The ‘Five Eyes’ are an intelligence sharing network, known for its exclusive cooperation among each other. However, in order to face the challenge of international terrorism, they adopted increasingly the practice of sharing intelligence with non-‘Five Eyes’ members, like Bangladesh. But instead of using intelligence information for a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, Bangladesh’s Government is suspected to have misapplied this information against political opponents accompanied with severe human rights violations.
By Siegfried O. Wolf
Introduction
The ‘Five Eyes’ are an intelligence sharing network, known for its exclusive cooperation among each other. However, in order to face the challenge of international terrorism, they adopted increasingly the practice of sharing intelligence with non-‘Five Eyes’ members, like Bangladesh. But instead of using intelligence information for a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, Bangladesh’s Government is suspected to have misapplied this information against political opponents accompanied with severe human rights violations. This accusation created certain confusions in the relations between ‘Five Eyes’ countries and Dhaka, which resulted in demands to restrict security cooperation with Bangladesh.
The ‘Five Eyes’ are an intelligence sharing network, known for its exclusive cooperation among each other. However, in order to face the challenge of international terrorism, they adopted increasingly the practice of sharing intelligence with non-‘Five Eyes’ members, like Bangladesh. But instead of using intelligence information for a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, Bangladesh’s Government is suspected to have misapplied this information against political opponents accompanied with severe human rights violations. This accusation created certain confusions in the relations between ‘Five Eyes’ countries and Dhaka, which resulted in demands to restrict security cooperation with Bangladesh.
Keeping this context, this article
argues that any punishable measures towards Bangladesh, like the holding back
of valuable intelligence for counter-terrorism, would have significant negative
impacts in the long run. It will be outlined that the major rationale therefore
lies in rooting the issue in the country’s political legacies and collective
memories determined by the experience of the independence war and the role of
western countries, foremost the United States (US). Furthermore, restriction in
security cooperation with Bangladesh might disturb the country’s historically
sensitive civil-military relations adding to the problems of democratic
transition, and could be harmful for relations with Bangladesh in the long run.
As such, it will be necessary to continue full cooperation between the ‘Five
Eyes’ and the GoB in counter-terrorism.
The ‘Five Eyes’: An exclusive club
The so-called ‘Five Eyes’ nations
make up the world's
leading intelligence-sharing network. This alliance is comprised of
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States which
are represented by their signal intelligence agencies (SIGINT).[1]
The ‘Five Eyes’ partnership’s origin
can be traced to the British-US intelligence cooperation to monitor enemy radio
transmissions during the Second World War (WW II), that matured
during the Cold War. In the aftermath of the East-West conflict, it seemed
that the most
exclusive intelligence alliance was temporarily without a clear assignment.
Subsequently, the ‘Five Eyes’ were trying to broaden the scope of its initial
mission. This task was defined by the collection of foreign
intelligence ‘defined as "all communications […] of a foreign country
which may contain information of military, political or economic value’ to the
Five Eyes partners, as determined in the more or less founding document, the
1946 UKUSA
agreement (or BRUSA).
In this context, it is important to
note that, originally, ‘Five Eyes’ partners and Commonwealth nations were
excluded. Nevertheless, due to various ‘whistleblowing processes’ it became
obvious that especially the United States National Security Agency (NSA) do spy
on affiliates. This got more significance in the global war against terror.
Nevertheless, collaboration between the ‘Five Eyes’ gained new impetus after
9/11.
Today, this alliance constitutes of
a patchwork
of various surveillance programmes and intelligence-sharing arrangements which
enable to monitor the majority of all kinds of communications worldwide.
Operating within a system of geographical work-sharing, the group divides
the world into eavesdropping target sectors. By exchanging their respective
intelligence, concerns and subsequent approaches go far beyond the original
SIGINT sharing (like defence intelligence, human intelligence). But besides
their cohesiveness in action, the respective individual intelligence agencies
are running within their own national legal framework and legislated mandates.
