By Dr. Samuel Mullins
Abstract
This article explores the role of
converts in the ‘Global Salafi Jihad’ based on a sample of 75 American and 47
British converts who became involved in Islamist terrorism between 1980 and
September 11th, 2013. Converts are compared to non-coverts on a
variety of demographic, operational and investigative variables, and each
sample is further divided into those who mobilized before and after 9/11 in
order to allow assessment of changes over time. Contrary to previous research,
results show that American converts in particular constitute a “jihadi
underclass” that is markedly disadvantaged compared to the rest of the U.S.
sample. They also present a generally less capable terrorism threat and are
especially likely to be caught in sting operations. British converts, whilst
also clearly disadvantaged and less capable, are much less distinct compared to
non-converts in the U.K. Practical and theoretical implications of these
findings are discussed.
Image Attribute: Robb Leech's stepbrother Richard
Dart, who pleaded guilty in court in March 2013 to travelling to Pakistan for
terror training./ Source: Video Screen Grab
Keywords: Islamist;
terrorism; jihad; converts; United States; United Kingdom.
Introduction
From Richard Reid to Omar Hammami,
the involvement of converts in Islamist terrorism has been a subject of much
interest, yet there has been relatively little in the way of systematic
research. A notable exception to this is the work of Robin Simcox and Emily
Dyer, who found that American converts “were likely U.S.-born young men with a
good education who had since found regular work” and were on a similar
socioeconomic footing to the rest of their sample.[1] Utilizing a somewhat
broader sampling frame, this paper re-examines the involvement of American
converts in Islamist terrorism and compares them to British converts whilst
also taking into account changes over time. Although there are broad
similarities between the two bodies of research, the conclusion here is that
American converts in particular constitute a highly marginalized “jihadi
underclass” which is markedly worse off than the rest of the sample. This
suggests a rather different reality than Simcox and Dyer depict, thus raising
important questions about how and why converts are drawn to Islamist terrorist
activity in the U.S. and what this means for counter-terrorism (CT). This is a
critical issue in light of the recent increase in Islamist terrorist activity,
combined with the fact that that converts make up for a significant percentage
of such cases in the U.S.
Methodology
The Simcox and Dyer study included a
total of 171 people (among them 40 converts) who were convicted of al-Qaeda
related offences (AQROs) or were killed in suicide attacks within the U.S.
between 1997 and 2011. The analysis presented here is based upon a U.S. sample
of 365 individuals (75 converts, i.e. 21%) and a U.K. sample of 427 (including
47 converts, i.e. 11%) who mobilized in support of the al-Qaeda-led “Global
Salafi Jihad” (GSJ) between 1980 and September 11th 2013 (see Appendices 1 and
2).[2] This included anyone from, living, or offending in the U.S. and U.K who:
- Was convicted of a relevant offence (whether under terrorism legislation or otherwise);
- Was killed during the course of terrorist activities, either at home and abroad;
- Was facing legal allegations at the time the analysis was conducted;
- Was subject to administrative or other sanctions in the absence of a conviction (detention, deportation, financial asset freezing and British control orders);
- Openly admitted their involvement in the GSJ, for example by way of appearing in a jihadi propaganda video;
- Was publicly alleged to have been involved in GSJ-related terrorism
but had not been subject to any legal action (including, for example,
numerous individuals from Minnesota who are believed to have joined
al-Shabaab).
In addition, each sample was divided
into those who mobilized before and after 9/11 in order to evaluate changes
over time.[3] Finally, while Simcox and Dyer examined 11 variables (7 relating
to demographic backgrounds and 4 to operational behavior), the analysis here
covers 14 (8 demographic, 5 operational and 1 relating to investigations).
Findings
The findings for demographic,
operational and investigative variables before and after 9/11 are summarized in
Tables 1 and 2 below. In the ensuing discussion of results, American converts
vs. non-converts are compared first, followed by the equivalent comparison for
the British sample.[4]
Table 1: Converts vs. non-converts involved
in Islamist terrorism in the U.S. who mobilized before and after 9/11
(1980–September 11th 2013).[5]
*FTs refers to foreign terrorists.
Table 2: Converts vs. non-converts involved
in Islamist terrorism in the U.K. who mobilized before and after 9/11
(1980–September 11th 2013).
*FTs refers to foreign terrorists.
Demographic Variables
More than 90% of all individuals in
both the American and British samples, before and after 9/11 were male.
