By Jason Rineheart Abstract This article focuses on current counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency doctrines. It argues that the mor...
By Jason Rineheart
Abstract
This article focuses on current counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency doctrines. It argues that the more traditional frameworks for analyzing counter-terrorism campaigns, which structure debates around a military (or war) model or a criminal justice model, need to be updated in the light of the current state of terrorism. As a potential new framework, the author restructures the debate around hard and soft power tactics. He also describes how the existing counterinsurgency literature primarily focuses on two frameworks: classical and modern (or global) counterinsurgency. Using the war in Afghanistan as an example, he compares and contrasts the strengths, weaknesses, and potential offsetting effects of modern counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency strategies, arguing that in order for the United States to be successful in its battle against Al-Qaeda’s brand of international terrorism, it must take its struggle from the open battlefields of counterinsurgency into the shadowy world of counter-terrorism.
This article focuses on current counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency doctrines. It argues that the more traditional frameworks for analyzing counter-terrorism campaigns, which structure debates around a military (or war) model or a criminal justice model, need to be updated in the light of the current state of terrorism. As a potential new framework, the author restructures the debate around hard and soft power tactics. He also describes how the existing counterinsurgency literature primarily focuses on two frameworks: classical and modern (or global) counterinsurgency. Using the war in Afghanistan as an example, he compares and contrasts the strengths, weaknesses, and potential offsetting effects of modern counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency strategies, arguing that in order for the United States to be successful in its battle against Al-Qaeda’s brand of international terrorism, it must take its struggle from the open battlefields of counterinsurgency into the shadowy world of counter-terrorism.
US CCT Team - Source: Deviant Art [Link]
Creative
Commons Attribution-Non-commercial-Share Alike 3.0 License
Introduction
Nine years after
9/11, the struggle against international terrorism is at a crossroads.
Policy debates on whether to adopt a counter-terrorism or
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan continue to drive contemporary
security discourse in the United States and NATO.[1] However, these
debates provide little strategic clarity on how to counter international
terrorism. While Al-Qaeda’s strategy is adaptive, the war in Afghanistan
has become much more complicated than one would surmise from America’s stated
goal to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”[2] Counter-terrorism
and counterinsurgency debates on Afghanistan are somewhat shortsighted –
focusing too much on the strengths and weaknesses of short and long-term
commitments while avoiding critical discussions about what a sustainable counter-terrorism
strategy should consist of at the international level. The line between
counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency strategy has become increasingly
blurred, yet they are two rather distinct doctrines.
The American-led
invasion of Iraq not only diverted attention away from the perpetrators of the
9/11 attacks, it also gave rise to a new wave of research and analysis on
insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. While the Al-Qaeda terrorism
threat was not entirely ignored, research on terrorism tended to aggregate
America’s terrorism and insurgency threats and frame counter-terrorism within
the context of counterinsurgency warfare, leading to the misleading conclusion
that both strategies where mutually reinforcing. There were at least
three perceptions of the problem at hand. The first focused on how Al-Qaeda was
exploiting the largely nationalist insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in
order to play the role of strategic spoiler. The second focused on the
resilient and adaptive nature of Al-Qaeda as a global organization and its
ability to project its ideology worldwide in order to gain more recruits and
encourage new attacks. The third focused on the need to change the facts on the
ground and address the root causes of terrorism.
This gave rise
to several theoretical approaches to counter the threat posed to the U.S.
forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan: including enhanced policing,
better intelligence and information operations, increased international
cooperation, counter-radicalization programs, and the need for good governance
and economic development – all in an attempt to address the ill-understood
underlying causes of terrorism. Such prescriptions tended to
misunderstand the nature of the terrorism and overplay causal linkages.
In the following
I shall try to address five questions: What is counter-terrorism?
How has counter-terrorism evolved over the past four decades? What is the
nature of counterinsurgency? How are counter-terrorism and
counterinsurgency doctrines similar and how are they different? And,
finally, to what extent has the increased focus on counterinsurgency warfare
after 9/11 affected how we view the current nature of counter-terrorism?
What is
Counter-terrorism?
Counterterrorism
is a difficult concept to define, especially for western democracies.
Paul Wilkinson writes that: “There is no universally applicable
counter-terrorism policy for democracies. Every conflict involving
terrorism has its own unique characteristics.”[3] Both Paul Wilkinson and
Louise Richardson argue, and they are not alone, that Western democracies must
make respect for civil liberties and the rule of law a staple in their
counterterrorism strategies.[4] While this advice to liberal democracies
is admirable and complies with championed democratic principles, it does not
amount to a counterterrorism strategy – these are simply highly valued
principles meant to guide counterterrorism.
Counterterrorism
is defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual as “Operations that include the
offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to
terrorism.”[5]. This definition is more concrete but has its strengths and
weaknesses. First, it correctly states that counterterrorism is an
all-inclusive doctrine including prevention, deterrence, preemption, and responses,
which would require bringing to bare all aspects of a nation’s power both
domestically and internationally. Second, this definition includes
everything but essentially differentiates nothing, which is a problem. If
an effective counterterrorism doctrine means ‘whatever we need, whenever we
need it,’ then this could create problems with developing effective counter
strategies, allocating resources, and determining accountability – it might
make the concept of counterterrorism rather worthless. There are,
however, advantages to an all-encompassing approach to counterterrorism.
It allows a government such as the United States to recognize the complexities
of responding to terrorism; it also provides a rhetorical tool that reinforces
the notion that there is no simple fix to America’s terrorism problem – but
that does little to help our understanding of counterterrorism.
Counterterrorism
operations are subject to change according to the nature of the terrorism
threat. Indeed, international terrorism, particularly Al-Qaeda terrorism,
is and remains persistent and adaptive. While terrorism is a tactic that
cannot be entirely eradicated, steps can be taken to disrupt, dismantle, and
ultimately defeat organizations that use terrorism. As such, policy
prescriptions for addressing threats emanating from ‘corrigible’
groups like Hamas and Hezbollah will look entirely different according to the
political context, the current threat environment, and, of course, the
government conducting the counter-terrorism operations. For instance,
American would probably shy away from conducting Predator and Reaper drone
strikes in southern Lebanon; this might not be a productive strategy in the
long-term if the objective is to encourage Hezbollah to renounce terrorism, disarm,
and fully blend its political and military forces into the existing Lebanese
system. By the same token, while Israel may continue to carry out
targeted assassination strikes against Hamas leaders, it would not be in the
interest of American foreign policy or its counter-terrorism policy to conduct
U.S. strikes in Gaza and the West Bank. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, is
considered an ‘incorrigible’ terrorist organization with ambitious
socio-political objectives which no government could realistically accommodate
when trying to negotiate a political settlement and bring about an end to
Al-Qaeda’s terrorism. Therefore, America has chosen a clearly
enemy-centric approach to combating Al-Qaeda in order to achieve its
objectives, which, as President Obama has recently stated, is to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda.
