GEOINT | India and China : The Order of Next War

By IndraStra Global Editorial Team The Chumar Incident of 2014 served as a preview of what is to come. The future incursions i...

By IndraStra Global Editorial Team

The Chumar Incident of 2014 served as a preview of what is to come. The future incursions in this specific region will be more forceful, akin to a resounding slap. However, the true impact will originate from Yunnan, which encompasses the "Eastern Sector" of the disputed territory. It is important to acknowledge that although India may hastily establish a few mountain strike corps, its deficient airpower capabilities will prove detrimental to both its defensive lines and offensive aspirations. The outcome of the next war between India and China will be determined in the high-altitude regions of Aksai Chin and Tibet, where the thin mountain air prevails. The question remains: Is India truly prepared for such a scenario?

Multiple Spark Points : Chumar, Ukdungle, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldi

On April 15, 2013, a platoon-sized group from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) established a camp in Raki Nula, located 30 kilometers south of Daulat Beg Oldi near the Aksai Chin-Ladakh Line of Actual Control (LAC). While it is not uncommon for Chinese and Indian patrols to encounter each other in this disputed area, both sides have generally refrained from establishing permanent bases or fortifications in the region. In response to the Chinese presence, Indian forces swiftly set up their own camp just 300 meters away. Negotiations between China and India continued for nearly three weeks, during which the Chinese position was strengthened with the arrival of trucks and helicopters. Ultimately, the dispute was resolved on May 5, and both sides subsequently withdrew from the area.

The Chinese claim that DBO area is part of Xinjiang, while the Indians believe that this area is part of Jammu and Kashmir. China and India signed two agreements in 1993 and 1996 to establish protocols to resolve potential disputes in the region. These protocols included the mutual recognition of a "Line of Actual Control" (LAC). Still, disagreements continue between the two governments about where the LAC lies over a roughly 20 km-wide swath in this sector. India first claimed that the Chinese encampment was 10 km on their side of where they view the LAC, later revising that to 19 km. Despite the disputed area being an "unpopulated and desolate wasteland", it is strategically important to China because of the highway connecting Pakistan to Tibet and Xinjiang.

The 2014 stand-off in the Chumar-Demchok area in the Ladakh region has been resolved without loss of face on either side.   The 2013’S incident in Depsang Plains and the last one almost 250 km South in Demchok and Chumar have some similarities and some differences. In both cases, the PLA/People’s Armed Police Forces personnel in sizable strength had intruded into the territory controlled and claimed by India. Both incidents lasted more than two weeks each, during which the assertiveness of the Chinese troops was on full display.

In the case of the DBO-Depsang incident, there were reports of an armored division being present at Shahidullah and the intruding troops being in communication with this force, indicating that the Chinese were ready to escalate the conflict. Interestingly, there was no concentration of Chinese troops near the Chumar-Demchok area. Last year’s intrusion was termed as ‘accidental’ by China, and their Foreign Ministry expressed ignorance about the incident - at least in the initial stages.

The Permafrost: The Necessary Evil

Permafrost is the permanently frozen ground that occurs when the ground temperature is 32 °F (0 °C) or colder for two or more years. It is continuous in the arctic military operating environments but sporadic in the subarctic and nonexistent in temperate regions. The thickness of permafrost varies from a few feet to over a thousand feet in depth. Disturbance of the tundra increases the thawing of permafrost.

In Aksai Chin-Ladakh and Tibet, permafrost is generally encountered around the year. In this area, the ground never fully thaws. This can be one of the trickiest areas in which to stage mechanized military operations. The most suitable time for conducting ground operations is from mid-winter to early spring before the breakup period. During this period, the ground remains frozen, allowing greater mobility. Care must be taken with operations in the late spring or in the fall. They should only be undertaken when daytime thaw and nighttime freeze leave only a thin layer of mud on deeply frozen ground. Vegetation varies from barren lands to moss and lichens. Forests are usually found closer to the temperate zone. Moss and lichen are usually found in permafrost areas. In summer, vegetation may mat together over a pool of water in permafrost areas. This is called a bog. The matted vegetation may support a man but will not support any type of vehicle. These areas can be extremely dangerous.