Although the number of females becoming involved has increased over time, there
is no obvious difference between converts and non-converts, or between the U.S.
and U.K. While Simcox and Dyer found that American converts were significantly
older than non-converts, this result was not replicated here and the average
age in all groups was in the mid to late 20s. Nevertheless, in accordance with
the previous study, American converts were found to be much more likely than
non-converts to be born in the U.S. (more than 80% compared to 13% of
non-converts before 9/11 and 25% after 9/11). Similarly, U.S. converts were
more likely to be American citizens or permanent residents (almost 100% vs. 57%
of non-converts in the pre-9/11 sample and 78% afterwards). By comparison,
these differences were far less pronounced in the U.K. where, for example, 83%
of converts were British citizens/permanent residents compared to 74% of
non-converts after 9/11.
The remaining findings in relation
to demographic variables are much more revealing. Simcox and Dyer found that
overall, American converts did not differ greatly from non-converts in terms of
education, although they were more likely to have obtained a college degree
(20% vs. 8%). They further found that converts were more likely to be employed
and in particular to be in skilled occupations (35% vs. 15%). In the present
study, the figures are rather different. Among those who mobilized before 9/11,
28% of American converts had obtained a degree, compared to 23% of
non-converts, yet they were more likely to be unemployed (12% vs. 4%) and less
likely to be in skilled occupations (4% vs. 19%). During the same period,
British converts did not appear to differ significantly from either the rest of
the British sample or from American converts.
After 9/11, however, there are some
quite dramatic differences. Just 10% of American converts had obtained a
degree, compared to 17% of the rest of the U.S. sample. In addition, 25% of
American converts had failed to complete high school, compared to just 7% of
non-converts. They were also less likely to be in skilled occupations (4% vs.
10%) and much more likely to be unemployed (28% vs. 4%). Furthermore, American
converts were more than twice as likely to have a previous criminal record (56%
vs. 20%) and were three times as likely to have a documented history of mental
health problems (25% vs. 8%).[6] By contrast, although British converts were
also worse off than their compatriots, the differences were generally less. In
terms of education, 3% of British converts had obtained a degree compared to
11% of the rest of the U.K. sample, but just 1 convert (3%) had failed to
complete high school compared to 3 non-converts. Just 3% of individuals in
either sub-sample were in skilled occupations; however, converts were much more
likely to be unemployed (31% vs. 16%). British converts were also more likely
to have a criminal record (29% vs. 17%) but there was little difference in terms
of mental health issues (9% vs. 6%).
Operational Variables
Previously, Simcox and Dyer found
that American converts were less likely to have received terrorist training
(25% vs. 51% of non-converts), equally likely to have combat experience (18%)
but more likely to have received training and then progressed to combat (54%
vs. 33%). They further found that converts were less likely to be connected to
designated terrorist organizations (DTOs) (38% vs. 63%) and seemingly less
likely to be involved in terrorist plots against the U.S. (excluding plots
involving undercover operatives).[7] Overall, these results suggest that
converts are less of a terrorism threat, compared to non-converts. Although the
findings from the present research generally confirm this, they also help to
highlight important changes that have taken place over time as well as
differences on either side of the Atlantic.
In terms of links to foreign
terrorists (DTOs or otherwise), American converts are indeed less connected
than non-converts (68% vs. 78% before 9/11 and 22% vs. 46% afterwards). Prior
to 9/11, American converts were more likely to have trained and/or fought
overseas (60% vs. 42%). After 9/11, however, the pattern has reversed – the
respective figures being 12% vs. 22%. There has also been significant change in
relation to planning of terrorist attacks.[8] Before 9/11,
there was very little difference: 16% of American converts and 15% of
non-converts were actively involved in planning attacks. Yet after 9/11, the
percentage of converts rose to 44%, compared to 23% of non-converts. Finally,
the number of lone-actor terrorists[9] has also increased, in particular for
converts where the figures rose from 0 before 9/11 to 16% afterwards (compared
to an increase from 2–8% for non-converts).
Although the changes that have
occurred in the British sample have all been in the same direction, the
differences between converts and non-converts are less. Before 9/11, 92% of
British converts had links to foreign terrorists, compared to 90% of non-converts.
