By Zane Egitkhanoff As former republics of the USSR - home of the KGB - it should come as no surprise that Armenia and Azerbaijan b...
By Zane Egitkhanoff
As former
republics of the USSR - home of the KGB - it should come as no surprise that
Armenia and Azerbaijan both have dedicated national intelligence services,
respectively called the National Security Service (NSS) and the Ministry of
National Security (MNS). Since these two countries are essentially in a state
of war over the contested territory of Nagorno Karabakh (NK), both intelligence
services are assuredly tasked with stealing each other’s secrets (collecting
intelligence) and preventing the other from doing the same
(counterintelligence). To this end, the NSS and the MNS periodically announce
the arrest of citizens accused of conspiring with the enemy. These press
reports are typically fairly brief and do not disclose the techniques used to
detect the alleged espionage. Nevertheless, they do occasionally contain
nuggets of information, which provide a window into the inner workings of the
NSS and MNS. The objective of this article will be to comparatively assess each
country’s intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, objectives, and
operations based on publically available information.
Like all
countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan do not publically disclose how much they
spend on espionage. However, it’s
reasonable to assume that the relative size of the countries’ intelligence
budget correlates with their publically revealed national budgets. Therefore,
given the fact that Azerbaijan’s 2015 state budget is ~$25 Billion USD[i] and
Armenia’s is ~$3 Billion USD[ii], we can estimate that Baku’s intelligence
budget is approximately 8.3 times larger than Yerevan’s. Although money is not
a perfect measure of capability, it plays a significant role in human
intelligence (HUMINT) due to the fact that assets/sources frequently require
monetary compensation. For example, after he was arrested for spying in 2013,
NK soldier Rafael Avagian claimed his Azerbaijani handler paid him $1,000
(presumably USD) in exchange for detailed military information.[iii] The per
capita income in NK is difficult to determine, but Armenia’s 2013 figure was
~$7.7k[iv]. Thus the amount paid to Avagian constituted ~13% of the average
Armenian’s annual income. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s per capita income in 2013
was $17.1k. If 1,000 dollars was enough to seduce Avagian, one can assume
Armenia’s NSS would have to pay $2.2k [Ã 1,000*(17.1/7.7)] to tempt a typical
Azerbaijani soldier to provide similar information. Consequently, not only is
the NSS’ budget likely only ~12% [Ã 3/25] as large as the MNS’, but it probably
has to pay 2.2 times much per human asset to acquire the same information. In
other words, if the MNS can hypothetically afford 1,000 Armenian agents, the
NSS could only afford 55 operatives [Ã (1,000*0.12)/2.2]. Given this economic
reality, we can assume the NSS is likely far more choosey when it comes to
asset recruitment than the MNS.[v]
With regards
to Baku-controlled agents, one of the most intriguing cases to emerge in recent
years was the arrest of Armenian soldier, Mane Movsisian; NK soldier, Rafael
Avagian (referenced above); and Avagian’s friend, Davit Barseghian.[vi] The
three operatives were reportedly recruited online by an Azerbaijani
intelligence (presumably MNS) officer, who used a number of personas on social
networking sites such as Facebook.[vii],[viii] The accused claimed their
handler initially masqueraded as a Diasporan Armenian in Turkey who said he was
seeking military and infrastructure related information for NK in order to
appropriately prioritize/direct a forthcoming charitable gift. If this story has
any element of truth, it can be inferred that some MNS officers carry out
false-flag asset recruitment using their near-native Armenian-language speaking
abilities.
One year after
Movsisian et al. were arrested, Armenian media reported that the NSS carried
out a concerted disinformation campaign against the MNS, which allegedly
continued to try and recruit Armenian and NK military personnel using the exact
same online personas.[ix] Upon initial observation, this public revelation
appears to be part of an Armenian information campaign that was intended to
embarrass the MNS, because using the same cover clearly reflects shoddy
intelligence tradecraft. However, the disclosure of the disinformation campaign
also likely compelled Baku to recall/ignore whatever intelligence it received
from its social media sources between mid-2013 and mid-2014. While this may
initially seem like a setback from Baku’s perspective, in reality, it would
likely benefit the MNS since its eyes were effectively opened to a previously
unknown issue, giving Azerbaijan the opportunity to rectify a problem it may
not even know existed. Given the inherent benefit of keeping the NSS
disinformation campaign secret, one may naturally ask why Armenian media
outlets were allowed to publicize it in the first place.
There are a
number of plausible explanations that may account for this seemingly irrational
decision. First, the revelation could simply stem from an unintended leak,
reflecting poor Armenian operational security (OPSEC) or bureaucratic
ineptitude. It is also possible the MNS
learned of the disinformation campaign prior to its public revelation. If the
NSS was able to detect the MNS’ awareness, the former may have opted to
disclose the program, reasoning that the benefit of humiliating Baku superseded
the risk of publically revealing a program that the MNS had already discovered.
Another distinct possibility is that, upon further investigation, the NSS
realized the MNS online personas continued to recruit sources and collect bona
fide intelligence even after Movsisian and the two other soldiers were arrested
in mid-2013. By trumpeting the disinformation operation, the NSS may have
intended to discredit (at least in the eyes of the MNS) intelligence that was
actually both legitimate and damaging. In other words, it may have been an
Armenian attempt to trick Azerbaijan into figuratively dumping the baby out
with the bathwater. Whatever the reason, the revelation likely reflects a
sophisticated intelligence-counterintelligence dynamic between the two warring
sides.
