By IndraStra Global Editorial Team 2014 Chumar Incident was just a teaser, The future incursions in this particular region wil...
By IndraStra
Global Editorial Team
2014 Chumar
Incident was just a teaser, The future incursions in this particular region
will be just like a slap but the feisty blow will come from Yunnan which covers
the "Eastern Sector" of the Order. And, let us be clear about one
thing - India may raise couple of mountain strike corps in a short period of
time but a deficiency induced air power capabilities will break India's
defensive lines as well as offensive dreams. The Order of Next War between
India and China, will be decided in the thin mountain air's of Aksai Chin and
Tibet. Is India really prepared?
Multiple Spark
Points : Chumar, Ukdungle, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldi
On 15 April 2013, a platoon-sized contingent of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) set up a camp in Raki Nula, 30 km south of Daulat Beg Oldi near the Aksai Chin-Ladakh Line of Actual Control (LAC).Chinese and Indian patrols in this disputed area are common, but both Chinese and Indian military forces have avoided establishing permanent bases and fortifications in the region. Indian forces responded to the Chinese presence by quickly establishing their own encampment 300 meters away. Negotiations between China and India lasted nearly three weeks, during which the Chinese position was reinforced and supported by trucks and helicopters. The dispute was resolved on 5 May, after which both sides withdrew.
The Chinese
claim that DBO area is part of Xinjiang, while the Indians believe that this
area is part of Jammu and Kashmir. China and India signed two agreements, in
1993 and 1996, in order to establish protocols to resolve potential disputes in
the region. These protocols included the mutual recognition of a "Line of
Actual Control" (LAC), but disagreements continue between the two
governments about where the LAC lies over a roughly 20 km-wide swath in this
sector. India first claimed that the Chinese encampment was 10 km on their side
of where they view the LAC, later revising that to 19 km. Despite the disputed
area being an "unpopulated and desolate wasteland", it is strategically
important to China because of the presence of a highway that connects Pakistan
to Tibet and Xinjiang.
The 2014
stand-off in Chumar-Demchok area in Ladakh region appears to have been resolved
without loss of face on either side.
The 2013’S incident in Depsang Plains and the last one almost 250-km
South in Demchok and Chumar has some similarities and some differences. In both
cases the PLA/People’s Armed Police Forces personnel in sizable strength had
intruded into the territory controlled and claimed by India. Both the incidents
lasted more than two weeks each during which the assertiveness of the Chinese
troops was on full display.
In the case of
DBO-Depsang incident, there were reports of an armored division being present
at Shahidullah and the intruding troops being in communication with this force
indicating that the Chinese were ready to escalate the conflict. Interestingly,
there was no concentration of Chinese troops in the near vicinity of
Chumar-Demchok area. Last year’s intrusion was termed as ‘accidental’ by China
and their Foreign Ministry expressed ignorance about the incident - at least in
the initial stages.
The Permafrost :
The Necessary Evil
Permafrost is the permanently frozen ground that occurs when the ground temperature is 32 °F (0
°C) or colder for two or more years. It is continuous in the arctic military
operating environments but sporadic in the subarctic and nonexistent in
temperate regions. The thickness of permafrost varies from a few feet to over a
thousand feet in depth. Disturbance of the tundra increases the thawing of
permafrost.
In the Aksai
Chin-Ladakh and Tibet, permafrost is generally encountered round the year. In
this area, the ground never fully thaws. This can be one of the trickiest areas
in which to stage mechanized military operations. The most suitable time for
conducting ground operations is from mid-winter to early spring before the
breakup period. During this period, the ground remains frozen allowing greater
mobility. Care must be taken with operations in the late spring or in the fall.
They should only be undertaken when day time thaw and nighttime freeze leave
only a thin layer of mud on deeply frozen ground. Vegetation varies from barren
lands to moss and lichens. Forests are usually found closer to the temperate
zone. Moss and lichen are usually found in permafrost areas. In summer in
permafrost areas, vegetation may mat together over a pool of water. This is
called a bog. The matted vegetation may support a man but will not support any
type of vehicle. These areas can be extremely dangerous.
Now, if we look
at the Chinese PLA's Incursion Patterns:
- 2013 DBO- Depsang Plains Incident - April 2013: Early Spring
- 2014 Chumar Incident - September 2014: Fresh Himalayan Winter
It is evidently
proved, China tested the readiness and effectiveness of its forces on technical
grounds in these two primary incursion points by considering the Himalayan
Permafrost factors. The results are crystal clear.
