Iran’s interest in developing ballistic missiles can be traced back to the 1960s and can be tied to its regional security interests even before the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In general, the U.S. intelligence community has publicly stated that it believes Iran’s overall approach to its international affairs “will remain relatively constant and will continue to be driven by longstanding priorities of preserving the Islamic regime, safeguarding Iran’s sovereignty, defending its nuclear ambitions, and expanding its influence in the region and the Islamic world.”
By IndraStra
Global Editorial Team
On October 11,
2015, Iran launched a medium-range ballistic missile “Emad”, inherently capable
of delivering a nuclear weapon, which was immediately duped by United States as
a clear violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which was adopted in 2010 and remains valid
until a nuclear deal between Tehran and six world powers goes into effect.
Under that deal, reached on July 14, most sanctions on Iran will be lifted in
exchange for curbs on its nuclear program. The missile test is not a violation of
the nuclear deal, which focuses on Iran's atomic program, U.S. officials have
said. Speaking to reporters in Washington, President Barack Obama acknowledged
that the nuclear deal does not fully resolve all areas of dispute with Tehran.
Image Attribute:
Two views of the new MARV employed on the EMAD Ballistic Missile.
About The
Missile: Emad (Persian: عماد)
is an Iranian-designed, liquid-fuel, intermediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM) with a claimed range of 1,700 km and 1,750 kg payload. The missile was
presented by Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan on 11 October 2015. Emad
features a newly designed reentry vehicle with a more advanced guidance and
control system, making it the country's first IRBM that is precision-guided
Any missile
capable of carrying a large conventional payload—including the Emad—is
technically capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. But the deal’s prohibition
“doesn't lie in missile booster or nonnuclear warhead design, or
range-payload,” said Anthony Cordesman, an expert on Iranian missile
capabilities at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington.[1] “It only applies to actually developing and deploying a nuclear
warhead for a given missile.” However, Iranian officials have insisted that the
country’s ballistic missile program is for defensive purposes only, and doesn't
fall afoul of restrictions imposed by the U.N. or other bodies.
An effective
nuclear weapons capability has three major elements, each of which presents its
own unique technical and other challenges. Additionally, each of these elements
must work together as part of an operational system. All this is required to
make the case that a specific ballistic missile threat is grave and imminent.
First is the production of fissile or nuclear material in sufficient quantity
and quality as the source of a nuclear device.The second element concerns the
design, weaponization, miniaturization, and survivability of the warhead and
its physics package capable of being delivered to its
Iran’s
interest in developing ballistic missiles as the third component of an
effective nuclear weapons capability can be traced back to the 1960s and can be
tied to its regional security interests even before the Islamic Revolution in
1979. In general, the U.S. intelligence community has publicly stated that it
believes Iran’s overall approach to its international affairs “will remain
relatively constant and will continue to be driven by longstanding priorities
of preserving the Islamic regime, safeguarding Iran’s sovereignty, defending
its nuclear ambitions, and expanding its influence in the region and the
Islamic world.”[2] Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated the
strategic objectives of Iran’s leadership are “first and foremost, regime
survival; making Iran the preeminent regional power; and turning Iran into an
economic, scientific, and technological powerhouse.
Since 1999,
the U.S Intelligence Community has assessed that Iran could test an ICBM
capable of striking parts of the United States by 2015 with sufficient foreign
assistance, no doubt assessment has hit the near to a bull's eyes with the
Iranian's test of Emad in October 2015. However, there is no reliable
open-source assessment as to how much Iran spends to develop, test, and field
its ballistic missile capabilities, nor how much it spends relative to other
nations that develop, test, and field ballistic missiles. There is limited
open-source data, however, regarding Iran’s military expenditures in general.
Over the period 1997-2009, Iran reportedly spent about $6.2 billion annually
(U.S. constant dollars).[3] Iran’s military expenditures placed it fourth among
the other Gulf States and the GCC.[4]As a function of GDP, Iran’s military
expenditures placed it sixth among those same states [5] and 60th in the world
according to the CIA.