In order to
effectively frame current American counter-terrorism efforts, it is important to
appreciate the difference between counter-terrorism policy and counter-terrorism
operations, and to fully understand the competing objectives and mandates
within the American government. The U.S. Department of State has had a
long-term no concessions counter-terrorism policy, which continues today.[6]
This position was defined early on during its struggle against
international terrorism. In 1973, Palestinian terrorists seized six
diplomats (including the American ambassador to Sudan) in Khartoum and demanded
the release of over 60 terrorists jailed in Israel, Jordan, West Germany, and
the United States. Richard Nixon’s response was direct: “As far as the
United States as a government giving in to blackmail demands, we cannot do so
and will not do so.”[7] However, after 9/11, while America’s no
concessions policy remains intact, counter-terrorism operations carried out by
the Department of Defense and CIA highlight that counter-terrorism had evolved
into a more lethal form of asymmetric warfare, which further blurred the line
between policy and operations and reinforced the notion that counter-terrorism
has become an all-encompassing approach.
American
counter-terrorism policy and operations worldwide have, at times, appeared to
present contradictions. But this is largely a problem of understanding
the American bureaucracy and the competing efforts of the U.S. State
Department, Department of Defense, and its intelligence agencies, rather than
proving or disproving any contradictions in American counter-terrorism
policy. For example, Mark Perry has recently argued that America must
talk to terrorists or risk losing the so-called war on terrorism. Perry
argues that America violated its ‘no concessions’ counter-terrorism policy in
Iraq when it chose to negotiate a settlement with the loose network of Iraqi
tribal militias in the al-Anbar province. By this logic, he argues, the
U.S. must engage with other terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah
because they are completely rational organizations with realistic political and
social goals.[8] But within the fog of war in Iraq, it is important to
understand how the negotiations unfolded. The American military engaged
in talks with an insurgent enemy in order to quell violence within the broader
context of an ongoing war. On the other hand, future negotiations with
Hamas or Hezbollah, if they were to ever take place, would be handled by the
Department of State within a non-war context.
Daniel Byman
argues that despite America’s attempts to isolate and weaken Hamas, the group
has emerged stronger than ever and that direct engagement is the only option
for resolving the conflict.[9] The same can be said for Hezbollah in Lebanon.
However, practically no responsible analyst has argued that direct engagement
with Al-Qaeda is an option for ending Al-Qaeda’s terrorism. This
highlights the fact that different counter-terrorism strategies are needed for
different terrorist organizations and that different departments within the
same government have different approaches. In short, America’s ability to
successfully isolate and weaken terrorist organizations is subject to debates.
We also have to
look how counter-terrorism has evolved over the past four decades in order to
fully appreciate the current state of affairs and the widening gap between
policies and operations.
The Evolution of
Counter-Terrorism
Counter-terrorism
has changed over the past four decades; unsurprisingly, this evolution has
mirrored changes in the nature of terrorism. The current wave of
international terrorism began arguably on July 22, 1968, when three members of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a commercial
passenger flight from Rome to Tel Aviv.[10] This represented at least
three novelties. First, it was one of the first hijackings where the
objective was primarily political, and the target was specifically chosen for
its symbolism. Instead of hijacking any airplane, three Palestinian
terrorists took control of an El Al plane from Israel’s national airline.
Second, the hijacking was intended to influence a wider audience, rather than
for personal criminal gain or for escape by simply redirecting a flight for
transport. Rather, the terrorists were intending to trade hostages for
imprisoned Palestinian terrorists in Israel. In addition, it was the
first time a terrorist organization began operating regularly at the
international level, leaving its home turf to attack citizens of a foreign
country who, in many cases, had nothing to do with their struggle in order to
promote their political cause before an international audience.[11] This
encouraged other non-Palestinian groups – such as the
ethno-nationalist/separatist ASALA (the Armenian Army for the Secret Liberation
of Armenia), the JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide), militant
elements within the Free South Moluccan Youth organization, and left-wing
groups such as the German Red Army Faction (a.k.a the Baader-Meinhof Group) –
to “internationalize” their political struggles. These groups, Bruce
Hoffman observed, learned from the PFLP that they could promote their cause
worldwide by simply taking a plane, its crew, and its passengers hostage.
“When we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis
in battle,” said George Habbash, the founding leader of the PFLP in a 1970
interview. “For decades world opinion has been neither for nor against
the Palestinians. It simply ignored us,” he said. “At least the
world is talking about us now.”[12]
International
terrorism became a serious problem in 1968 for two reasons. First the
loss of the 1967 Six-Day War, and subsequent Israeli occupation of the Golan
Heights, West Bank, and the Sinai Peninsula, was a devastating defeat for the
Palestinians and the Arab countries bordering Israel. This inspired
groups like the PFLP to begin operating internationally to promote their cause
because there was no chance that it could defeat Israel on the battlefield.
Second, Latin American guerrilla fighters, frustrated with their battlefield
failures in the countryside, began an urban terrorism campaign, which involved
at first mainly the kidnapping of foreign diplomats. The primary tactics
used by all of these groups were hijackings, kidnappings, and embassy raids,
and the intention was, in addition to obtaining publicity, gaining ransoms and
having imprisoned comrades exchanged for hostages and/or a safe passage away
from the crime scene.[13] Such terrorist blackmail forced governments to
respond accordingly. While acts of terrorism at this time killed relatively few
people, such publicity stunts put tremendous pressure on governments to respond
responsibly since a wrong decision during a hostage crisis could have
disastrous consequences and the blame was likely to land in the court of the
government. An example of this was the German response to the attack on
Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich on September 5, 1972: eleven
Israeli athletes (and eight members of the Palestinian Black September) were
killed after a hostage standoff that ended in a shootout. While the West
German government was not the primary target of the attack, the scene of crime
was on German soil and the government was forced to act and bungled in its
rescue attempt. This was an eye-opener as not only Germany but many other
governments realized how insufficient their response capabilities were.