However, all intelligence agencies of the ‘Five Eyes’ are entrenched in the Anglo-Saxon
culture and bounded together by the acceptance of liberal democratic values and
processes in their goal to achieve complementary national interests. The
latter one is commonly perceived as the main factor in building trust between
the alliance partners but also sets them apart from intelligence activities of
many other countries.
In this context, one must emphasize
that information
sharing and other forms of cooperation have significant implications for human
rights. This turned into an critical issue between the ‘Five Eyes’ countries
and their partners after Edward
Snowden made public that the NSA has been able to retain vast amounts of
data from the UK and other partners. Besides this ‘Five Eyes’ internal
dimensions of Snowden exposures, also the relationship and intelligence sharing
with non-alliance members got in the
focus of international attention.
The ‘Five Eyes’ and Bangladesh: The
accusation of misuse of intelligence sharing
One of the latest remarkable cases
is that of Bangladesh. Tensions, or at least some kind of disconnection,
appeared in the relationship between Dhaka’s security circles and foreign intelligence
agencies. More precisely, it seems that there exists some ‘confusions’ over how
shared intelligence is used by Bangladesh’s authorities and security sector
agents.
There are two major claims: First,
human rights organisation (like Amnesty
International, Human
Rights Watch) are stating that Bangladesh’s security agents are involved in
human rights violations. Secondly, and closely linked with the previous claim,
accusations exist that the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), namely Prime
Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League (AL) administration, use
foreign intelligence for political purposes. As such, in both cases,
intelligence sharing about subjects between foreign agencies with Bangladesh
authorities is considered as critical. Such phenomena could complicate
counter-terrorism efforts in Bangladesh. This raises further questions
regarding ongoing and future intelligence cooperation between Dhaka and the ‘Five
Eyes’ and its impact on the rise of Jihadism in Bangladesh.
There are claims that foreign
intelligence was handed to the GoB and to its security agents. However, the
more problematic claim that this information was supposedly used for partisan
reasons to arrest suspects, especially political opposition members (Bangladesh
Nationalist Party/BNP) who maintain close
relationship with religious extremist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, is
difficult to prove. Reports of human rights agencies hint that some detainees
face human rights violations. Considering the strong polarisation
of state and society, endemic violence, and a culture of revenge between
the two major political parties AL and BNP, it seems that these claims have
some substance. Furthermore, Bangladesh’s armed forces have a historical record
of extra judicial, outlaw activities and being highly
politicized. This got fostered due to a widespread culture
of impunity dating back to the time of the country’s independence war, a
serious lack of political will, and a gap in institutionalized civilian
control over armed forces. However, statements that the GoB used
information for political purposes instead of comprehensive counter-terrorism are falling short. Furthermore, it hampers the understanding of the currently
perceived tensions between Bangladesh and the ‘Five Eyes’. This can be
understood from the following reasons-
(A.) Sensitive civil-military
relations as factor in counter-terrorism and foreign relations
One has to be aware of the tensed
relationship between the GoB and the security forces. Bangladesh lacks
formal, institutionalized civilian control mechanisms over its security
forces. Generally, PM Sheikh Hasina was able to gain control over
decision-making processes in all policy fields, especially in the area of
internal security. Ms. Hasina’s main power resource is her personal charisma
and authority as daughter of Bangladesh’s ‘founding father’ Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman (Bangabandhu) as well as internal
factionalism within and rivalry between the different security agents.
A most remarkable example in this
direction is the ‘Pilkhana
crisis’, a staged mutiny of the para-military Bangladesh Border Rifles
(BDR) at Pilkhana/Dhaka on 25/26 February 2009. During that time, the capital
witnessed a bloody confrontation in which numerous commanding officers of the
Bangladesh Army, deployed at the BDR, were killed. PM Hasina was able to hold
the regular soldiers back by taking revenge on the BDR, restructuring the
latter one as the Border Guards Bangladesh and reducing the army leverage in
the new force.
