By You Ji Visiting Senior Research Fellow, East Asian Institute National University of Singapore, Singapore The Chinese military ...
By You Ji
Visiting Senior Research Fellow, East
Asian Institute
National University of Singapore,
Singapore
The Chinese military is undergoing rapid transformation simultaneously unfolding in three areas: changing civil-military relations embodied in new post-Deng patterns of PLA-CCP interaction; an organizational overhaul in terms of its personnel composition and structure; and force modernization driven by doctrinal innovation, capability enhancement and war game plans [1-3]. These changes have been deepened and accelerated since Xi Jinping became commander in- chief in November 2012 who ordered the PLA to concentrate all its effort to raise combat readiness in order to and win the next war [4].
Image Attribute: 110712-N-TT977-077:
Soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1st Amphibious Mechanized
Infantry Division / DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad
J. McNeeley/Released / SOURCE: Wikimedia Commons
What is unique
about PLA transformation in military terms is that it is not a normal process
of modernization for hand-ware and software due upgrading due to technological
progress at home and abroad. It is war driven, catering for particular external
security threats, specific adversaries and anticipated combat modes and
scenarios. Its practical objective in the short-to-medium run is to reduce
absolute US military superiority vis-Ã -vis China to one that is relative,
which, by the calculus of Beijing’s strategists, would make Washington balk at
confronting the PLA directly in US regional intervention, e.g., to buttress
Asian states in challenging China’s territorial claims. This is in resonance
with the post-Iraq syndrome [5].
To this end PLA
transformation has to be capability-based reflected by accelerated generational
upgrade of order of battle. The PLA is pursuing the goal in multiple ways but
crucial to its realization is possession of MAD (mutually assured destruction)
capabilities at both strategic and tactical levels. The former is ensured by a
nuclear arsenal that is minimum but reliable for effective retaliatory strike.
“Minimum but reliable” is measured by a “number’s game”: when the PLA’s five
new strategic missile submarines all become operational in about a decade from
now, they could launch 60 ICBMs, each with three war heads. Then the total
number comes to 180 and surely generates MAD deterrence against any power.
The latter is
informed by PLA “star war” designs. The PLA has acquired initial capability of
space operations through either landbased ASAT assets or striking satellites in
the earth orbit. They can hit the enemy’s under-soft belly through knocking
down a proportion of its military satellites so that US one-way battle-field
transparency against the PLA would be weakened or denied in future wars. Any
armed action in the outer-space would generate MAD outcome, i.e., through
accumulated debris of destroyed space objects. Since no human casualties are
caused, however, it is hoped that star war may or may not escalate into an
all-out war. This tactical MAD capability is essential for the PLA to deter or
frustrate US preemptive strikes against China’s key homeland strategic targets.
Such attack is a top scenario envisaged both by Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle (ASB)
concept vis-Ã -vis the PLA and by PLA criteria for space operations. Thus
limited but effective tactical aerospace power is of strategic importance for
PLA transformation. It provides the requisite technology for China’s
everenlarged arsenal of long-range precision munities against adversary’s
forward deployed bases and weapons systems, e.g., carrier battle groups in the
West Pacific. Thus it constitutes an indispensable foundation for
anti-access/area-denial (2A/AD) operation -- its asymmetric warfare against a
more powerful adversary.
More generally,
Chinese military transformation is ambitious with clearly designed roadmaps to
guide the policy formulation and force modernization. Generally, it has been
embodied in the following endeavors:
• Changing the
PLA from a military of quantity to that of quality.
• Changing PLA
posture from being defensive-offense (homeland defense) to one that is capable
of offensive-defense (sustained operations of long range power projection).
• Changing PLA
force structure from being army-centric to one that suits joint operations with
the special Services, especially the PLA Air Force and the PLA Navy, playing a
primary role in war preparation.
• Changing PLA
command structure from being multiple-layered and vertically-distributed to one
that is horizontally arranged with fewer layers of command, control and
communication.
• Changing PLA
force development from focusing on mechanization (latform-centric warfare) to
on paralleling mechanization and informatization network-centric warfare).
• Changing the
PLA’s weapons R&D and equipment priority from high-tech hardware
modernization to one that combines both platform upgrade and IT-software
advancement for future network-centric warfare.
The list of
changes can be much longer [6]. Suffice to say that the PLA is taking a new
look with transformation deepening day by day.
To the PLA a
proper force development strategy provides good guidance for force
transformation but only capabilities can fill the gap between an overarching
design embedded in the strategy and combat effectiveness/battle-field dominance
assured by advanced weaponry. PLA reform is based on three decisive factors: a
guiding strategy, a suitable force structure, and necessary capabilities, the
last considered as the pivot. So far the gap is still enormous for the PLA to
narrow visà - vis the US military. However, with increased financial and
material input the PLA’s catch-up endeavor gradually produces tangible outcome.
