A war has some basic definable features. Although its contemporary definition now encompasses asymmetric warfare, it still has some generally accepted characteristics. One of these is the observance of established rules of engagement.
By James Adewunmi Falode
Lagos State University
Image Attribute: "Bring Back Our Girls" Wall Graffiti Photo by Tim Green,
Flickr, Creative Commons
The conflict with Boko Haram has
gone through three different iterations. In the beginning, the Nigerian
government perceived it to be a form of civil unrest when it reared its head
between 1995 and 2002.[1] Subsequently, it came to be seen as a religious
uprising between 2002 and 2009.[2] Between 2010 and 2015, the war took its
final form. It became a war on terror on the one side and an insurgency on the
other.[3] It is from this final form that the true nature of the war can be
gleaned.
It is the contention of this article that the war is not a mere terror
campaign but amounts to hybrid war. This assumption is based on, among other
things, the tactics and strategies, aims and objectives and the choice of
weapons used in prosecuting the war by the adversaries.
A war has some basic definable
features. Although its contemporary definition now encompasses asymmetric
warfare, it still has some generally accepted characteristics.[4] One of these
is the observance of established rules of engagement. Normally, the combatants
take special care during engagements to shield non-combatants from the violence
of war. Proportionality is also an established norm. Terrorism does not have
such rules of engagement. Boko Haram only graduated from occasional attacks to
irregular warfare in 2010. Why 2010? It is an established fact that the
conflicts between Nigeria and the group went as far back as early 2000. It is
worth recalling that the founder-leader of the group, Mohammed Yusuf, was
killed in 2009 along with over 900 of his followers by Nigerian security
forces.[5] The group subsequently dispersed to re-organize. By 2010, the new
leader Abubakar Shekau escalated the conflict and took it to a more dangerous
and unrestricted phase. In addition to seeking revenge, a major factor
responsible for this escalation was the desire of Boko Haram to Islamise
Nigeria as a long-term objective. Since 2010, there has been a noticeable
difference in Boko Haram’s tactics in its confrontations with the Nigerian
state. For the first time, the Group carried out a series of carefully
coordinated and deadly bombing campaigns in Nigeria, directed against both
religious and secular targets. The bombing campaigns took four major formats:
suicide bombings, VBIEDs, roadside IEDs, and vehicle-borne suicide bombings
(VBSBs). By this period, the CZs of the war were clearly defined. The major CZs
are Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, Gombe and Bauchi states. Other targeted zones in the
HN include Abuja, Plateau and Kano states.
From 2010 onward, Boko Haram
started launching a series of attacks on security structures and military
installations in the North-Eastern part of the country. For example, on
September 7 2010, Boko Haram attacked and overrun a prison in Bauchi, freeing
over 700 inmates in the process.[6] Between 2010 and 2015, Boko Haram attacks
became more daring and brazen. Never in the history of political violence in
Nigeria had any group deliberately targeted not just military structures but
military formations and barracks in the CZs. The attacks launched on Giwa
barrack and Baga military base in Bornu in 2014 and 2015 are cases in
point.[7] In the two encounters, over 500 lives were lost. What became
noticeable in the course of the confrontation was that the adversaries
simultaneously employed asymmetric and conventional tactics and strategies in
waging the war. This is why the Nigeria-Boko Haram conflict can be described as
a form of hybrid warfare.
The Nigeria-Boko Haram war has gone
through the different phases earlier enumerated above. Elements of unrestricted
warfare could be seen
in the use of girls (as young as 10 years old) as suicide bombers.[8] This is
apart from the fact that the group uses men and women in carrying out
conventional suicide bombings and VBSBs. A good example was the deadly suicide
attack in Borno that killed 58 and injured over 139 people in March 2015.[9]
During this phase too, Boko Haram actively targeted Nigerians of different
religious persuasions. Vulnerable groups such as the old, the infirm, women and
children were not accorded any protected status. Churches, mosques, pastors and
imams, traditional chiefs, universities, secondary schools, markets, car depots
and restaurants became legitimate targets. Boko Haram also became very adept at
using cyberspace. It has effectively communicated via YouTube,
Twitter and Facebook during
its war against the Nigerian state. The group made use of every tangible and
intangible resource at its disposal to wage war. During this phase, the
Nigerian state also used considerable resources to wage war. The military used
tactics and strategies such as the declaration of a state of emergency in the
CZs, arrest and intimidation of spouses and relatives of known Boko Haram
members while deliberately flouting humanitarian rules of engagement. This was
the reason why Human Rights Watch (HRW) wrote a critical report about the
activities of the Nigerian forces in the CZs and its treatment of prisoners in
the course of the war.[10] The point being made here is that during the unrestricted
phase, the adversaries used conventional and unconventional
techniques in prosecuting the war. The responses of the opposing forces were
disproportional and civilian counter value targets were actively sought and
destroyed.