In the fall of
2013, the United States, Great Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany (the
“P5+1”) had entered into intensive negotiations with the recently elected
government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. Those negotiations soon led to
an interim agreement that froze and in some cases rolled back Iran’s nuclear
program and ultimately culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) on July 14, 2015. This comprehensive agreement, when implemented, will
severely constrain Iran’s nuclear program and ensure that it is intensively
monitored for many years.
Because the
JCPOA will prevent Iran from arming its ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads, Iran’s missile inventory looks far less formidable than it would have
without the agreement. Iran’s ballistic missiles armed with conventional
warheads are relatively inaccurate. They can inflict pain and suffering on
civilians, as happened in the “War of the Cities” during the eight-year
conflict between Iraq and Iran, but they are not a game-changer militarily, nor
do they constitute an existential threat to any nation.
Again because
of the size and capabilities of Iran’s ballistic missile force, some argue that
in the event of a crisis or conflict the United States might be deterred from
engaging Iran militarily or that the possibility of ballistic missile attacks
might preclude certain U.S. force options. In fact, the U.S. IC believes that
Iran views its missile forces “as an integral part of its strategy to deter—and
if necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including U.S. forces. Its
ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and, if so armed,
would fit into this strategy.” In
addition, some observers have argued that because many of Iran’s neighbors lack
their own deterrent capabilities or effective ballistic missile defenses Iran
could “blackmail such states into meeting demands, for example, to raise oil
prices, cut oil production or even withhold cooperation with the U.S. on which
their very survival depends”. In the
event of a conflict, one expert wrote, “U.S. military action would be to
forestall Iranian interference with Gulf oil exports; this would have to be
near total in its effect on Iranian capabilities. This would be difficult if
not impossible to achieve, leading to a fear of attack which alone would have a
formidable impact on oil prices.” Iran
thus is viewed as a challenge to U.S. national security interests in the
region, even with superior U.S. conventional military power. A major trend in
U.S. military sales to the Persian Gulf states today is for anti-missile
systems intended precisely to address this threat.
Finally,
Iran’s ballistic missile and space launch programs are major drivers of the
U.S. BMD program. In addition to an extensive number of short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs) and a smaller number of medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) in Iran, the United States remains concerned about the possibility of
an intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM) program in Iran. Such
threats in the future are the basis for the Pentagon’s plan to deploy
increasingly capable phases of BMD, called the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA), over the next decade in Europe and perhaps in the Persian Gulf
as well.[6] The U.S. EPAA will be integrated with other BMD systems already
being developed, augmented and deployed by NATO individual member states under
NATO command and control architecture.[7]. To deploy minimum deterrent against
Iran, U.S. has no much options left beside providing Russians bunch of reasons
to get annoyed and pushing the latter to cut it's own deal with Iranian Government.
References:
- Iran Says Missile Didn't Violate Nuclear Deal - WSJ
- Dennis C. Blair, Dir., National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010, p. 25.
- Anthony H. Cordesman and Aram Nerguizian, The Gulf Military Balance in 2010: An Overview, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, April 2010, p. 36. Data for military expenditures was taken from the annual Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London).
- Ibid., Figure 24: Southern Gulf Military Expenditures by Country: 1997-2009, p. 36.
- Ibid., Figure 25: Comparative Military Expenditures of the Gulf Powers as a Percent of GDP – 1989-2009.
- See CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek. CRS Report R42529, NATO’s Chicago Summit, by Paul Belkin. Also, LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA, BMD Overview— Phased Adaptive Approach, Missile Defense Agency, 11-MDA-6321, Washington, DC, August 15, 2011, http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/bmds_briefing12.pdf.
- CRS Report R42529, NATO’s Chicago Summit, by Paul Belkin.
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