Now, if we look at the Chinese PLA's Incursion Patterns:

• 2013 DBO- Depsang Plains Incident - April 2013: Early Spring
• 2014 Chumar Incident - September 2014: Fresh Himalayan Winter

It is evidently proved that China tested its forces' readiness and effectiveness on technical grounds in these two primary incursion points by considering the Himalayan Permafrost factors. The results are crystal clear.

Western Sector Assessment

As per the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Report, Lanzhou Military Region, which faces Ladakh, has 220,000 troops, including an armored division and two motorized infantry divisions. The Chengdu Military Region, opposite India’s north-eastern states, has some 180,000 PLA troops, including two armored brigades and four motorized infantry divisions.

As stated by the late Mr. B. Raman, a former official of RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), two key elements have emerged in China's military strategy concerning India with regards to the prompt deployment of assets.

• China’s increasingly emphasizing the role of helicopter-borne operations. They have been actively exploring different strategies to catch India off guard, particularly in Southern Tibet. The completion of the G219 highway will play a crucial role in facilitating this surprise factor.
• China’s fine-tuning of integrated Army-Air Force role in defending Tibet from external threats and in asserting their will trans-Himalayas. As part of this effort, there has been an uptick in the frequency of Air Force exercises conducted in Tibet. The objective is to familiarize all elements involved with tactics specific to high-altitude warfare.

Logistically, Tibet is a nightmare for troop movement and sustenance. Lack of ground communication facilities rather than a shortage of troops has been the limiting factor for military operations on the entire Tibetan plateau. Before the railway was constructed, the principal route into Tibet was the 1160 km long Qingzang highway (National Highway 109) which connects Tibet to the neighboring Qinghai province. It was built in the 1950s and has a limited load-carrying capacity, apart from numerous bottlenecks. The travel time on this highway between Golmud to Lhasa via Nagqu is 72 hours. The other important land route is National Highway 318 (connecting Linzhi and Lhasa), which is the southern section of the Sichuan-Tibet Highway (Chuanzang Highway). In the event of war or future large-scale riots in Tibet, this highway will be the key passageway for combat troops from the Chengdu Military Region (CMR) to enter Tibet.

Analysts point to the military implications of the railroad, saying it could be used to beef up China's already heavy military presence in Tibet, including the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2001, Jane's Intelligence Digest reported that 'the PLA considers it necessary to build up a network of roads and mule tracks to bring military hardware and troops to the forward areas of the disputed border (with India).' Defense expert William Triplett said, 'With even a single line, the PLA could move about 12 infantry divisions to central Tibet in 30 days to meet up with their pre-positioned equipment.'12 Most military experts agree with this assessment that, in military terms, this rail link allows China to mobilize up to 12 divisions (approximately 12,000 men make a Chinese division) a month. Up North in the Qinghai province, Golmud, the start point of the QTR, has now been turned into a major military base with rail connectivity. It is located strategically to cover both the unrest-prone provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang.

Further, the Lanzhou Military Region (LMR), with its headquarters at Lanzhou in Qinghai province, is also near Golmud and connected with Golmud by rail on the Longhai Line, the major East-West railway of China. LMR covers a vast area covering the Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and Shaanxi provinces. In the Indian context, LMR is responsible for the Aksai Chin and the other Chinese areas in Xinjiang across Eastern Ladakh. The International Institute for Strategic Studies attributes the Military Region with an estimated 220,000 personnel, including the 12th Armoured Division (Unit 84701) at Jiuquan in Gansu province. The movement and rapid deployment of this equipment-intensive division will be greatly facilitated by the QTR.

Eastern Sector Assessment

In any future military confrontation with India, the Chinese will most likely use their Air Force in Tibet for defense. Still, they simultaneously will deploy forces in Yunnan and mobilize in a military offensive. Let's consider the proximity of Myanmar’s Kachin State and Yunnan. Both regions are very important in trans-Himalayan military strategy, but disappointingly, India continues to neglect these two important regions in their intelligence coverage.

