By Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner In recent years, Turkey and Qatar have found much common ground on a host of foreign policy issu...
By Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner
In recent years, Turkey and Qatar have found much common ground on a host of
foreign policy issues. Both Ankara and Doha have sponsored a variety of Sunni
Islamist groups, seen as conduits for their geopolitical influence in the fluid
Middle East. However, both countries have experienced setbacks from their
engagement in some of the region’s conflicts, most notably in Syria.
Last month, the Turkish and Qatari representatives left the Vienna talks on Syria maintaining their conviction that Bashar al-Assad must relinquish power as a precondition for peace. Although Turkey’s shared border with Syria and Qatar’s deep pockets provide the two nations much potential to prolong insurgencies against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies, it appears unrealistic to imagine Ankara and Doha achieving their objective of toppling the Syrian regime through their current strategies, especially in light of Russia’s military intervention in the country.
Last month, the Turkish and Qatari representatives left the Vienna talks on Syria maintaining their conviction that Bashar al-Assad must relinquish power as a precondition for peace. Although Turkey’s shared border with Syria and Qatar’s deep pockets provide the two nations much potential to prolong insurgencies against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies, it appears unrealistic to imagine Ankara and Doha achieving their objective of toppling the Syrian regime through their current strategies, especially in light of Russia’s military intervention in the country.
Image Attribute: The
scene at Saadallah Al-Jabiri Square, Aleppo after being targeted by the armed opposition in October 2012 / Source: Wikimedia Commons [Link]
Turkey and Qatar’s Quest for Regional
Influence
Throughout the 2000s, both Turkey
and Qatar pursued efforts to expand strategic clout at a time when Washington’s
relative power was declining in the aftermath of the invasion and occupation of
Iraq. Since taking power in 2002, the AK Party’s leader ramped up Turkey’s role
and image on the Arab street through the ideological lure of the party’s brand
of “democratic Islamism,” as well as through trade and investment opportunities
that the Turks offered the Arabs.
Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan’s anti-Israel rhetoric in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) and the Mavi Marmara incident of May 2010 improved the Turkish leader’s popularity in the region in the years leading up to the Arab Awakening. Similarly, Qatar relied on its ownership of Al Jazeera and its reputation as a “fair broker” in regional conflicts to enhance the nation’s own soft-power influence far beyond the Gulf. Indeed, Al Jazeera’s coverage of the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 2003, its focus on the Palestinians’ plight and its role as a platform for Arab regime critics to voice their opinions sat well with many Arabs, whose previous media selections were heavily censored and slanted in favor of the ruling regimes.
However, the Syrian crisis and
2011’s other Arab uprisings and “revolutions” elicited reactions from Turkey
and Qatar that severely damaged their reputations. By sponsoring Sunni Islamist
causes in Egypt, Gaza, Libya, Syria and Tunisia, Ankara and Doha came under
harsh condemnation from other powers in the region. Many quickly accused Turkey
and Qatar of stoking sectarian unrest and promoting extremism.
In Egypt, both states opposed the
rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in July 2013. In Libya, Ankara and Doha both
supported the Islamist-dominated “Libya Dawn Coalition”. Both Turkey and Qatar
prevented Hamas from becoming internationally isolated through their shared
support for the Palestinian group, which the U.S. State Department and EU
designate a “terrorist organization”. Qatar’s willingness to break political
ranks with its fellow Arab states was underscored in August, when Doha strongly
distanced itself from an Arab League resolution condemning Turkey’s bombing of
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets in northern Iraq. Qatar expressed its
“full solidarity” with Turkey as it seeks “to protect its borders and
preservation of its security and stability.”
Yet it is in Syria where both
countries have invested the most in their common cause. Despite their efforts
to topple Assad, the regime’s resilience has highlighted the limitations of
Turkey and Qatar’s means to project power beyond their borders. In 2011, the
Turks and Qataris bet on Assad following the fate of Mubarak, Ben Ali and
Qaddafi, and sought to be on the “right side of history.” Their miscalculations
about the regime’s future were rooted in a misread of domestic issues within
Syria and the dynamics of the regional forces that would ultimately come to
have a profound impact on the course of events.
