This paper analyzes how the use of drones could constitute war crimes, which are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (Gill & Fleck, 2010) within the context of Article 8 of the Rome Statute.
By Rachel Alberstadt
This paper analyzes how the use of drones could constitute war crimes, which
are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (Gill & Fleck, 2010) within
the context of Article 8 of the Rome Statute.
Image Attribute: Boeing X-47B in flight / Source: Wikimedia Commons
Article 8 (1) of the Rome Statute
reads “The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes” (Rome Statute, 1998). Thus to trigger prima facie
requirements under this opening provision, the alleged crimes in question would
require a plan or policy or a large scale commission of the acts, although an
individual crime can also constitute a war crime (Cryer, Friman, Robinsin,
& Wilmshurst, 2007). However, in its analysis of drones fulfilling war
crimes criteria, this paper will restrict its evaluation to war crimes falling
under Article 8 (2) (a) and 8 (2) (b). These sections specifically pertain to
conflicts of an international character.
According to the
Rome Statute, an additional requirement exists for an act to constitute a war
crime. For there to be an act qualifying as a war crime under Article 8 there
requires a nexus criteria linking the crime with an armed conflict, either an
international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-international armed conflict (NIAC)
(Cryer, Friman, Robinsin, & Wilmshurst, 2007). More generally, to trigger
jurisdiction of the Court itself, this requires three methods outlined in
Article 13 as 1) a State party refers a situation to the Court, 2) the UN
Security Council refers a situation to the Court, or 3) for the Prosecutor to
act propriomotu. These correspond to Articles 13, 14, and 15bis and 15ter which
elaborate on these provisions (Rome Statute, 1998).
Under Article 8
(2) (a) the Statue incorporates established International Humanitarian Law (IHL) law taken from the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and other relevant established international law (Cryer, Friman,
Robinsin, & Wilmshurst, 2007). Core provisions of IHL ban indiscriminate
targeting practices, including weaponry which are incapable of distinction
(Gill & Fleck, 2010). However, this distinction holds an overall caveat in
international conflicts, as in these types of conflicts there are two
categories of persons: combatants and civilians. Each category are afforded
aspects of protections, but under some acts, such as wilful killing, these are
crimes only against non-combatants (Cryer, Friman, Robinsin, & Wilmshurst,
2007).
As IHL argues
that whoever does not qualify as a combatant automatically qualifies as a
civilian (Gill & Fleck, 2010) customary law and State practice exist in a
current State of flux regarding non-State armed groups in international
conflicts and also terrorist actors. However, this paper will explain how under
existing IHL, for which violations under the Rome Statute can arise, terrorists
and non-State actors continue to constitute protected civilians. Exceptions to
this rule allow for legitimately targeting civilians should the civilians in
question actively and directly participate in combat (Kalshoven & Zegveld,
2011). However, lawfulness of targeting these civilians pertains strictly to
the duration of their active involvement.
The factual
nature of drones—as an instrument capable of but not restricted to purposes of
force—provides imperative evaluation for potential allegations of international
core crimes, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity. States deploy
drones for three interrelated reasons 1) efficiency, 2) accuracy, and 3)
prevention or protection of human risk. As indicated in the previous section,
these objectives also potentially implicate mens rea elements for judicial
hearings. Because of the precision of drones, both from the accuracy of data
procured to inform the pilot and the relative accuracy of the targeting itself,
any crimes resulting from drone sorties could demonstrate either an intent to
disregard the laws of war by means of recklessness or negligence, or a direct
culpability for knowingly firing upon unlawful targets.
Regarding
liability, actual launching of drones ultimately rests upon a leadership
decision. This implicates liability under command responsibility, or liability
under Article 28 of the Rome Statute, as it is the commanders who give the
final authorization for the order (Air Force Operations, 2009). For example,
precautions must be taken when giving orders to exercise drone strikes, thus,
if the status of the target is doubted (in terms of being military or
combatant), then the assumption is the target is civilian and is protected and
must not be attacked (Gill & Fleck, 2010; Kalshoven & Zegveld, 2011;
Military Commander, 2012; Cryer, Friman, Robinsin, & Wilmshurst, 2007).