After 9/11, the figures dropped to 31% and 38% respectively. The findings for
participation in overseas terrorist training and/or combat are similar to the
U.S: this applied to 72% of British converts and 49% of non-converts who
mobilized before 9/11, then 6% vs. 26% after 9/11. Unlike in the U.S., however,
there has been little difference in terms of planning attacks: 23% of British
converts vs. 26% of non-converts were involved in attack planning prior to
9/11, compared to 20% and 23% respectively since then. Lastly, when it comes to
lone actors, the results are again very similar to the American sample: among
British converts, lone actors rose from 0–14%, compared to 2–7% among
non-converts.
Investigations
A final variable of interest for the
purposes of this paper relates to the use of informants and/or undercover
law-enforcement operatives within CT investigations. Here there are very
substantial differences. Prior to 9/11, 36% of American converts, vs. 25% of
non-converts were caught in such investigations. After 9/11, the respective
percentages were 60% vs. 45%. Meanwhile, in the U.K., no converts and just 2%
of non-converts who mobilized prior to 9/11 were caught in investigations using
informants/undercover operatives. After 9/11, these figures rose to 14% vs. 5%.
Discussion
The above findings clearly suggest
that American converts in particular are far more likely to be socially and
economically marginalized on a variety of indicators compared to non-converts.
They are also much less likely to have trained or fought overseas and more
likely to act alone, as well as more likely to be involved in domestic attack
plots and to be caught in sting operations. British converts also tend to be
disadvantaged (notably with regards to unemployment and criminality) but
otherwise appear to be slightly better off than their American counterparts and
closer to the rest of the British sample. Similar to American converts, they
are less likely to have trained or fought overseas and more likely to act
alone, but otherwise there are no obvious, dramatic differences (bearing in
mind that the number of British converts was smaller, meaning that percentages
were easily skewed).
The disparity between these results
and those of Simcox and Dyer comes down to methodology. By utilizing a wider
sampling frame, the present study included a greater number of relevant cases,
such as Jesse Morton (one of the founders of Revolution Muslim, later convicted
of soliciting murder[10]), Ruben Shumpert (killed in a missile strike in
Somalia in 2008[11]), Troy Kastigar (reportedly killed fighting for al-Shabaab
in 2009[12]), and Naser Jason Abdo, who was charged in 2011 (and later
convicted) of planning an attack on soldiers in the vicinity of Fort Hood.[13] Moreover,
as the above results demonstrate, American converts involved in Islamist
terrorist activity have shown a rapid decline in socioeconomic status after
9/11 and so it is equally important to measure changes over time.
Likewise, it is of course necessary
to continually update analyses and this can obviously give quite different
results. Notably, several American converts accused of Islamist terrorist
activity in more recent years also appear to have been highly marginalized.
These include Nicholas Teausant, who is believed to suffer from schizophrenia
and stands accused of planning to join the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) following his
arrest in March 2014[14]; Zale Thompson, who had been arrested multiple times
and been evicted from his apartment before being killed in an attack on New
York City police officers in October 2014[15]; Joshua Van Haften, an ex-convict
described as a “mentally ill loner” who was arrested at Chicago airport in
April 2015 on suspicion of attempting to join IS[16]; and Alexander Ciccolo, a
young man with a long history of mental health and behavioral problems who was
arrested on July 4, 2015 on suspicion of planning domestic attacks.[17] Although
continued, systematic research will be required to confirm whether or not such
cases are indeed part of a continuing trend, they nevertheless provide
anecdotal support to the findings presented in this article, which suggest that
American converts involved in Islamist terrorism tend to belong to a jihadi
“underclass”.
Given that this is the case,
American converts appear to conform, perhaps more than any other group, to the
notion that people are drawn to Islamist terrorism as a result of being
marginalized in society. Although this has become a rather stereotyped explanation
for involvement in terrorism which tends to ignore the incredibly wide
demographic profiles and diverse backgrounds of perpetrators, it at least
appears to hold some truth for this category. Among the many thousands of
people unable to achieve the ‘American dream’ who are left frustrated and
resentful, a small number may thus find the answer in violent jihad as the
ultimate counter-culture – one that promises belonging and acceptance, whilst
simultaneously providing opportunities for excitement and fame and a chance to
strike back against those who rejected them.[18] Putting aside debates about
the nature of sting operations, this may help explain the greater willingness
of American converts to attack their own country. It is also consistent with
the suggestion that, for some, converting to Islam in the post-9/11 (now
post-IS) world is an act of rebellion and this in turn helps us understand why
there seems to have been such a dramatic shift in the average demographic
profile of American converts involved in Islamist terrorism.
