The two great powers of Asia are arming. And it is not clear why.
By Charles F.
Bingman
1. The Indian
Military
1.1. Introduction
With the almost
universal preoccupation with the Chinese expansion and modernization of its
armed forces, it is easy to overlook the major modernization of the military
forces of India. Yet India has 1.3 million troops on active duty, backed by 2.3
million reserve forces, making it the second largest standing army in the world
in terms of personnel. The Indian Navy, which may be the most important of the
military services, has already been significantly expanded, and its 65,000
personnel on active duty makes it the fifth largest navy in the world.
Similarly, the expansion of the Indian Air Force to about 170,000 personnel
makes it the fourth largest air force in the world.
The Indian
government, at great cost, is pursuing a major modernization program involving
all aspects of its forces from command and control to force structural
modernization, major upgradings of weapons, new unit missions, new training
objectives and new communications technology. It faces problems of money,
uncertain political backing and a lot of confusion over who they may be
fighting and why.
Traditionally,
the great opponent of the Indian military has been seen as Pakistan, and
conflict with the Pakistani army is constant, ranging from small border insults
to threats of nuclear holocaust. India and Pakistan have been in major conflict
with each other over Kashmir for almost 60 years. Wars were fought in 1948 and
1965, and again in 1971 when India supported East Pakistan in the 70s with both
diplomatic and military assistance against Pakistan, to help it become
Bangladesh. India is still fighting three anti-terrorist wars in Kashmir, the
Maoist Naxalites in north east India, and against Pakistan and Bangladesh which
support rebel groups in Assam. In November, a large, well organized group of
terrorists attacked targets in Mumbai killing many, destroying property, and
terrorizing the population. India is convinced that this attack was sponsored
and supported by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), and it
once again seriously damaged some hopeful peace negotiations at the time and is
regarded as a mortal insult that will not soon be forgotten. The great fear for
the future seems to be China, and the more the Chinese rattle their sabers, the
more hysterical the Indians become. But one of the dominating problems which
the Indians are reluctant to discuss is the fact that they have never been able
to develop a satisfactory “military/industrial complex” and they are heavily
dependent on the Russians, the Americans and others to provide them with modern
weapons. In the last analysis, India’s strategy seems mostly internal and
defensive, and it is hard to see its military as ominous or threatening.
India’s political and military preoccupation continues to be Pakistan, and this
relationship has made little sense for 60 years. All other foreign players –
Russia, China, the U. S. and even Japan – are first and foremost measured by
their relationship with Pakistan, and then, collaterally, with India itself. It
is a game which nobody seems to know how to play, and each has its own set of
rules.
India’s
strategic situation makes it hard to conceive of a major land based conflict
with China over the mountain barriers that separate them. First of all, it is
hard to conceive why China would ever consider invasion at all. Second, the
mountains make such an invasion very difficult, with impossible supply lines,
and terrain relatively easy to defend. An option for invasion might be for
China to come through Pakistan, but this would be impossible if Pakistan were
not an ally. Even if it were, the first point still applies – what could China
hope to achieve even with a successful invasion of India? The same realities
apply in reverse for India versus China and Pakistan. It is also probably true
that the deterioration of Pakistan and its own internal conflicts have
substantially reduced the likelihood of any serious offensive against India. In
the end, offensives by the land forces of all three countries are marginalized,
and their main roles are defensive and internal. In addition, the international
community would bring enormous pressure against all three countries if insanity
threatened to take over.
1.2. Indian
Ministry of Defense
Responsibility
for national defense lies with the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs,
chaired by the Prime Minister. India’s military command has no joint defense
staff or unified command apparatus. The Minister of Defense and the ministry
provide management and operational control over the three main services1. There
are important inter service organizations such as the Services Headquarters,
Production Establishments, and R & D organizations—plus a Finance Division.
A major study in 2000 resulted in recommendations – being implemented – to
establish a Defense Procurement Board, a Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Defense University, a Strategic Forces Command, and an integrated
headquarters in the Ministry of Defense. To enhance military planning, the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) has created the Defense Coordination and
Implementation Committee, and the Defense Planning Staff. All of these steps
seem highly desirable, but what one wonders is why they have been so long in
coming.
The Union
Ministry of Home Affairs controls the nationwide Indian Police Service, most of
the paramilitary forces, and the internal intelligence bureaus. It includes the
Central Bureau of Investigation (reporting to the Dept. of Personnel), the
Central Industrial Security Force, and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. The
separatist insurgencies, drug interdiction problems, and community unrest have
led to a stronger role for paramilitary forces under the direction of the Home
Ministry. Unfortunately, these paramilitary forces have a bad reputation for
civil rights abuses. Each state has its own police force, reporting to a
Director General (Police), and state forces are provided in the districts. The
prison system is entirely state operated.