As a consequence, several countries developed elite rapid-reaction hostage
rescue teams. In short, during this period, governments’ counter-terrorism
efforts consisted mainly in improving responses to groups hijacking
international flights, taking hostages, and raiding embassies. At that
time, the terrorists’ primary intention was not to kill, but rather to raise
attention for their cause by playing to the media and blackmailing governments
into acceding to their political demands before worldwide television audiences.
Over time the
nature of international terrorism changed and so too did counter-terrorism.[14]
It appeared that terrorists were no longer taking people hostage or
hijacking airplanes as the primary tactic to achieve their goals. These
tactics offered diminishing returns and no success in achieving the terrorists’
primary political objectives. Palestinian militants quickly realized that
hostage takings and hijackings were little more than a nuisance to governments.
New groups, such as Hamas, introduced more lethal tactics like suicide
bombings with the intention of achieving at least the same level of limited
strategic success that Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers had reached by using
suicide strategies.[15] Al-Qaeda also started attacking the United
States, aiming at mass-casualty terrorism from the 1990s onward, which culminated
with the theatrically orchestrated 9/11 attacks. In 1995, the Japanese
religious cult Aum-Shinrikyo carried out a Sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway
system, apparently with the intention of causing mass casualties.
Terrorism had evolved into a more lethal and indiscriminate form of warfare
that appeared to be more religiously motivated. This once again put
governments in a predicament to respond forcefully to an enemy that it did not
entirely understand.
The evolution of
counter-terrorism over the past forty years was a slow process that
involved adapting to the nature of international terrorism, as well as taking
advantage of new advancements in military technology. The Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) played a significant role in this evolution. The
RMA is associated with new advancements in military technologies. It
began in the 1970s during the nuclear stalemate between America and the Soviet
Union when it was becoming clear that possession of nuclear weapons offered
little strategic or political advantage over the other since using them would
have drastic consequences. The answer, for America, was to develop more
conventional weapons capabilities that the USSR did not have or could not
afford to develop. This, it was assumed, would ultimately give them the
upper hand in the event of a conventional war.[16] Yet the new weapons
had to be politically and morally acceptable, i.e. they had to be precise,
minimize collateral damage, and reduce the risk of death by the military personnel
delivering them.[17] They had to make war “bloodless, risk-free and
precise as possible.”[18] These military capabilities, combined with modern
advancements in computer technology, were the kicker in the RMA, because if
linked into precision-guided weaponry, military commanders could, in theory,
orchestrate the battlefield in real-time from a safe distance. These
advancements in military technologies are what Michael Ignatieff dubbed
“virtual war,” meaning “a war without death – to our side – is a war that ceases
to be fully real to us.”[19]
After 9/11 the
evolution of counter-terrorism became more apparent. Michael Boyle argues
“the development of counterterrorism as a model of warfare is new to the
post-September 11 era.”[20] Peter Bergen dubs counterterrorism in the
post-9/11 world as “The Drone War”; some have even characterized the Obama
administration’s over-reliance on drones as the “Obama Doctrine.” Indeed,
the use of unmanned aerial Predator and Reaper drones by the US military and
CIA has revolutionized how America combats terrorism; it can be seen as a new
tactic in counter-terrorism warfare. But using unmanned drones is not the
first attempt by America to use the benefits of the RMA to respond to
international terrorism. Before 9/11, President Bill Clinton ordered a
one-off, precision-guided cruise missile attack aimed at Al-Qaeda bases in
Afghanistan in response to the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania. The use of unmanned drones has had interesting implications
on the development of counterterrorism strategies not only in the unpopular
Bush administration, but as highlighted above, the Obama administration has
considered drone warfare to be “the only game in town”.
“President Obama
has not only continued the drone program,” writes Peter Bergen, “he has
ratcheted it up further.” He goes on to say that in 2007 “there were
three drone strikes in Pakistan; in 2008, there were 34; and, in the first
months of 2009, the Obama administration has already authorized 16.”[21] At the
time of writing, in 2010 alone, the Obama administration has authorized over
one-hundred drone strikes worldwide. The large majority of them have
occurred in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[22]
Regardless of the controversy surrounding these operations, American
drone strikes have been successful to a certain extent. Mohammed Atef,
AQ’s top military strategist, was killed in November 2001 in a drone strike
near Kabul, two months after the 9/11 attacks. In 2002, Abu Ali Al Harethi,
a suspected mastermind of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, was killed in Yemen
- the first drone operation outside of Afghanistan. Kamal Derwish, an
American citizen, was also killed in the attack - the first American citizen to
be killed by a CIA-orchestrated drone strike.[23] Drone strikes have also
been seen as successful. Since 2008, according to Bergen, “U.S. drones
have killed dozens of lower-ranking militants and at least ten mid-and
upper-level leaders within Al Qaeda or the Taliban.”[24]
However, it is
debatable whether the drone strikes will prove strategically successful in the
long-term, due to their often-unintended consequences. Killing AQ leaders
and rank-and-file members might be considered a ‘success’ in the short-term,
but they can be replaced relatively quickly. Drone strikes can also lead
to collateral damage, killing innocent bystanders who are presumably not
affiliated with AQ or its leaders, which could alienate the local population or
blunt the effectiveness of more population-centric strategies such as
state-building and counterinsurgency, which focuses on winning the legitimacy
of the local population and promoting good governance. Yet it remains to
be seen if drone attacks alone are sustainable. In order to identify, locate,
and target AQ and its affiliates from the air in regions like Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen, America needs effective and timely human
intelligence. Drone strikes are also questionable from an ethical and
international law perspective because operations are deadly – capitulation to a
drone is not possible. Such strikes may well violate the sovereignty of a
state like Pakistan, which allows America to carry out attacks in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which has historically been an autonomous
region outside the authority of the Pakistani government. Yet the
Pakistani government has yet to authorize strikes in Baluchistan which is a
hotbed for Islamic extremism in Pakistan proper. At the end of the day,
an advanced drone program is an operational tool, and a campaign of targeted
strikes can provide a counter-terrorism strategy with some innovative and timely
successes. Yet drone operations are a tactic, not an overarching
strategy. Moreover, the changes in the nature of counter-terrorism raise a
larger question of the nature of power in modern counter-terrorism
operations. If counter-terrorism is indeed an all-encompassing approach
requiring all aspects of a nation’s power, then it is important to understand
both the hard and soft power options of counter-terrorism.
