The EU plays a major role in Kosovo’s development, despite the fact that several Member States do not recognise its independence, writes Gëzim Krasniqi. While the recently signed EU-Kosovo Association Agreement is a significant political step, he suggests, the benefits for Kosovo may be minimal in the short term, and unresolved questions over its sovereignty will continue to hinder future progress.
By Gëzim Krasniqi
The European
Union is by far the main international actor in Kosovo. Its influence in the
country has been expanding gradually and stretches into the political,
judicial, economic and security spheres. This is a result of more than a
decade-long period of direct involvement in stabilization and reconstruction as
well as in (member) state building.
Contrary to
other international actors involved in Kosovo, the EU’s role is characterized by a dual capacity of engaging simultaneously in state building (through its
Rule of Law Mission – EULEX) and European integration.
Yet, despite a
heavy presence on the ground and recurrent promises about Kosovo’s European
future, the EU has been struggling to overcome the statehood impasse in Kosovo,
as five of its members still refuse to recognise Kosovo’s independence. In
turn, this has conditioned Kosovo’s progress towards European integration.
However, in
October 2015, Kosovo and the EU signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), marking a breakthrough in the
relations between the two. This is just the first step towards closer
cooperation with the EU and eventual membership.
Nevertheless, it
is a very important development for Kosovo, as it constitutes the first
contractual relationship between the two parties and practically puts Kosovo on
an equal footing with other countries in the region.
Normally the
process for reaching an SAA is based on political and technical criteria. In
the case of Kosovo, the signing of its SAA resulted from two distinct, yet
interrelated, factors. The first factor is related to changes in the Treaty of
Lisbon, which gives the Commission more powers.
Before the
Lisbon Treaty, SAAs required ratification by all EU Member States. Now,
however, since the treaty conferred legal personality on the EU itself, the
Commission can sign certain international agreements on its own.
With several
Member States still not recognizing Kosovo’s independence, the EU would not
otherwise be able to sign an SAA with it. It was the European Commission’s
decision to adopt a ‘status neutrality’ approach, referred to as ‘creative
ambiguity’ by EU officials, which enabled it to keep a minimum internal
consensus and engage Kosovo and Serbia in a dialogue.
The second
factor concerns the EU-facilitated political dialogue between Kosovo and
Serbia. The two countries have been engaged in this dialogue since 2011,
resulting in some 17 agreements. The most important of these is the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of
Relations reached in April 2013.
This agreement
establishes the parameters for the inclusion of northern Kosovo within
Pristina’s legal framework, while increasing the level of autonomy for the
Serb-dominated municipalities in Kosovo.
Although some
progress has been achieved, both countries have failed to implement the signed
agreements completely. According to the Big Deal (Civic Oversight of the Kosovo-Serbia
Agreement Implementation), so far only four of the 17 agreements have been
implemented completely.
Once in force,
the SAA will establish a contractual relationship with mutual rights and
obligations, covering a wide variety of sectors, including respect for key
democratic principles, free trade, education and employment to energy, the
environment and justice and home affairs.
Although the SAA
offers numerous opportunities, in particular in terms of free trade, given
Kosovo’s weak economy, high-level corruption and political instability, it is
unlikely that it will have a major impact, at least in the short run.
The EU is
Kosovo’s main trading partner, but the trade is mostly one-way and Kosovo has a
huge trade deficit. The 2015 European Commission Progress Report on Kosovo paints a picture of a
country that has made progress in its relations with Serbia and the EU, but has
failed to achieve any substantial progress in other key sectors.
The overriding
message is that Kosovo is at an early stage of alignment with European standards
in most areas, and the road to membership is still very long. While the
government has continued to implement European integration priorities, it has
not achieved much progress in reform of the judiciary and in the fight against
corruption and organised crime.
Necessary as it
might be, the EU’s exclusive focus on the issue of dialogue with Serbia has in
many ways undermined democratic consolidation in Kosovo. To begin with, from
the very outset the negotiation process has lacked transparency. Many important
stakeholders and institutions, including the parliament, civil society and the
local population, were practically excluded.
Second, by tying
Kosovo’s EU path to the dialogue with Serbia, the EU has enabled the government
to circumvent criticism on its lack of reforms and poor results in the fight
against corruption. Third, although the whole process focuses on the rights of
Serbs in Kosovo, they have been completely sidelined in the process.
This has enabled
the Serbian Government to establish direct control over the representation of
Serbs in Kosovo, thus practically destroying political pluralism among Kosovo
Serbs. In addition, there are increasing fears of further division along ethnic
lines as a result of the Brussels dialogue.
These concerns have
been used by opposition parties to challenge the government, leading to a serious political crisis. The repeated use of tear gas,
blocking the floor of the parliamentary chamber and street protests have led to
clashes with police and the arrest of a number of opposition MPs.
Notwithstanding
the significance of the SAA, with the EU divided on the issue of Kosovo’s
independence and the latter’s integration process inherently linked to the
‘normalization’ of relations with Serbia, the EU-Kosovo relationship remains a
very complex and peculiar one.
The failure of
the EU to speak with a single voice is hindering Kosovo’s EU perspective. A
case in point is the visa liberalization process. Kosovo remains the only
country in the region whose citizens need a visa to travel to the Schengen
Area. Moreover, Kosovo won’t be able to apply for membership without being recognized by all EU Member States.
As a potential
Member State, Kosovo – unlike any other EU Member State that has pooled its
sovereignty as part of the integration process – is a state with minimal
sovereignty. Its sovereignty is limited by the EU Rule of Law Mission, as well
as by a whole set of ambiguous modalities emerging from the dialogue with
Serbia.
The result has
been a form of ‘tripartite sovereignty partnership’ over the territory of
Kosovo. Undoubtedly, the EU’s ‘creative ambiguity’ is reaching its limits, and
disentangling the sovereignty conundrum remains the paramount challenge in
Kosovo’s European integration process.
About The Author:
Gëzim
Krasniqi (@GezimK), University
College London. He is Alexander Nash Fellow in Albanian Studies at the School of Slavonic
and East European Studies at University College London. His research interests
include nationalism, nationalist movements, citizenship and politics in the
Balkans.
Publication Details:
This article was
originally published at European Futures under a Creative
Commons (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International) License.