A Department of
Defense Production was set up in 1962 after the disastrous war with China to
shape up all defense procurement, and it was later merged with the Department
of Defense Supplies in 1984. The basic policy is to move almost completely to
domestic production of all needs. Presently 39 ordnance factories and 8 Defense
Production Service Units (DPSUs) are in operation, but much is purchased from
civilian suppliers. The Ordnance Factories (OF) are government owned and run by
the Ministry of Defense. They produce ammunition, explosives, weapons, vehicles
both regular and armored, and other ordnance equipment and maintenance. The 8
DPSUs are: Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.; Bharat Electronics; Bharat Earth Movers;
Mazagon Dock Ltd.; Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd.; Boa Shipyard Ltd.;
Bharat Dynamics Ltd.; Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd.
The government
has only recently begun to urge the private sector into the armaments market,
presumably to try and split the costs, but so far, the private sector has been
permitted only marginal participation through the provision of raw materials,
semi-finished parts, components, services and some maintenance, which means
that they contribute little to more sophisticated weapons systems R & D.
FDI in any defense activity is limited to 26%.
The size of the
budget is difficult to assess. The official military budget excludes military
pensions (15% of actual total outlay), the Coast Guard, the nuclear weapons
arsenal, and the huge paramilitary forces. All things considered including PPP
calculations, the military budget is about $ 100 billion2. The terrorist
attacks on Mumbai in 2008, also terrorized the political parties who had been
very sluggish about the cost of modernization, and as a result, the military
asked for and got a 34% increase in its main operating funds for 2009. India is
the second largest weapons importer after the Chinese, which is a reflection
not only of the desire to upgrade equipment, but also the inability to produce
high technology weaponry domestically. Recent purchases of new items include
the Adm. Gorshkov aircraft carrier purchased from the Russians, plus another
new carrier now being built by a Russian shipyard. India is also purchasing
upgraded versions of Sukoi strike fighters from the Russians, plus Mirage
fighters, Hawk trainers, submarines, multiple unit rocket launchers, light
helicopters, long range artillery, plane-based radar, and increased funding for
R & D. Funds are also included in the budget for the start of deployment of
short range – 700 km Agni – I surface-to-surface missiles, and the intermediate
range - 2,000 km Agni – II missiles. The Army is also seeking development of a
“weapon locating “radar. The military is also seeking new “anti-terrorism”
weapons – whatever that means. One of the most significant ways to redirect
military expenditures would be to do what the Chinese did: radically cut back
on the very large numbers of infantry troops and reinvest the money saved into
high technology weaponry. This is especially true because, as a result of a
recent Sixth Pay Commission report, major increases in pay, benefits and
pensions will add large sums to an already tight budget. India can scarcely
afford its very large standing army and paramilitary forces, but it seems
extremely hard to reduce units with such grand traditions.
The Iraq war
proved to be a great surprise to military planners and procurement officials
because of it demonstrated the great superiority of U. S. vs. Russian weapons
systems which are heavily relied upon in the Indian armed forces. There is a
growing feeling that scarce military funds will be better spent on U. S. and
other western country weaponry. This fits in with other tides running in Indian
foreign affairs – the decline of the Soviet Union as a potential ally, the
surge of concern over the rise of China and its military modernization program,
the decline of Pakistan, and the fact that the “on again, off again”
relationship with the United States seems again to be “on”. This is especially
true because the Indian R & D community which was supposed to key the
development of Indian domestic weapons development capability seems to have
promised much, but delivered little. Soviet weapons systems were often
disappointing, lacking promised performance and often proving to be of poor
quality and reliability. Many Soviet suppliers have gone out of business and
been replaced with post Soviet owners and managers, but some sources of
replacement/repair parts have been lost, and it seems hard for Indian
enterprises to fill these gaps. But still, the major purchases being made
remain heavily oriented
1.3. The Indian
Army
The Indian Army
numbers over 1.4 million troops on active service plus more than two million
reserve troops, making it the second largest standing army in the world and it
is almost all volunteer and has long been able to maintain a large number of
permanent long serving troops as its core (Global Security 2009). But pay is
low, morale is often poor, discipline is often weak, and there is a growing
pattern of accusations of corruption. It also seems true that fewer young men
are enlisting, more are opting out, and even appointments to the Indian
Military Academy are less sought. But still, the government is attempting to
find ways to modernize Army weaponry. Indian armored units, which have
performed well against the Pakistan Army are being beefed up with the purchase
of more than 1,600 new T-90 main battle tanks from Russian sources, along with
more than 4,000 Milan 2T anti-tank guided missiles. It has been involved in
four wars with Pakistan (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999) of which it can be said it
won three. It has fought one war against the Chinese in 1962, which was a
military disaster, and led to a new emphasis on military modernization that is
still progressing slowly. It usually fields about 36 divisions, 97 armored
regiments with more than 3,200 main battle tanks, 3,200 artillery pieces, 1,500
aircraft, and more than 2,000 battle field ballistic missiles. The Chinese
realized, in the post Maoist period that its huge army was far larger – and far
more expensive – than the country needed or could support, and it has spent 25
years reducing the size of its standing army and re-equipping the remaining forces.
