By David Brenner Hopes were once high that Myanmar’s transition to semi-civilian government in 2011 would be accompanied by the set...
By David Brenner
Hopes were once high that Myanmar’s transition to
semi-civilian government in 2011 would be accompanied by the settlement of its
decades-old conflicts with its ethnic minorities. However, many of the
country’s insurgencies have escalated since then, plunging the north back into
renewed civil conflict. As things currently stand, government forces are
battling various ethnic armed groups – including Kachin, Kokang, and Palaung
movements – resulting in heavy losses on both sides and the displacement of up
to 200,000 civilians in Shan and Kachin States.
The escalation of conflict seems particularly puzzling
because Myanmar’s generals managed to pacify many of the country’s
ethno-nationalist insurgencies with ceasefires in the 1990s. These settlements
allowed non-state armed groups to not only retain their arms and pockets of
territory, but also granted lucrative business concessions. Instead of fighting
each other, elites from all sides started to collaborate in exploiting the
area’s natural riches. Dubbed “ceasefire capitalism”[i] by some observers, this
economic approach to counterinsurgency produced a remarkably stable order.
Fast forward several years, however, and an
arrangement which once appeared to be working well now lies in tatters. The
same insurgency movements that were ostensibly bought off with economic
incentives have again taken up arms and resumed calls for greater ethnic
minority rights and federalist constitutional amendments. At a recent
conference at the London School of Economics, the long-time Myanmar observer
Martin Smith called the renewed escalation of these conflicts the most pressing
and puzzling question currently facing the Southeast Asian country’s peace
process and wider transition. Indeed, Smith followed this up by asking why some
ethnic groups have been able to remobilize on such a scale after years of
ceasefire and, in some cases, eroding capacities.
In the article ‘Ashes of Co-optation: from Armed Group
Fragmentation to the Rebuilding of Popular Insurgency’, recently published in
Conflict, Security and Development, I seek to answer these questions by
analyzing the 2011 breakdown of the 17-year ceasefire between Myanmar’s armed
forces and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO).[ii] This armistice with
one of the country’s oldest and strongest ethnic armed groups was considered
‘integral to the security of northern Burma’.[iii] During the ceasefire years,
individual Kachin rebel elites also lined their pockets with the proceeds of
the lucrative ceasefire economy, while their organization’s military strength
and revolutionary agendas withered away. However, after experiencing near
organisational collapse in the early 2000s, the insurgency has found its former
resolve, capacity, and popularity.
To reveal why the co-optation of Kachin leaders
ultimately failed, it is necessary to trace the ripple effects this development
sparked within other parts of the movement. While the mutual exploitation of
the area’s vast natural resources – including jade, teak, and gold – profited
elites on all sides, wealth did not trickle down to local communities. The
settlement also left underlying grievances about ethnic and political
marginalization unaddressed. Moreover, the ceasefire did not mean an end to
insecurity for many Kachin. Unsustainable mining and logging operations brought
large-scale environmental degradation, land grabs, and militarization. In its
wake a rampant narcotics and HIV/AIDS problem has choked the region’s
disillusioned youth. These developments planted the seeds for new grievances
within local communities and the Kachin movement, which were now not only
directed at the Myanmar government, but also against Kachin leaders. This also
provided a fertile ground for an emerging faction of young officers to take
over leadership by mobilizing against the old guard’s conciliatory stance.
Through the crafting of new alliances and the building of new institutions they
managed to remobilise popular insurgency on a large-scale.
The insights from the Kachin case are important for
understanding the wider dynamics of conflict in Myanmar and beyond. Most
importantly, a business and development focused approach to conflict resolution
might buy temporary stability, but it cannot buy peace. In Myanmar, the ongoing
negotiations for a national ceasefire and an eventual peace agreement between
the government and the country’s ethnic armed groups have not yet produced any
tangible results mprecisely because of past and present ceasefire
experiences.While Naypyidaw still encourages investments in natural resource
extraction and large-scale infrastructure projects in ceasefire areas, it
continues to bar discussions on the underlying political issues of the
country’s ethno-national conflict, most-importantly federal provisions for
power-sharing.
This can be well observed in southeast Myanmar’s Karen
State, which has seen increased in investment in infrastructure and resources
since the country’s oldest insurgency movement – the Karen National Union (KNU)
– signed a historical and much-applauded armistice in 2012. In Karen State as
well as in other marginalized and war-torn communities, it is certainly
undeniable that an end to fighting and economic development has helped to
improve insecure and impoverished livelihoods. Yet, Myanmar’s unaltered
ceasefire politics deliver neither long-term development nor security. On the
contrary, the everyday lives of civilians in ceasefire areas are still
dominated by militarisation and displacement most often at the hand of army and
militia soldiers, who forcefully clear the land for mining operations,
agro-businesses and infrastructure. The worrying resemblance of present and
past ceasefire experiences, therefore, casts doubt on the success of the
ongoing peace process in its current form, despite wider changes in Myanmar’s
political landscape since the country initiated political and economic reforms
in 2011. Rather than repeating past mistakes, decision-makers from all sides
need to learn from the breakdown of previous settlements. Only then can the
country’s perpetual cycle of violence be broken.
Ashes of Co-optation: From Armed Group Fragmentation
to the Rebuilding of Popular Insurgency in Myanmar will be available for six
months free and open access exclusively through this link by courtesy of
Conflict, Security & Development and Taylor and Francis.
Ashes
of Co-optation: From Armed Group Fragmentation to the Rebuilding of Popular
Insurgency in Myanmar will be available for six months free and open access
exclusively through this link by courtesy of Conflict, Security &
Development and Taylor and Francis.
This article has been first published at ISN Blog maintained by ISN ETH Zurich
About
The Author:
David
Brenner is a doctoral researcher in International Relations at the London
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His research focuses on the
politics of non-state armed groups and the political economy of borderlands in
Myanmar/Burma. He tweets @DavBrenner.
References:
[i] Woods, Kevin, 2011. ‘Ceasefire
capitalism: military–private partnerships, resource concessions and
military–state building in the Burma–China borderlands’. Journal of Peasant Studies
38(4).
[ii] Brenner, David, 2015. ‘Ashes of
Co-optation: from rebel group fragmentation to the rebuilding of popular
insurgency in Myanmar’. Conflict, Security and Development 15(4).
[iii] Farrelly, Nicholas, 2012. ‘Ceasing
Ceasefire? Kachin Politics Beyond the Stalemate’. In Myanmar’s Transition:
Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities. Cheesman, Skidmore and Wilson. Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p.54.
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