2013 was the
year of great capability enhancement for the PLA. In December the PLA nuclear force
tested two ICBMs within ten days: a DF-41 strategic missile with a range of
12,000 km; and Jiuliang-2, a submarine launched ICBM with a range of over 8,000
km. The air force and naval expansion was even more impressive in the year. The
PLA Air Force had more modern combat aircraft under R&D than any country in
the world. In 2013 it had a number of new combat aircraft enter series
production and military service, including J-10B, J-11B, JH-7B, naval strike
aircraft J-16, combat helicopter WZ-10 and WZ-19 and GaoXin-8, a Chinese
version of PC-3. At the same time the test light for no fewer than seven new
class combat aircraft was intensified, including stealthy fifth generation J-20
and J-31, strategic transport Y-20, strategic bomber H-18, GX-10 electronic
warfare aircraft, second generation AWACs KJ-500, and aircraft carrier AWACs
JZY-01 and no fewer than five types of combat drones, including Lijian-1, an
equivalent to US X-47B. The navy also achieved a year of great leap forward in
adding an unprecedented number of combat ships into the service, including
18,056 light frigates, six 054 stealth frigates, two 052C Aegis air defense
destroyers, one 071 amphibious ship (LHA 20,000 tons), two 094 strategic
submarines, one submarine rescue ship, two conventional submarine with AIP (the
Yuan class) and two large supply ships [7].
Does China’s
rapid military transformation mark the end of the era of “concentrated
research, minimum equipment”, which was the PLA’s long-term R&D and
equipment policy? The question will be of strategic importance in understanding
PLA transformation in the years ahead. An affirmative answer will see the quick
addition of new generation weapons systems to the services, while a ‘no’ will
herald its continued adherence to the concept of “pockets of excellence” due to
technological and material constraints that only allowed the PLA to produce
“emergence hardware” to tackle immediate military threat and equip a small
proportion of its “fist troops” as fast response means. The “well-burst”
phenomenon of platform-acquisition mentioned earlier at least gives all
observers a solid impression that the PLA weapons development has entered a new
phase of comprehensive modernization, although, the idea of more research, less
equipment still holds pending further technological breakthroughs.
One catalyst for
this development is China’s rapid growth of military budget. In the last three
decades it has at least increased by eight times. If the current pace of
accelerated financial investment continues for another decade, it will
substantially alter global structure of military expenditure. In 2014 US share
in the structure is ahead of the next group of 20 major nations. By 2024 the
picture will have changed to one that the US is still ahead of China, but
China, possessing over half of US defence spending, is ahead of the next group
of 20 states. When this is translated into capability-building the current huge
gap between the US and China will be visibly narrowed and China will further
consolidate its superiority in order of battle against all Asian powers.
Then an
important question for strategists in the world to answer is about how much PLA
transformation has empowered power shift in the Asia-Pacific region, and how
long it would proceed before US force superiority in the Far East is eroded to
the point where Washington’s resolve in protecting its allies is compromised
[8]. This has far-reaching impact on Asia’s international relations in general
and its security landscape in particular.
Interestingly
Chinese accumulation of military power is for the time being a relatively small
driver in power transition. It is still in its initial and vulnerable stage of
development, as seen a large number of unfinished R&D programs mentioned
above. Military is also the area where the US dominance is most solid and
deeply rooted. Relatively decline of US power is not really happening in
military balance of power globally in general and between China and the US in
particularly. In fact with new generations of weapons systems introduced to the
US military in the next decade or so, such as global strike munitions within
one hour, the Sino-US capability gap will widen until it is narrowed in about
two decades when Chinese technological achievement and monitory inputs reach
the peak in this round of rise, of course, under condition that no major war
involving China occurs and the country’s domestic challenges are basically
managed.
Probably power
transition materializes first in diplomatic and economic field. It is a kind of
inevitable that China’s economic size will reach a rough parity within the US
this decade and then overtake it in an accelerated fashion. Given China’s high
savings rate it will have more available capital for internal and external
investment than America. Similarly China’s huge population heralds a larger
domestic market to absorb imports from the world. The changing international
economic structure is mirrored by some simple data of 2009: China’s growth of
8.5 percent was achieved with its export growth in the negative territory
(-16%). In 2010 China’s mounting domestic demand resulted in US export growth
to China 50% faster than that to the rest of the world with an amount over $US
113 billion [9]. This staggering change testifies that China’s growth cannot be
simplistically defined as exportdriven. Such an assertion has long been
inaccurately based on the Yuan exchange rate and foreign trade/domestic GDP
ratio. The GDP figure is a concept of accumulated assets but the trade figure
is one year’s amount. Putting them together for calculating China’s dependence
on global trade creates distortions [10]. China is the primary engine for
global economic recovery from crisis. And the reality of China and the US being
the twine-engine for global growth underlines a G-2 logic advanced by former
World Bank president Zoellick [11].