Western Sector
Assessment:
As per the International
Institute of Strategic Studies' Report, Lanzhou Military Region, which faces
Ladakh, has 220,000 troops, including an armored division and two motorized
infantry divisions. The Chengdu Military Region, opposite India’s north-eastern
states, has some 180,000 PLA troops, including two armored brigades and four
motorized infantry divisions.
According to
Late Mr. B. Raman, an ex-RAW official – the two primary factor which has
emerged in Chinese’s military strategy against India, for timely deployment of
assets.
1. China’s
increasingly emphasizing on the role of the helicopter-borne operations. China
has been searching for alternative means of taking India by surprise;
particularly in Southern Tibet. And, the completion of the G219 highway is going to
be the primary feeder to that surprise.
2. China’s
fine-tuning of integrated Army-Air Force role in defending Tibet from external
threats and in asserting their will trans-Himalayas. There has been an increase
in the number of Air Force exercises in Tibet, to get all the elements
acclimatize with high altitude warfare tactics.
Logistically,
Tibet is a nightmare for troop movement and sustenance. Lack of ground
communication facilities rather than a shortage of troops has been the limiting
factor for military operations on the entire Tibetan plateau. Before the
railway was constructed, the principal route into Tibet was the 1160 km long
Qingzang highway (National Highway 109) which connects Tibet to the
neighboring Qinghai province. It was built in the 1950s and has a limited load
carrying capacity, apart from numerous bottlenecks. The travel time on this
highway between Golmud to Lhasa via Nagqu is 72 hours. The other important land
route is the National Highway 318 (connecting Linzhi and Lhasa) which is in
fact the southern section of the Sichuan-Tibet Highway (Chuanzang Highway). In
the event of war or future large-scale riots in Tibet, this highway will be the
key passageway for combat troops from the Chengdu Military Region (CMR) to
enter Tibet.
Analysts point
to the military implications of the railroad, saying it could be used to beef
up China's already heavy military presence in Tibet, including the deployment
of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2001, Jane's Intelligence Digest reported that
'the PLA considers it necessary to build up a network of roads and mule tracks
to bring military hardware and troops to the forward areas of the disputed
border (with India).' According to defense expert William Triplett: 'With even
a single line, the PLA could move about 12 infantry divisions to central Tibet
in 30 days to meet up with their pre-positioned equipment.'12 Most of the
military experts agree with this assessment that in military terms, this rail
link gives China the capability to mobilize up to 12 divisions (approximately
12,000 men make a Chinese division) a month. Up North in the Qinghai province,
Golmud, the start point of the QTR, has now been turned into a major military
base with rail connectivity. It is located strategically to cover both the
unrest prone provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Further, the Lanzhou Military
Region (LMR) with its headquarters at Lanzhou in Qinghai province is also in
proximity of Golmud and connected with Golmud by rail on the Longhai Line, the
major East-West railway of China. LMR covers a vast area covering the Xinjiang,
Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and Shaanxi provinces. In the Indian context, LMR is
responsible for the Aksai Chin and the other Chinese areas in Xinjiang across
the Eastern Ladakh. The International Institute for Strategic Studies
attributes the Military Region with an estimated 220,000 personnel including
the 12th Armoured Division (Unit 84701) at Jiuquan in Gansu province. The
movement and rapid deployment of this equipment-intensive division will be
greatly facilitated by the QTR.
Eastern Sector
Assessment:
In any future
military confrontation with India, the Chinese will most likely to use their
Air Force in Tibet for defense, but simultaneously will deploy forces in Yunnan
and mobilized in a military offensive. If we consider the proximity of
Myanmar’s Kachin State and Yunnan, both the regions are very important in
trans-Himalayan military strategy, but disappointingly, India continues to
neglect these two important regions in their intelligence coverage.
Map Attribute :
Indian Defence Review - Link
The geographical
peculiarity of Arunachal Pradesh is that the river valleys and the mountain
ranges in the State-run more or less in a North-South alignment. Between the
Kameng sector in the West and the lower Subansari, in the center, there is a
vast swathe of land that is unassailable. The major rivers east of Kameng
sector are Kameng, Kamla, Kurang, Subansari, Shyom, Siang, Dibang, and
Lohit. These rivers have their source in
the North in the glaciated regions along the watershed and some north of the watershed
too. Geo-morphologically, the rivers have a huge drainage basin and are fed by
numerous turbulent tributaries. The volume of water and the current of these
rivers, particularly in the monsoon season is awesome. As a consequence, these
rivers have created deep gorges along their course down to the plains.
