By Flavio Sanguigni ‘Islamic groups have conducted the most significant, deadly, and profoundly international attacks.’ (Ropoport...
By Flavio Sanguigni
‘Islamic
groups have conducted the most significant, deadly, and profoundly
international attacks.’ (Ropoport, 2012: 51)
Groups engaged
in confrontations with Governments, antagonist parties or with forces that are
occupying disputed territories, are often on the edge, and can feel the need to
resort to terrorist practices (Hoffman, 2006: 23-24-26). When this choice is
made, they try to disseminate their ideology as much as possible and in this
way try to increase the number of their active and passive supporters (Hoffman,
2006: 28).
Ropoport
(2012: 41-42-43), accounts for four waves of terrorism of which, the end of the
third and the whole of the fourth are noteworthy for this essay’s purpose. They
refer to a transformation of some Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, from
nationalistic to religious and, in the fourth wave, give a full insight into
the dynamics of those organizations which while originating from within the
religious wave develop particular characteristics into a much wider framework.
Nevertheless,
when chosen as weapon within ethnic, religious, social or political confrontations,
Islamic terrorism is driven by specific factors. The reason for such choice can
be contingent to conflict’s nature and/or extreme interpretation of religious
creed (Kiras, 2013: 174); Lutz, and Lutz, 2013: 278-286). In this extent,
within this short paper, the problem’s focal aspects will find possible
justification through the following arguments:
A short
background of the historical and political context behind the Islamic terrorism
will be provided to address some of the possible causes of the same.
The
Salafist/Jihadist creed/doctrine and developments will be analyzed as the
funding principles behind two contemporary and wide spread bloody Islamic
terrorist groups, de facto representing the third millennium of the phenomenon.
The diffusion
and growth of Islamic terrorist groups will be debated. In this section, two
short case studies, respectively on Al Qaeda and the ISIS, functional to show
the status quo of the phenomenon, will be explored.
The main
outcomes that determine the spread and expansion of Islamic terrorist groups in
the contemporary world will be summarized and therefrom, specific conclusive
considerations will be drawn.
Background of
the historical and political context behind the phenomenon
Hoffman (2006:
43) dates the initial terrorist acts of the contemporary world, after the end
of the Second World War. He addresses them as part of the ‘anticolonial- and
postcolonial-era’. Using the case of colonial Palestine as illustration, he
points out how the Jewish terrorists, in their bid to coerce Britain to accede
to their requests, exploited the clear international concern about the harsh
reactions of the British when attempting to block the actions of the Jewish
terrorists (Hoffman, 2006: 46-50).
Ropoport
(2012: 51) accounts for an overlay of ethnic and sacred motivations for
terrorism already in his third wave. Correspondingly, only in the fourth wave
he posits religion and Islam in particular, as the central catalyst for the
phenomenon.
In addition,
sundry scholars (Migaux, 2007: 256); Fine, 2008); Springer et al, 2009: 22-26);
Ropoport, 2012: 52), individuate, in 1979, two major events triggering Islamic
terrorism: the Iranian Revolution and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan.
Consequently at
the time, Iran backed and stimulated Shi'a terrorism in the Middle East and in
Arabian Peninsula, whilst Sunni volunteers were supported by US against Soviets
in Afghanistan.
Accordingly,
Lebanon, with its multifaceted religious actors (Shi'a, Sunni and Druze
Muslims, Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Armenian Christians)
became the battlefield for bloody statements, propaganda, and terrorist
training camps (Pike, 2011).
Subsequently,
the Palestine dispute became the epitome of where two ethnic groups, two
creeds, one territory, the holocaust and the end of an international obligation
defined the status quo, and rose as Islam’s flag. For long time, the
Palestinian struggle, embodied (and provided a justification) in the Muslim
world, the need of firm actions against the occupation of territories and Holy
sites (Springer et al, 2009: 20-21); Al Raffie, 2012: 18).
Salafist/Jihadist
creed/doctrine, and developments
Leaving out
Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya, contemporary groundwork of the Salafist creed,
dates back in the mid-sixties when the Egyptian militant of the Muslim
brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, wrote a guide, named Milestones. Being the base for
the document, the Quran is taken as the fundament of Islam and along with the
Sunnah, as the only truth above all the other possible creeds, that by default,
resulted into their status as being fraudulent and repressive (Rabasa et al,
2006: 11); Stout, 2009: 878); Al Raffie, 2012: 17); Hayat, 2014: 38-39-40-41).