Hard and Soft
Power in Counter-Terrorism
Existing
research on counter-terrorism tends to structure debates around two approaches:
the war (or military) model and the criminal justice model.[25] The war
model tends to frame the struggle against terrorism in military terms of an
enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of
developing counterterrorism strategy. On the other hand, the criminal justice
model champions the rule of law and democratic values which prevail in Western
democracies. Doing so puts restrictions on the government and thereby
risks reducing the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. However,
as Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp have argued, both models rarely function
according to academic theory during an actual counterterrorism campaign.
While democracies tend to champion democratic ideals and the preservation of
civil liberties, their attempts to combat terrorism forcefully have continually
tested the boundaries of the criminal justice model.[26]
There is a need
to view counterterrorism from other angles. It is becoming increasingly
clear that a new framework is needed in order to develop and measure successful
counterterrorism strategies.[27] Considering the evolution of
counter terrorism, it could be more useful to view counterterrorism in terms of
“hard” and “soft” power. This would require restructuring the debate
around a direct and indirect approach to counter-terrorism.[28] The direct
approach would be an enemy-centric doctrine consisting of primarily offensive,
hard power tactics such as Predator and Reaper drone strikes, special forces
operations, increased policing and intelligence operations. These are
useful tools if the goal is to isolate and destroy groups like Al-Qaeda.
The indirect soft power approach would consist of population-centric methods,
and would contain features such as capacity building, economic development, and
counter-radicalization focusing on the underlying causes that allow terrorism
to thrive.
The direct
approach to counter-terrorism is straightforward but it raises serious questions
regarding the ethical and legal use of force – on top of the issue of
collection of intelligence and the protection of civil liberties within a democratic
society. On the other hand, it remains to be seen if soft power
alternatives such as democracy promotion, economic development, and
counter-radicalization effectively address the ill-defined “root causes” of
terrorism. Robert Jervis argues that even if political oppression, weak
states, poverty, and economic inequality were the real root causes, “there is
little reason to think that we could deal with them effectively”. He concludes
that “we cannot point to solid evidence that doing so would make much
difference.”[29] This is not to say that American involvement internationally
would not include some form of economic and development assistance in weak and
failing nations. But it is difficult to give aid to weak states like
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen and expect to be able to determine
effectiveness in terms of countering Al-Qaeda’s terrorism.
Moreover, providing development aid to increase capacity building is
questionable from a counterterrorism perspective since a causal link between
weak states and terrorism cannot be proven. Aid may well increase the
standard of living, level of education and general quality of life in some
countries. Yet it is difficult to argue that locals would turn to terrorism or
political violence without it. Furthermore, such root cause theories
would have to address the fact that homegrown terrorists do indeed radicalize
and carry out attacks in democratic countries as well as weak and failing
nations – and that while poverty and economic inequality are prevalent
throughout the world, terrorism is not.[30] It may be more useful from a
counterterrorism perspective to view terrorists as rational actors who adopt
the tactic of terrorism as a strategic choice to pursue political objectives,
not as passive observers who are susceptible to what the supposed underlying
causes forces them to do.[31]
Then there is
the issue of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization in
counterterrorism. Some argue that terrorist radicalization and
de-radicalization should be viewed as a complex process consisting of a variety
of interdependent push- and pull-factors and triggering events that drive
people into and out of terrorism.[32] Others contend that social networks
and group dynamics better explain how individuals are violently
radicalized.[33] So far theories of radicalization have had difficulties
in explaining why individuals take up or leave terrorism behind. This is mainly
due to the fact that terrorists come from a wide variety of backgrounds and
there exists no single individual terrorist profile.[34] Despite the
absence of a single terrorist phenotype, some view counter-radicalization
programs as a critical part of counterterrorism. Lorenzo Vidino argues
that attempts to dismantle terrorist networks is similar to playing a game of
“whack-a-mole” and that governments should take steps to prevent radicalization
in order to stop people from becoming terrorists. He goes on to argue
that anti-radicalization programs would vary from “convening interfaith
meetings to creating government-funded Muslim magazines and TV channels, from
promoting lectures of Muslim clerics exposing the theological flaws of al
Qaeda’s ideology to mentoring projects and professional development
seminars.”[35] Theories of counter-radicalization also have trouble measuring
success from a counter-terrorism perspective, because such programs essentially
amount to increased community engagement that requires community leaders to
target and mentor individuals who are presumably susceptible to terrorism recruitment.
Yet it is difficult to prove that they would have turned to terrorism in the
first place, and, more importantly, that they will not engage in terrorism
afterwards.
Some go a step
further and look at ways soft power can facilitate an exit for individuals from
terrorist groups, arguing that government counter-terrorism programs should
offer terrorists a pathway out of terrorism by facilitating disengagement and
rehabilitation.[36] While research on disengagement, de-radicalization,
and rehabilitation is in the early stages, it is realistic that (local)
government can play a crucial role in facilitate pathways out of terrorism for
groups and individuals who want to leave terrorism behind.[37] In
Lebanon, soft approaches such as political engagement and increased capacity
building might have some influence on bringing about Hezbollah’s disarmament
and its full integration into the Lebanese political system. Yet the fact
remains that Hezbollah already chose to join the political process in Lebanon
many years ago and has yet to decommission its militia.[38] Similarly,
attempts to weaken and isolate Hamas have proved questionable from a hard power
perspective. Hamas showed in 2006 that it could use democracy to its benefit
without having to moderate its political aims or renounce violence. The
FMLN in Central America, on the other hand, decommissioned its militia and
joined a democratic system in the early 1990; it is now one of the largest
political parties in El Salvador. So the record is mixed on whether
democracy can offer groups a pathway out of terrorism. Yet it is reasonable to
assume that some soft power measures could indeed offer certain individuals and
groups some sort of pathway out of terrorism.