It is felt that perhaps India is facing the same problems, and they it may need
to decide to trim back its standing forces, so that the money saved could be
used to finance modernization. As with the other services, most of the Army’s
weapons are imported, but there are more small arms and ammunition being
produced domestically.
1.4. The Indian
Navy
It may well be
that the most important service in the Indian military is not the Army, with
its huge forces and glorious traditions, but the Navy because it has a series
of contemporary missions to perform, and more flexibility in its deployment. It
would be the first line of defense if any country attempted either invasion or
attack against the homeland. It would be the only feasible weapon of offense
against another county if needed. It can and will play a critical role in
either blockading or keeping open vital shipping lanes in the whole of
Southeast Asia. And it has already established a solid record of offering help
to other nations in the area such as its excellent record against Indian Ocean
pirates operating out of East Africa.
The Indian Navy
currently has about 65,000 personnel on active duty, and that makes it the
fifth largest navy in the world in terms of personnel. It has about 150 ships,
including one aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers, 15 submarines, 37 frigates and
corvettes, and about 250 aircraft of all kinds. It operates mainly out of three
naval bases at Goa and Karwar on the west coast about 400 miles south of
Mumbai, and at Visakapatnam on the east coast about 400 miles north of Chennai.
The Indian Navy
has always had one aircraft carrier in service starting with one purchased from
the British in 1963 and running thru three replacements or retrofits. The
current INS Vikrant has been in service since 1987, and is due for retirement
in 2012 – but may be kept in some adapted role. But in direct response to
constant Chinese rumblings about building a carrier, the Indians have done two
things:
They purchased
the aircraft carrier Adm. Gorshkov from Russia and it is currently being
refitted in India for service “soon” (this is a valuable learning process for
Indian technicians).The Indians
signed a contract in 2005 for design and construction of an entirely new modern
carrier which is being built by the Russians.
When these
actions are completed, India will have two and possibly three carriers in
operation and they will be the only carriers possessed by any Asian nation. The
key to the military balance of power in S. E. Asia will then lie with the ability
of the Indian Navy to operate three powerful aircraft carrier groups carrying
the best military aircraft in the region, and contracts have been signed for
purchase of 16 more MiG 29s, and there are apparently plans for purchase of an
additional 29. This is very important; it represents the kind of force
projection that the Chinese do not have. The capacity of the Indian Navy to
disrupt supply lines and blockade the ports of other countries is very great,
and could be devastating. The Navy has 8 destroyers, 13 frigates and 24
corvettes which are capable of independent operations but are critical as the
carrier escort vessels in aircraft carrier groups.
The Indian Navy
has 16 submarines only one of which is nuclear powered– but at any given time
only about 6 are operational. They are diesel powered and obsolete by
international standards. Half of these subs are approaching 22-23 years old,
with a supposed life cycle of 30 years. General plans seem to be to start to
replace these at the rate of 2 per year, and six are already scheduled, but it
not certain that this schedule can be maintained. Training, refitting,
maintenance and upgrading capabilities all seem very limited and difficult.
India keeps saying that it wants to be self sufficient in weapons systems
production, but in fact they seem technically to be another generation away,
and meanwhile it keeps buying ships from the Russians, with more frigates and
submarines to be purchased soon. In fact, one of the Navy’s most serious
problems is the talent shortage, both in the service and in its supporting
military industrial complex. The Navy has been very dependent on military state
owned enterprises because of long standing government policy of import
substitution, and the domestic private sector has been largely excluded from
the more technologically sophisticated systems3.
This may change.
India is trying to build up its skill base, the Russians are increasingly
reluctant to supply its top level technology, and the U. S. and other countries
such as France, Israel, Japan and Brazil are ready to step into any gap, and
appear more willing to share their technology knowledge.