Unquestionably, the regime’s resilience is partially due to its brutality, but it is imperative to note that Assad has a wide network of support in Syria from groups who share common fears of the takfiris’ agenda. Given that the two most powerful factions fighting the Syrian regime are ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra—both takfiri groups—many Syrians see the secular Ba’athist regime as the only realistic bulwark against Islamist extremism in Syria. Many analysts have largely attributed the strength of hardline jihadist forces not only in Syria, but also in Libya, to Ankara and Doha’s sponsorship of Islamist networks across the region, associating Turkey and Qatar’s influence with sectarianism and extremism.
Unquestionably, the regime’s resilience is partially due to its brutality, but it is imperative to note that Assad has a wide network of support in Syria from groups who share common fears of the takfiris’ agenda. Given that the two most powerful factions fighting the Syrian regime are ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra—both takfiri groups—many Syrians see the secular Ba’athist regime as the only realistic bulwark against Islamist extremism in Syria. Many analysts have largely attributed the strength of hardline jihadist forces not only in Syria, but also in Libya, to Ankara and Doha’s sponsorship of Islamist networks across the region, associating Turkey and Qatar’s influence with sectarianism and extremism.
Ankara and Doha also underestimated the extent to
which Assad’s foreign backers would come to his side. Indeed, Ankara and Doha’s
roles in the conflict have been dwarfed by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah’s military
intervention against the regime’s enemies. Despite the efforts of Ankara and
Doha to topple Assad, the SAA remains by the far most powerful force on the
ground and the regime is not about to disappear.
Syria’s most important strategic ally in the
Middle East is Iran, which has a played a pivotal role as a military, political
and economic supporter of the Assad regime throughout this conflict. That
Washington and Moscow invited Tehran to join last month’s Vienna talks on Syria
marked a reversal in U.S. foreign policy, given that Washington previously
refused to talk directly to Iranian officials about the Syrian crisis. In the
larger picture, Iran’s participation in the talks underscored not only Tehran’s
important role in the Syrian conflict but that yet another ally of Assad was brought to the negotiating table.
Natural Gas Geopolitics:
It is important to note that despite the
ideological dimensions of Turkey and Qatar’s role as sponsors of the anti-Assad
rebellion, the geopolitics of natural gas have factored into Ankara and Doha’s
alignment vis-Ã -vis Syria. In 2009, Assad rejected a Qatari offer to run a
pipeline from the Gulf emirate’s North Field (which is contiguous with the
South Pars field, owned by Iran) to Turkey and beyond via Saudi Arabia, Jordan
and Syria. As a strategic ally of Moscow, Damascus’ refusal to sign the Qatari
proposal was said to be driven in part by Syria’s interest in protecting
Russia’s position as the EU’s number top natural gas supplier (which has tended
to be overlooked as a factor in the analyses of Russia’s role in the Syrian
crisis).
To the ire of officials in Doha, in 2010 Assad
began negotiations for the alternative $10 billion “Islamic pipeline” with
Tehran, with the objective of transiting natural gas to Syria’s Mediterranean
coast via Iran and Iraq. Sixteen months after the Syrian crisis erupted, Assad
signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran. Syria has often been
written off from a geostrategic perspective because it does not have much oil
and gas compared to other Middle Eastern states. However, the country’s
potential as a regional energy corridor has itself been a significant factor
influencing the ongoing Syrian conflict—one that has received little attention
in Western reporting about the conflict.
Turkey, Qatar and the Sunni Arab World:
Since Saudi Arabia’s King Salman inherited the
throne in January, Riyadh has softened its opposition to Sunni Islamist groups.
In contrast to his predecessor, King Abdullah, who aggressively countered these
groups both domestically and regionally, King Salman has sought to pursue a
strategy of uniting the Sunni world against Iranian influence in the region,
which he views as a graver threat than grassroots Sunni Islamist movements
which represent social justice causes and embrace democratic institutions. In
practice, this has entailed deeper collaboration with Turkey and Qatar in
Syria, as well as diplomatic overtures to Muslim Brotherhood branches in Egypt,
Gaza and Yemen.
The territorial defeats that the SAA endured
earlier this year are believed to be largely attributable to Riyadh, Ankara and
Doha’s stepped-up support for the “Army of Conquest” (a coalition of militias dominated by
Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham fighters). By pursuing deeper cooperation
with Turkey and Qatar in Syria, Saudi Arabia has created a degree of tension
with its two strategic allies: the UAE and Egypt, which both staunchly oppose
nearly all forms of political Islam in the region. Although Egypt, Jordan and
the UAE have not openly sided with Assad, their reactions to Moscow’s military
campaign in Syria are indicative of their view of Russia as an important player
in the regional struggle against terrorism, as well as the greater Middle
East’s shifting geopolitical order, despite their Sunni Arab identities and
alliances with Washington.