Map Attribute : Indian Defence Review - Link

The geographical peculiarity of Arunachal Pradesh is that the river valleys and the mountain ranges in the State-run are more or less in a North-South alignment. Between the Kameng sector in the West and the lower Subansari in the center, there is a vast swathe of land that is unassailable. The major rivers east of the Kameng sector are Kameng, Kamla, Kurang, Subansari, Shyom, Siang, Dibang, and Lohit.  These rivers have their source in the North in the glaciated regions along the watershed and some north of the watershed too. Geo-morphologically, the rivers have a huge drainage basin and are fed by numerous turbulent tributaries. The volume of water and the current of these rivers, particularly in the monsoon season, is awesome. As a consequence, these rivers have created deep gorges along their course down to the plains.

The Indian Army already has plans to build a lateral road from Kameng to Lohit halfway up on the road axis from the plains leading to the LAC, traversing up and down the valleys and the mountain ranges running on either side of the river valleys. In rough terms, that would mean going up and down 16 mountain ranges and crossing eight major rivers. As such, this proposal has not progressed beyond an expression of a ‘desire’. A similar lateral road alignment nearer the LAC would entail equally formidable engineering challenges. The additional ones are those that are posed by the altitude, which would be greater; the river gorges encountered would be more numerous and require innovative solutions. Also, overall, the resources required would be enormous.

The Capabilities of PLA's Mechanized Forces

Image Attribute: PLA's 149th Rapid Reaction Motorized Forces at Lhasa during the 2008 Riots,

Source: AFP

In 1989, when major unrest occurred in Tibet and a curfew was imposed in Lhasa, the 149th division was the first PLA combat unit to arrive on the scene. The 149th Rapid Reaction Motorised Division of No.13 Group Army of the CMR is located at Leshan/Emei in Sichuan province. At that time, the army troops entered Tibet via the Sichuan-Tibet highway which imposed considerable delay. However, in March 2008, within 48 hours of the start of the riots in Lhasa, T-90/89 armored personnel carriers (APC) and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) of the 149th Division appeared on the streets. This is indicated by the fact that the PLA soldiers on the T-90/89 vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were all wearing the “leopard” camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operations. These uniforms have appeared in the video footage of the 149th Division during exercises. This rapid arrival of the Division using QTR relieves pressure from the troops of the No. 52 and No. 53 Mountain Brigades, which are located comparatively closer to Lhasa at Linzhi and Milin, respectively for quicker response in case of unrest.

China also has 14 military airfields and 10 missile bases in Tibet. In TAR itself, according to the Dharamshala-based Tibet's government-in-exile,18 called the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), there are six sub-military districts, having two independent infantry divisions, six border defense regiments, five independent border defense battalions, three artillery regiments, three engineers' regiments, one main signal station, and two signal regiments, three transport regiments and three independent transport battalions, four Air Force bases, two radar regiments, two divisions, and a regiment of para-military forces (referred to as Di-fang Jun or 'local army'), one independent division and six independent regiments of the People's Armed Police (PAP). In the absence of any Indian threat as such, many of the regular army formations, particularly the rapid reaction divisions, were stationed primarily to quell any rioting in Tibet. The two mountain infantry units of the Xizang Military District, which form the Tibet garrison, are also used for internal security. However, the recent movement and deployment of PLA units for internal security was very rapid, wiping out any Tibetan hopes for any sustained armed uprising. The use of QTR meant that there was a minimum requirement of air support from the 2nd Army Aviation Regiment, based at Fenghuangshan in Sichuan province. Therefore, the recent improvement in rail infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau has thus greatly assisted China in maintaining its grip over Tibet and gaining moral ascendancy over the disaffected Tibetan groups. Further extensions of QTR may permit the PLA troops in Tibet to completely hand over the internal security tasks to PAP and focus their attention on India.

The QTR also features prominently in the PLA's Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) operational plans, forming a core of mechanized infantry tactics. The PLA has established a regiment-level Army Special Force (ASF) in every Military Region (MR) as an RRF unit directly under the MR headquarters command. The total strength of ASF may be as high as seven regiments and twenty-four battalions, or approximately 25,000 personnel. The RRFs are meant to be quickly deployed in the conflict-prone peripheral areas of China, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The PLA has conducted various exercises since 1995, concentrating particularly on long-range and intraregional rapid mobile deployment. To this end, RRF combined exercises were carried out in 1995 and 1996 in the Gobi desert, the Tibetan and Xinjiang highlands, and in the southwestern tropical forests to enhance the RRF's adaptive survival capabilities. It is learned that a 1000-mile railway transport rapid-deployment exercise in the LMR was held in August 1996. The purpose of the railway transport-based exercise was to enhance mobile deployment capability. After the completion of QTR, the operational readiness and the deployment timings of RRFs (ASF) in LMR and CMR have been further boosted.