1.5. The Indian
Air Force
India’s air
force is the world’s fourth largest with about 170,000 personnel and over 1,300
aircraft, including over 600 combat aircraft and more than 500 transports and
helicopters operating out of more than 60 airbases around the country4. Its
newest plane is the multi-role Sukhoi 30 which are obtained from Russia, and
are capable of delivering strategic weapons. It now also operates a large
number of MiG 29s and Dassault Mirage 2000 aircraft which have advanced
electronics permitting night operation. MiG 27 aircraft are deployed for ground
attack and ground support missions. The air force has many older MIG 21s which
it wants to replace with a domestically produced light combat aircraft.
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) is major domestic aircraft manufacturer and it
currently produces many of the Russian aircraft in India under license. It also
produces several helicopters, and is designing the HAL Tejas domestically as
the replacement for the obsolete MiG 21s.
The Indian Air
Force is also responsible for the defense of the country against air attack,
and it is moving to upgrade its land-based detection electronics and its ground
to air missile systems, including the use of mobile missile trailers. It is
also deploying three of the Phalcon Airborne Earl Warning radar system obtained
from Israel Aerospace Industries considered among the best in the world. The
Air Force also operates a large number of transport aircraft which gives it
superior airlift capability.
1.6.
Paramilitary Forces of India
The military
capability of India is supported by an extraordinary complex of police and
semi-military organizations grouped under the general heading of the
Paramilitary Forces of India (Global Security, 2010). The first and most
important level of such forces is the Central Police Organizations which
function as a national police force for the State, dealing with a whole range
of law enforcement matters ranging from insurrections to parades. These
organizations include the State Armed Police, which is highly mobile and well
armed force of more than 450,000 troops, and functions independent of the
military, reporting to civilian bosses. It is supported and reinforced by the
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which is a volunteer force with more than
300,000 active members, plus a Home Guard and Civil Defense forces with almost
one million more members. The Central Reserve Police Force also maintains a
Rapid Action Force and the Anti-Riot Police to deal with particularly violent
threats, and a new 10,000 man Rapid Action Battalion for Resolute Action
(COBRA) is being formed under the CRPF specifically to deal with the Naxalite Maoist
insurgents in northeast India.
At a next level
are the Central Paramilitary Forces which are linked more closely with the
Indian Army, and during wartime, would serve directly under the armed forces
chain of command. It includes such units as the Coast Guard, the Border
Security Force, the Central Industrial Security Force, the Tibetan Border
Police, and many other special purpose units. The total population of all of
these units exceeds 8.7 million troops. All of these organizations are headed
by a senior Indian Police Service Officer apparently to provide some coherent
leadership to a very complex array of military and police establishments, which
are hugely expensive.
India’s military
modernization is about a lot more than weapons. The military establishment
suffers from weak planning, lack of coherent command and control, obsolete
structure both of fighting units and support commands, and a lot of
disagreement and uncertainty as to who “the enemy” really is, and what
strategic objectives should be followed. There is a genuine but highly
dysfunctional difference of philosophy between an assertive military and
national leadership that has long believed in a more peaceful and passive
national posture. There is a strong movement in the country that sees the
military as overly aggressive, unduly expensive, and largely misdirected. Thus,
the civilian leadership favors “strategic restraint”, a defensive stance and
the hope of a nuclear umbrella, with a “no first strike” philosophy, as
precluding the possibility of any real war. One role that both can agree on is
the growing importance of the need for counter insurgency. But this has been
largely the responsibility of the police, and only recently has the army
stepped in, but with unsavory accusations of excessive brutality.
2. The Chinese
Military
2.1.
Introduction
The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) holds a special place of honor in China as its liberator,
its protector, the stalwart defender of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
the guardian of the Revolution. Despite this honored position, the PLA has
suffered from a strangely rocky history of alternating support and neglect, and
has spent the last 20 years attempting to recoup its position from the mistakes
of it’s past. It was both neglected and ill-used for 20 years by the Maoist
regime. It’s strategies were muddled, its equipment obsolete, its funding has
been uncertain, its officer corps is underpaid and under trained, and its
troops are a non-professional transient population. In the 80s it was authorized
to create or acquire state owned enterprises (SOEs) and other businesses in the
hope that it could largely finance itself and save the political leadership
from the necessity of raising more taxes. This policy was a disaster for both
the PLA and the Chinese economy from which both are still laboriously
recovering.
