Rethinking Warfare: Why Militaries Must Train for the Age of Cheap, Asymmetrical Conflict

By IndraStra Global Editorial Team

Cover Image Attribute: A Ukrainian drone operator with a first-person-view kamikaze drone.

Source: Andriy Andriyenko/SOPA Images/Shutterstock

The face of modern warfare is shifting beneath our feet, and the evidence lies scattered across battlefields from Ukraine to Syria and beyond. Conflicts once defined by towering budgets, cutting-edge technology, and symmetrical force-on-force engagements are giving way to a messier reality—one where ingenuity, improvisation, and low-cost solutions wield outsized influence. The Russo-Ukraine War and the Syria-Rebel forces conflict have thrust this evolution into stark relief, showcasing how asymmetrical warfare, powered by commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones, vintage bombs retrofitted with glide kits, and makeshift air defense systems, can disrupt traditional military paradigms. Yet, despite these glaring lessons, global militaries—particularly those of major powers like the United States, NATO allies, and even rising players like China—continue to train predominantly for conventional wars that may never come. The question looms: why aren’t we rethinking military exercises to mirror these chaotic, resource-driven scenarios? The answer may lie in a mix of institutional inertia, budgetary priorities, and a reluctance to embrace the unglamorous truth of 21st-century conflict. It’s time for a new type of military exercise—one that doesn’t just nod to asymmetry but immerses forces in it.
Let’s start with the Russo-Ukraine War, a proving ground for low-cost innovation on an unprecedented scale. Ukraine’s forces, outmatched in raw numbers and conventional firepower, turned to COTS drones like the DJI Mavic 3—hobbyist toys costing as little as $2,000 apiece—and transformed them into battlefield game-changers. Modified to drop grenades or guide artillery strikes, these drones have swarmed Russian positions, offering real-time intelligence and precision strikes at a fraction of the cost of a single missile. Meanwhile, Russia countered with its own ingenuity, retrofitting Soviet-era bombs with folding-wing glide kits to create devastating “glide bombs.” These munitions, launched from aircraft beyond the reach of Ukraine’s air defenses, marry vintage stockpiles with modern guidance, proving that high-tech isn’t always high-cost. Both sides have leaned on electronic warfare—jammers and spoofers—to neutralize drone threats, often at a cost far below that of traditional air defense systems like the Patriot. This isn’t the clean, predictable warfare of Cold War simulations; it’s a gritty, adaptive slugfest where the winner isn’t the one with the most expensive toys but the one who can stretch a dollar furthest.
Syria’s rebel factions tell a similar story, albeit with a different flavor of improvisation. Since 2016, groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham have weaponized quadcopters—again, often COTS models—to drop improvised explosives on Russian and regime targets. A notable example came in 2018, when insurgents attacked Russia’s Hmeimim airbase with store-bought drones rigged with mortar rounds and badminton shuttlecocks for stabilization. The damage was limited, but the message was clear: a $500 drone could threaten a multi-million-dollar fighter jet. Russia responded with the Pantsir S-2, a hybrid missile-gun system designed to swat such threats from the sky, but the rebels adapted again, shifting tactics to overwhelm defenses with sheer numbers. This cat-and-mouse game echoes Ukraine’s drone swarms, underscoring a universal truth: asymmetrical warfare thrives on affordability and adaptability, not overwhelming force.
These aren’t isolated cases. Look at Yemen, where Houthi rebels have used Iranian-supplied drones—some as basic as the Samad series, built from off-the-shelf components—to strike Saudi oil facilities in 2019. Costing mere thousands, these drones evaded billion-dollar defense networks, exposing the vulnerability of even the most advanced militaries to low-budget ingenuity. In Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, Azerbaijan’s Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones—mid-tier in cost but lethal in effect—decimated Armenian tanks and artillery, shifting the conflict’s balance without breaking the bank. Even in Myanmar, rebel groups have recently turned to 3D-printed drones to challenge a junta armed with Chinese and Russian hardware, proving that garage-level innovation can rival state arsenals. Across these theaters, the pattern is unmistakable: cheap, accessible technology is rewriting the rules of engagement.
