By Maksym Bugriy Executive Summary The Russia-supported separatists operating in eastern Ukraine as well as some of their backer...
By Maksym Bugriy
Executive
Summary
The
Russia-supported separatists operating in eastern Ukraine as well as some of
their backers in Russia are increasingly espousing a radical ideology based on
a meld of Christian Orthodoxy, expansionist Eurasianism, and irredentist state
aggression. One important figure closely tied into this group is Konstantin
Malofeev. A self-described “Orthodox businessman,” Malofeev is believed to
personally finance the Donbas separatist operation and have direct links to
President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. Although he has been sanctioned by
both the European Union and Canada, to date Malofeev has not come under US
sanctions and flies under the radar of Washington policymakers.
Introduction
On
July 28. 2014, as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continued to escalate, Russia marked
the Day of Baptism of Rus. Simultaneously, Ukraine held celebrations for the
Day of Baptism of Kyivan Rus and commemorated Volodymyr the Great (980–1015)—a
Great Prince of Kyivan Rus who introduced Orthodox Christianity as the
principality’s state religion. The dual observances in Moscow and Kyiv
illustrate the importance of the Christian Orthodox faith to the cultural
identities of both nations as well as their competing desires to lay claim to
its roots. But meanwhile, a radical fringe version of Orthodox Christianity has
been growing in importance among the backers of the Russia-sponsored separatist
movement in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. This Orthodox-based ideology
justifies Moscow’s irredentist politics and openly welcomes Russia’s hybrid
warfare against Ukraine and other potential Eurasian states. Both the official
Russian Orthodox Church led by Patriarch Kirill, as well as its “affiliated”
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), have cautiously distanced
themselves from the Donbas militants and pro-Kremlin hardliners who espouse
these pseudo-Orthodox views. Nonetheless, the fringe Orthodox movement has
attracted support from several high positions around the Kremlin, including an
activist Russian “Orthodox businessman,” who has been accused of financing much
of the Donbas rebellion.
Malofeev:
Radical “Orthodox Businessman”
The
Russian “Orthodox businessman” in question is Konstantin Malofeev, the founder
of the investment firm Marshall Capital and, at one point, the largest minority
shareholder in the Russian telephone company Rostelecom. Malofeev seems to have
close connections to Russian political technologist (and, until recently, the
supposed “prime minister” of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic”)
Aleksandr Boroday and to military commander Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Strelkov). As
evidenced from a conversation intercepted by the Security Service of Ukraine
(SBU) during the early days of escalation of the Donbas conflict, Strelkov
allegedly reported to Malofeev about killing a high-ranking Ukrainian
counter-terrorism official. In turn, Malofeev is allegedly heard on the tape
encouraging Strelkov to pursue the military operation in Slovyansk without
hesitation. The Russian businessman also congratulated Strelkov on a
“well-marked” holiday of Verbnoye (Palm) Sunday (Novosti Dnya, April 14).
Konstantin
Malofeev is believed by some observers to be one of the primary financiers of
the entire separatist operation in eastern Ukraine, acting on the personal
directives of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The arguments in support of
this reasoning were laid out in a May 27 investigative article by the Russian
online media outlet The Insider (The Insider, May 27). The article refers to
the contents of a hacked e-mail written by Strelkov in which the Donbas
military commander claims that in the spring of 2014 he was employed as the
security chief at Marshall Capital. In another e-mail released by The Insider,
which Strelkov allegedly sent four years earlier, he muses about staging a
“Transnistria scenario” in Ukraine and notes that “some of his friends” were
involved in planning the operation. Importantly, the same e-mail mentions that
the financing for this operation was being “allocated by Staraya Ploshchad [4
Starya Ploshchad is the address of the Presidential Administration building in
Moscow].” The Insider further investigated Malofeev’s alleged current
connections to President Putin’s administration, including Putin’s chief of
staff, Sergei Ivanov, as well as Ivanov’s son. The online news source concluded
that the circle of Malofeev’s contacts included Russian Communications Minister
Igor Shchegolev and Father Tikhon (Georgiy Aleksandrovich Shevkunov), who
presides over Sretensky Monastery and is believed to be Vladimir Putin’s
personal confessor (dukhovnik). The Insider further deduced that most likely
Moscow is making “direct use of Malofeev’s [financial] resources for combat
operations in southeastern Ukraine without the official involvement of the
Russian Armed Forces” and suggested that Father Tikhon actually might have
acted as a liaison between Malofeev and the Kremlin (The Insider, July 25).
Konstantin
Malofeev has openly denied his alleged role in the Ukraine war, as well as
repudiated the suggestions of Strelkov’s employment with Marshall Capital
(Forbes-Russia, May 21). Nevertheless, he welcomed being called an “Orthodox
businessman” and sought to highlight his role in sponsoring “humanitarian aid.”