As
consequence, Qutb forecasted a time, yet to come, where it would be possible to
worship Allah in the unique correct way as per his interpretations of the holy
texts. The idea of Allah as the only entity to accede obedience, and the
rewards connected to this, is present in many parts of his narrative (Stout,
2009: 878); Hayat, 2014: 38-39-40-41).
In his book,
he proposed that until then, the whole of the Muslim people (Ummah), had been
influenced and spoiled by false ideas, and due to a profound ignorance
(Jahiliyya) coming along with the latter. Therefore, the leaders had to be
thought to live and rule according to the Islamic commandments (Sharia) to be
further enforced in all Muslim territories along with disseminating the
teachings among the Muslims around the world. Whoever would not follow these
would be judged according to the takfir, considered the apostate of Islam, and
candidate for castigation through death. (Rabasa et al, 2006: 11); Stout, 2009:
878); Al Raffie D. 2012: 15); Hayat, 2014: 38-39-40-41).
Stout (2009:
878), highlights how, for Qutb, and the following Salafi jihadists (among
others Ayman al-Zawahiri and bin Laden), there is a clear distinction between
Muslims and the rest of the world, conveying that firmly following these ideas,
would grant them the ultimate victory through Allah.
The ultimate
end goal of the Salafi jihadist, is re-establishing the Caliphate as it was in
the ancient Arab world going from Andalusia to the most remote Muslim
strongholds in Asia, in order to create the optimum environment to implement
the Sharia and so, allow the Ummah to follow Islam in the way Allah requires
(Migaux, 2007: 256); Stout, 2009: 879).
Briefly citing
Migaux, (2007: 255-258), gives a full insight of the matter:
‘The
jihad-by-the-sword—or jihadist—movement, which first emerged in the early
1970s, draws its inspiration from an age-old ideology. But it has taken an
aberrant form—the end result of a fundamentalist line of thinking based on a
mythicized view of original Islam. Indeed, its goal is the manipulation of
excluded and marginalized segments of Islamic societies.’ [jihadist terrorism]
‘has a different goal: to push for mass radicalization in the context of a
near-Messianic undertaking.’
Last
considerations for this part of the paper, cannot leave aside the fact that
modern Islamic terrorist groups, namely al Qaeda, ISIS –the Islamic State - and
many of their affiliates, have developed rhetoric narratives, that benefiting
from deep knowledge of the West, allowed their well-educated strategist, to
include approaches, tactics and ideologies hired out from Marxism-Leninism in
general and from revolutions around the world in particular (Rabasa et al,
2006: 10-11); Stout, 2009: 881); Al Raffie, 2012: 14-15-16).
Because of the
narratives they developed, one established account, contemplates the Ummah
misery, her dishonor, and subjugation due to dishonest regimes and their
aberration from real Islam as a result from historical foreign influence. Approaching
and providing at ethno-social level an easy motive for their fate, and
exploiting existent criticisms, terrorist groups try to go straight at the
heart of the people (Al Raffie, 2012: 17).
Diffusion and
growth of Islamic terrorist groups
As previously
seen, the Iranian revolution, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, ignited
fuel on an already blazing environment. It is interesting to note that Shi'a
terrorism, although having revolutionary origins stayed pretty much confined in
the countries where the terrorist organization was operating and/or, in the
nearby countries where was convenient exercise some form of influence (Hayat,
2014: 38-39-40-41).
On the
contrary, Jihadi terrorism moved and expanded accordingly to needs and
opportunities as they presented. It is worth highlighting, that despite the
confrontation among these two currents, Jihadi terrorism, to some extent,
borrowed the revolutionary connotation of Shi'a, to support what they define as
a revolutionary global counter-crusade. While from time to time, and
erratically, they supported each other with subtle propaganda statements
(Huntington (1993: 35); Hayat, 2014: 38-39-40-41).
Spread of
Islamic Terrorist Groups
Migaux (2007:
292-293) and Hayat, (2014: 41), among others, share the same view on the
relevant Afghanistan events in 1979 and about the reasons why US, Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan, supported the Mujahidin.
The main
objective for the US was containing USSR, and in some extent Iran as well, in
yet another proxy war. Saudi Arabia after few terror attacks, wanted to have a
sort of control on young Sunni extremist also in order to have a possible
weapon available, whilst for Pakistan was enough to fight an India supporter
(Migaux, 2007: 292-293); Hayat, 2014: 41).
Afghanistan
was the place where all the Muslim had to fight the Jihad, a battlefield where
weapons, training, and money where widely available. Extreme interpretations of
the Quran were thought in order to motivate and commit volunteers arriving from
the Muslim world reaching a peak of 20,000 in 1980 (Migaux, 2007: 292-293);
Hayat, 2014: 41).