The Role of Air Forces

By the late 90s, PLAAF was operating over 3500 combat aircraft comprising mainly the J-6 (MiG-19 equivalent) and the J-7 (based on the MiG-21). A deal with Russia saw the induction of 100 Su-27 fighters. PLAAF also had in its inventory the H-6 (Tu-16-based) bombers. China had no precision-guided munitions (PGMs); only the Su-27 was BVR compatible.

The modernization of the PLAAF has been propelled by China’s astounding economic growth. The 21st century has witnessed the acquisition of 105 Su-30MKK from 2000 to 2003 and 100 upgraded Su-30MKK2 in 2004. China produced more than 200 J-11s from 2002 onwards. The PLAAF also bought a total of 126 Su-27SK/UBK in three batches. The production of the J-10 combat aircraft began in 2002 and 1200 are on order. The H-6 bombers (Tu-16 Badger) were converted into flight refueling aircraft.  In 2005, the PLAAF unveiled plans to acquire 70 Il-76 transport aircraft and 30 Il-78 tankers to significantly upgrade strategic airlift capability and offer an extended range to the fighter force. The US Department of Defense has reported that Su-27 SKs are being upgraded to the multi-role Su-27 SMK status.

Recently China unveiled its fifth-generation fighter, the J-20, and J-31, which represents a significant step in the evolution of the Chinese aerospace industry. The new aircraft displays stealth features and indicates a determination on China’s part to shape new military capabilities in the period ahead. China is determined to develop modern military aerospace capabilities.

Compared to Pakistan, IAF has an edge. But, with the speed at which PAF is modernizing, with the current aircraft-pilot ratio, The edge will not last long. Now, when the same plight is compared to China's PLAAF - It's simply pathetic. According to the Standing Committee on Defence, the sanctioned squadron strength for Indian Air Force was 42, but at present, it has 35 active squadrons. It is also noted that there are plans for the induction of Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft and indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas, along with a Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft project with Russia. Committed commented, "Even if all the procurement fructifies, IAF is likely to achieve the authorized strength of 42 squadrons only by the end of the 15th Plan or in 2032."

The Role of Navies

In June 1994, the Japanese-language Sankei Shimbun claimed that, in addition to constructing a radar station on Great Coco Island, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) had also installed radar on nearby Little Coco Island. The smaller island was across Alexandra Channel to the south and thus even closer to India’s North Andaman Island. Beijing had reportedly “leased” both Burmese islands from the SLORC. According to the same news story, the intelligence collected by these facilities was to be shared with the Burmese to help " strengthen future cooperative military ties between the two countries”.27 The source of all these claims was given as a former senior official of Japan’s Defence Agency, in turn quoting “a British military intelligence official”.

At first, the main purpose of the Great Coco Island facility was reportedly to monitor regional military activities, especially air and naval movements in the Bay of Bengal. Before long, however, journalists and academics began claiming that the base was also established to conduct surveillance of India’s strategically important tri-service facilities at Port Blair on South Andaman Island. Some suggested that the Chinese, and their Burmese allies, were monitoring submarine activity around the Indian Navy’s base at Visakhapatnam (Vizag) in eastern India. In an elaboration of this theme, a number of commentators claimed that the Great Coco Island base was built and equipped by the Chinese to analyze telemetry from Indian missile tests. These included flights by ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles over the Bay of Bengal from ranges in eastern India. The electronic intelligence gathered it was suggested, was shared with Pakistan to help it develop counter-measures against new Indian weapon systems

India took an unprecedented step 14 years ago to counterbalance the Chinese maneuvers by setting up a joint theater operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). As of 2015, the command includes 15 ships of the Indian Navy, two Navy Sea bases, four Air Force and Naval Airbases, and an Army brigade. The Andaman and Nicobar Command is India’s first and only joint tri-service command, with rotating three-star Commanders-in-Chief from the Army, Navy, and Air Force reporting directly to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Described as the `sentinel post' for the east and south, the command was created to bring about a qualitative difference to operations and surveillance in that region through multiple Indian military assets.

