SITREP: Qosh Tepa Canal (as of August 2023)

By IndraStra Global Editorial Team

Cover Image Attribute: Screenshot from Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs - Afghanistan (FDPM AFG) YouTube video depicting the construction of the Qush Tepa canal in northern Afghanistan

Can Central Asia initiate dialogue with the Taliban regarding water access?

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty recently covered the development of Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Irrigation Canal, a project costing $670 million. This 285-kilometer canal is designed to provide irrigation for 550,000 hectares of land by redirecting 25% of the Amu Darya River's flow.
Irrigating northern Afghanistan has been a long-standing priority for Kabul, dating back to the 1970s when Afghanistan's first president, Mohammad Daud Khan, initially proposed the canal. The Amu Darya River, which forms Afghanistan's border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, originates in the Hindu Kush and Wakhan regions of Afghanistan and stretches for 2,540 kilometers before reaching the Aral Sea, situated between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
In 2018, the U.S. Agency for International Development initiated a feasibility study for the canal; however, the NATO withdrawal from the country occurred before the study could be completed. The Taliban took over the project in March 2022 and have already finished approximately 100 kilometers of the canal. They assert that the canal will play a vital role in ensuring food security and will bring benefits to farmers, particularly those from the Pashtun community who support the Taliban and are expected to migrate to the predominantly Uzbek and Tajik-inhabited region.

Map Attribute: Sentinel Playground

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have expressed concerns over the potential loss of 15% of their irrigation water sourced from the Amu Darya. They have communicated these concerns to the Taliban but have not officially commented on the ongoing negotiations. The Taliban have asserted that Uzbekistan's representative conveyed a willingness to collaborate with the Islamic Emirate (the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan) through technical teams to maximize the benefits of the Qosh Tepa canal project.
Uzbekistan's primary worry revolves around the health of its cotton industry and the impact on the water-scarce region of Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan. Karakalpakstan witnessed disturbances in July 2022 after the government announced a constitutional amendment to eliminate its autonomy. This change was later withdrawn after protests that resulted in 18 fatalities and hundreds of injuries.
The existing agreement governing the sharing of Amu Darya water is the 1996 Almaty Agreement, signed by the Central Asian republics but not Afghanistan. This Agreement upholds the water allocation quotas originally established by the Soviets. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan collectively consume over 80% of the river's water. These republics have established mechanisms to manage the Amu Darya, with Afghanistan currently excluded. The Taliban maintain that they will use the water responsibly for the benefit of all parties, although they likely hold the private belief that the other states have enjoyed the advantage of 100% of the water for several decades, and now it is Afghanistan's turn to claim its rightful share.

What options are available to the Central Asian republics in this situation?

Their options are limited. Afghanistan holds a dominant position as the source of the watercourse and, notably, it is not a signatory to the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, established in 1992. However, extending a formal invitation to Kabul for participation in a water-sharing arrangement would provide the Taliban with something it desires – legitimacy. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, Central Asia faces significant water stress, and the World Bank reports that nearly one-third of the region's population, around 22 million people, lacks access to safe water.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could potentially negotiate individual agreements, but an alternative approach would be to engage the Taliban through the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC). This Commission, formed in 1992 by the newly independent Central Asian republics, is tasked with adopting principles of collective decision-making on shared water-related issues. It recognizes that water is a crucial factor for development and operates on principles of equity, equality, and consensus. Its decisions carry binding authority, and it possesses substantial expertise in water management, which it could share with Afghanistan. Involving the Taliban, possibly as an observer, in discussions with the Commission could introduce them to the regional governance structures and provide an opportunity to present their case to neighboring countries, especially on the vital matter of water access.
Should the Taliban engage in negotiations in bad faith, the Central Asian republics have several options. These include reconsidering or renegotiating the sale of electricity to Afghanistan, as Afghanistan imports 80% of its electricity from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. They could reroute surface freight traffic through Iran and the International North-South Transport Corridor, opening connections to Russia, the Caspian region, the markets of the southern Persian Gulf, and India. The Central Asian republics could also attach additional conditions to the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline and enhance counter-narcotics efforts and cooperation with Europe, Russia, the U.S., Iran, China, and Pakistan.
It's worth noting that the Taliban is reportedly funding the canal project through coal sales to Pakistan, but coal prices are expected to decline by 42% in 2023 according to the World Bank. Additionally, Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines and Petroleum recently announced reduced royalties and customs duties for coal, which may impact project financing negatively.
Furthermore, once the canal is finished, there is the issue of the Dasht-i-Jun hydroelectric complex. The dam's filling volume will utilize a significant portion of the Pyanj River's summer flow, a tributary of the Amu Darya River. This could adversely affect agriculture in Tajikistan, which ironically just joined a sustainable cotton initiative. Consequently, the Taliban is set to have substantial control over Central Asia's transboundary waters.
Regarding the U.S.'s response to increased Taliban engagement with the Central Asian republics, it's important to recognize that Central Asia may not be a top priority for Washington at this time, as it is preoccupied with the conflict in Ukraine and preparing for potential challenges from China. However, the U.S. has declared its commitment to supporting the security, development, and prosperity of the Central Asian republics, so there may be expectations for the U.S. to fulfill this policy commitment.

What Washington's Role Can Be

• Facilitate Diplomacy: Washington should avoid hindering negotiations between the Central Asian republics and the Taliban, even if this temporarily boosts the Taliban's standing. Actively opposing efforts to address food security would only serve to expose malicious intentions. Instead, supporting initiatives promoting stability and regional cooperation is essential.

• Support Water Management Initiatives: Washington can contribute by endorsing and funding water resource management projects led by international organizations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the UN-Water. These projects can be crucial in ensuring sustainable and equitable access to water resources in the region.

• Provide Information and Expertise: Sharing valuable information and tools with the Central Asian republics can empower them to make informed decisions. For instance, collaborative efforts like the partnership between the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the College of William & Mary, which generated a comprehensive report on Afghanistan's water management under the Taliban, can serve as a model. This kind of knowledge sharing can enhance regional capacity and promote responsible water resource governance.

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