However, he has been unable to entirely hide his more radical activities. For
example, this past June, a Swiss newspaper reported that Malofeev had sponsored
a gathering in Vienna of radical nationalists, ideological proponents of
“Eurasianism” and European far-right politicians. At this meeting,
ultranationalist Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin was a keynote speaker
(Tages Anzeiger, June 3). Moreover, Russian journalist Oleg Kashin—one of the
first to write about Malofeev’s alleged role in the Ukraine crisis—also
reported that in the 1990s, this notorious Russian businessman had contact with
Orthodox Church Metropolitan Ioann (Snychev), who has a reputation of being
“openly fascist” and who later “made friends with Dugin” (Slon, May 19). Dugin
is particularly well known for his Eurasianist (Russian imperialist) views and
as a proponent of Russia’s irredentist war against Ukraine.
A
lawyer and an investment banker who founded Marshall Capital Partners in 2005,
Malofeev has been accused of “raidership” influence over the Russian
telecommunications monopoly Sviazinvest (Lenta.ru, November 1, 2010). His funds
accumulated a 10-percent stake in Rostelecom, one of Russia’s most powerful
telephone companies. And in February 2013, his company was searched by
authorities in relation to a criminal investigation involving a VTB loan to of
one of his assets (Forbes-Russia, February 4, 2013). Marshall Capital supports
the Saint Basil the Great Charitable Foundation, which Malofeev personally
established in 2007, as well as a range of other projects (Marshall Capital,
July 30). On July 22, the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior opened a criminal case
against Konstantin Malofeev on charges of financing unlawful military groups
(RBC, July 22). He was placed on the European Union’s sanctions list on July 30
for his role in supporting the armed separatist movements in Ukraine
(eur-lex.europa.eu, July 30), and was also added to Canada’s sanctions list on
August 6 (international.gc.ca, August 6); but so far officials in the United
States have failed to subject him to US sanctions.
Religious
Justification for Russian Imperialism
Malofeev’s
alleged partnership with Father Tikhon in funding the Donbas rebels further
underscores the centrality of radical Christian Orthodox thought in guiding
Russia’s imperialist policies. Father Tikhon is known for being a conservative
intellectual, a writer and director of several documentaries, as well as the
editor of the Russian Orthodox Church web portal Pravoslavie.ru. His beliefs
blend Orthodox conservatism with ideologies linked to the cultural legacy of
the Soviet Union and Russian irredentism. Father Tikhon is believed to be
especially close to Putin—he is the Russian president’s spiritual confessor.
Illustratively, in a recent SBU counter-intelligence recording, a former United
Russia party official states that Father Tikhon’s help would be needed to
defend warlord Igor Strelkov’s fading reputation before Vladimir Putin (SBU
YouTube Channel, July 25). Putin and Father Tikhon’s “geopolitical” views are
remarkably similar. Both dwell on a cold war–style confrontation between Russia
and the West (The Trinity Temple at Vorobyevy Hills , June 21, 2013). Notably,
the idea of the “Russkiy Mir” or “Russian World,” which is openly promoted by
the official Russian Orthodox Church, easily combines with nostalgia for the
Soviet Union’s bygone hard power and global dominance. The resulting ideology serves
as philosophical justification for Russia’s irredentist wars in its
neighborhood.
Finally,
the aforementioned sectarian pseudo-Orthodox doctrine is widely employed by the
Russia-backed insurgents operating in Donbas. On July 28, for example, Strelkov
issued an order banning the militants from using obscene language. In this
directive, Strelkov referred to the rebels as an “Orthodox Army” and labeled
his enemies “haters of Christians” who, he proclaimed, “seized power in Kyiv
and order Orthodox Ukrainians to fire at their own temples [and] sneer at
[Orthodox] Banners [religious icons] and the Orthodox Clergy” (Informastionniy
Korpus, July 28). A couple days earlier, an editorial on the militants’
official website stated: “We fight for the Faith of Christ […] after the West
unleashed a new campaign with the purpose to destroy the Orthodox-Slavic world.
This is why the Opolcheniye [militia] is called The Orthodox Host…”
(Informatsionniy Korpus, July 26).
Conclusion
From
a purely religious perspective, the militants’ sectarianism has little in
common with true Orthodox Christianity. But there is a distinct danger that the
Russian Orthodox Church and even Russian authorities may be increasingly swayed
by its radical nationalist ideology, the consequences of which could lead to
further chaos and unrest along Russia’s borders. Consequently, proponents of
this dangerous ideology such as Konstantin Malofeev—who have deep pockets and
whom the Kremlin can, seemingly, count on to finance artificial militant rebellions
abroad—pose a specific threat to Western policies and should not be ignored.
About The Author:
About The Author:
Maksym
Bugriy is a Ukrainian analyst who specializes in Ukraine and the CIS region,
international economics and international security. Mr. Bugriy has broad career
experience as an analyst and researcher with leading Ukrainian think tanks,
including The Institute of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation and the Ukrainian
Institute for Public Policy. During 2011, he was a public servant as the Head
of the Geo-Economics Sector with the Ukrainian Presidential think tank The
National Institute for Strategic Studies. Prior to working as an international
affairs analyst, Mr. Bugriy spent more than ten years working as a research
analyst and corporate finance associate with regional leading investment banks,
including Troika Dialog (2006–2010). He graduated with an MBA from Catalica
Lisbon School of Business and Economics and a Master’s of Finance from the
National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv. Currently he is a PhD researcher
in National Economic Security with the National Institute for Strategic
Studies. Mr. Bugriy lives with his wife in Kyiv.
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