Military affairs
are naturally highly political, and they are under the direction of the Central
Military Commission (CMC), an extraordinarily powerful body that is chaired by
the CCP General Secretary, who is also the head of the CCP and formal leader of
the government and the country. The CMC has three vice chairmen, one of whom is
the prime minister, plus seven other members who are the most senior military
officers. It has four general departments: General Staff, Logistics, Armaments,
and Political Affairs. The country is divided into 7 Regional Military
Districts, and the PLA itself has five field Commands: Army (PLA), Navy (PLAN),
Air Force (PLAAF), the Second Artillery (which is the nuclear missile command),
and the Peoples Armed Police (PAP), which is officially under the dual command
of the State Council and the CMC, but is generally considered to be an integral
part of the military establishment.
The strategic
thinking of the CMC and the PLA has been almost entirely defensive except for
Taiwan. Its major stated policies are first and foremost to defend the CCP,
then to defend industrial centers, defend the capitol of Beijing, guard the
borders and potential avenues of attack, protect key elements such as transport
routes, lines of communication, harbors, and power sources; and to secure key
locations providing internal security. None of these policies specifically
emphasize the defense of the Chinese people.
But the new
leadership of China has now fully committed itself to genuine and comprehensive
modernization and expansion of its military capability. The authority of the
PLA is wide open and its role is defined at any given time by the views of the
political leadership. It is pursuing several major modernization programs:
reduction in troop numbers, creation of medium and long range missile
capability, an expanded and updated Air Force and Navy, creation of
“multi-role” military units with rapid deployment capability, an upgraded
command/field communications network, and an air defense system, and a coastal
defense capability with naval and shore forces. But troop concentrations seem
not to have changed much in 20 years and they are still deployed opposite Taiwan,
along the Russian border, and in Tibet and Xinjiang.
As with so much
else in the modern history of the Chinese, the death of Mao in 1976 broke the
pattern of neglect and stagnation and permitted the CCP leadership to initiate
a long, complex and multi-faceted reform of the PLA which, 30 years later, is
still under way.
Essentially
three major arenas of reform were therefore considered vital:
First, the whole
military establishment had to be “downsized” on a grand scale in terms of
personnel, and its organizational structure had to be simplified and made more
efficient and productive. It had to get rid of old obsolete types of forces,
mainly massive ground units, so that it could afford new units more relevant to
the nature of modern warfare.
Second, every
aspect of PLA operations had to be modernized from new field communications, to
weapons systems design and acquisition, to logistics, supply and transport and
even to financial responsibility and control. An important policy was
enunciated by Deng Xiaoping in 1985: the military should concentrate on
modernization through R & D; but it was not necessary to then manufacture
new weapons unless the actual military situation requires them. This is the
same pattern that makes sense in the U. S. since R & D is relatively cheap,
and manufacture is very expensive, especially with technologies that tend to
become obsolete quickly. The difference for China is that, in many disciplines,
Chinese education and technological development had never really developed, and
this limits the skills available for military upgrades.
Third, the
government made a decision about 1985 that probably seemed smart at the time,
but which ultimately proved to be a disaster. The PLA was authorized to enter
into business in a big way to create or acquire state owned enterprises (SOE)
and other businesses. The political reasoning at the time was that the central
government budget could not afford both the PLA and funds for economic
development, so the PLA was largely cut loose to finance itself. The basic
intent of authorizing PLA business activities was very quickly perverted. At
its peak, the PLA controlled 30,000 SOEs employing 3 million workers. There was
almost no accounting for either income or expenditure, and these commercial
operations were a serious cause of corruption, including the diversion of
military assets (such as trucks, fuel, food and labor) to its businesses. In
many cases such as electronics or certain minerals, the PLA enterprises
dominated whole sectors of the economy. The whole complex structure continues
to suffer from the usual sins of corruption, patronage and incompetence, and it
is likely that any development of major weapons systems, will take 12-15 years
to complete, even if it is pursued steadily and not interrupted with funding
shortages or political changes of mind. Only in the 90’s did the Chinese appear
to discover systems management and competitive bidding, and it is not clear how
far they have advanced.
Despite years of
hand wringing, it was not until 1999 that the political leadership finally got
serious about this elaborate mess. The point had been reached where both the
military and the political leadership realized that this PLA commercial
activity was a failure. The essence of the agreement that emerged was that the
government promised to substitute regular appropriated funds for the loss of
SOE revenues, and the newly acquired wealth from the market economy made it
feasible to promise the PLA adequate funding for the future. The PLA leadership
recognized this was a good face saver, since most of its SOEs were operating at
a loss, despite their subsidies. Therefore they could dump the failed
commercial enterprises, return their officers to military roles, clean up much
of the corruption, and assure a reasonable flow of funds for modernization. So
the deal was struck.