While both hard
and soft power measures in counter-terrorism do not necessarily provide a
magical way to defeat terrorism, such a framework can be a useful way to
characterize and analyze counter-terrorism initiatives. In the context of
countering Al-Qaeda terrorism, however, it seems America prefers hard power to
soft power. One of Al-Qaeda’s primary goals is to reverse American
foreign policy and its influence in the Middle East while overthrowing corrupt
Arab regimes it supports.[39] But it is clear, and rightfully so, that
American government has little appetite for addressing the root causes of
Al-Qaeda’s terrorism since it has just approved $60 billion in military
sales to Saudi Arabia - the largest military sales package ever for an Arab
state[40]. According to Bob Woodward’s new book Obama’s Wars, the
CIA has Presidential and Congressional approval to carry out covert, lethal
counter-terrorism operations in over sixty countries. It also manages a
3,000-man team of Afghans known as Counter-terrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPT). Its
purpose is to take the fight to Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In
short, it appears that for the time being aerial drone strikes and other hard
power tools will drive American counter-terrorism strategy.[41]
Nevertheless,
America should be mindful that counter-terrorism operations that cause high
civilian casualties rates allow terrorists to exploit its actions and to
strengthen their own position from a propaganda perspective. There is a fine
line between effectively responding to terrorism and strategic overreach.
John Brennan, President Obama’s top counter-terrorism advisor, recently
commented on the need to resist using the “hammer” in counter-terrorism.
He went on to argue that America must use the “scalpel” and prepare for a long
struggle against Al-Qaeda, a struggle that would take the fight from the
battlegrounds of counterinsurgency into the shadows of more covert counter
terrorist operations.[42] However, this does not mean that more precise
is necessarily less lethal. While post-modern terrorists may want a lot of people
watching and a lot of people dead, covert counter-terrorism forces now want few
people watching and a lot of terrorists dead.
Counter-Insurgency
Theory
How does
counterinsurgency differ from counter-terrorism? Counterinsurgency has
been defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an
insurgency.”[43] Based on this definition, counterinsurgency is an
all-encompassing approach to countering irregular insurgent warfare – an
approach which recognizes that a military solution to a conflict is not
feasible; only a combined military, political, and civilian solution is
possible. Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation has argued that, based on
his analysis of 90 insurgencies, defeating an insurgency is a long process that
lasts on average 14 years.[44] T. E. Lawrence has been quoted as saying
“to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a
knife.”[45]
There are
several studies that highlight the best practices of waging counterinsurgency
warfare. David Galula, a former Lieutenant Colonel in the French army, is
considered the intellectual God Father of counter-insurgency studies. In
his famous book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964),
Galula argued that, in order to counter an insurgency, it was essential for the
counter-insurgent to win the support and legitimacy of the local population,
promote good governance, and keep a sufficient amount of troops in an area to
provide security after the governments forces have taken it over. He also
argues that is important to “destroy or expel the main body of armed
insurgents” or, if that is not possible, to “win over or suppress the last
insurgent remnants.”[46] These principles provided the intellectual framework
for countries like America and Britain to further develop and implement their
respective counterinsurgency doctrines at both the theoretical and practical
level. They are also the foundation of General Petraeus’s “clear, hold, and
build” strategy.
John Nagl,
building on Galula’s work, argues that there are two approaches to
counterinsurgency: the direct and indirect approach. The direct approach
focuses primarily on defeating the enemy with military force. The
indirect approach, on the other hand, involving a “battle for the hearts and
minds,” focuses on a more population-centric strategy. It involves denying the
insurgency the support of the local population while at the same time attacking
the insurgency with military force.[47] The primary goal of both the
insurgent and the counter-insurgent is promoting good governance and winning
legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. This framework for
victory has been the primary focus of American counterinsurgency operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. As a consequence, General Petraeus’s declaratory
strategy has revolved around denying the insurgency its sanctuary within the
population and training the local security services to hold the territory so
the insurgents do not return, while building infrastructure, promoting good
governance, and eliminating political corruption – thereby wining the
population’s “hearts and minds.”
Counter-insurgency
theory can be seen within a classical and modern framework. Classical
counterinsurgency theory is similar to both the Nagl and Petraeus
approaches. Since a classical insurgency is generally associated with a
struggle within one state, with a possible safe haven in a bordering state, a
classical counterinsurgency is confined within the borders of a single state.
Seth Jones, in his analysis of 90 insurgencies, identified three key variables
that are, in theory, critical to a successful classical counterinsurgency: 1)
training the local police and security forces to combat the insurgency; 2)
improving the quality of local governance; and, 3) denying the insurgency any
external support and outside sanctuary.[48] Jones goes on to argue that
America is not likely to commit itself to a 14-year long counterinsurgency in
Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. Thus, in his view, training and
supporting the host government’s security forces to defeat the insurgency is
critical. Locals have more legitimacy and are more familiar with the
local geography, language, culture, political landscape, and history.
They are simply more capable of gathering intelligence from the local
population and thus should take the lead in any long-term counterinsurgency
effort.
Modern
counterinsurgency theory, on the other hand, takes a more international
approach. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda’s network across national borders was
characterized by many as a global insurgency.[49] This new insurgency
threat was not only local, it was international, which as some argue, requires
a re-thinking of how such irregular warfare should be combated.[50] Many
counterinsurgency experts acknowledge that as the nature of an insurgency
evolves so too does the counterinsurgency strategy[51] Indeed,
Kilcullen’s observation that “a globalized insurgency demands a rethink of
traditional counterinsurgency” appears to make sense if one subscribes to the
argument that Al-Qaeda is a global Islamist insurgency.[52] Bruce Hoffman
recently framed the global Al-Qaeda threat in a similar way, and argued that
while AQ does not enjoy the operational safe-haven it did before 9/11, it has
“nevertheless been able to reconstitute its global terrorist reach.”[53]
As such, Hoffman argues that a new Global Counterinsurgency (GCOIN)
strategy is needed to combat this international terrorist threat. This
approach would include: vital information operations to counter the radical
narratives; separating the enemy from its support base to deny it sanctuaries
and freedom of movement; continuing to detect and defuse the enemy domestically
and internationally; and a commitment to build legitimate civil governance
which could counter the underlying causes of terrorism and insurgency.[54]
This modern approach is basically a classical counterinsurgency theory of
winning the “hearts and minds,” which denies the enemy sanctuary, seeking to
promote good governance and engaging in information operations - but on a
global scale. It is a much more ambitious undertaking than conducting
classical counterinsurgency within a single state. However, it also remains to
be seen whether AQ merits this type of attention and whether it really amounts
to a global Islamist insurgency.