Media reports
also shed light on how the intelligence services are able to access enemy
territory and contact HUMINT assets. For example, former Armenian police
Colonel Khachik Martirosian was arrested for espionage in early 2014.[x] The
NSS claimed Martirosian had been co-opted by (likely official cover) MNS
officers, who were operating out of Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tbilisi. The MNS’
decision to run HUMINT operations out of Georgia makes perfect sense given that
country’s shared borders and good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia;
and it’s only natural to assume the NSS leverages Armenia’s Tbilisi embassy for
the same purpose, even if there is no evidence indicating as much. In addition
to using Georgia as an access conduit, Baku also appears to conduct
intelligence operations via Iran. In this vein, the 2009 arrest and 2010 trial
of Behnam Bagheri revealed the MNS tactic of using ethnic-Azeri, Iranian
nationals to gain entry into Armenia.[xi] This demographic group likely appeals
to the MNS for several reasons. Not only are ethnic-Azeri Iranians more
inclined to sympathize with Baku’s position regarding NK, but they also compose
~20% of Iran’s population. Due to their large numbers, Yerevan cannot bar them
from crossing into Armenia, since it would undoubtedly prove economically
damaging and would harm Armenian-Iranian ties (which Yerevan is keen to
foster). In contrast, Armenian Iranians compose of less than 1% of Iran’s population,
which means Baku is likely able to enforce a de facto travel ban against them
(just as they do against other third-country national, ethnic Armenians).[xii]
In other words, the NSS probably cannot route intelligence operations through
Iran as easily or effectively as the MNS.
Behnam
Bagheri’s trial is also revealing because it was claimed that he tried to
smuggle sensitive footage across the Armenian-Iranian border.[xiii],[xiv] The
fact that a likely MNS asset had to go through such lengths to transfer his
collected data to his handlers weakly suggests (i.e. by no means confirms) that
the MNS lacked a clandestine operating base/station/safe house in Armenia as of
2009. It may also indicate the MNS
lacked the technical infrastructure, know-how, or training to electronically
send and retrieve sensitive material (e.g. encrypted email), thereby
necessitating risky real-world smuggling operations.
A final issue
worth discussing is the fact that there are far more reported cases of Azeri
assets being arrested in Armenia than vice versa. Moreover, there also appears
to be a significant qualitative difference in terms of those arrested in each
respective country. Most alleged MNS assets, for instance, appear to have had
plausible access to sensitive Armenian security information as a result of
their positions as soldiers and police officials. In contrast, Baku only
appears to have arrested journalists (Rauf Mirkadirov) and human rights
defenders (e.g. Leyla Yunus), individuals who probably just ran afoul of the
Aliyev regime and likely did not have
access to actual intelligence.[xv] It is possible this disparity could
simply reflect the relative size of each country’s HUMINT program, as discussed
earlier. That is to say, more MNS assets were arrested than NSS assets simply
because there are more of the former. It’s also possible that NSS
counterintelligence capabilities are more sophisticated than the MNS’, hence
the larger number of arrests. Another potential theory is that the NSS and MNS
have different policies in terms of publically revealing espionage cases.
Yerevan may intentionally publicize spy-related arrests as a means of deterring
other Armenian officials who might otherwise be tempted to betray their
country. In contrast, the MNS could believe that public disclosure will only
serve to highlight Armenia’s competency and reveal Azerbaijani weakness. In
other words, it is possible Baku arrests far more legitimate Armenian spies
than it is willing to publically disclose.
While this
article sought to provide an overview of Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s HUMINT
operations, it is important to acknowledge that there are many different types
of intelligence, including signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery
intelligence (IMINT). Meaning, one country’s HUMINT advantage may not
necessarily extend to SIGINT, IMINT or any other type of intelligence.
Furthermore, the NSS’ and MNS’ respective ability to integrate their collected
intelligence into defense/war plans and operations also remains a key
information gap…one which is unlikely to be covered in regional media
reporting.
This article was first published at Small Wars Journal on Sep 3, 2015
About the Author:
Zane
Egitkhanoff is an analyst for the Department of Defense. The contents of this
article do not constitute or reflect official US government policy or analysis.
End Notes
[i]
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71451
[ii]
http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/26731939.html
[iii]
http://www.horizonweekly.ca/news/details/11955/print
[iv]
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD
[v] This
calculus ignores potentially important but ephemeral variables like the
comparative patriotism of the two sides’ security forces as well as possible
third country intelligence assistance (e.g. Russia and Turkey)
[vi]
http://www.horizonweekly.ca/news/details/11955/print
[vii] Ibid.
[viii]
http://arka.am/en/news/incidents/armenian_army_servicewoman_suspected_of...
[ix]
http://telecom.arka.am/en/news/internet/armenia_s_national_security_agen...
[x]
http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-azerbaijan-spy-arrest/25253901.html
[xi]
http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijani_Court_Sentences_Iranian_Citizen...
[xii] http://news.am/eng/news/166853.html
[xiii]
http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijani_Court_Sentences_Iranian_Citizen...
[xiv]
http://www.rferl.org/content/Iranian_Tried_For_Espionage_Collapses_In_Ar...
[xv]
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69301