But it is clear
from subsequent events that the PLA and the rest of the government never really
got out of the enterprise game. At present, it appears that there are still
about 10,000 enterprises employing 700,000 workers under PLA control. There are
about 2000 SOE’s that are genuinely defense related, but there remain many
others that are for mixed military/civilian production. For example, the
Aviation Industries of China, which produces both civilian and military
aircraft is in fact a large holding company that includes more than 200
enterprises and trading companies and employs more than 500,000 people, of whom
200,000 are engineers and technicians (Shambaugh, 2004).
The other big
source of PLA revenue is weapons sales. The PLA is reported to still own or
control dozens of major SOEs that produce weapons for export (Shambaugh 2004)5.
Most of the weapons sales have been to international “bad guys” in the eyes of
Western nations: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, Cuba, Sudan, Pakistan and
of course N. Korea. But predictions that Chinese aid would allow Iran to have
nuclear weapons by 2000 were obviously exaggerated. In fact, the Chinese seemed
to have been aiding Iran for 25 years to little effect.
In the fall of
2002, the State Council and the Central Military Commission directed local
governments at all levels to include provision of “rear services” costs for the
military establishment which allowed the PLA to reduce its own budgets. In
addition, local governments bear some/all of the cost of military reserve
units.
Adequate
accounting procedures were not available until well into the 90s when the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) developed standards which the PLA is required to use.
Also, the MOF began serious budget reviews with a Zero Based Budgeting approach
requiring more line item information and more account auditing. Thousands of
PLA accounts were off budget, and much of the PLA budget was (and still is)
concealed in other types of accounts. Huge debt levels were revealed – so
substantial that they endangered the banks and local governments that had been
coerced into backing the loans. Thus, it was clear in retrospect that the PLA
had access to huge amounts of money, and it is a puzzle why they got so little
real military capability out of these funds for more than 40 years.
2.2. Military
Reforms
When all is said
and done, the PLA seriously wants to be a lot smaller but a lot more
sophisticated, versatile and more technically advanced. Therefore, one major
reform has been to shift the mix of units away from large ground units to more
compact and multi-mission units. The number of divisions has been reduced in
favor of more brigade (1,000-2,500 troops) units to add flexibility. There are
13 infantry, 20 artillery, and 20 tank brigades. 59 divisions including 44
infantry, 10 tank and 5 artillery are still active. Efforts have been made to
create at least one Rapid Reaction Unit (RRU) for each of the seven military
regions, but airlift is scarce, and there are only about 130 transport
helicopters in the whole PLA. Thus, most rapid deployments would still be by
rail or truck. There are an estimated three RRUs actively deployed. Artillery
is a big strength, with 30-35,000 pieces of ordnance of many types, including
14,000 self propelled howitzers of 120 to 203 mm caliber. There are more than
6,000 tanks of varying age with 85-125 mm guns (Karmel, 2000, pp. 123-154).
The PLA has
about 8,300 main battle tanks of different ages, but all of them, even the new
T-90s under development, are obsolete by international standards, and those
sold to Iraq were no match for the U. S. tanks. The history of tank design and
production is a good illustration of how weak the Chinese military/industrial
complex really is. A tank designated the T-69 was the first tank domestically
produced. It was designed about 1970, but took another 10 years to reach
production, and was not deployed in any numbers until the mid 80s by which time
it was obsolete. The main battle tank is now considered to be the T-85,
introduced in 1989, but it did not enter production until 1995, and not many
have yet actually been deployed to the troops (Karmel, 2000, pp 252-255).
The PLA has two
very capable artillery pieces: the 155 mm and 203 mm mobile howitzers. The 203
mm howitzer has, at 50 km, the longest range of any weapon in the world but
again, neither has really been built in any numbers.
Even before
these reformed unit alignments, there was a serious reduction in troop numbers,
over a 20 year period. Reductions have so far totaled 1.8 million from its peak
of 4.5 million as recently as 1985 (5.5 million in 1950), and the active Army
ground troops now number about 1.6 million. But in fact, many of the people
“reduced” have been simply redeployed. A Reserve component has been created,
largely for Army forces, and some active duty personnel have been transferred
to the Reserves which now number about 800,000. Some have been moved into
civilian jobs in the PLA and others have even been assigned to other government
ministries. There are about 4 million military dependents and “several million”
civilian employees of the PLA.