Against this backdrop, Sheikh Hasina
exercised successfully her personalized and not institutionalized
decision-making power vis-à-vis the military top brass. However, from a long
term perspective, there are not clear indications that Ms. Hasina was able to
exert control over policy implementation, especially not when it comes to
counter-terrorism activities. Especially religious inspired segments of the
armed forces are trying to undermine Sheikh Hasina’s government. The coup attempt of fanatic
Islamists officers in 2012 (Heinous
conspiracy) can be seen as a proof. Despite the fact that the coup failed,
it turns out that parts of the army still try to follow historical patterns by
acting against the line of the civilian government. One should be aware that
Bangladesh has a tradition of direct military
interventions, namely the military rules of General Ziaur Rahman
(1975-1981) and General H.M. Ershad (1982-1990) as well as the military-backed
(rather controlled) non-party
caretaker governments from 2006-2008. Both of the dictators helped to
prepare the ground for the rise of the Islamist threat.
To sum up, political instability,
rise of Islamist militancy, and deteriorating security situation is not only a
matter of the entrenched conflict between two political parties (BNP versus AL)
but also an outcome of the country’s stressed civil-military relations. As
such, any insensitive punishable measures by the ‘Five Eyes’, like restrictions
in counter-terrorism cooperation, could further disturb Bangladesh’s sensitive
relations between civilians and soldiers. Additionally, it could also create
anti-sentiments towards foreign interference, especially if the GoB feels that
cooperation in counter-terrorism with foreign agencies will weaken their
position towards their own security apparatus. In result, potential tensions in
relations with other countries are more likely.
(B.) The historical legacies need
to taking into account
The claim of misuse of foreign
intelligence ignores the historical
legacies which are of tremendous importance to grasp today’s political
patterns in Bangladesh. Generally, one should be aware that political psyche,
behaviour and culture is largely determined by the experience of the war of
independence (‘liberation war’) against the West Pakistani forces who
are responsible for conducting large-scale massacres and target-killings
among the people of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1970/71. Most
remarkably, in this context were the reports of US Consul General Archer Blood,
especially his last cable on 6 April 1971, the so called ‘Blood
Telegram’. In the legendary document, the diplomat denounced the complicity
of the then US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger in the mass murdering of Bangladeshis. Obviously, Blood’s reporting
was inconvenient for Washington. Until today, the ignorance of Blood’s alarming
documentation and the recall from his post is perceived as a major wrongdoing
of the US towards Bangladesh. Many people are still asking why Washington did
not stop the genocide in East Pakistan. Apparently, the silence of Mr. Nixon
was the trade-off
for Pakistan’s help to arrange the US-China rapprochement (1972 Nixon visit to China).
This experience determines without any doubts a crucial element in the ‘collective
memory’ of the people. Especially, within the AL which was the driving force of
the independence movement. In result, this traumatic cognition is partly causal
for a cautious approach of GoB in interpreting any restrictive policy towards
Dhaka by other states, especially the US.
Final thoughts – The need to
continue security cooperation with the GoB
Taking into consideration the issues
of civil-military relations and cognitive memory, it would be disastrous for
the future course of counter-terrorism in Bangladesh, if the ‘Five-Eyes’ would
withdraw its support for Dhaka. The crucial point is that Bangladesh lacks a
coherent counter-terrorism approach. The tortuous nets between political
parties and Islamist groupings make the sharing of intelligence even more
difficult. On top of that, Bangladesh’s weak and dysfunctional institutions are
another challenge for security cooperation. The intense political polarisation of
the country is not only hampering the effectiveness of political-administrative
institutions but also keeps the disintegration
within security sector agents going.