Drones and
Proportionality under the Rome Statute
While this paper
has extensively analysed the lawfulness of certain targets, a related issue of
lawful drone action is the resulting damage from the strikes. While it is clear
that prohibitions on directly targeting civilians exists, States are also
prohibited from executing strikes which would predictably or knowingly cause
excessive or unnecessary civilian harm (Kalshoven & Zegveld, 2011). Thus,
war crimes may result from strikes if the results failed proportionality tests.
Generally the
proportionality test weighs potential harm against military benefit (Gill &
Fleck, 2010). It is a test decided by the commander prior to the launched
sorties and must be decided for each and every attack (Matthews & McNab,
2011). Michael Schmitt clarifies that the weapon used proves irrelevant, but
rather the issue is whether “expected civilian casualties or damage were
excessive relative to the military gain the attacker reasonably anticipated
from the strike” (Schmitt, 2011). The evaluation of proportionality by courts
results in inconsistent determinations as proportionality is assessed
subjectively by the military apparatus (usually a commander giving a final “go”
order) and is difficult to objectively quantify or qualify (Air Force
Operations, 2009; Cryer, Friman, Robinsin, & Wilmshurst, 2007).
Proportionality
is considered prior to launching an attack but is again evaluated after the
fact, often by different actors than the ones considering the initial attack.
As proportionality must be determined for each individual attack, and as each
attack carries different factors to be weighed (such as the nature of the
target, circumstances, weaponry available, etcetera), this complicates attempts
at legal certainty for subjective or objective determinations of, for instance,
what constitutes “excessive” under the framework of proportionality (Matthews
& McNab, 2011; Cryer, Friman, Robinsin, & Wilmshurst, 2007). Harm
resulting from drones does not negate its lawfulness under principles of
proportionality (Matthews & McNab, 2011; Schmitt, 2011), but it is the
qualification of the numbers which provides uncomfortable calculations. As
such, while there are certainly more clear concepts within IHL, proportionality
is not one of them. It remains an evaluation on a case-by-case basis as (Vogel,
2011) “[t]he main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether
or not it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied” (Final Report,
2000).
Strikes may be
ordered with legitimacy in mind, but legitimacy does not equate to
lawfulness—those in authority for the planning and decision making of the
attacks are obligated to uphold preventative and protective measures against
needless civilian harm, even if this harm would be caused incidentally
(Kalshoven & Zegveld, 2011; Military Commander, 2012). That being said,
drones are not flawless mechanisms of war. Humanitarian “[l]aw does not require
perfection in the execution of a military attack nor does it prohibit all
civilian casualties” (Matthews & McNab, 2011). Armed conflict will
inevitably result in loss of life, but the parties to the conflict are under
conventional and customary obligations to prevent unnecessary harm. Drones
possess improved mechanisms to facilitate discrimination capacities for
targeting, but war crimes could result if these capabilities are misused.
Drones,
Targeted Killings, and International Criminal Law (ICL)
The use of
drones to implement targeted killing policies presents a key area of drone use
which affects international and non-international conflicts alike. This paper
ventures that this usage of drone technology poses a plausible example of
drones constituting war crimes within the meaning of Article 8 of the Rome
Statute. It is acknowledged that targeted killing policies are perceived to
affect NIACs more commonly than IACs. However, the increasing role of non-State
actors in conflicts, in particular complication of non-sanctioned participation
of civilians, demonstrates on-going concerns which pertain equally to
international as well as non-international conflicts. As such, IHL
(particularly Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions), customary
international law and international human rights continue to apply to all forms
of armed conflict, regardless of designation as international or internal.
(This author strongly notes that IHL and international human rights law apply lexspecialis
in conjunction with human rights.)
Nonetheless,
international human rights law would be the applicable legal framework for
drones used to fulfil targeted killings outside of armed conflicts. (This
author strongly notes that IHL and international human rights are not mutually
exclusive but rather, IHL applies as lexspecialis in conjunction with human
rights.) While this paper will not engage with the latter, it uses this
statement to point out that even absent an armed conflict, use of drones as lethal
force still falls under a compatible legal framework (O’Connel, 2011). If
States employ military force which falls outside the scope of armed conflicts
or self-defence, then these operations are governed by the human rights
paradigm; where IHL gaps exist—international human rights law fills in
(Matthews & McNab, 2011).