Taiwan has been
the keystone to military policy. The conflict with Taiwan is the only external
situation that can be used to justify the high cost of the PLA. There is no
credible land threat, now or in the foreseeable future. The major strategic
posture is one of coastal defense. The military has virtually no force
projection capability, beyond Taiwan. China wants to become the dominant regional
power, and it is acting to enhance its force projection capability. About 82%
of the PLA total forces have been 3 year conscripts. The goals are to cut the
conscript period to two years, but to reduce the percentage of conscripts to
less than 65%.
Many personnel
have been transferred to the People’s Armed Police (PAP), created in 1983,
including 14 PLA divisions more or less intact. This reflects a significant
change in policy following Tiananmen Square; the leadership wants a far larger
and more heavily armed internal security force to deal with potential civil
insurrections but wants to avoid the visibility of using the army. The PAP
force which was about 400,000 in 1982 and around 900,000 in the late 90’s has
climbed to what is estimated to be about and 1.5 million today (the official
number is just 660,000). Its major roles are border control, internal security,
civil unrest, customs and anti-smuggling and facilities protection. But it is
still not clear who really controls the PAP. The CCP wants it both ways; they
appear to want it linked to the military establishment, but want it to appear
to be run as a civilian function.
Major
modernization of forces has occurred in all of the services. Recently, most
modernization funding is going to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLA Navy
(PLAN). While ground forces are being upgraded, only a limited number of units
will be improved; the rest of the Army units will be low quality. There is an
annual conscription program which is dysfunctional. 25% of all forces are one
year people, and many of the rest have three year terms of service in a
profession that is poorly paid and not very promising. All services suffer from
a lack of capable NCOs. The Navy has no aircraft carriers, no heavy capital
ships, only about 25 capable subs (only one nuclear powered nuclear missile
capable sub and that is in its development/testing cycle. All 6 of the nuclear
powered subs are obsolete)6.
The Air Force
has about 420,000 personnel and a growing number of planes, but most are based
on 20 year old technology. It has about 150 first line planes including two
fighter types bought from Russia, and one domestic plane based on good but 20
year old Israeli designs, but it has languished because of major technical
problems with design, metallurgy, avionics, engine technology, and generally
low manufacturing skills and quality control. The engines for the new J-18
fighter are actually being supplied by Sugat – a Russian company. More than
3,000 older aircraft (built in 1979 or earlier) of all types are so obsolete
that they are being decommissioned. The Russian SU-27 is a good but old trainer
that has been upgraded. The SU-30 is a good modern multi-task fighter-bomber
with a range of 1600 nautical miles. There are about 120 old but good Russian
“Badger” heavy bombers with a range of about 5,900 KM, and nuclear capability.
None of these aircraft compare well against American and other country
aircraft. The past reliance on Russian sources is now in question.
Increasingly, the Russians are reluctant to part with new designs or production
technology, fearing China not necessarily as an enemy but rather as a
competitor as well as a customer, and they are now insisting on cash rather
than bartered goods (Karmel, 200, pp. 158-161). The PLAAF also operates a
formidable Air Defense System with 220,000 air defense personnel in 100 sites,
with surface to air missiles and about 16,000 anti aircraft guns. There is a
large early warning radar network with ranges up to 100 km.
Missile forces
are perhaps the strongest arm of the PLA, but they are still almost entirely
ballistic. Seven ICBM missile systems entered development, but four have been
cancelled and one is an old liquid fuel system. There are two modern systems:
the DF-31 with a range of about 7,200 km; and the DF-31A with a range of 11,200
km, but the inventory for each is very small – less than 10. There are about
1000 air-to-air missiles, and another 1000 land based cruise type missiles, but
the maximum range for any of them is about 85 NM. These are Russian designs
that are being upgraded and switched to domestic production. The Chinese
produce several short range attack missiles, has sold a lot to Iran, and wants
to sell more to developing countries. There is a consolidated missile force
with longer range missiles named “The Second Artillery”. Long range missiles
are really upgraded middle range missiles shifted from liquid to solid
propellants. There are at least ten theater missiles with ranges from 180 to
4,700 km. Most remain ballistic; and some are now equipped with upgraded
guidance systems, but they remain scarce. China has 8-900 nuclear weapons, the
third largest inventory in the world.
