreen, ”China in the Indian Ocean Region,” 62.
[51]
Brewster, “Beyond the String of Pearls,“ 139.
[52]
Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls,“ 15.
[53]
Holslag, ”The Reluctant Pretender,” 49.
[54]
Pant, “India in the Indian Ocean,“ 288.
[55]
Pant, “Sino-Indian Maritime Ambitions,“ 196.
[56]
Pryce, “The Indian Navy,“ 4.
[57]
Ying, “An Analysis of India,“ in Yoshihara, “Chinese Views of India,“ 495.
[58]
Yoshihara, “Chinese Views of India,“ 495., and Ganguly, ed., India, 109.
[59]
Malhotra, “Indo-Vietnam Relations,“ in Scott, “India’s Role,“ 60-62. See also
Weimar, ”Sino-Indian Power Preponderance,” 20-21.
[60]
Rehman, “Keeping the Dragon at Bay,“ 132-133.
[61]
Vasan, “ India’s Maritime Core Interests,“ 422.
[62]
Pant, “Sino-Indian Maritime Ambitions,“ 197.
[63]
Holmes and Yoshihara, ”China’s Naval Ambitions,” 385.
[64]
Scott, “India’s Role,“ 65.
[65]
Kaplan, “Center Stage,“ 18.