Why, then, would the situation be
any different in the U.K.? Of course, neither population of ‘terrorist
converts’ is entirely homogeneous and so there is certainly overlap between the
two. Nevertheless, there still appears to be a relative difference which is not
easily explained. Part of the answer may lie in the fact that Islamist
terrorism cases are far more geographically dispersed in the U.S., there are
far fewer connections between cases on the domestic stage and the Internet
appears to play a comparatively greater role in processes of radicalization[19]
– meaning that violent jihadists in the U.S. often mobilize either by
themselves or as part of relatively self-contained groups and there are few
barriers to ‘membership’ in the movement.
By comparison, Islamist terrorism
cases in the U.K. are confined within a much smaller area (dominated by four
regional hotspots of activity) and there are many more connections between
them.[20] This is indicative of socially ingrained jihadist subcultures within
Britain, manifest by way of networks of likeminded individuals with varying
degrees of involvement in extremist activism and terrorism-related activities.
Presumably, these networks exert a certain level of natural control over who is
able to join, which might therefore exclude people suffering from mental health
disorders for instance. Moreover, the relative continuity of extremist networks
in Britain may also have preserved the ‘quality’ of ideological understanding
and expression in the sense that new recruits can often draw upon the knowledge
and advice of more experienced individuals. By contrast, terror networks in
the U.S. were largely dismantled during the 1990s and those who radicalize
today are more likely to be essentially self-taught – thereby allowing wider
participation and an apparently greater emphasis on specifically
rebellious/counter-cultural elements over time.
The more established presence of
extremist networks within Britain might help to explain another possible
difference between these two countries. According to Simcox and Dyer, British
converts (though fewer in number than Americans) seem to be proportionally
over-represented within Islamist terrorism cases in the U.K., accounting for
15% of their sample of terrorists but only an estimated 4% of the U.K. Muslim
population.[21] Meanwhile, they found that the number of American converts
involved in Islamist terrorism was proportional to their place within the U.S.
Muslim population (both 23%).[22] If true, the relatively high proportion of
British converts might be due to the fact that they are more likely to come
into contact with, and/or be deliberately targeted for recruitment by extremist
networks (notwithstanding that 14% were classed as lone actors). However, there
is no register of converts in either country and the overall numbers of Muslims
are also approximations, meaning the above figures must be treated with
caution.[23] Moreover, recent research has suggested that converts are also
over-represented in Islamist terrorism cases in the U.S. Of 71 people arrested
in America on ISIS-related charges since March 2014, Vidino and Hughes found
that 40% were converts, compared to an estimated 23% for the Muslim population
as a whole. [24] Although based on a relatively small sample, this suggests
that the proportion of converts involved in Islamist terrorism in the U.S. has
increased quite dramatically. Furthermore, the proportional difference is
considerably greater than appears to be the case in the U.K. If indeed this is
now the case, it seems likely that it is connected to the increased
significance of social media as a vehicle for terrorist propaganda and
recruitment. Ultimately, however, the reality is still very much unclear and
there are no currently definitive answers which explain the different profiles
and rates of mobilization of British and American converts involved in Islamist
terrorism.
Conclusion
The available data indicate that,
contrary to previous research, American converts are in fact now worse off than
non-converts on socioeconomic measures and although this also applies to
British converts, the latter are much less distinct. Similar to previous
research, the results here confirm that American converts in particular present
a much less capable terrorism threat and are more likely to be acting alone.
Nevertheless, they are also more likely to be involved in domestic attack plots
within the U.S. and are more likely to be caught in sting operations.
Since converts make up a significant
(and apparently growing) proportion of Islamist terrorism cases in the U.S., it
is important to try and understand more about how and why such highly
marginalized individuals are drawn to violent jihad. Ultimately, this may lead
to more efficient ways of dealing with them. Indeed, the fact that American
converts are especially likely to be caught in stings and often receive lengthy
custodial sentences, makes them an added burden on law enforcement and society.
Given that these individuals are socially and economically deprived and
frequently suffering from mental health problems, intuitively it seems they
might be more amenable to practical, “soft” interventions that emphasize
social, financial and psychological support as opposed to more complex
ideological “de-radicalization”. Of course such interventions will not always
succeed, but amidst the current climate of strained budgets and increased
mobilization to violent jihad, there is a clear need to look for alternative
approaches to CT. Just as American converts seem to be especially vulnerable to
radicalization and recruitment, they may present equally soft targets for CT or
for countering violent extremism (CVE). Whether or not this is true –and
whether it might also apply in Britain– will require further research.
