By John Higginbotham Must Watch, CSIS Video on U.S. Arctic Policy by Senator Lisa Murkoswski, Chairwoman of The Senate Committ...
By John Higginbotham
Must Watch, CSIS Video on U.S. Arctic Policy by
Senator Lisa Murkoswski, Chairwoman of The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
The United
States and Canada have been remarkably slow to recognize the potential
geopolitical consequences of a warming Arctic at a time that may be a tipping
point in the global balance of power.
In coming
decades, the melting ice cap will make the Arctic’s abundant resources more
accessible, disputed maritime boundaries more volatile, surface naval probes
and conflict less likely, new marine corridors more economically viable,
growing fisheries more attractive to pirates, and communities and ecosystems more
vulnerable.
The
international governance framework, including the Arctic Council now chaired by
United States, reflects the peaceful and optimistic world of the early 1990s
when Russia and China were weak and “well behaved.” But current Arctic multilateral
cooperation is thin, fragile and prone to wishful thinking, when viewed from
Moscow and Beijing.
Russia, with new
backing by China, is moving into the Arctic vacuum as part of an emerging
global “hard power” partnership to expand territorial, political and cyber
realms.
Surprises
abound. Russia expands into Ukraine and now Syria, probing NATO’s soft spots,
as China builds maritime forts in the South China Sea, steadily increasing the
quality of its military and cyber power.
Russia has officially
declared China its preferred partner in the Arctic, reacting against Western
sanctions. Overlooked by the media, Arctic cooperation between Russia and China
has dramatically intensified in recent months, signalled by exchanges of
leaders’ visits with a military flavour, a plethora of both “commercial” and
government to government agreements, and military cooperation above and below
the radar.
"President
Vladimir Putin sees the great Arctic melt as an opportunity, not a problem."
The Arctic is
just one area where Russian and Chinese economic and global political interests
converge, signalling at best a temporary alliance (China has money, Russia
needs it), at worst a logical partnership between complementary economies under
autocratic regimes with common expansionist and revanchists goals. The
difference from their alliance in the 1950s is that China is now the “big
brother,” and the West is weak and divided.
China’s Arctic
interests can prosper on a strong Russian Arctic base. President Vladimir Putin
sees the great Arctic melt as an opportunity, not a problem. It fits his
domestic nationalist agenda and promises a road back to lost Soviet greatness
for Russia’s huge landlocked empire.
The Russian
Federation, with its growing fleet of powerful icebreakers, the Northern Sea
Route Administration, and massive oil and gas and port and rail facilities, has
been pushing Arctic economic development full speed ahead for decades, largely
paying lip service to other goals. Low oil prices and half-hearted Western
sanctions will slow for a time but not stop Arctic oil, gas and mining
state-driven activity in Russia.
Meanwhile,
American and Canadian Arctic policy is largely animated by domestic politics
and a curious myopia about Arctic change.
Despite US
President Barack Obama’s unprecedented Arctic adventure in Alaska and Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s yearly Gaullist “show the flag” visits to the
North to deter largely imagined threats to Canada’s Arctic “sovereignty,”
neither country is in the race for a lead role in the new, opening and,
potentially, contentious Arctic Ocean.
Canada is
winding up a federal election campaign and the Arctic has not even been an
election issue, although Arctic identity politics are a familiar tool in
Canadian politics.
Why? There are
few people or votes in Canada’s vast Territories, big Arctic marine and
security ideas and infrastructure are expensive, and the government’s Arctic
policy is modest but adequate — unless viewed through a larger global lens.
As Liberal
leader Justin Trudeau said in a debate about Harper’s Arctic policy: “Big sled,
no dogs,” while offering no “dogs” himself.
The Obama
administration deserves considerable credit for trying to develop a new Arctic
strategy and working to implement it over the last three years. Agencies have
produced a small mountain of impressive studies, and there are signs of greater
focus and a deeper awareness of Alaskan interests.
However, toxic
relations between the Obama administration and Congress mean no cheques are in
the mail for the maritime and surface transport, energy infrastructure, focused
science, Coast Guard icebreaker and Navy projects, and Alaskan community
support, the areas of focus pointed to in the studies.
President Obama
and Secretary of State John Kerry’s lament for melting glaciers and wave
erosion in Alaska at the GLACIER summit was no doubt welcomed by US Democrats
and environmental absolutists in their “civil war” with Republicans over
climate change.
Unfortunately,
it was a single issue summit that lost an opportunity for wider national and
international leadership based on the president’s Arctic strategy.
There is no
evidence that the GLACIER summit moved the needle on international action on
climate change, and it ignored a wide range of pressing national and bilateral
Arctic issues as defined by Alaska’s excellent legislative review of Arctic
policy.
Twenty foreign
ministers were invited to GLACIER, but only a few smaller Arctic countries’
foreign ministers came. None of the cool kids — for example, Russia, China,
India and other Group of Eight countries — sent high-level political
representatives.
The program
offered no public forum for ministers and others who did come. Some felt they
were invited merely as props for Obama’s speech. A diplomat from a very
important power daily said, “Our level of representation reflected our view of
the significance of the meeting.”
Some Arctic
countries came with a fear that this larger gathering would set a precedent for
a larger Arctic grouping, an “A20” that would dilute the power of regional
states and aboriginals at the Arctic Council table and enhance that of
observers, who have legitimate interests not fully reflected in the council.
While Alaskans
were genuinely flattered that Obama came up on an unprecedented full
presidential visit, it was not because of his climate change theme. They hoped
for greater sensitivity to the special problems and opportunities of a
resource-based state that borders Russia as the Arctic Ocean melts.
Before the
visit, most Alaskan officials were furious at the administration for further
restricting oil and gas development as Alaska faces bankruptcy in a few years
because of aging Prudhoe Bay exports and the drop in the price of oil.
Then, Shell
stunned Alaskans and other prospective North American Arctic energy producers
by pulling the plug on its massive offshore oil and gas exploration project.
While global oil
market conditions were the main reason for this decision, the president’s
GLACIER message probably helped pushed Shell over the edge, citing continued
regulatory uncertainty (read: continued active administration hostility) as an
important factor. The next US election offers little or no chance of reversing
this verdict.
Viewed from a
global perspective, North America is losing the great game in the Arctic.
Worse, few are even aware that a battle is taking place.
Peaceful
multilateral Arctic cooperation remains an important diplomatic objective for
the United States and Canada, including keeping channels of cooperation open
with Russia. But bold, purposeful Canadian, US and NATO moves to forestall
eventual Russian Arctic maritime and political hegemony with China’s financial
and technical support, are now urgently required.
About the Author
John
Higginbotham is a CIGI senior fellow, where he leads research on Arctic
governance.
This analytic article was first published at Center for International Governance Innovation, Canada on October 19, 2015 and is licensed under CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License by the Original Publisher.
Note: Embedded Video is for reference purpose only, not linked with the Author or Original Publisher
Note: Embedded Video is for reference purpose only, not linked with the Author or Original Publisher