Although the full implications of Moscow’s strikes
against Assad’s enemies in Syria have yet to be realized, Russia’s military
campaign has enabled the SAA to reconquer territory in the provinces of Homs,
Hama and Aleppo. As Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar remain committed to their
position that any transition in Syria cannot include Assad, and all three
governments have condemned Moscow's backing of the Assad regime, it remains to
be seen what Riyadh, Ankara and Doha may do to change facts on the ground in
Syria.
Last year Ankara and Doha signed an agreement
permitting the joint deployment of troops in either country. The return of
Turkish troops to the Gulf emirate 100 years after Ottoman forces withdrew from
modern-day Qatar is a symbolic development. It is a huge leap, however, to imagine
that the next logical step in their evolving military cooperation is a joint
force in Syria. In fact, last month Qatar's Foreign Minister Khalid al-Attiyah ruled out the possibility of deploying Qatari forces to Syria,
instead vowing to continue financially sponsoring groups fighting the Ba’athist
regime. Similarly, with Riyadh bogged down in Yemen, it is hard to imagine that
Saudi Arabia will be committing ground forces to Syria.
Conclusion
On the surface, Turkish and Qatari officials have
gone to great lengths to express support for the other. In December the Emir of
Qatar visited the presidential palace in Ankara. Speaking next to the Qatari
monarch, ErdoÄŸan asserted that “together with Qatar, we [the Turks] always
side with oppressed people around the world.”
It is worth asking, however, if shared
geopolitical interests in Arab civil wars and a common ideology are enough to
serve as the basis for a long-term strategic alliance between Turkey and Qatar.
Analysts have questioned the extent to which such a development is even
possible, given that the two nations lack substantial economic ties. In fact,
aside from Bahrain, Qatar is Turkey’s smallest trade partner in the Gulf
Cooperation Council. Last year, Turkey and the UAE’s bilateral trade volume was
ten times greater than Turkey and Qatar’s total trade.
In spite of this, both nations appear determined
to strengthen their military ties, seeing more upside potential. Turkey and
Qatar’s common cause on the battlefields of Syria and elsewhere have brought
Ankara and Doha closer than ever. On paper, at least, Doha and Ankara have the
potential to contribute to Syria’s outcome, given that Turkey has a powerful
military and a lengthy border with Syria, while Qatar has the deep pockets to
sponsor the training and arming of rebel groups.
In practice, however, Turkey and Qatar’s strategy
of regime change in Syria has obviously failed, while the two governments’
support for Assad’s Islamist enemies has also complicated their ties with their
own strategic allies, trade partners and neighbors. Despite these costs and
recent developments resulting from Moscow and Tehran’s deepening military
involvement in Syria, Turkey and Qatar remain firmly committed to their political
objective of toppling Assad.
Last month in Vienna, Turkey’s Foreign Minister
Feridun Sinirlioglu reiterated Ankara’s position that “peace is not possible with Bashar
al-Assad,” and his Qatari counterpart emphasized Doha’s continued commitment to financially supporting Syrians who
seek to “liberate their country”. Given their common stakes, we should expect
Ankara and Doha to continue devoting resources to their growing political
relationship. However, it is doubtful that their combined efforts will have any
kind of meaningful effect on the ground in Syria. Russia and Iran’s stepped up
role military role in Syria comes at the expense of Ankara and Doha’s relevance
in the conflict.
It would serve the Turks and Qataris well to
swallow their pride, reconsider their strategy for Syria and adopt a more
realistic approach to a jointly executed foreign policy. Rather than devoting
such substantial resources to arming jihadist militias in Syria, the region could
benefit a great deal from Ankara and Doha channeling their resources toward
humanitarian efforts aimed at meeting the basic needs of the conflict’s
innocent victims, while working with the international community to pursue a
diplomatic settlement to the conflict and enhancing their own soft power in the
process.
About The Authors:
About The Authors:
Giorgio Cafiero is the Co-Founder of Gulf
State Analytics. Daniel Wagner is the CEO of Country Risk Solutions.
________________________________
Publication Details:
This article was originally published by The National Interest on November 9, 2015
It has been re-pusblished at IndraStra's website with due permission from the Authors.
AIDN: 001-11-2015-0416
It has been re-pusblished at IndraStra's website with due permission from the Authors.
AIDN: 001-11-2015-0416