If we consider
Al-Qaeda a serious global insurgency threat that has the resources and support
to overthrow multiples governments worldwide, then it is certainly reasonable
to adopt both Kilcullen and Hoffman’s approaches. However, if we do so it
blurs even further the line between counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency
because it not only inhibits our understanding of both doctrines, it requires
us to develop a new form of hybrid warfare. Just because an organization
such as Al-Qaeda may use terrorism on an international scale and dabble in
domestic insurgencies does not make it subject to the same respective counter
strategies. Furthermore, to a certain extent, labeling Al-Qaeda as a globalized
insurgency threat legitimizes Al-Qaeda’s cause and gives this organization or
network too much credit. “The Al-Qaeda organization is neither an
insurgency against a US hegemonic order nor the vanguard of a global Islamic
resistance to globalization and westernization,” Michael Boyle has
argued. “It is a resilient and highly lethal terrorist organization with
a fanciful political programme and relatively little popular support in the
Muslim world.”[55]
Counter-Terrorism
and Counter-Insurgency
Counter-terrorism
and counterinsurgency are two fundamentally different doctrines and it is
important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each in order to fully
appreciate the offsetting effects they might have. Michael Boyle has
recently asked the question whether counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency go
together, and concluded that there is no reason to think that both strategies
are fully compatible or mutually reinforcing, and despite the recent conflation
of the two doctrines, that a counterinsurgency strategy should not be seen as a
counter-terrorism strategy and vice-versa.[56] Counterinsurgency can
provide a clear framework for success if the situation is ripe for this type of
warfare. The main tenet of counterinsurgency recognizes that a sole
military solution is not feasible, making it essential for a dual
military-political solution that adopts a population-centric approach.
Additionally, counterinsurgency doctrine rests on a few key pillars of
protecting the local population, promoting good governance, eliminating enemy
safe-havens, and training the locals to take the fight to the insurgency.
Classical counterinsurgency seeks to combat an insurgency confined within the
borders a nation-state, while modern counterinsurgency theory takes these
classical principles and applies them at the international level, or what Bruce
Hoffman calls Global Counterinsurgency (GCOIN), which ultimately seeks to
combat international terrorism while addressing the underlying socio-economic
conditions that supposedly allow terrorism to thrive.
Counter-terrorism,
on the other hand, provides a less clear framework for success but
is equally complex. Counter-terrorism has evolved over the past four
decades into a more lethal form of unconventional warfare. Not
surprisingly, this evolution has mirrored the trends in international
terrorism. Since international terrorists from the late 1960s to roughly
the end of the Cold War were primarily hijacking airplanes, raiding embassies,
and taking hostages to promote their causes, counter-terrorism forces adjusted
to meet these threats. Yet over the past few decades terrorism has become
bloodier and more indiscriminate, which forced governments to adjust their
counter tactics. With the RMA developing unmanned, precision-guided
weaponry that drastically decreases the risk of one’s own soldiers dying in
conflict on the ground, counter-terrorism was able to evolve into a form of
irregular warfare that is, as Michael Ignatieff described the RMA, as
“bloodless, risk-free and precise as possible.”[57] Instead of hostage
negotiators being called to deal with a terrorist’s demands, now a soldier
operates unmanned aerial Predator and Reaper drones with Hellfire missiles to
seek and destroy Al-Qaeda terrorists. Counter-terrorism today is indeed a
complex, multifaceted phenomenon. In the context of combating Al-Qaeda,
counter-terrorism is a sharp, quick, and lethal form of warfare focused on
isolating, boxing in, and destroying the organization and its members.
However, counter-terrorism is something entirely different when thinking in
terms of dealing with the complexities of Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the
hard and soft power alternatives that an all-encompassing strategy can bring to
bear.
Recently the
debate between counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency advocates has gained
traction within the Obama administration. Some argue that a long-term
counterinsurgency is the only way to achieve America’s goals in Afghanistan,
while others argue that it does little to address the global threat posed by
Al-Qaeda. For this a number of reasons can be cited. First, Afghanistan
has been a “nightmare, a graveyard of empires,” ranging from the Brits to the
Soviets and now, potentially also to the Americans.[58] No one has ever effectively
ruled Afghanistan. The country is so diverse in terms of its tribal structures
that no unified state has ever been formed. Second, based on the
counterinsurgency principles, success in Afghanistan requires certain
underlying conditions that America currently does not have and cannot
create. For example, having a legitimate host government is the bedrock
of any successful counterinsurgency strategy. However, the current Karzai
regime has been criticized for being extremely corrupt and for having made
little progress in development.[59]
A recent poll of
6,500 Afghans conducted in 34 of the 36 provinces put the police and judiciary
as the most corrupt departments in the Afghan government. These are the very
entities responsible for implementing the rule of law.[60] Different U.S.
governmental agencies in Afghanistan also appear to be working at
cross-purposes. For example, the CIA has been funding Hamid Karzai’s
corrupt brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who is essentially the governor of Kandahar
City, to provide security, collect intelligence, and combat the Taliban using
his local militias. But the military, at the same time, is working to
promote legitimate governance and win the “hearts and minds” of the
locals. Major General Michael Flynn was quoted as saying: “If we are
going to conduct a population-centric strategy in Afghanistan and we are
perceived as backing thugs, then we are just undermining ourselves.”[61]
Furthermore, CIA drone operations used for counter-terrorism purposes are not
only highly lethal but also have a tendency to cause unintended civilian
causalities. Therefore, while targeted drone strikes that have relatively
high levels of collateral damage may be seen as a necessary evil for a
successful counter-terrorism strategy, it essentially blunts the effectiveness
of the nearby counterinsurgency operation since it has the potential to further
alienate the local population.[62]
Third, the costs
of a long-term commitment to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan are
astronomic. As Kalev Sepp has argued, “If – as in Iraq –
counterinsurgency means a campaign that will cost $2 trillion, engage 150,000
troops, see the deaths of some 5,000 of those soldiers, and last for at least
six years with an indeterminate end, then only the United States can do it, and
probably only once in a generation.”[63] According to Bob Woodward’s new book
on the Obama administration, President Obama has been quoted as saying, in
relation to the war in Afghanistan: "I'm not doing long-term
nation-building. I am not spending a trillion dollars."[64] Due to the
costs of counterinsurgency warfare, as the argument goes, the United States is
not likely to sustain an international coalition or the international
legitimacy required that some argue is critical to succeeding in Afghanistan.