The Indian Army
already has plans to build a lateral road from Kameng to Lohit halfway up on
the road axis from the plains leading to the LAC, traversing up and down the
valleys and the mountain ranges running on either side of the river valleys.
That would, in rough terms, mean going up and down 16 mountain ranges and
crossing eight major rivers. As such this proposal has not progressed beyond an
expression of a ‘desire’. A similar lateral road alignment nearer the LAC would
entail equally formidable engineering challenges. The additional ones being
those that are posed by the altitude which would be greater, the river gorges
encountered would be more numerous and require innovative solutions. Also,
overall, the resources required would be enormous.
The Capabilities
of PLA's Mechanized Forces:
Image Attribute:
PLA's 149th Rapid Reaction Motorized Forces at Lhasa during the 2008 Riots,
Source: AFP
In 1989, when a
major unrest occurred in Tibet and the curfew was imposed in Lhasa, the 149th division was the first PLA combat unit to arrive on the scene. The 149th Rapid
Reaction Motorised Division of No.13 Group Army of the CMR is located at
Leshan/Emei in Sichuan province. At that time, the army troops entered Tibet
via the Sichuan-Tibet highway which imposed considerable delay. However in
March 2008, within 48 hours of the start of the riots in Lhasa, T-90/89
armored personnel carriers (APC) and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles
(IFV) of the 149th Division appeared on the streets. This is indicated by the
fact that the PLA soldiers on the T-90/89 vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were
all wearing the “leopard” camouflage uniforms specifically designed for
mountain warfare operations. These uniforms have appeared in the video footage
of the 149th Division during exercises. This rapid arrival of the Division
using QTR relieving pressure from the troops of the No. 52 and No. 53 Mountain
Brigades, which are located comparatively closer to Lhasa at Linzhi and Milin
respectively for quicker response in case of unrest.
Presently, China
also has 14 military airfields and 10 missile bases in Tibet. In TAR itself;
according to the Dharamshala based Tibet's government-in-exile,18 called the
Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), there are six sub-military districts,
having two independent infantry divisions, six border defense regiments, five
independent border defense battalions, three artillery regiments, three
engineers' regiments, one main signal station and two signal regiments, three
transport regiments and three independent transport battalions, four Air Force
bases, two radar regiments, two divisions, and a regiment of para-military
forces (referred to as Di-fang Jun or 'local army'), one independent division
and six independent regiments of the People's Armed Police (PAP). In absence of any
Indian threat as such, many of the regular army formations, particularly the
rapid reaction divisions were stationed primarily to quell any rioting in
Tibet. The two mountain infantry units of the Xizang Military District, which
forms the Tibet garrison, are also used for internal security. However, the
recent movement and deployment of PLA units for internal security was very
rapid, wiping out any Tibetan hopes for any sustained armed uprising. The use
of QTR meant that there was a minimum requirement of air support from the 2nd
Army Aviation Regiment, based at Fenghuangshan in Sichuan province. Therefore,
the recent improvement in rail infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau has thus
greatly assisted China in maintaining its grip over Tibet and gaining moral
ascendancy over the disaffected Tibetan groups. Further extensions of QTR may
permit the PLA troops in Tibet to handover the internal security tasks
completely to PAP and focus their attention on India.
The QTR also
features prominently in the operational plans of the PLA's Rapid Reaction
Forces (RRF) which forms a core of mechanized infantry tactics. The PLA has
established a regiment-level Army Special Force (ASF) in every Military Region
(MR) as an RRF unit, directly under the MR headquarters command. The total
strength of ASF may be as high as seven regiments and twenty-four battalions,
or approximately 25,000 personnel. The RRFs are meant to be quickly deployed in
the conflict-prone peripheral areas of China, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan,
and the South China Sea. The PLA has conducted various exercises since 1995,
concentrating particularly on long-range and intraregional rapid mobile
deployment. To this end, RRF combined exercises were carried out in 1995 and
1996 in the Gobi desert, the Tibetan and Xinjiang highlands, and in the
south-western tropical forests to enhance the RRF's adaptive survival
capabilities.15 It is learned that in the LMR, a 1000-mile railway transport
rapid-deployment exercise was held in August 1996. The purpose of railway
transport based exercise was to enhance mobile deployment capability15. Post
completion of QTR, the operational readiness as well as the deployment timings
of RRFs (ASF) in LMR and CMR have been further boosted.
