As rivalry between the United States and China (PRC) continues to intensify, regional security in East Asia is increasingly interconnected with global stability. East Asia, with various ongoing security issues that date back to the Cold War, is the region where geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing primarily manifests itself. The regional security order is therefore a matter of global consequence.
By Elena Atanassova-Cornelis and Frans Paul van der Putten
(via E-International Relations)
As rivalry between the United States and
China (PRC) continues to intensify, regional security in East Asia is
increasingly interconnected with global stability. East Asia, with various
ongoing security issues that date back to the Cold War, is the region where
geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing primarily manifests
itself. The regional security order is therefore a matter of global
consequence.
Image Attribute: The littoral combat ship USS
Fort Worth conducted routine patrols in international waters of the South China
Sea near the Spratly Islands May 11, 2015 / Source: US Pacific Command /
Wikimedia Commons
Two major uncertainties are shaping the
regional order in East Asia. The first is uncertainty regarding the rise of China:
Will it continue and, if so, how will this affect the relations between the PRC
and other actors? The second is uncertainty about the future role of the United
States: Will America continue to be a leading security actor in East Asia, and
if so, what will this mean for the way in which Sino-US rivalry will play out?
The strategic behaviour of all countries in the region, including the US and
China themselves, is fundamentally influenced by these two major uncertainties.
Below we outline the sources of, responses
to, and the implications of these two uncertainties for the evolving regional
security order. What are current trends, and what is the outlook for the short
to mid-term future? Geographically, this article defines East Asia as including
the sub regions of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The article narrows the
analysis further, by focusing primarily on those states that have supply lines
and/or territorial interests in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea
(SCS). It does so, because regional worries about China are, at present,
largely related to the PRC’s maritime security behaviour.
Sources of
Strategic uncertainty in East Asia
Two fundamental uncertainties associated, on
the one hand, with the US security engagement in East Asia in the long term,
and, on the other, with China’s future rise and use of its growing power, are
underlying more specific short- to mid-term anxieties. These have become
salient over the past five years.
The first dimension of regional anxieties is
related to China’s maritime security objectives. PRC’s perceived assertiveness
since 2010 in pressing its territorial claims in the ECS and SCS, as well as
its naval modernisation, are the direct triggers of these uncertainties.
Implicit or explicit concerns about PRC’s aspirations for regional maritime
domination have been expressed by the US and by many Asian nations. These
include, most notably, Japan and Southeast Asia’s maritime states, especially
those having territorial disputes with China such as the Philippines and
Vietnam, but also non-claimants such as Indonesia. The present China-associated
anxieties appear to have become more pronounced as the US under Barack Obama
embarked in 2012 on a policy of ‘strategic rebalance’ to Asia. Questions about
Washington’s ability to sustain its renewed engagement amid economic and fiscal
difficulties, and in the context of China’s growing economic, political and
security role, have become increasingly scrutinised in various Asian capitals
(Atanassova-Cornelis and van der Putten, 2014).
At the same time, the US’ own uncertainties
about its ability to defend allies and friends in East Asia have become more
explicit as Chinese power has grown. American anxieties about China are now
increasingly focused on the PRC’s naval power and, in particular, its behaviour
in the East China and South China Seas. This may be sending a signal to Asian
states that one of the most critical aspects of the US security engagement in
the region – namely, its ability to ensure the stability of Asia’s shipping
lanes – is now being questioned. This, in turn, could pose a major challenge to
the continuity of the US-led regional alliance structure altogether.
A second dimension of regional anxieties
concerns US-China relations. On the one hand, Asian countries are worried about
a more pronounced great power struggle, as this might necessitate ‘choosing
sides’, i.e. siding with either Washington or Beijing. For the smaller
Southeast Asian nations in particular, this would have detrimental implications
for their economic development and nation-building. Most of these nations are
economically dependent on the PRC, but rely on the US for security protection
against the prospect of a more hostile China. On the other hand, both major
powers such as Japan and the smaller members of ASEAN, the Association for
Southeast Asian Nations, are concerned that Washington might decide to
accommodate Beijing and strike some kind of a deal for jointly leading the
region. This is a relatively recent and new concern directly related to
regional perceptions of American decline in the wake of the 2008 global
financial crisis. While countries in East Asia favour positive Sino-US
relations for maintaining regional stability, they are wary of a joint US–China
leadership that may disregard the voices and interests of the region’s other
players (Van der Putten and Atanassova-Cornelis, 2014).