Similarly, although British converts
do not appear to be as distinct as those in the U.S., they exhibit relatively
high rates of unemployment and criminality and (though small in number) may be
proportionally over-represented in Islamist terrorism cases. It is therefore
necessary to examine them more closely in order to understand how and why they
mobilize to violent jihad and just how different they are, both to non-converts
in the U.K. and to converts in the U.S. More generally, there is also a need to
compare ‘terrorist converts’ to non-violent converts in each country in order
to establish whether the former are representative of the latter in terms of
demographic characteristics. Finally, it is of course necessary to update this
research in light of the significant increase in terrorist activity, largely
inspired by events in Syria and Iraq, in which substantial numbers of converts
continue to be involved.
About the Author:
Dr. Samuel Mullins is
a Professor of Counter-Terrorism at the George C. Marshall European Center for
Security Studies, Germany, and an Honorary Principal Fellow at the University
of Wollongong, Australia.
Publication Details:
This article is originally published at Perspectives on Terrorism is a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies . ISSN 2334-3745 (Online), Vol 9, No 6 (2015), under Creative Commons 3.0 License
Appendix 1. List of American
converts included in the sample
Converts included in the analysis
are listed in chronological order according to when they began. Details include
individual names, brief case description, offence period, and classifications
(grounds for inclusion at the time the study was completed). Co-offenders are
listed together.
Pre-9/11
- Wadih El-Hage. AQ operative. 1982–1998. Prosecuted.
- Ephron Gilmore. NY/NJ network, fought overseas. 1988–Unknown.
Public allegations.
- Daniel Patrick Boyd and Charles Boyd. Trained in
Afghanistan. 1989–1991. Confession/Public allegations.
- Christopher Paul. AQ links, planning attacks. 1990–2007.
Prosecuted.
- Abu Ubaidah Yahya. NY/NJ network. 1992–1993. Public
allegations.
- Kelvin E. Smith. NY/NJ network, provided training. 1993.
Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Earl Gant. NY/NJ network. 1993. Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Clement Rodney Hampton–El and Victor Alvarez. NYC
Landmarks plot. 1993–1993. Prosecuted.
- Aukai Collins. Fought in jihadi conflicts abroad. 1993–1996.
Confession.
- Jason Pippin. Trained in Kashmir, involved with Tarek Mehanna.
1996–2003. Confession.
- Abu Adam Jibreel al-Amriki. Killed in Kashmir. 1997–1998. KIA.
- Adam Gadahn. AQ spokesman. 1997–Ongoing. Confession.
- Jose Padilla. AQ operative. 1998–2002. Prosecuted.
- Earnest James Ujaama. Oregon training camp. 1999–2001. Prosecuted.
- Randall Todd Royer, Hammad Abdur–Raheem, Donald Thomas Surratt,
Yong Ki Kwon. Virginia jihad group. 2000–2003. Prosecuted.
- Hassan Abu Jihaad. Disclosed navy secrets. 2000–2001. Prosecuted
(non-terror).
- John Walker Lindh. American Taliban. 2000–2001. Prosecuted.
- Jeffrey Leon Battle, Patrice Lumumba Ford and October
Martinique Lewis. Portland jihad group. 2001–2002. Prosecuted/ Prosecuted
(non-terror).
Post-9/11
- Clifton L. Cousins. Threatened George W. Bush. 2001–2003.
Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Rafiq Abdus Sabir. Offered support for AQ. 2001–2005. Prosecuted.
- Ryan Anderson. Tried to give military info to AQ. 2004. Prosecuted
(non-terror).
- Mark Robert Walker. Planned to join Somali jihadis. 2004.
Prosecuted.
- James Elshafay. NYC subway bomb sting. 2004. Prosecuted.
- Kevin James, Levar Washington and Gregory Patterson. LA
attack plot. 2004–2005. Prosecuted.
- Justin Singleton. Discussed jihad online, lied to FBI. 2005.
Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Paul Gene Rockwood Jr and Nadia Rockwood. Jihadi hit–list.
2006–2010. Prosecuted/Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Mohammed Reza Taheri–Azar. North Carolina vehicle attack March 3,
2006. Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Russell DeFreitas. JFK airport plot. 2006–2007. Prosecuted.
- Ruben Luis Leon Shumpert. Joined al-Shabaab. 2006–2008. KIA.
- Omar Shafik Hammami. Joined al-Shabaab. 2006–2013. Legal
allegations/Confession/KIA.
