By Vidhee Makwana, MAHE, India
The
return of the Afghan Taliban to Kabul and its takeover of Afghanistan while
ousting the Ashraf Ghani government has caused ripples in the international
community. This development is not only going to alter the geopolitics of South
Asia, but also cause concerns in neighboring Central Asia over the threats
emanating from Afghanistan. Central Asian Republics (CAR) fear a spillover of
the unstable security situation in Afghanistan. This is particularly true for
Tajikistan, as it is considered amongst the most impoverished and volatile of
the post-Soviet states. This article attempts to highlight the impact of the
evolving situation in Afghanistan on Tajikistan and the kind of challenges it may
face. Tajikistan shares over 1000 km of protracted and a permeable border with
Afghanistan in the northeast which also happens to be a confluence of the
Hindu Kush and the Karakorum mountains. Both nations share history, culture,
and values. Moreover, Tajiks make up the second-largest ethnicity, about twenty-seven percent in Afghanistan after Pashtuns who constitute forty-two percent.
The
Tajiks in Afghanistan have been the biggest opponents of the Taliban. Their
resistance to the Taliban first began with the then Afghan President
Burhanuddin Rabbani who was in power during 1992-2001. He was an Afghan Tajik
who was overthrown by the Taliban in 1996 after they assumed power in Afghanistan.
Rabbani along with Ahmad Shah Massoud then proceeded to form the Northern
Alliance to fight against the Taliban rule.
At present, while there have been a fraction of Tajik voices who have
spoken in support of the Taliban citing cultural similarities, Tajikistan’s
President Emomali Rakhmon has largely spoken against the Taliban ideology and
voiced his support to the Northern Alliance. After the recent Taliban offensive
in the Panjshir Valley, there was a revival of the erstwhile Northern Alliance
which is now a newly formed military alliance called National Resistance Front
(NRF) led by Ahmad Massoud and Amrullah Saleh from Panjshir, has received
massive support from the Afghan Tajik community as well as from Tajikistan. The
eventual fall of Panjshir has raised multiple questions regarding NRF and its effectiveness
as opposed to the Taliban. It is believed that leaders like Saleh and Massoud
have sought refuge in Dushanbe.
The
situation in Afghanistan is just compounding on Tajikistan’s existing issues:
unstable economy, undemocratic political system, and the threat from religious
radicalism. Dushanbe faces some immediate repercussions, like a resurgence of
the extremist elements in the region who aspire to establish a caliphate, and
an uptick in the refugees and smuggled drugs. It becomes imperative for
Tajikistan to prevent the smuggling of drugs as it is the Taliban’s largest source
of funding; illegal opium is smuggled from Afghanistan into Tajikistan, then to
Russia eventually reaching Europe.
Even
though the Taliban explicitly mentioned that their interests solely lie in
Afghanistan and that it wouldn’t interfere in the affairs of the CAR, they have
been recruiting Tajik jihadists with the help of Al Qaeda, to form a base in
the northern region of Afghanistan (close to the Tajik border), propagating the
Taliban ideology in the rural communities and setting up Madrasas. Another
pressing concern for the Tajiks is the presence of the Islamic State Khorasan
Province (ISKP) closer to their border, a handful of Taliban militants who
aren’t averse to the idea of the “new Taliban” have come out in support of ISKP
as it claims to expand their reach to the Central Asian region. Moreover, some
Tajik provinces which are closer to the Afghan border have been spotted
hoisting Black flags usually associated with ISKP. The ISKP threat had
materialized earlier in April 2015 when the head of Tajik Special Police,
Colonel Khalimov who was trained in both the U.S. and Russia defected to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The same year, he surfaced in a video
demanding a Sharia ruled the state of Tajikistan. He also accused the Americans of
training military personnel to kill Muslims.
Regardless
of the many challenges, Tajikistan could use the political situation to its
advantage. President Rakhmon has openly voiced his concerns against the
Taliban, saying he wouldn’t recognize a government “created by humiliation and
ignoring the interests of the people of Afghanistan as a whole including those
of ethnic minorities”. Dushanbe’s position on this issue didn’t toe the line of
the two major actors in the region: China and Russia. This depicts the emerging
role of Tajikistan as an important actor in the region.
The
Tajik-Afghan border is the weakest link in Central Asia’s security. This has
been keeping Moscow on the edge since the stability of the CAR region is in its
best interest, considering it still hasn’t recovered from its wounds of
extremism and the two wars that it fought for the relative peace in Chechnya.
Russia hence aims for peace and stability in the region since it doesn’t want
extremist elements to trickle into Russia. Aside from Russian interests,
Tajikistan is also a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (an
intergovernmental military alliance) and is the only member country to share a
border with Afghanistan which makes it essential for the CSTO countries to
provide security and support to Tajikistan. Russia who is also a member of
CSTO has one of the largest overseas military bases in Tajikistan which makes
it an imperative security partner. On the other hand, Western countries are hunting
for potential opportunities to partner with Tajikistan. Therefore, Moscow would
not like to alienate Dushanbe, making it easier for Dushanbe to push forward
its security demands and concerns.
Terrorism
is not a new phenomenon in the region, in fact, one of the foundational reasons
for the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was to counter terrorism. It aimed at regional stability and led one of the most successful
counter-terrorism operations by creating the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure
in 2002. It also created the SCO-Afghanistan contact group in 2005. With the
security concerns shifting from West Asia to CAR and the rise in terrorism, it
remains to be seen how the SCO strategizes to deal with Afghanistan’s security
situation. It is also important to note that China has formally initiated talks
with the Taliban, though there hasn’t been a formal recognition. This also
could be a huge factor influencing the counter-terrorism strategies of the SCO.
Tensions
have been constantly rising on the Afghan-Tajik border and diplomatic
relations have been deteriorating between Kabul and Dushanbe. Tajikistan held
two military parades in provinces bordering Afghanistan; Rakhmon still pledging
his allegiance to the Afghan government in exile has raised threat perceptions
for the Taliban. These developments have resulted in a troop build-up on both
sides increasing the security concerns for many states in the region which led
Russia to intervene urging both countries “to resolve any dispute in a mutually
acceptable manner.”
The
situation in the CAR is complex with a multiplicity of state and non-state actors
and their vested interests. A power struggle seems inevitable considering the
perplexing nature of the alliances amongst the state actors has resulted in
the non-state actors gaining an upper hand. This is going to be a major
national security concern for several countries in the region. The spillover
of the conflict from Afghanistan could potentially lead to the region becoming
a shatter belt altering the geopolitics of Central Asia and South Asia coupled
with a never-ending power struggle.
Vidhee Makwana (ORCID ID: 0000-0002-9272-6073) is a Postgraduate Research Scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), India.
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