The final dimension of regional anxieties is
related to specific US and Chinese concerns about possible exclusion from
regional (ASEAN-led) multilateral arrangements. Washington is worried about how
Asian states may choose to respond to Beijing’s growing economic and diplomatic
influence, especially to China’s support for exclusive regionalism
centred on ASEAN+3 (see, Van der Putten, 2013). PRC’s recent initiatives,
notably the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and China’s
(Maritime) Silk Road initiative, contribute to more broad American anxieties
about regional exclusion. As for China, concerns about ‘strategic encirclement’
by the US under the rebalance appear to be dominant in the PRC. At the same
time, worries about possible shifts in ASEAN’s China strategy, as well as
ASEAN’s relevance as a driver of Asian institution building, are becoming more
palpable. Indeed, ASEAN is growing increasingly divided due to the SCS
disputes, with some of its members tilting towards the US. Beijing fears that
this may affect the organisation’s traditional policy of non-alignment, which,
in turn, could undermine ASEAN’s centrality in regional multilateralism. The
net result could be a strengthening of US-led bilateral and multilateral (e.g.,
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, TPP) arrangements in East Asia, or a
more dominant American role in defining ASEAN agendas, and hence China’s
regional isolation.
Regional
Responses to Strategic Uncertainty in East Asia
Regional responses to strategic uncertainty
have been broadly situated at three levels: the individual, the bilateral and
the multilateral. While these dimensions are interrelated, for the purposes of
clarity the discussion below will examine them separately.
At the individual level, and largely in the
domain of maritime security, a common response includes Asian states’ increased
emphasis on defence self-reliance through military modernisation. In the case
of Japan, this has included a growing defence budget under the Abe Shinzo
administration (2012-present), acquisition of capabilities to deal with
potential ECS contingencies, and an overall expansion of Japan’s security role
in terms of both geographical focus and security missions. In Southeast Asia,
the trend of rising military expenditure and naval build up has accelerated
over the past five years. Regional countries in the SCS region appear to be
countering, in particular, China’s maritime advances there. As observed by
Bitzinger (2015), the acquisition of previously lacking military hardware, such
as longer-range warships, submarine fleets and vessels for expeditionary
warfare, has significantly increased Southeast Asian navies’ power-projection
capabilities and ability to safeguard territorial interests, while raising the
risk of more ‘devastating’ potential military clashes.
The developments examined above have largely
been a response to regional fears of Chinese maritime domination in the ECS and
SCS, as well as to uncertainties associated with the US ability to deter or
restrain a more assertive China. The PRC, for its part, has sought to minimise
the risk of containment (by America and its allies) and increase Chinese
freedom of action, especially at sea, by continuing with its own military
modernisation programme with an emphasis on naval capabilities.
At the bilateral level, a noticeable trend
over the past five years has been the pursuit of diversification strategies by
Asian states (as well as of the US itself), especially by those having (or
concerned about) territorial disputes with China. This has included
establishing new, and reinforcing existing, strategic (or comprehensive)
partnerships with other East Asian countries. These bilateral engagements have
ranged from holding high-level summits and defence talks, to military exchanges
and exercises, and the signing of economic agreements. Some of the most recent
developments in 2015 include the first joint naval drills in the SCS between
Japan and the Philippines, the joint search and rescue exercises of the
Japanese and Vietnamese coast guards, and the Japan-Malaysia agreement for
raising the bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership. Most
of these engagements have been pursued in tandem with Asian countries’
enhancement of their respective ties with the US. The latter includes both
traditional military alliances, notably US-Japan and US-Philippines alliances,
and non-allied partnerships such as the new strategic partnerships (signed
under Obama) with Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia, respectively.