Moreover, this
paper rejects the category of unlawful combatants as this concept fails to
compatibly and consistently apply to established rules of IHL. The (contested)
category of unlawful combatants largely relates to counter-terrorism policies
by States. These States, particularly, Russia, the US, and Israel, argue that
unlawful combatants are individuals who under IHL would generally be deemed
civilians, but because of their affiliation with non-State armed groups, are
deemed to have active combatant roles (Gill & Fleck, 2010). As combatants
are authorized by their respective States, these third category of individuals
are combatants who are not sanctioned as members of armed forces, thus their
participation in hostilities is rendered unlawful (Gill & Fleck, 2010).
While this
category perceptively makes State policies more legitimate, outside of theory
they fail to uphold legal standards. This rests upon several inter-related
reasons. First, in IHL there are two categories: combatants and civilians.
Second, the distinction as a combatant means that the State for which the
individual(s) are fighting authorizes them to fight. With the distinction of an
unlawful combatant, this is decided by third party States and not by the State
of the individual’s origin or nationality.
This proves
problematic for several reasons, one main reason being that the third party
(for example, Russia, the US, or Israel) labels an individual as an unlawful
combatant for the purposes of targeting them—which predicates largely on
allegations of, for instance, terrorist membership or association with a
particular organization. One example of this in practice is the
characterization of an individual as fulfilling “continuous combat function”.
This characterization forfeits the individual’s immunity from attack
exclusively based upon group membership (Lewis, 2012). Yet without processes of
verification, or objective standards, this presents a highly contested practice
which, in the author’s opinion, fails to comply with the objective purpose of
IHL—which is to protect those engaging and effected by conflict, and to limit
the means and methods of warfare. In opposition to this, the unlawful combatant
category seeks to broaden methods of warfare and allow for more inclusive
methods of targeting.
Third, this
author contends that the unlawful combatant category is inherently unnecessary.
There already exist compatible designations allowing States to target civilians
under certain circumstances without unnecessarily enlarging the scope of lawful
targets. While civilians overall are entitled to protective status, they are
not absolutely prohibited from being targeting under certain conditions. These
conditions include direct and active engagement in combat, for which the person
loses their immunity and can be lawfully targeted for the duration of this
engagement (Gilll & Fleck, 2010; Lewis, 2012; Vogel, 2011; Kalshoven &
Zegveld, 2011). However, this author acknowledges what constitutes “active”,
“direct” and “for the duration” can prove problematic in practice,
complications arising from this fail to negate the continued status of the
civilian (Kalshoven & Zegveld, 2011). In 2009 the ICRC issued Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities; while useful,
its authoritative force is questioned.Ultimately, civilians engaging actively
and directly lose their protection in that they can be lawfully targeted during
their engagement with the conflict, but this does not abolish their overall
status as civilians (Gill & Fleck, 2010).
The Israeli
Supreme Court provided insight into targeting restrictions as it decided upon
the targeted killing issue in its evaluation of the legality of Israel’s
targeted killing policy. In its conclusion the Court confirmed that the status
of a target being lawful or unlawful resides on a contextual case by case basis
and should be evaluated retroactively by an independent party (Targeted
Killings, 2005). Indeed, Judge Rivlin stated one “cannot determine in advance
that targeted killing is always illegal” (Targeted Killings, 2005). Overall,
while the judgement failed to provide more broadly applicable legal analysis,
it did provide clarification that the current State of international law does
not recognize the category of unlawful combatants (Targeted Killings, 2005).
As such, States
that employ drones to target individuals under the guise of the category of
unlawful combatants usually do so under systematic elimination of these targets
through the use of drones. Therefore, this systematic elimination, as a State
policy, fulfils the criteria of Article 8 of the Rome Statute and results in
the commission of war crimes. Under the Geneva Conventions, civilians who
engage in armed conflicts are acting unlawfully as by definition they are
acting without State authorization. As a result, they can be tried for
illegally participating in the conflict.
However, if
States target civilians who participate in conflict under the justification of
labelling these actors as unlawful combatants, this denies them their civilian
status under Article 8 (2) (a) (vi) which affords them the right to a fair
trial (ICC Elements, 2002). In addition, these targeting policies demonstrate
intentional attacks against civilians within the meaning of Article 8 (2) (b)
under the provisions of (i-v) which includes intentionally directed attacks
against the civilian populations or civilian objects and otherwise knowingly
and intentionally attacking targets where civilian or civilian objects will be
foreseeably harmed or damaged (ICC Elements, 2002).