The Role of Air
Forces
By the late 90s,
PLAAF was operating over 3500 combat aircraft comprising mainly the J-6 (MiG-19
equivalent) and the J-7 (based on the MiG-21). A deal with Russia saw the
induction of 100 Su-27 fighters. PLAAF also had in its inventory the H-6 (Tu-16
based) bombers. China had no precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and only the
Su-27 was BVR compatible.
Modernization of
the PLAAF has been propelled by China’s astounding economic growth. The 21st century
has witnessed the acquisition of 105 Su-30MKK from 2000 to 2003 and 100
upgraded Su-30MKK2 in 2004. China produced more than 200 J-11s from 2002
on-wards. The PLAAF also bought a total of 126 Su-27SK/UBK in three batches.
The production of the J-10 combat aircraft began in 2002 and 1200 are on order.
The H-6 bombers (Tu-16 Badger) were converted into flight refueling
aircraft. In 2005, the PLAAF unveiled
plans to acquire 70 Il-76 transport aircraft and 30 Il-78 tankers to
significantly upgrade strategic airlift capability and offer an extended range to
the fighter force. The US Department of Defense has reported that Su-27 SKs are
being upgraded to the multi-role Su-27 SMK status.
Recently China
unveiled its fifth-generation fighter, the J-20, and J-31 which represents a
significant step in the evolution of the Chinese aerospace industry. The new
aircraft displays stealth features and indicates a determination on China’s
part to shape new military capabilities in the period ahead. China is
determined in developing modern military aerospace capabilities.
Compared to
Pakistan, IAF has an edge. But, the speed in which PAF is modernizing, with
current aircraft-pilot ratio, The edge will not last long Now, when the same plight is compared to
China's PLAAF - It's simply pathetic. According to the Standing Committee on
Defence, the sanctioned squadron strength for Indian Air Force was 42 but at
present, it has 35 active squadrons. It is also noted that there are plans for
the induction of Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft and indigenous Light Combat
Aircraft, Tejas, along with a Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft project with
Russia. Committed also commented - "Even if all the procurement
fructifies, IAF is likely to achieve the authorized strength of 42 squadrons
only by the end of the 15th Plan, or in 2032."
The Role of
Navies:
In June 1994, the Japanese-language Sankei Shimbun claimed that, in
addition to constructing a radar station on Great Coco Island, the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) had also installed radar on nearby Little Coco Island.
The smaller island was across Alexandra Channel to the south, and thus even
closer to India’s North Andaman Island. Beijing had reportedly “leased” both
Burmese islands from the SLORC. According to the same news story, the
intelligence collected by these facilities was to be shared with the Burmese,
to help in “strengthening future cooperative military ties between the two
countries”.27 The source of all these claims was given as a former senior an official of Japan’s Defence Agency, in turn quoting “a British military intelligence
official”.
At first, the main purpose of the Great Coco Island facility was reportedly to monitor
regional military activities, especially air and naval movements in the Bay of
Bengal. Before long, however, journalists and academics began claiming that the
base was also established to conduct surveillance of India’s strategically
important tri-service facilities at Port Blair, on South Andaman Island. Some
suggested that the Chinese, and their Burmese allies, were monitoring submarine
activity around the Indian Navy’s base at Visakhapatnam (Vizag) in eastern
India. In an elaboration of this theme, a number of commentators claimed that
the Great Coco Island base was built and equipped by the Chinese to analyze
telemetry from Indian missile tests. These included flights by ballistic
missiles and space launch vehicles over the Bay of Bengal from ranges in
eastern India. The electronic intelligence gathered it was suggested, was
shared with Pakistan to help it develop counter-measures against new Indian
weapon systems
To counter
balance the Chinese maneuvers, India took an unprecedented step 14 years ago by
setting up a joint theater operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands (ANC). As of 2015, the command includes 15 ships of the Indian Navy,
two Navy Sea bases, four Air Force and Naval Airbases, and an Army brigade. The
Andaman and Nicobar Command is India’s first and only joint tri-service
command, with rotating three-star Commanders-in-Chief from the Army, Navy and
Air Force reporting directly to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Described as the `sentinel post' for the east and south, the command was
created to bring about a qualitative difference to operations and surveillance
in that region through multiple Indian military assets.