From the
Afghan war, two different outcomes heavily contributed to the spread of Islamic
terrorism. First, due to the Soviet defeat, blind believers and able Muppet
masters conveyed the universal message, that Allah had rewarded his fighters
with invulnerability leading them to victory (Fine, 2008). Second, these well
trained, fearless, and now extremely radicalized fighters were mostly returning
to their countries. Migaux (2007: 293-297) accounts for at least 17 different
countries where these Jihad’s Mujahidin, returning, have become a reference
point for local extremism.
Huntington
(1993: 24-32), points out, that diverse cultures can be ‘defined both by common
objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions,
and by the subjective self-identification of people.’ Additionally, he
highlights an ongoing ‘Clash of Civilizations’, where the Muslim world feels
threatened by the West.
Following the
Gulf wars and the enduring deployment of western forces in the Arabic
peninsula, Islamic terrorist groups spread the idea that Islam and the Arab
civilization was under attack. Oil reserves and Holy sites virtual occupation,
provided the needed evidence for the concept. Furthermore, local governments
under external influence were buying western weapons. It is easy to understand
how these arguments enabled, a high degree of self-identification among
Muslims.
Al Qaeda has
had a significant role in the spreading of Islamic terrorism. It represents the
ground zero of real and active terrorism’s internationalization. His leader,
Osama bin Laden and his seniors, like Ayman al-Zawahiri, shaped a message fully
exploiting the tensions between the West and the Muslim world. The base, as
they named it, as first worldwide terror enterprise, acted as catalyst for
projecting Ummah’s grievances and frustrations, on the west in general, and on
US and Israel in particular. (Hoffman, 2006: 93); Lutz, and Lutz, 2013: 274).
The terror
network started using the worldwide Mujahidin’s contacts and, their local
linkage along with the ones naturally created by migration, (Goldstein Ferber
& Schweitzerand, 2005: 7); Hoffman, 2006: 93); Lutz, and Lutz, 2013: 274),
gathering, and controlling members, through the ideal of self-sacrifice,
istishhad, as new frontier of the Jihad; being a martyr to be the struggle and
fearless for terrain life (Goldstein Ferber & Schweitzerand, 2005: 7).
Al Qaeda
organization, aims and actions evolved through diverse stages. At the beginning
(early 1990s), it provided support for other groups. By 1998, the activities
concentrated on the building of a radical Islamic network against Israel, the
Jews and the countries perceived as invaders. Eventually in 2001 a solid
organization was in place (Goldstein Ferber & Schweitzerand, 2005: 17-18).
During the
network evolution, actions like the 1993 first attack on the World Trade
Center, the bombing in Khobar and Dahran, the 1998 simultaneous attacks at the
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 U.S.S. Cole, showed global
capacity for bloodshed. (Goldstein Ferber & Schweitzerand, 2005: 19-20).
After the
invasion in Afghanistan as consequence of 9/11, the defeat, and the killing of
the leader Osama bin Laden, a new and more flexible organization has been
shaped in order to continue the global struggle. Thought operations of
associated networks, as showed in Bali – 2002, Madrid - 2004, London -
2005/2007, and Mumbai – 2008, al Qaeda has had a large degree of visibility
pursuing the goal of having a world ruled by Islam (Goldstein Ferber & Schweitzerand,
2005: 26); Lutz, and Lutz, 2013: 274).
The last
aspect accounting for the spread of Islamic terrorism, is the circumstance that
feeble governance in the majority of Islamic countries, including corruption,
dictatorial behaviors and dead end in controlling the territories, bear out
terrorist narratives. Weak or unfair Governments, undermines society’s trust,
and this is especially sensed, when they are backed up by a western country
(Huntington, 1993: 32); Springer et al, 2009: 8-9).
Expansion of
Islamic Terrorist Groups
Spread and
expansion of Islamic terrorist groups are subtly connected. Muslims are
currently fighting under the same Islamic flag in the Middle East, in Asia, in
different regions of the former USSR, in China, in Pakistan, in India, in
Africa, and have had major conflicts in east Europe. Islamic terrorist are
committing acts of atrocities in all of these countries, in the nearby ones and
in all the others deemed responsible for Islam’s decadence. Contemporary world,
with all the technological advances brought the expansion to a level never seen
before.
One aspect of
the terrorist attacks is that they have to be memorable. This is required in
order to frighten the population and possibly pursue the main aims of the
group. They have to gain visibility among other comrades, pushing to emulate
the gesture and convincing that the tactic is working showing that there is no
alternative. When the action is planned, the media coverage of the act is
usually taken in consideration, offering footage and recorded interview of the
suicide bombers. The value to pay, is that when the media cover such events,
they invariably to some extent also authenticate them (Hoffman, 2006:
173-174-175).