Drones,
Precautionary Measures, and ICL
While drones
could be used as weaponry of heightened precision, and as such could qualify as
taking precautionary measures to prevent excessive harm (Schmitt, 2011),
miscalculations or disregard for on-the-ground situations could nonetheless
result in war crimes (Cryer, Friman, Robinsin, & Wilmshurst, 2007). For
instance, murder (Article 8 (2) (a) (i)) and otherwise causing excessive damage
(Article 8 (2) (b) (iv)) constitute war crimes which could result from drone
strikes. IHL requires the attacker to implement reasonable verification
measures and in circumstances where the legality of the strike’s objective is
dubious, requires the cancelation or suspension (as indicated in Additional
Protocol I, Article 57 (2)) of the strike (Kalshoven & Zegveld, 2011; Hague
Rules, 1923). This balances against the requirement to evaluate proportionality
as the strike must have concrete and direct military advantage, not merely
speculated or hopeful—civilian harm must be avoided (Gill & Fleck, 2010).
An example of
precautionary methods available with drones is target verification using
technology such as imagery and loitering capabilities, as was discussed
earlier. Visual feedback of the drone’s camera allows for multiple authority
figures to evaluate the data. In practice, this means that “[t]he drone’s
sensors allow many sets of eyes, including those of [Judge Advocate General]
lawyers trained to assess proportionality, to make a proportionality
determination at the time of weapons release” (Lewis, 2012).
Civilian harm in
itself does not constitute a war crime, but rather, a war crime is committed
when the drones were employed with reckless or excessive attacks (Vogel, 2011).
Wilful killing and murder results if the missiles are launched from drones when
IHL precautions are not taken or are disregarded. Thus, unarmed drones could be
used as a precautionary method if used to gather intelligence to verify
targeting information, but would be employed illegally if armed drones are used
when less harmful methods are available (Schmitt, 2011)—drones may carry
smaller missiles, but the results are no less accountable.
An example of
aerial bombings and precautionary measures used in practice is the 1999 NATO
aerial bombings discussed earlier. These bombings were criticized for executing
strikes with higher altitude ceilings which decreased efficiency for targeting,
as flying higher complicates visibility (Amnesty International, 2000). In light
of this example, evolution of drone technology could prevent this issue in the
future as drones can fly at lower altitudes to gather improved targeting data
with decreased risk of harm to the pilot. Flying at lower levels with minimized
risk to pilot and civilians alike would allow for less risky gathering of
substantial information regarding the ground situation (Matthews & McNab,
2011). This could exemplify a precautionary measure as employing drone use in
this instance compares to capabilities usually unavailable for ordinary aerial
bombings by larger aircraft.
Furthermore, an
important precautionary measure to implement is the obligation to issue, where
permissible, warnings of impending strikes as elucidated under Article 26 of
the (Hague Convention II, 1899). As seen with the NATO bombings discussed above
and in prior sections, a consistent criticism of the legality of drone use
predicates on the failure to give prior warnings to civilian populations. Prior
warning of impending attacks is a requirement under Article 57 (2) (c) of
Additional Protocol I and Article 26 of the II Hague Convention. In practice,
the use of drones for surprise attacks has meant that strikes are often done
with no forewarning (Vogel, 2011), yet the lawfulness of these strikes would
then rest upon whether effective forewarnings were available and viable options
to the attacker.
Nonetheless, it
is imperative to remember that any perceived precautionary measures available
with drone usage or any perceived benefits to prevent collateral damage and
other harm rests entirely on the quality and accuracy of intelligence received
(Alston, 2010; Knoops, 2012). While drones possess camera technology to send
information to the pilots itself as raw data, all too often intelligence relied
upon derives from secondary sources (Knoops, 2012). Intelligence collected from
the drone are not flawless either. One practical example raised is the issue of
surrender and mistakenly targeting those of hors de combat status, where it
would be difficult for a drone operator to alter the drone’s actions to
facilitate a declaration of surrender (Vogel, 2011).