Fourth, counterinsurgency is “clearly not working” writes Richard Haass,
President of the Council on Foreign Relations.[65] Haass goes on to argue
that America must stop thinking that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda represent the
same security threat to Afghanistan and to its national security interests in
the region, and that the Taliban is not likely to harbor Al-Qaeda again because
of the enormous consequences.
Above all,
counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency strategies must keep in mind the current
threat that Al-Qaeda poses. CIA Director Leon Panetta estimated that
Al-Qaeda has only “60 to 100, maybe less” members in Afghanistan.[66] And
a recent estimate put its size in both Afghanistan and Pakistan at fewer than
500.[67] So if the mission in Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat Al-Qaeda, as President Obama has stated, then a strategy focusing on
this threat seems to be more feasible and have a higher likelihood of
success. However, some have argued that the size of Al-Qaeda’s membership
in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not necessary a productive method to measure its
strength. Al-Qaeda has never had more than a few hundred core members and
it continues to use affiliate organizations to project its terrorist brand
internationally.[68] Whatever its size, as America’s battle against
Al-Qaeda continues worldwide, it seems counterinsurgency warfare will be
marginalized for a more enemy-centric counter-terrorism strategy which will
utilize a variety of hard and soft power tactics to disrupt, dismantle, and
destroy Al-Qaeda.
Conclusion
The line between
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy has become increasingly
blurred, yet as we have seen, both concepts represent two different strategic
doctrines. However, the increased focus on counterinsurgency warfare
after 9/11 has affected how we view current counter-terrorism efforts. At
the heart of any counterinsurgency strategy is a “hearts and minds” approach of
promoting good governance and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.
This way of thinking appears to have had a certain impact on the development of
more soft power counter-terrorism measures, which now seek to promote legitimate
governance and capacity building to address the somewhat unclear underlying
causes of terrorism. Indeed, Daniel Benjamin, the U.S. State Department’s
Coordinator of Counter-terrorism, writes that America must address the complex
factors of radicalization and “confront the political, social, and economic
conditions that our enemies exploit to win over recruits and funders” by
increasing “foreign assistance to nations and communities where violent
extremism has made inroads, such as Pakistan and Yemen.”[69] This view
reinforces the notion that American can effectively address its terrorism
problems by changing the facts on the ground. Yet, in reality, this only
highlights the State Department’s strategy for countering Al-Qaeda terrorism,
which at the end of the day assumes a dubious causal linkage between
socio-economic and political conditions and terrorism, and appears to be at
odds with the more hard power approaches used by the CIA and American military.
However,
critical questions remain regarding American counter-terrorism strategy.
Will the hard power counter-terrorism tactics such as Predator drone strikes
used by the CIA blunt the effectiveness of the State Department’s soft approach
to counter-terrorism? In contrast to counterinsurgency doctrine, does
America really need the support and legitimacy of a local population in order
to be successful in counter-terrorism?[70] If so, can America and its
allies develop a realistic framework to counter extremism and violent
radicalization? If not, to what extent can hard power tactics prove
strategically successful? Can both hard and soft power in counter-terrorism
be fully compatible and mutually reinforcing, or will both always operate at
cross-purposes? And, more importantly, just because local populations in
regions like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia may have extremist views
or despise American foreign policy, does that necessarily mean they will join
Al-Qaeda and resort to international terrorism? In short, the larger task
for America and its allies will be to find adequate answers to such questions
and determine what the long, perhaps multi-generational struggle against
international terrorism will look like after the war in Afghanistan, and, in
this way, move beyond the current debate surrounding counter-terrorism and
counterinsurgency.
About the Author:
Jason
Rineheart is a Freelance Writer specializing in counter-terrorism
and Middle East security and a Research Assistant at the Terrorism Research
Initiative. He holds a B.A. from the University of Oklahoma and an M.Litt from
the University of St Andrews.
Notes
[1] Robert
Haddick. “This Week at War: Obama vs. Team Surge”. Foreign Policy,
24 Sept. 2010.
[2] Quoted in
Austin Long. “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan”.
Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2010.
[3] Paul
Wilkinson. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response.
New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 203.
[4] Paul
Wilkinson. Terrorism and the Liberal State. Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1977, 1986; Louise Richardson. What Terrorists Want: Understanding the
Enemy, Containing the Threat. New York: Random House, 2006.
[5] Quoted in
the US Army Field Manual, 2006, p. 4.
[6] See Morris
Busby. “U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 1980s and the priorities for the
1990s”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 13:1, 2005, pp. 7-13;
Paul Bremer. “The West’s Counter-terrorist Strategy”. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 4: 4, 1992, pp. 255-262.
[7] Quoted in
Bruce Hoffman. “Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?”. Foreign Policy,
1999.
[8] Mark Perry. How
to Lose the War on Terror. London: Hurst & Company, 2010.
[9] Daniel
Byman. “How to Handle Hamas: The Perils of Ignoring Gaza’s Leadership”. Foreign
Affairs, Sept/Oct., 2010.
[10] Bruce
Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press,
2006,
pp. 63-80.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Quoted in
Ibid, p. 66.
[13] Richard
Clutterbuck. Negotiating with Terrorists. In: Alex P. Schmid and Ronald
Crelinsten (Eds.). Western Responses to Terrorism. Frank Cass:
London, 1993.
[14] Bruce
Hoffman (1999). Terrorism Trends and Prospects. In: I.O. Lesser, B. Hoffman, J.
Arquilla, et al. (Eds.) Countering the New Terrorism., Santa
Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1999, pp. 7-35; Walter Laqueur. “Postmodern
Terrorism”. Foreign Affairs, 75: 5, 1996, pp. 24-36; p. 26.
[15] See Mia
Bloom. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2005; Robert Pape. Dying to Win: The
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House, 2005.