So why do military exercises still lag behind? NATO’s annual exercises like Saber Strike or the U.S.’s Red Flag focus heavily on air superiority, armored maneuvers, and high-tech systems—scenarios that assume a peer adversary with matched capabilities. These drills are vital for maintaining readiness against a Russia or China, but they sidestep the scrappy, asymmetrical threats that dominate today’s conflicts. Imagine a Red Flag variant where U.S. pilots face not just simulated MiGs but swarms of $500 drones launched from pickup trucks, or where vintage bombs with glide kits rain down from unseen altitudes. Picture a scenario where troops must cobble together air defenses from commercial jammers and small-arms fire, mimicking Ukraine’s mobile anti-drone units. Such exercises wouldn’t just test hardware—they’d challenge doctrine, forcing commanders to think beyond the playbook.
The reluctance to pivot isn’t hard to understand. High-cost systems like the F-35 or hypersonic missiles are the darlings of defense budgets, promising prestige and deterrence. Asymmetrical warfare, by contrast, feels like a step backward—less sexy, more chaotic, and harder to quantify in congressional briefings. Yet the cost-benefit ratio demands attention. A single F-35 costs $80 million; 40,000 DJI Mavics could be bought for the same price, each capable of disabling a tank or disrupting a supply line. In Ukraine, Russia’s glide bombs have leveled entire towns for pennies on the dollar compared to precision-guided munitions. The Houthis’ drone strikes in Yemen cost a fraction of the Saudi interceptors fired in vain. Efficiency, not extravagance, is winning wars—a fact militaries ignore at their peril.
What might a new exercise look like? Start with a hybrid scenario blending urban and rural terrain—think Aleppo meets Donetsk. Blue forces, representing a conventional military, would face a Red team armed with COTS drones, retrofitted bombs, and improvised defenses. The catch: Red’s budget is capped at, say, $10 million, forcing them to prioritize low-cost solutions over flashy hardware. Blue, meanwhile, must adapt their $10 billion arsenal to counter threats they can’t outspend. Drones could swarm airfields, targeting F-16s on the tarmac, while glide bombs—launched from civilian planes modified mid-exercise—strike command posts. Electronic warfare would be omnipresent, with both sides racing to jam signals or spoof GPS. Victory wouldn’t hinge on total destruction but on resilience: how well can Blue hold ground against a foe that fights dirty and cheap?
This isn’t just about mimicking Ukraine or Syria—it’s about anticipating the next twist. Take the Sahel, where jihadist groups are already experimenting with drones to ambush French and UN convoys. Or consider the South China Sea, where a future conflict could see Philippine or Vietnamese forces deploying swarms of fishing boat-launched drones against Chinese naval assets. A new exercise could test adaptations like “drone motherships”—cheap cargo planes releasing waves of quadcopters—or “smart nets” fired from ground vehicles to snare enemy UAVs, an idea born from Ukraine’s drone-on-drone duels. Another innovation might be “decoy swarms,” where dozens of $100 drones mimic the signatures of larger threats, overwhelming radar and buying time for real strikes. These aren’t sci-fi fantasies; they’re logical extensions of trends already underway.
Critics might argue that focusing on asymmetry dilutes preparedness for peer conflicts. Fair point—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine still involves tanks, artillery, and missiles, not just drones and glide bombs. But the line between conventional and asymmetrical is blurring. Russia’s glide bombs are dropped by Su-34 jets, a conventional platform; Ukraine’s drones guide HIMARS rockets, a high-end system. Future wars won’t be either/or—they’ll be both/and. Exercises must reflect this hybrid reality, training forces to toggle between facing a T-90 tank and a swarm of grenade-dropping quadcopters in the same breath.
There’s a deeper stakes here: deterrence. A military that can’t handle low-cost threats risks emboldening adversaries who don’t need billion-dollar budgets to inflict pain. The Houthis disrupted global oil markets with drones costing less than a used car. Azerbaijan reshaped a decades-old conflict with a handful of TB2s. If major powers can’t adapt, they’ll cede the initiative to those who can. A new exercise wouldn’t just prepare troops—it would signal to the world that we’re ready for the fight as it is, not as we wish it to be.
The evidence is piling up, from Bakhmut’s rubble to Hmeimim’s runways. Asymmetrical warfare isn’t a sideshow; it’s the main event. Militaries that cling to old scripts risk being outmaneuvered by foes who’ve already torn up the playbook. A new type of exercise—gritty, inventive, and unapologetically cheap—could bridge the gap between yesterday’s wars and tomorrow’s. The question isn’t whether we need it. It’s why we haven’t started already.

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