In the case of escalation of any conflict between India and China, Myanmar’s 2,276 km long coastline in the Bay of Bengal has the potential to provide the ‘second coast’ to the latter by giving direct access to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Especially transportation of military logistics to the ‘second coast’ from landlocked southwest Chinese provinces like Yunnan has both military and economic benefits.

Conclusion

The occurrence of "Short Border Wars" between India and China appears to be unavoidable. India has taken measures to strengthen its presence in Arunachal Pradesh by deploying additional ground troops, enhancing missile defense capabilities, and acquiring advanced strike aircraft like the Russian-made Su-30 fighters. This marks a shift in India's military focus from the longstanding Western threat posed by Pakistan to the long-term challenge posed by China.

China has the potential to carry out a targeted territorial seizure, such as attempting to capture Tawang as an example. Another significant flashpoint exists further west along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Kashmir. China currently holds a portion of the sparsely inhabited territory called Aksai Chin, which it gained control of during the 1962 war. These locations present suitable opportunities for launching multiple surgical incursions. However, in order to execute such a sudden attack, China still needs to consolidate its land and air defense forces along the India-China border under a unified military region or command. Such consolidation would give their strategic forces the necessary tactical capabilities in high-altitude regions.

One hypothetical scenario involves the potential threat of coordinated action by China and Pakistan using the Pincer strategy based on their long-standing mutual animosity towards India. Pakistan, either through its own forces or by utilizing terrorist and insurgent proxies, would engage in diversionary maneuvers across the conflict-ridden Siachen glacier or Kargil, the site of the Indo-Pakistani war in 1999. Meanwhile, China would launch an offensive further east along the border. However, it should be noted that during such a situation, the United States and other influential nations would exert significant geopolitical pressure on Pakistan to avoid getting involved in the conflict. As a result, the feasibility of the Pincer strategy is limited to peacetime circumstances and not feasible during actual wartime.

The Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is expected to be regarded as a neutral entity similar to Switzerland. On the other hand, Nepal, a country with a population of 40 million and enjoying the support of both Beijing and New Delhi, can reasonably assume that neither of its significant neighboring countries would take the risk of violating its sovereignty in the event of a war.

However, India must establish a comprehensive and coordinated strategy to ensure the security of its maritime and land regions surrounding the Bay of Bengal and Northeast India. This involves strengthening naval forces and coastal patrols in the waters near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and enhancing strategic assets along the Northeastern borders, which face the "second coast."

The role of the Indian Air Force will play a crucial role in determining the outcome of potential conflicts. It is the only branch among the Indian Armed Forces that currently lacks any form of tactical or strategic advantage over the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Army Aviation.

However, as India strengthens its alliances in Asia and steadily improves its defense capabilities, the significant power imbalance between the two nations will be partially addressed. If China intends to employ aggressive tactics against India, it would need to do so within a limited timeframe when the military advantage favors them. After a period of 5-10 years, marked by India's economic and military growth, China's ability to act against India will significantly diminish.

References:

1. Road Parallel to the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh by Lt. Gen. J.S. Bajwa, Indian Defence Review October 17, 2014  

2. India Under Fire by Bharat Verma, Indian Defence Review

3. Andrew N. D. Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao (Retd), 'PLA Rapid Reaction Forces

4. John Makin, 'The Lhasa Frontier', The American, January-February, 2007.Also at www.american.com

5. 'China Daily, Xinhua News Agency, Qinghai-Tibet Rail Rumbles Across Roof of the World', July 1, 2006, at www.chinadaily.com.cn

6. Qinghai-Tibet Heavy Rail Line, China' at www.railway-technology.com 

7. Train to Lhasa, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi  

8. Cold Region Operations Manual, US Department of Army, Pdf  

9. Regional Outlook, Chinese Military Bases in Burma: : The Explosion of a Myth / Andrew Selth , Griffith Asia Institute , Pdf  

10. China’s Second Coast: Implications for Northeast India, Namrata Goswami, IDSA New Delhi -  

AIDN: 001-11-2015-0401

Disclaimer: All Geo-spatial Information in this article has been derived from "Open Sources", Only