Correspondingly,
terrorist organizations have developed new capacities compared to the passive
media coverage and the possible spread/broadcasting through clandestine radios
or printed materials. All the previous means, neither were controllable nor
could reach very far. Islamic terrorist groups, have shown deep media handling
knowledge, both as creation and marketing (Hoffman, 2006: 197-198); Rabasa et
al, 2006: 164).
Therefore,
suicide bombers accomplishments, occupation forces harassing civilian and
well-chosen pieces of the Quran, are expertly assorted to feed a chain of
resentment, odium and retaliation (Hoffman, 2006: 220-221).
In this way,
the group’s attitude goes from passive to active. In addition, media footage
are released to states and private owned broadcasting companies to target the
adversary. A supplementary rhetoric chronicle has been developed and conveyed
through web sites, CDs/DVDs production and publications. All this efforts are
meant to reach the organization’s members and supporters around the globe,
surpassing countries’ borders, and continents. (Hoffman, 2006: 197-198); Rabasa
et al, 2006: 164).
In contrast to
what happens in Muslim nations, where madrassas are the perfect environment for
radicalization and for moulding new generations, in the west, where to
communicate is a constitutional right, terrorist often exploit the disorganised
vacuum offered by social media and the internet. There they target adolescent,
diaspora and migrant communities ‘for propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment,
and operations on the scale of the March 2004 Madrid terrorist attack’ (Rabasa
et al, 2006: 164); Bott et al, 2009: 54-55-56-57-58-59) Springer et al, 2009:
133); The targeted societies, due to their own system which guarantees personal
freedom, are rendered often defenceless (Bott et al, 2009: 54-55-56-57-58-59).
ISIS. This
terrorist group resembles many characteristics from others and in particular
from al Qaeda from which has seen the genesis in Iraq, but adding a new
dimension to the Jihad. In 2014, after having positioned his forces between western
Iraq and eastern Syria, it self-named as the Caliphate, ruling on few millions
of people in the area (Laub and Masters, 2015).
As the word
Caliphate indicates, it refers to the rigid Salafi concept of Islam already
discussed previously. An extremely skilful media branch, coupled with filmed
infinite ferocity and web based calls, have managed to appeal large numbers of
foreign fighters that have joined the Islamic State – grossly 13,000. The
Islamic State possibly expanded as consequence of Sunni marginalization in Iraq
and Syria. In both cases, it happened due to the exclusion of Sunni from
governance, and advantaging, in the case of Iraq the Shi'a political forces
(Laub and Masters, 2015).
As lesson
learned from the al Qaeda/Islamic State experience so far, it can be clearly
deducted that, al Qaeda has accomplished much more than probably expected in
terms of disseminating the principles of the Jihad and inflicting pain to the
west through martyrdom. By contrast, the Islamic State, after being a branch of
al Qaeda in Iraq, took over, reaching for the first time of the modern
terrorism era – non including the Taliban such as a more complex environment -,
to establish a sharia ruled territory, in an area between progressing and
moderate Arab/Muslim modern countries.
Conclusions
In this paper,
the spread and the expansion of Islamic terrorist groups has been approached in
a systematic way. Some background on the history connected with the genesis of
the phenomenon and the standing political situation, have posed the base for a
journey in the Salafi doctrine and her evolution. The Salafi creed resulted as
the Islamic terrorist’s manifesto and the driving force for the actions.
Analysis of the objective spread for Islamic terrorist groups, has highlighted
that the Iranian revolution and the Afghan war started it and contributed
heavily to it.
Particularly,
the Afghan war spread some radicalized fighters around the world and posed the
fundamentalists for the development of al Qaeda. The western invasions exacerbated
the ongoing clash among the west and the Muslim world further biased from the
terrorists’ messages. As a final possible reason for spread of Islamic
terrorism, it has been established that weak governance of Muslim countries has
a big responsibility.
Concerning the
expansion of Islamic terrorist groups, technology surely takes great part of
the blame, in that it is exploited to reach boundaries that were never possible
before, and more than this, in a blink of an eye. Among many, an important
issue emerged through the references, is that young generations are exposed by
social networks and the internet, to self and coerced radicalization, with the
risk of even increasing the huge number of fighters joining networks like the
one of the Islamic State. By contrast, the technical tools in the hands of
western societies are not many. The only possible solution is the social
prevention of these risks.
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