- Daniel Patrick Boyd. North Carolina jihadi plotters. 2006–2009.
Prosecuted (repeat offender).
- Carlos Eduardo Almonte. Conspiracy to join al-Shabaab. 2006–2010.
Prosecuted.
- Derrick Shareef. Mall attack sting. 2006. Prosecuted.
- Daniel Joseph Maldonado. Joined al-Shabaab. 2006–2007. Prosecuted.
- Bryant Neal Vinas. AQ operative. 2007–2008. Prosecuted.
- James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams and Laguerre Payen.
NYC attack sting. 2008–2009. Prosecuted.
- Barry Walter Bujol Jr. Conspiracy to join terrorists overseas.
2008–2010.
- Troy Matthew Kastigar. Minnesota jihadi network. 2008–2009. KIA.
- Colleen Renee LaRose and Jamie Paulin–Ramirez. Conspiracy
to support terrorists overseas. 2008–2009.
- Michael C. Finton. Springfield, Illinois attack sting. 2009.
Prosecuted.
- Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad. Little Rock shooting, June 1, 2009.
Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Zachary Adam Chesser and Jesse Curtis Morton. Online
threats, attempt to join terrorists overseas. 2009–2010.
Prosecuted/Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Emerson Winfield Begolly. Promoting terrorism online. 2010.
Prosecuted.
- Antonio Benjamin Martinez. Baltimore attack sting. 2010.
Prosecuted.
- Randy Lamar Wilson. Planned to go to Mauritania for jihad.
2010–2012. Prosecuted.
- Marcus Dwayne Robertson and Jonathan Paul Jiminez. Jihadi
facilitation network. 2010–2011. Prosecuted/Legal allegations/Prosecuted
(non-terror).
- Walli Mujahidh and Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif. Seattle
military attack sting. 2011. Prosecuted.
- Naser Jason Abdo. Planned attack near Fort Hood. 2011. Prosecuted.
- Jose Pimentel. NYC attack sting. 2011. Legal allegations.
- Craig Benedict Baxam. Attempted to join al-Shabaab. 2011. Legal
allegations.
- Arifeen David Gojali, Ralph Kenneth Deleon and Miguel
Alejandro Santana Vidriales. Conspiracy to join AQ/Taliban. 2011–2012.
Legal allegations.
- Shelton Thomas Bell. Attempted to join jihadists in Yemen. 2012.
Legal allegations.
- Justin Kaliebe. Attempted to join jihadists in Yemen. 2013.
Prosecuted.
- Erwin Antonio Rios. Plan to commit armed robberies to fund jihad
(sting). 2012–2013. Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Matthew Aaron Llaneza. Oakland attack sting. 2012–2013. Legal
allegations.
- Nicole Lynn Mansfield. Killed fighting in Syria. 2012–2013. KIA.
- Eric Harroun. Fought in Syria. 2013. Prosecuted
(non-terror)/Confession.
Appendix 1. List of British converts
included in the sample
Converts included in the analysis
are listed in chronological order according to when they began. Details include
individual names, brief case description, offence period, and classifications
(grounds for inclusion at the time the study was completed). Co-offenders are
listed together.
Pre-9/11
- David Sinclair. Killed in Bosnia. 1993. KIA.
- Xavier Jaffo. Killed in Chechnya, April 12, 2000. 1995–2000. KIA.
- Andrew Rowe. International terrorist. 1995–2003. Prosecuted.
- David Courtailler. FPM network. 1997–2000. Overseas conviction
(France).
- Jerome Courtailler. FPM network. 1997–2001. Overseas conviction
(Netherlands).
- Abdullah el-Faisal. Jihadi ideologue. 1998–2002. Prosecuted.
- Abu Abdul Rahman Roland. Killed in Afghanistan. 1998–1999. KIA.
- Richard Reid. Shoe–bomb plot. 1998–2001. Overseas conviction (US).
- Dhiren Barot. US/UK attack plots (AQ). 2000–2004. Prosecuted
(non-terror).
- Martin John Mubanga. Alleged terrorist activity. 2000–2002. Gitmo
detainee.
- Feroz Abbasi. Alleged terrorist activity/FPM network. 2000–2001.
Gitmo detainee/Confession.
- Binyam Mohammed. Alleged terrorist activity. 2001–2002. Gitmo
detainee.
- Richard Dean Belmar. Alleged terrorist activity. 2001–2002. Gitmo
detainee.
Post-9/11
- Jamal Malik al-Harith. Alleged terrorist activity. 2001. Gitmo
detainee.