Consequently, the misuse of shared
information will most likely remain as an issue as long there are no healthy
military relations featured by an effective civilian control. Undoubtedly, this
creates cautiousness among the ‘Five Eyes’in its current interaction with Dhaka
in counter-terrorism. When it comes to cooperation with states featured by a
unstable process of democratic transition and political instability, the ‘Five-Eyes’
prefer to work directly with the security agents together instead with civilian
(understood as elected representatives) authorities. In other words, taking
into account the ties of the intelligence alliance with other countries,
especially Pakistan, it seems that intelligence sharing and other security
related cooperation
via military-to-military contacts is the preferred modus operandi. This did
not only strengthen the military’s role in politics in Pakistan but also weaken
the ability of the government to exercise decision-making power vis-à-vis the
soldiers.
Despite uncertainties, it is crucial
that the international community continues to give full support to the GoB in
its struggle against militant Islamic fundamentalism. The dictate of the moment
is that the government with its security agencies must work out a concrete and
comprehensive strategy to counter the domestic and global Jihadist threats.
Until now, this did not happen, at least not in an effective, visible way.
Moreover, the GoB is reluctant
to confirm the presence of international terrorist groupings, foremost
Islamic State (IS).
Two reasons could be responsible for
Dhaka’s difficulties in dealing with home-grown and international terrorism:
First, the country’s difficult civil-military relations which are featured by personalized
decision-making procedures on security related matters of PM Sheikh Hasina.
In this context, the establishment of an institutionalized relationship with
the armed forces is essential. At the moment, it appears that Ms. Hasina either
does not see the ‘right moment’ for introducing new mechanisms and/or her
administration as well as the parliament has no necessary
capacities (like functional and effectives committees for civilian control,
properly equipped and staffed/skilled ministries) to establish a functional,
institutionalized relationship with the country’s security forces. Secondly,
another additional major roadblock making the implementation of a successful
counter-terrorism concept unlikely is the difficult relations between and
within the different security agencies. In the past, factionalism within the security apparatus
was one of the major rationales behind the numerous coups and coup-attempts
which the country had to experience.
To sum up, the ‘Five Eyes’ should
continue its intelligence and security cooperation with Bangladesh’s civilian
authorities. This would help the GoB to carry out an appropriate strategy in
countering Islamist fundamentalism and to strengthen democratic procedures in
the country.
About The Author:
Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf, is Senior Researcher (member) at the South
Asia Institute (SAI), Heidelberg University, and Director of Research at SADF
(Coordinator: Democracy Research Program). He was educated at the SAI and
Institute of Political Science (IPW) in Heidelberg. Additionally he is a
visiting fellow at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST,
Islamabad), affiliated researcher at the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU,
Durham University), and a former research fellow at IPW and Centre de Sciences
Humaines (New Delhi, India).
He is the co-author of 'A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia' (Routledge; London 2006), co-editor of 'Politics in South Asia. Culture, Rationality and Conceptual Flow' (Springer: Heidelberg, 2015), 'The Merits of Regionalisation. The Case of South Asia' (Springer: Heidelberg, 2014) and 'State and Foreign Policy in South Asia' (Sanskriti: 2010), and Deputy Editor of the 'Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics' (HPSACP).
Furthermore, he has worked as a consultant for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Germany, and is member of the external group of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force, Federal Foreign Office, Germany.
He can be reached at his official email id:
swolf@sai.uni-heidelberg.de
[1] Namely the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Canada’s Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the United States
National Security Agency (NSA).
__________________________
Publication Details:
AIDN: 001-11-2015-0414
Wolf,
Siegfried. "FEATURED | Why the ‘Five Eyes’ Should Not Turn Blind: A
Decisive Moment for Counter-Terrorism in Bangladesh." IndraStra Global 01,
no. 11 (2015):0414. http://www.indrastra.com/2015/11/FEATURED-Why-Five-Eyes-Should-Not-Turn-Blind-CT-in-Bangladesh-by-Siegfried-O-Wolf-0414.html.
| ISSN 2381-3652 |