In the case of
escalation of any conflict between India and China, Myanmar’s 2,276 km long
coastline in the Bay of Bengal has the potential to provide the ‘second coast’
to the latter by giving direct access to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Especially
transportation military logistics to the ‘second coast’ from landlocked south
west Chinese provinces like Yunnan have both military and economic benefits.
Conclusion:
"Short
Border Wars" between India and China are inevitable. India has reinforced
its position in Arunachal with more boots on the ground, new missile defenses
and some of the Indian air force's best strike craft, new Russian-made Su-30
fighters. After decades of focusing its army against the perennial western threat
from Pakistan, India is tacitly realigning its military east to face the
long-term challenge of China.
China could make a targeted territorial grab, "for
example, a bid to take Tawang." Further west along the LAC, another major
flash-point lies in Kashmir. China controls a piece of the largely uninhabited
territory known as Aksai Chin that it captured during the 1962 war, a suitable
collection of spark points that provides all possible scenarios to launch
multiple surgical incursions. However, to initiate such a flash-attack, China yet to unify it's land and air defense forces, across the India-China border under one military region or command. Such an arrangement will give their strategic forces much required tactical teeth at such high altitudes.
The threat of
coordinated action by China and Pakistan under Pincer strategy - an alliance
built largely out of years of mutual antipathy toward India is one mooted
scenario. Pakistan, either with its own forces or terrorist, insurgent proxies,
would "make diversionary moves" across the blood-stained Siachen
glacier or Kargil, site of the last Indo-Pakistani war in 1999, while a Chinese
offensive strikes further east along the border. But, at the same time United
States and others will deploy there heavy geo-strategic muscles over Pakistan
to stay out of the conflict by all means. In short, the Pincer strategy is possible
only during peacetime, but not feasible during wartime.
Himalayan
kingdom of Bhutan would likely be treated as a neutral "Switzerland",
while Nepal, a country of 40 million that entertains both Beijing and New
Delhi's patronage is more or less assured that neither of its big neighbors
would risk violating its sovereignty in the event of war.
On other hand,
India needs to put in place a well-coordinated approach to secure the maritime
and land neighborhood of the Bay of Bengal and Northeast India. This would
include strengthening naval and coastal patrol assets in the littoral waters
off the Andaman and Nicobar islands as well as enhanced strategic assets at the
Northeastern borders opposite the ‘second coast’.
Indian Air
Force's role will be very decisive. Currently, It's the only force among Indian
Armed Forces which lacks all kind of tactical and strategic edge over PLAAF and
PLA Army Aviation.
As India
strengthens it Asian alliances and improves its defense capabilities steadily,
the current huge asymmetry in military power between the two will be partially
redressed. If China wants to try any strong-arm tactics against India, it has
to do so using the narrow window of time when the military skew is against the Indians.
After 5-10 years of an economic and military build-up by India, China's capacity
to act against India will fall dramatically.
References:
1. Road Parallel
to the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh by Lt. Gen. J.S. Bajwa, Indian Defence Review
October 17, 2014
2. India Under
Fire by Bharat Verma, Indian Defence Review
3. Andrew N. D.
Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao (Retd), 'PLA Rapid Reaction Forces
4. John Makin,
'The Lhasa Frontier', The American, January-February, 2007.Also at
www.american.com
5. 'China Daily,
Xinhua News Agency, Qinghai-Tibet Rail Rumbles Across Roof of the World', July
1, 2006, at www.chinadaily.com.cn
6. Qinghai-Tibet
Heavy Rail Line, China' at www.railway-technology.com
7. Train to
Lhasa, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi
8. Cold Region
Operations Manual, US Department of Army, Pdf
9. Regional
Outlook, Chinese Military Bases in Burma: : The Explosion of a Myth / Andrew
Selth , Griffith Asia Institute , Pdf
10. China’s
Second Coast: Implications for Northeast India, Namrata Goswami, IDSA New Delhi
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AIDN: 001-11-2015-0401
Disclaimer: All Geo-spatial Information in this article has been derived from "Open Sources", Only
Disclaimer: All Geo-spatial Information in this article has been derived from "Open Sources", Only