The People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has a total of about 250,000 personnel. It has been
trying hard to upgrade its submarine fleet as an attack force. It initiated
five types of subs, of which two – the Type 92 Xia and the Type 94 Jin are
nuclear capable, but neither is fully operational, and only 9-10 have so far
been identified. Submarine missiles are old and limited in numbers. The JL-2
has a range of 7,200 km, but apparently has yet to be deployed for fleet
operations. It has only one full range nuclear powered ballistic missile sub,
plus 5 “attack” boats with ballistic missile capability. China has a very large
merchant marine, but many of the vessels are coast or river based. It has two
guided missile destroyers based on a 1990 Soviet design, and carrying 8
anti-ship cruise type missiles. It also has 2 smaller guided missile destroyers
and 8 smaller frigates. All other ships in the Chinese navy are from the 1950’s
and are obsolete (Shambaugh, 2006).
The current
budget is estimated at about $36 billion, but much of the funding for the
military establishment remains concealed. Almost all R & D is carried in a
separate national R & D budget category. The costs of some arms imports are
budgeted separately and mostly off budget. The PAP is largely funded out of
civilian accounts. The Reserve is funded from provincial budgets. A lot of the
cost of military SOEs including deficits are covered by government subsidies
and forced “loans” and the PLA has always had huge bank debts, much of which is
not realistically expected to be repaid. Many of the prices of military goods
are deliberately understated. There is a serious and deliberate lack of
reliable data, and most of the statistical comparisons with world prices lack a
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) assessment. In fact, there is serious doubt that
the Chinese themselves know how much they spend on their military
establishment. The budget in 2000 was double that of 1978, but it has had
persistent ups and downs – up for Korea and then down; up for the Vietnam War
and then down. In effect, financing for the military establishment as a percent
of the national budget is not much better than in 1978. A substantial part of
the recent increase is to bring pay for both officers and men up to some
reasonable standard after decades of underpayment. The quality of personnel
has, for 30 years or more been poor since the military is not an attractive
career. In addition, there is a track record of bad maintenance, a shortage of
spare parts, and low performance reliability.
“China’s
reported 17.5% increase in its defense budget still leaves it a fraction of
what the US spends each year on its armed forces. President Bush’s last budget
requested $515 billion for FY 2009 – a 7.5% increase – plus $70 billion for the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” The Obama Administration DOD budget for 2014 is
$526 billion, down slightly from its peak of $530 billion in 2012.
A spokesman for
the Chinese National People’s Congress said that defense spending has increased
at an annual average of 15.8% in the last 5 years, and while this seems ominous
to some observers, it is actually less than the increase in general government
revenues which have increased an average of 22.1%. He noted that the defense
budget is equivalent of 1.4% of GDP, while the US spends at 4.6% and Britain
spends 3%. He also stated that much of the increase was for higher military
salaries, more training and rising oil costs rather than new weapons. However
the Pentagon still manages to brood about nuclear force modernization and new
high tech missiles.
Here again, as
with India, the Chinese government is utterly preoccupied with preparations for
a war that will never happen, against an enemy that does not exist. None of the
conflicts that seem to drive military policy – against the U.S.; against
Japan; against Pakistan; against Russia; seem even remotely probable. Military
leaders in both countries ominously overstate the risks because such
overstatements are hypocritically accepted by the political leadership as
justification for authorizing more resources for their military establishments.
Citations:
1 Wikipedia:
Indian Army; Indian Air Force; Indian Navy; Paramilitary Forces of India. See
also Global Security, Ministry of Defense.
2 OpenSalon.com.
Report of the Indian Defense Budget, Feb. 7, 2010. See also Global Security
“Military Budget”. See also Medhani in The Trajectory, “India’s Defense
Spending: Facts Beyond the Figures”, July, 2010.
3 Wikipedia,
“Indian Navy”.
4 Wikipedia,
“Indian Air Force”.
5 See also
Frankenstein, John, and Bates, Gill, “Current and Future Challenges Facing
Chinese Defense Industries”, in Shambaugh, David, and Yang, Richard H.,
Editors, Oxford University Press, 1997.
6 The Chinese
Navy has fewer than 10 nuclear submarines, only one of which is armed with
strategic ballistic missiles, and it is not operational. It now has one
aircraft carrier, built as an upgrade of its original ‘80s capability. Although
the PLAN keeps announcing plans for the new ships, even if true, the actual
development cycle for such systems to reach production continues to be more
than 12-15 years.
References:
GlobalSecurity,
July, 2009.
Karmel, S.M.,
China and the People’s Liberation Army, St. Martins Press, New York, 2000.
Shambaugh, D.,
Modernizing China’s Military, University of California Press, 2004.
Shambaugh, D.,
Modern China’s Military, University of California Press, 2006.
Publication Details:
Vol
9, No 1 (2015), p.
5-16, Feb. 2015. ISSN 2373-0005,
And is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.