In the Fourth
Generation warfare phase,
which occurred within the same period, the group effectively tried to undermine
the sovereign integrity of the Nigerian state. It tried to achieve this through
incessant and ubiquitous attacks on civilian and military structures in
Nigeria. The aim was to demonstrate to Nigerian citizens that the government
did not have the capacity to protect them. This was probably also the main
reason why the group carried-out the brazen kidnapping of more than 200 Chibok
girls from their school in Borno in 2014.[11] The repeated attacks against
military infrastructure targets (such as barracks and munition depots) were
designed to show the citizens that the Nigerian military even lacked the
capacity to protect itself. The Internet played a crucial role in the
propaganda efforts of the group. Since the government could not effectively
censor what was posted on-line, Boko Haram used YouTube to disseminate its
threats against the Nigerian state. The exploits of the group against Nigeria
in the CZs as well as its administration of the localities under its control
were posted online. All these efforts were geared towards the delegitimization
of the authority of the State in what amounts to acts of psychological warfare.
During the compound
warfare phase, the opposing forces deployed asymmetric and
conventional tactics and strategies simultaneously in the CZs. In some cases,
there were even instances of role reversal with the military taking up the
guise of the insurgents and the insurgents doing vice-versa. Nigeria
established a special Counter Terrorism Squad (CTS) the aim of which was to go
into Boko Haram territory in the CZs and complement the efforts of the military
forces.[12] Militants from Boko Haram in turn sometimes posed as regular
Nigerian forces in order to make it easier for them to launch surprise attacks
on the villages in the CZs. This was what happened when Boko Haram attacked
Gwoza Local Government Area in Borno state in 2014.[13] Moreover, Boko Haram
adopted a conventional military mode to confront the Nigerian forces during
this phase. A prime example was the attack on Baga military barrack in January
2015. A video released by Boko Haram of the confrontation shows how it attacked
the military barrack frontally, using vehicle-mounted machine guns and lots of
AK-47-wielding infantry foot soldiers. This is not unlike how a regular army
would attack its opponent’s base in a conventional war. On the Nigerian
government’s side, the CJTF played crucial roles during this phase of the war.
It acted as the unofficial intelligence-gathering unit of the SMJTF and, in
many instances, acted also as the first line of defense against the
insurgents.[14] In March 2014, the SMJTF was able to foil a bomb attack on an
Internally Displaced Persons’ camp in Maiduguri due to the timely intelligence
provided by the CJTF. On several occasions the involvement of the CJTF in
actual combat operations was decisive to defeating Boko Haram attacks in the
CZs.[15] Thus, the simultaneous and synchronous use of conventional (JTF) and
unconventional (CJTF) forces and the use of conventional and unconventional
tactics qualify the situation as being one of compound warfare.
About The Author:
References:
[1]
Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, “Boko Haram and Politics: From Insurgency to
Terrorism,” in Perouse de Montclos, Boko Haram, pp. 136–138.
[2]
Ibid..
[3]
Walker, “What is Boko Haram,” pp. 4–6.
[4]
See Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos (London, Portland: Frank Cass,2005)
and Jack S. Levy, “Theories and Causes of War,” in Christopher J. Coyne and
Rachel L. Mathers (Eds.) The Handbook on the Political Economy of War(Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar, 2011), pp. 13–33.
[5] Andrea Brigaglia, “Ja’far
Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yusuf and Al-Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflections on the
Genesis of the Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria,” Annual Review
of Islam in Africa, Vol. 11: pp. 35–44.
[6] “More than 700 Inmates Escape
during Attack on Nigerian Prison,” TheGuradian, 8 September, 2010. Accessed
from URL: www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/08/muslim-extremists-escape-nigeria-prison
[7] Fidelis Soriwei, Sunday
Aborishade and Kayode Idowu, “350 Killed in Boko Haram, Army Clashes,” Punch,
15 March, 2014 and Kayode Idowu, “11 Soldiers Died in Baga Army Base Attack,” Punch,
6 January, 2015.
[8] Everest Amaefule, “10-Year-Old
Female Suicide Bomber Arrested in Katsina,” Punch, 30 July, 2014 and Fidelis Soriwei et. al.,
“10-Year-Old Girl Bombs Maiduguri Market, Kills 20,” Punch,
11 January, 2015.
[9]
“Update: Three Boko Haram Bombings Kill 58, Injures 139 in Borno,” P.M. News,
7 March, 2015.
[10]
“Nigeria: Massive Destruction, Deaths from Military Raid,” Human Rights
Watch, 1 May, 2013. Accessed from URL: https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid.
[11] Kingsley Omonobi et. al., “#BringBackOurGirls: We’ll Sell Chibok Girls into
Slavery- Boko Haram,” Vanguard, 6 May, 2014.
[12]
“Police Counter Terrorism Squad Joins Military Operations in Borno, Yobe,” The
Nigerian Voice, 16 May, 2013. Accessed from
URL: www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/113786/6/police-counter-terrorism-squad-joins-military-oper.html.
[13]
“Scores Killed in Fresh Boko Haram Attack in Borno,” Daily
Independent, 17 February, 2014. Accessed from URL: dailyindependentnig.com/2014/02/scores-killed-in-fresh-boko-haram-attack-in-borno/.
[14] “207 Boko Haram Militants Killed in Maiduguri Attack, says Civilian JTF-
PREMIUM TIMES,” SaharaReporters, 14 March, 2014. Accessed from
URL: saharareporters.com/2014/03/14/207-boko-haram-militants-killed-maiduguri-attack-says-civilian-jtf-premium-times.
[15] Kayode Idowu, “Civilian JTF
Beheads 41 Boko Haram Fighters,” Punch, 31 October, 2014.