These limited alignments between East Asian
countries do not jeopardise their respective alliances/partnerships with
Washington, and do not directly target Beijing either. Smaller and middle
powers thus seek to deal with strategic uncertainties by increasing their
strategic autonomy (see, Ciorciari, 2009), and by minimising their reliance on
America, as well as their vulnerability in case of US ‘abandonment’ or a
Sino-US strategic accommodation.
At the multilateral level, various regional
platforms for security cooperation co-exist. Some of these are
institutionalised and based on ASEAN. These include the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and the East Asia
Summit (EAS). Others are not linked to a multilateral organisation, such as the
annual Shangri-La Dialogue. The main regional multilateral mechanisms bring
together China, the US, and most regional states including the Southeast Asian
countries, Japan and South Korea. Some major extra-regional actors besides the
US are also involved, such as India and Russia. As mentioned above, both
Washington and Beijing worry that they might become marginalized in regional
multilateral organisations. In response to China’s growing regional and global
influence, the US under the Obama administration invested much diplomatic
capital in joining and supporting these multilateral initiatives. For its part,
China kept up an active approach to these platforms. Regional multilateralism
in the security domain thus increased as a result of geopolitical competition
between the US and China. At the same time, the ability of these regional
mechanisms to prevent and/or manage a potential Sino-US conflict remains limited.
Impact of
Current Trends on the Regional Order in the Short to Mid-term Future
While the previously mentioned
diversification strategies may be primarily associated with China-related
anxieties, where most of the partnerships are forged between countries having
maritime concerns about the PRC, they do also address Asian states’
uncertainties about possible US disengagement from the region and hence their
search for alternative strategic options. The effects of strategic uncertainty
on the regional order can be seen from two perspectives. On the one hand,
strategic uncertainty between and about the US and China precludes the
establishment of a stable regional order. Since East Asian perceptions of the
strengths and intentions of China and the US are continuously changing, many
regional actors are in a constant mode of assessing and potentially adjusting
their foreign policies in response to these perceptions. As a result, the
regional security order remains rather fluid, with a certain degree of unpredictability
about the behaviour of most actors.
On the other hand, this fluid regional order
appears capable – to some extent – of adapting to strategic uncertainty. This
has resulted in the emergence of a hybrid multilateral system of interconnected
regional institutions for communication and coordination on security issues.
This hybrid system tends to mitigate tensions between the US and China. It also
enables Washington to remain actively involved in regional diplomacy in the
longer term, while stimulating Beijing to adopt regional norms in its behaviour
towards its neighbours. According to Alice Ba, ‘however contested, there
remains a strong consensus that institutions serve a long-term interest in
creating a community of relations in which all might find appropriate roles’
(Ba, 2014, p.207). Still, for now working towards a regional community that as
yet remains immature can only partially offset existing strategic uncertainty.
Therefore, various other strategies to deal with uncertainty, including formal
alliances, flexible partnerships, and the build-up of military power, will most
likely continue to co-exist in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
What the future roles of China and the United
States will constitute the two fundamental uncertainties that shape the
regional security order in East Asia. These two uncertainties may well remain
in the coming decades. As China’s rise as a major power continues it will
become increasingly clear how the PRC intends to use its growing power both at
the regional level in East Asia and globally. At the same time, the
international repercussions of potential economic or political disruptions
within China, and the unpredictability thereof, will keep increasing. Regarding
the United States, its resilience in terms of playing its role as off-shore
balancer in East Asia will remain equally unpredictable. Nevertheless, if the
economic and military gap between China and the US keeps decreasing, Washington
will probably have to move beyond the alliance framework and embrace new
approaches of providing reassurance to Asian countries in order to demonstrate
its capacity and willingness to counterbalance China (see, Van der Putten,
2011). Ultimately, the strategic behaviour of the countries in East Asia with
major maritime interests will continue to be defined by how they perceive these
two major uncertainties.
About The Authors:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis is Lecturer in East Asian Politics at the University of Antwerp and Catholic University of Louvain, both in Belgium.
Frans Paul van der Putten is a Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands.
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Publication Details:
This article was originally published at E-International Relations on Nov 24, 2015 under Creative Commons license
