Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been tumultuous following the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Serious conflict between the ideology of Wahhabism and the political Shia Islam;
By Fahimeh
Ghorbani
(via IranReview.org)
Image Attribute: What if Saudi Arabia and Iran Went to War? / Youtube Screengrab
Relations
between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been tumultuous following the victory of the
Islamic Revolution. Serious conflict between the ideology of Wahhabism and the
political Shia Islam; establishment of the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council
([P]GCC] in 1981; the support offered by members of this council, especially
Saudi Arabia, to Iraq during Iraq’s imposed war against Iran; the massacre of Iranian
Hajj pilgrims in August 1987; Saudi Arabia’s support for US policies in the
Persian Gulf; the conflict between the two countries’ viewpoints on internal
affairs of such countries as Iraq and Bahrain; the crisis in Syria; and
finally, Saudi Arabia’s war on Yemen; the tragedy of Mina; and storming of
Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Tehran and consulate in the city of Mashhad can be
counted among those factors, which have caused relations between the two
countries to be totally choppy at the present juncture.
After the end
of the imposed war with Iraq and during the reconstruction period, relative
calm governed Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the main reason for which was
relatively tranquil conditions that prevailed in the region. However, Saudi
Arabia’s policies, which became increasingly inclined toward the United States,
Iran’s nuclear issue, and most importantly, regional developments once again
caused tensions to rise in the two countries’ relations. In fact, since 2003
and following the occupation of Iraq by the American forces, the two countries’
viewpoints on Iraq started to drift away from each other. Saudi Arabia believed
that the rise of a Shia government in Iraq would greatly boost Iran’s regional
power and change the balance of power in favor of the Islamic Republic. On the
other hand, Iran’s nuclear issue was another case that caused differences
between Tehran and Riyadh, because Saudis believed that Iran’s peaceful nuclear
program would increase Iran’s regional clout and further tilt the balance of
regional power towards Tehran.
After the
breakout of Arab revolutions, differences and conflict of viewpoints between
Saudi Arabia and Iran grew deeper. Iran interpreted those developments as the
Islamic Awakening and the beginning of popular uprisings, but Saudi Arabia
maintained that those developments had their roots outside the region and, as a
result, opposed them. The acme of the conflict between the two countries’ views
on those developments was reflected in their reaction to popular protests by
Bahraini Shias after Saudi Arabia accused Iran of interference in the internal
affairs of Bahrain and sent its forces to suppress protesters in the tiny
Persian Gulf monarchy. Another area in which viewpoints of Iran and Saudi
Arabia have differed is the ongoing crisis in Syria. By providing financial
support to Syrian opposition and smuggling arms into the Arab country, Saudi
Arabia has been consistently trying to topple the government of Syrian
President Bashar Assad. Riyadh has been trying to do this because firstly,
Saudi’s ideology is different from that of Assad. Secondly, Saudi
Arabia has found out that the fall of Assad could provide it with a golden
opportunity to undermine Iran’s regional influence. Finally,
supporting the opposition in Syria can be used as a means to thwart criticism
from Saudi regime’s opposition inside the country about how Riyadh chose to
deal with the issue of the Arab Spring and also help that regime ignore their
demands.
The crisis in
Yemen has also increased tensions in Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia. A coalition
of regional countries led by Saudi Arabia attacked Yemen on March 25, 2015.
Airstrikes by Saudi warplanes have already claimed thousands of innocent Yemeni
lives while causing blatant violation of international humanitarian law, and at
the same time, Riyadh keeps accusing Iran of intervention in Yemen’s internal
affairs. In fact, Iran believes the crisis in Yemen has no military solution
and the sole way out of the ongoing crisis in the impoverished Arab country is
to start talks and try to find political solutions. A mention should be also
made of the attack on Saudi Arabia’s embassy and consulate in the Iranian
cities of Tehran and Mashhad, respectively, after Riyadh executed senior Shia
cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Following the attacks, Saudi Arabia cut its
diplomatic relations with Iran.
As for the
future outlook of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the era following
the conclusion of Iran’s nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), the important point that must be mentioned is that JCPOA has
led to removal of international sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the
European Union, and the United States against Iran. At present, Iran’s economy
ranks the 18th in the world and the country boasts the world’s fourth biggest
proven oil reserves and the second biggest natural gas reserves. Iran is also
the biggest producer of automobiles in the Middle East with a population of
about 80 million, which is mostly educated. These factors make Tehran an
interesting place for the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). As a
result of the nuclear deal, Iran is planning to boost its crude oil exports two
times and increase them to 2.3 million barrels per day. This strategy would be
at odds with Saudi Arabia’s strategy as a regional oil exporter. Iran is also
mulling plans to renovate its transportation fleet, bolster its tourism sector,
and increase its gross domestic product. All these issues indicate that JCPOA
will certainly lead to higher economic growth in Iran. At present, Iran has
signed new contracts in oil and gas sectors with the French Total as well as
Italian oil companies. Such a powerful economic outlook has even made some
diplomats and financial experts predict that within a decade, Iran’s gross
domestic product may overtake those of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Therefore,
signing of more trade agreements in addition to improvement of Iran’s foreign
relations at international level can pave the way for the Islamic Republic to
meet its economic and geopolitical interests in a better way. This is why
following the conclusion of JCPOA Saudi Arabia has been feeling vulnerable for
two reasons. The first reason is that JCPOA can prop up Iran’s
economy, help boost its gross domestic product, and also increase its oil
exports while, at the same time, elevating geopolitical significance of Tehran
in the region during the post-JCPOA era. Secondly, Riyadh is concerned
about Iran’s capacity to become more powerful in the region at a time that the
United States has been losing its regional influence as a result of which
Washington has been replacing its present doctrine with the new doctrine of
looking to the East and paying more attention to East Asia; a policy which is
known as the “Pivot to Asia.” In fact, big powers have had to recognize Iran’s
regional role in establishing peace and security in the region, especially with
regard to fighting the Daesh terrorism.
Finally, two
prominent examples of Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability can be highlighted here. The
visit to Washington by Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir just one
week following the conclusion of JCPOA can be considered an evident example of
this country’s vulnerability. During his trip, Jubeir met with U.S. President
Barack Obama and discussed with him the details of JCPOA and ways of deepening
the two countries’ relations while seeking more guarantees from the United
States to Saudi Arabia due to Riyadh’s concerns about the current boost in
Iran’s geopolitical situation. Another example of Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability
is seen in futile efforts made by this country to create an Arab and Sunni
coalition against Iran in the post-JCPOA era. Therefore, it seems that even
after the signing of JCPOA, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia will
continue to be choppy.
About the Author:
Fahimeh
Ghorbani is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Middle East Strategic
Studies (IMESS) in Tehran
Keywords:
Iran, Relations, Saudi Arabia, Post-JCPOA Era, Yemen, Syria, Sheikh Nimr
al-Nimr, Barack Obama, Adel al-Jubeir, US, Ghorbani
This article was originally published at IranReview.org.
All
rights reserved by the original publisher. Reprinted with permission.
More by
Fahimeh Ghorbani:
*The
Role of Economy in Iran-Turkey Relations: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/The-Role-of-Economy-in-Iran-Turkey-Relations.htm
*Roots
of Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Roots-of-Tensions-between-Iran-and-Saudi-Arabia.htm