- Abu Omar. Fought in Afghanistan. 2001–2002. Confession.
- Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba. Alleged terrorist activity. 2001–2002.
Gitmo detainee.
- Anthony Garcia. Fertilizer bomb plot (Operation Crevice).
2003–2004. Prosecuted.
- AP. Went to join jihadis in Somalia. 2004–2006. Control order.
- Atilla Ahmet, Kibley da–Costa and Mohammed al-Figari. UK
training camps. 2004–2006. Prosecuted.
- Jermaine Lindsay. 7/7 bombings. 2004–2005. KIA.
- Abu Izzadeen and Simon Keeler. Soliciting funds for
terrorism (AM). 2004. Prosecuted.
- Abdul Ishaq Raheem. Terror–supply network/Beheading plot.
2004–2007. Prosecuted.
- Umar Islam. Aircraft liquid bomb plot (Operation Overt). 2005–2005.
Prosecuted (non-terror).
- Yeshiemebet Girma. 21/7 post–event assistance. 2005. Prosecuted.
- Kevin Gardner. Army base attack plan. 2006–2007. Prosecuted.
- Nicholas Roddis. Bomb hoax. 2007. Prosecuted.
- Andrew Isa Ibrahim. Planned attack in Bristol. 2007–2008.
Prosecuted.
- Mohammad Abdulaziz Rashid Saeed–Alim. Attempted suicide bombing in
Exeter, May 22, 2008. Prosecuted.
- M1. Suspected terrorist activity. 2008–2009. Deported.
- Matthew Ronald Newton. Manchester terrorism recruitment. 2008–2009.
Prosecuted.
- J1. London Somali jihad cell. 2009–2010. Detention/Deportation.
- Abu Bakr and Mansoor Ahmed. Killed in Pakistan.
2009–2010. KIA.
- Richard Dart. (Attempted) overseas training/Planning domestic
attack. 2010–2012. Prosecuted.
- Minh Quang Pham. Joined al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
2010–2011. Legal allegations (US).
- Nicholas Roddis. Preparing for acts of terrorism. 2011–2012. Legal
allegations (repeat offender).
- Robert Baum and Christian David Erkart Heinze Emde.
Possession offences. 2011. Prosecuted.
- Samantha Lewthwaite and Jermaine Grant. Planning attacks
(al-Shabaab). Legal allegations (Kenya).
- Maryam. Joined jihad in Syria. 2013–Unknown. Confession.
- Michael Adebolajo and Michael Oluwatobi Adebowale. Murder
of Lee Rigby, May 22, 2013. Legal allegations (non-terror).
- Royal Barnes and Rebekah Dawson. Encouraging acts of terrorism online. 2013. Legal allegations.
Notes
[1] Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer,
“The Role of Converts in Al-Qa`ida-Related Terrorism Offenses in the United
States” CTC Sentinel, 6 (3) (2013) https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-role-of-converts-in-al-qaida-related-terrorism-offenses-in-the-united-states. Accessed April 2, 2013.
[2] These data were collected and
analyzed by the author over a period of approximately seven years (see Sam
Mullins, ‘Home-Grown’ Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism in the US
and UK (London: Imperial College Press, forthcoming).
[3] After also dividing each sample
into converts versus non-converts, this resulted in 8 different sub-samples:
For the U.S., the pre-9/11 sample consisted of 143 individuals (25 converts,
118 non-converts) while the post-9/11 sample included 222 individuals (51 converts
–1 of whom was a repeat offender from before 9/11– and 172 non-converts). By
comparison, the U.K. pre-9/11 sample included 139 individuals (13 converts, 126
non-converts) and the post-9/11 sample included 288 (34 converts –including 1
repeat offender during the post-9/11 period– and 254 non-converts).
[4] Note that all percentages
reported for the present study refer to the number of known individuals as a
function of the respective sub-sample total.
[5] Note that the number of U.S.
converts before and after 9/11 adds to 76, although the true number of
individuals is 75. This is because one person (Daniel Boyd) committed separate
offences in both time-periods. All other repeat offenders, both American and
British, are excluded from the totals in order to show the actual number of
people involved.
[6] This is consistent with research
conducted by Kleinmann, who found that 19 of 32 American converts showed
evidence of individual-level mechanisms of radicalization (including mental
health problems), compared to just 5 of 51 non-converts (Scott Matthew
Kleinmann, “Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants in the United States:
Comparing Converts and Non-Converts” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
35(4) (2012) 278–297.