[16] Michael
Ignatieff. Virtual War. London: Vintage Random House, 2001.
[17] David
Lonsdale. Strategy. In: David Jordan and James Kiras et al. “Understanding
Modern Warfare.” New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
[18] M.
Ignatieff, op. cit., p. 164.
[19] Ibid, p. 5.
[20] Michael
Boyle. “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?”,
International
Affairs,86:2,
2010, 333-353, p. 342.
[21] Peter
Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann. “The Drone War”. The New Republic,
3 June 2009.
[22] For more
information on drone strikes and statistics, see the Counterterrorism Strategy
Initiative at the New American Foundation: http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones .
[23] P. Bergen
and K. Tiedemann, op.cit.
[24] Ibid.
[25] P.
Wilkinson, 2006; A. P. Schmid. “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism”, Terrorism
and Political Violence, 16: 2, 2004, pp. 197-221.
[26] Ami
Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp. “A Tertiary Model for Counter Terrorism in
Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel”. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 13: 2, 2001, pp. 1-26.
[27] Alex P.
Schmid and Rashmi Singh. Measuring Success and Failure in Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism: US Government Metrics of the Global War on Terror. In: Alex
P. Schmid and Garry Hindle (Eds.).After the War on Terror: Regional and
Multilateral Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism Strategy. London: RUSI Books,
2009.
[28] John Nagl
discusses a similar direct and indirect approach to counterinsurgency.
[29] Robert
Jervis. American Foreign Policy in a New Era, New York: Routledge,
2005, p. 43.
[30] Michael
Boyle. “The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy”. International
Affairs, 84: 2, 2008, pp.
191-209.
[31] For a
discussion on root causes, see Tore Bjorgo (Ed.). The Root Causes of
Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward. New York: Routledge,
2005.
[32] John
Horgan. Walking Away From Terrorism. New York: Routledge, 2009.
[33] Marc
Sageman. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania
Press, 2004.
[34] John
Horgan. The Psychology of Terrorism. New York: Routledge, 2005.
[35] Lorenzo
Vidino. “Europe’s New Security Dilemma”. The Washington Quarterly,
32: 4, 2009, pp. 61-75.
[36] J. Horgan,
op. cit.
[37] Jennifer
Windsor. “Promoting Democracy Can Combat Terrorism”. The Washington
Quarterly, 26: 3, 2003, pp. 43-58.
[38] For more
information on Hezbollah and its history, see: Augustus Richard Norton. Hezbollah:
A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
[39] Michael
Scheuer. Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror.
United States: Potomac Books, 2004.
[40] Thom
Shanker and David E. Sanger. “Obama Is Said to Seek Approval on Saudi Arms
Sale”. New York Times, 17 Sept. 2010.
[41] Mark
Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt. “CIA Steps Up Drone Attacks in Pakistan to Thwart
Taliban”. New York Times, 27 Sept. 2010.
[42] Scott Shane
et al. “Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents”. New York
Times, 14 Aug. 2010.
[43] Quoted in
Michael Boyle. Terrorism and Insurgency. In: Snyder, C. (Ed.) Contemporary
Security and Strategy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 186.
[44] Seth Jones. Counterinsurgency
in Afghanistan. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2008.
[45] Quoted in John
Nagl. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2005.
[46] David
Galula. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. United
States: Praeger Security International, 1964; 2006, pp. 55-56.
[47] J. Nagl,
op. cit.
[48] S. Jones,
op. cit.
[49] See Kim
Fishel. “Challenging the Hegemon: Al Qaeda's Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent
Warfare Onto the Global Arena”. Low Intensity Conflict and Law
Enforcement, 11: 2&3, 2002, pp. 285-298;and David Kilcullen.
“Counterinsurgency Redux”. Survival, 48: 4, 2006, pp. 111-130.
[50] D.
Kilcullen, op. cit.
[51] Ibid.
[52] D.
Kilcullen, op.cit., p. 608.
[53] Bruce
Hoffman. “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration”. Terrorism
and Political Violence, 21, 2009, pp. 359-377, p. 362.
[54] Ibid, pp.
372-373.
[55] M. Boyle,
2010, p. 338. For more on the current Al-Qaeda threat and its “Americanization”
trend, see: Kim Cragin, “Understanding Terrorist Motivations”, Congressional
Testimony. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2009; Peter Bergen and Bruce
Hoffman. “Assessing the Terrorist Threat”. A Report of the Bipartisan Policy
Center’s National Security Preparedness Group, 2010; and Brian Jenkins.
“Would-be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the
United States Since September 11, 2001”. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation,
2010.
[56] M. Boyle,
op. cit.
[57] M.
Ignatieff, op. cit., p. 164.
[58] Christoph
Schwennicke. “Why NATO Should Withdrawal from Afghanistan”. Spiegel
Online, 28 July 2010.
[59] Ahmed
Rashid. “Save Whatever We Can”. The New Republic, 26 July 2010.
[60] Ernesto
Londono. “Survey of Afghans points to rampant corruption in government”. Washington
Post, 8 July 2010.
[61] Mark
Sappenfield. “Ahmed Wali Karzai and the CIA: America’s conundrum in Afghanistan”. Christian
Science Monitor, 29 Oct. 2010.
[62] M. Boyle,
op. cit..
[63] Kalev I.
Sepp. Special Forces. In: Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney. Understanding
Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, operations, and challenges. New York:
Routledge, 2010, p. 138.
[64] Bob
Woodward. Obama’s Wars. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010, p. 251.
[65] Richard N.
Haass. “We’re not winning. It’s not worth it”. Newsweek, 18 July,
2010.
[66] Ibid.
[67] David
Sanger and Mark Mazzetti. “New Estimate of Strength of Al Qaeda is Offered”. New
York Times, 30 June, 2010.
[68] Brian
Fishman. “Counting Al-Qaeda”. Foreign Policy AFPAK Channel, 1
July, 2010.
[69] Daniel
Benjamin. Quoted in Foreword, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,
U.S. State Department, p. 9.
[70] This
question was raised by Michael Boyle at a counterterrorism workshop in St
Andrews, United Kingdom, 2010.
__________________________________________________________________
Publication Details:
This article was first published at Perspectives on Terrorism,
a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies
ISSN 2334-3745 (Online) Vol 4, No 10 (2010) / Original Link