While it has
been argued that drones do present mechanisms which facilitate greater
discrimination features for warfare, it remains “incumbent upon a drone
operator and commander to exercise judgment in determining when to conduct an
attack where there are co-located civilians or where the targets themselves are
difficult to identify” (Vogel, 2011; Air Force Operations, 2009). The
collateral damage is lawful if proportionate, but prior to the results, it is
required upon the commander and the operator to minimize, wherever possible,
foreseeable harm to civilians and civilian objects (Kalshoven & Zegveld,
2011; Military Commander, 2012; Air Force Operations, 2009; Hague Rules, 1923).
Targeting is inherently a responsibility of command function requiring
“commander oversight and involvement to ensure proper execution” (Air Force
Operations, 2009). As such, this expresses the commanders’ responsibility under
Article 28 of the Rome Statute for war crimes committed using drones.
Drones and
Terror under ICL
As a final
example of how drones could embody violations of Article 8 war crimes, the
causing of terror towards civilian populations will be briefly explored.
Additional Protocol I, Article 51 (2) prohibits terrorizing civilian
populations. Deficient definitions of terrorism aside, the author finds that it
is understandable that the buzzing heard from drones can cause fear or terror,
particularly as those who hear the drones will be unaware as to know whether
the drones are armed or not. Factual uses of drones discussed earlier also
could be seen to induce terror or fear into civilian populations as drones are
used for reconnaissance, meaning they follow, hover over, and maintain visual
connections with their targets. For family members, neighbours, and ordinary
civilians, this could result in violations of personal dignity and general
concern for safety and welfare. In addition, as Article XXII of The Hague Rules
of Aerial Warfare expressed “Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing
the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of a
military character, or of injuring non- combatants is prohibited” (Hague Rules,
1923). This demonstrates that use of aerial warfare to terrorize civilian
populations continues to present an issue—and a war crime—in international
conflicts.
However,
violations of Article 51 (2) and Article XXII of the Hague Rules do not
expressly compliment provisions under the Rome Statute as such, unless
interpreted broadly under provisions of outrages upon personal dignity or
inhumane treatment (Rome Statute, 1998). First, this author contends that
drones could result in the effect of terrorizing civilian populations, but this
would require unnecessarily broad interpretations of the Rome Statute and would
perhaps more appropriately fall under crimes against humanity rather than war
crimes. However, this author does acknowledge that the ICTY, particularly the
Galić cases, have dealt with inducing terror amongst civilians as a war crime
(Cryer, Friman, Robinsin, & Wilmshurst, 2007). Second, the prohibition of
terrorizing civilian populations does not encompass incidental terrorization,
meaning that to violate prohibitions the attacks would require the
terrorization of civilians as a purported objective (Gill & Fleck, 2010;
Cryer, Friman, Robinsin, & Wilmshurst, 2007).
However, it is
briefly noted that incidental harm could relate to indiscriminate usage as
non-State actors can prove difficult to distinguish by blending in with larger
civilian populations. On a peripheral note, drones do not have defensive
mechanisms per se, thus they are vulnerable to potential jamming frequencies which
cause interference with their remote piloting feed (Lewis, 2012). In practice
this means that those on the ground possess abilities to destroy drones in
progress, ultimately meaning that locals are not without hypothetical defences.
Conclusion
This paper has
argued that while drones are not without issues, and indeed their use could
result in commission of international criminal offenses; they fit within
compatible existing legal frameworks such as IHL and customary law.
Essentially, it is not whether or not there are laws sufficient to govern the
facilitation of drone use but whether these existing laws are compliantly
followed (Vogel, 2011). While acknowledging flaws with drone use, this paper
has in part sought to illuminate common areas of misconception with academics
and legal scholars on the legality of drone use. While this paper has argued
that drones do not represent an ungoverned phenomenon of weaponry, it will
contend that use of drones by non-State actors, such as armed groups, does
continue to pose a present concern. Ultimately, if the target is lawful, the
weaponry platform used to deliver the attack is irrelevant (that is, unless the
weapon itself is not prohibited under IHL). Just as an outbreak of war fails to
result in a legal vacuum, so too does the development of new weaponry fail to
result in a legal void.
About The Author:
Rachel Alberstadt, University of
Leiden (Advanced MA/LLM Public International Law (Peace, Justice, and
Development)), Leiden, The Netherlands
Publication Details:
Copyright © 2014
by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under
the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC
BY).http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Cite This Article:
Alberstadt, R.
(2014) Drones under International Law. Open Journal of Political Science, 4,
221-232. doi: 10.4236/ojps.2014.44023.
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