[7] Regarding involvement in
terrorism plots, Simcox and Dyer do not report provide clear, comparative
figures.
[8] Including plots involving
undercover operatives and excluding attacks that were actually completed.
[9] Defined here as lone, untrained individuals acting
independently of any organization or group (also excluding terrorism offenders
who were caught in sting operations where they plotted together with undercover
operatives).
[10] “Leader of Revolution Muslim
Pleads Guilty to Using Internet to Solicit Murder and Encourage Violent Extremism” US
Department of Justice, February 9, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2012/02/20120209mortonnr.html. Accessed February 10, 2012.
[11] Sara Carter, “Somalis in U.S.
Draw FBI Attention” The Washington Times, December 29, 2008 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/29/somalis-in-us-draw-fbi-attention/print/. Accessed June 13, 2010.
[12] Laura Yuen, “Sixth Minn. Man
Reportedly Dies in Somalia” Minnesota Public Radio, September 11,
2009, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/09/11/somali-death/. Accessed June 27, 2011.
[13] “Jury Convicts Naser Jason Abdo
on All Counts in Connection with Killeen Bomb Plot” US Department of
Justice, May 24, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/usao/txw/press_releases/2012/Abdo_conviction.pdf. Accessed May 25, 2012.
[14] Sam Stanton and Denny Walsh,
“Lodi-area Man Charged with Trying to Join Islamic State May Be Mentally Ill” The
Sacramento Bee, December 2, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article4248423.html. Accessed December 2, 2014.
[15] Michael Schwirtz and William
Rashbaum, “Attacker With Hatchet Is Said to Have Grown Radical on His Own” The
New York Times, October 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/nyregion/man-who-attacked-police-with-hatchet-ranted-about-us-officials-say.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes&_r=0. Accessed October 26, 2014.
[16] “Mom: Son Arrested at O’Hare,
Accused of Trying to Join Islamic State has Mental Illness” Chicago
Tribune, April 8, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-wisconsin-islamic-state-20150411-story.html. Accessed April 9, 2015.
[17] Bob Dunn, “Alexander Ciccolo:
Adams Man’s Path Divided Between Peace and Violence” The Berkshire
Eagle, July 16, 2015, http://www.berkshireeagle.com/local/ci_28496106/alexander-ciccolo-adams-mans-path-divided-between-peace. Accessed July 26, 2015.
[18] This is not to suggest that
these are the only motives for converting to Islam and becoming involved in
Islamist terrorism, or that converts’ expectations are always met. For more on
these issues see: Jahangir E. Arasli, “Violent Converts to Islam: Growing
Cluster and Rising Trend” Combating Terrorism Exchange, 1(1) (2011) https://globalecco.org/en_GB/ctx-v1n1/violent-converts-to-islam. Accessed November 29, 2015; Monika
Gabriela Bartoszewicz, Controversies of Conversions: The Potential
Terrorist Threat of European Converts to Islam (University of St.
Andrews: Unpublished doctoral thesis, 2013) https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/3676/3/MonikaGabrielaBartoszewiczPhDThesis.pdf. Accessed November 29, 2015; M.A.
Kevin Brice, A Minority Within a Minority: A Report on Converts to
Islam in the United Kingdom (Faith Matters: 2010) http://www.portmir.org.uk/assets/islam-and-muslims/a-minority-within-a-minority—a-report-on-converts-to-islam-in-the-uk—faith-matters.pdf. Accessed November 29, 2015;
Matthew Kleinmann, “Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants in the United
States”; Leon Moosavi, “Are Converts More Likely to be Extremists than Other
Muslims?” The Guardian, May 24, 2013,http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2013/may/24/islam-converts-woolwich-attackers-extremists. Accessed November 29, 2015; Milena
Uhlmann, “European Converts to Terrorism” Middle East Quarterly,
15(3) (2008) http://www.meforum.org/1927/european-converts-to-terrorism. Accessed November 29, 2015.
[19] Sam Mullins, ‘Home-Grown’
Jihad.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Simcox and Dyer, “The Role of
Converts in Al-Qa`ida-Related Terrorism Offenses in the United States”.
[22] Ibid.
[23] For a more detailed discussion
relating to estimates of the number of converts to Islam in the U.K. see Brice, A
Minority Within a Minority.
[24] Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus
Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa (George
Washington University: Program on Extremism, 2015) 7, https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf. Accessed December 2, 2015.