Despite Sino-US
political unwillingness to embrace G-2 characterization, a valid G-2 logic is
visibly embedded in global and regional security-making process. There has
emerged a consensus that no major world security issues can be effectively
tackled without China’s cooperation. Increasingly Washington and Beijing are in
the same boat in crossing the river of danger [12]. More concretely in Asia the
US alliance network continues to serve as the primary guarantee for regional
stability. US-China security cooperation becomes indispensable for crisis/war
prevention, e.g., in the Korea Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait and in regional
territorial disputes; and for threat management, anything from anti-terrorism
to anti-WMD proliferation. This fact was recognized by US approach of
“strategic reassurance” in Sino-US relations under Obama in his first years in
office. For instance, China’s decisive role in managing climate change is part of
its overall influence in world politics, positive or otherwise [13]. The G-2
logic is an embodiment of power shift over a period of time: the sole
superpower gradually declines to a power status of being the first among equals
in the club of top powers, while a rising power gradually matches the power of
the hegemon in some key economic and defense sectors.
Certainly
Sino-US competition will intensify amidst power transition, although not
necessarily leading to irreconcilable confrontation. Yet in military terms this
will redress balance of power between them, as testified by the changing
budgetary allocations based on changing economic strength mentioned earlier.
For instance, today the PLA has more new types of combat aircraft R&D
projects than U.S. military. In the last two years it launched more space
objects than Americans.
This trend may
have pointed to potential outcome Sino-US bipolarity in the making, due to
redistribution of global economic power, structural Sino-US strife, and forced
choice upon other countries caught in Sino-US contention [14]. This is a unique
type of bipolarity. First, there is defining difference between a bipolar order
and bipolar realignment. The former indicates that the relationship between two
top powers is confrontational across the board but in the latter confrontation
is only on an array of specific issues around which they mobilize support from
relevant countries. Secondly the bipolar realignment is not a linear course but
reflected by a gradual change in balance of power, starting in the economic
realm. Thirdly, Asian bipolarity evolves as a result of a long process of
bipolar realignment. Yet this process happens in a unipolar world order and
thus bears unique constructive features under US domination of regional
affairs. And bipolarity takes place exclusively in the security realm. Fourthly,
if in the end an Asian bipolarity takes a structured shape, it would be an
asymmetric one. The US has effective leverages by itself and with the support
from its allies. Yet China has advantages in key areas of influence, such as
geographic vicinity and its centrality in regional economic integration.
The consequences
of rising PLA power to regional security are profound. For instance, potential
US military threat to China due to its alliance commitment to countries in
territorial disputes with China obliges the PLA to enhance its combat
capabilities against US interventionist force. This catch-up effort alarms
Japan and India, which also step up their military modernization, which in turn
stimulates South Korea and Pakistan. The end result is open-ended upward spiral
of regional arms build-up. This is especially true in the naval sector [15].
However, thanks to imbalance of national economic power and technological
potential, China is clearly in an advantageous position vis-Ã -vis other
regional states. Eventually the “flying geese” dynamics of arms race may end
the post-Cold War military uni-polarity when economic multi-polarity is further
entrenched. Traditionally US allies and partners draw great comfort from the
unipolar world order and from absolute U.S. military superiority. When these
gradually give way to something different, it inflicts a visible level of
uncertainties among their leaders and people alike. For instance this anxiety
underlined Australia Defense White 2009 that unprecedentedly named China as the
source of Australian security concern and much annoyed Chinese authorities
[16].
Xi Jinping tried
to convince Obama in their Sunny lands Ranch summit in May 2013 that China’s
rise would not mean to challenge U.S. global leadership. Although historically
rise and fall of major powers are seldom peaceful, Beijing is determined not to
allow power shift to become zero-sum. In China’s view absolute U.S. superiority
is not an attribute to peace, and its effort to reduce it to a relative one is
not a cause for war either. Let us hope this is the historical destiny.
About The Author:
You Ji, Visiting
Senior Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore,
Singapore, Tel: 61-2-9385 3620, E-mail: J.You@unsw.edu.au
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Publication Details:
ISSN: 2151-6200
Citation: Ji Y
(2014) Rise of Chinese Military Might and Global Power Shift. Arts Social Sci J
5: e101. doi: 10.4172/2151-6200.1000e101 - [Link]
This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
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