By Joas Wagemakers Abstract Given the long roots of bay‘a (pledge of allegiance) in Islamic tradition and the controversial...
By Joas
Wagemakers
Abstract
Given the long
roots of bay‘a (pledge of allegiance) in Islamic tradition and the
controversial claim by the Islamic State (IS) to be a caliphate, the
application of bay‘a to the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his
project is a contested issue among radical Islamists. Based on secondary
literature and IS ideologues’ own writings, this paper analyses IS’s claims of
validity in their calls for allegiance to “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and how
radical Islamist critics of IS have responded to this. IS’s arguments resemble
quite closely the theories on bay‘a that its jihadi opponents themselves claim
to adhere to. Although the latter take their inspiration from early Islam and
far less so from the theories that developed afterwards, it sometimes also
appears as if they have idealised the caliphate so much that they find its
reality as represented by IS hard to swallow.
Introduction
After the leader
of the Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared a caliphate (khilafa)
on 29 June 2014, his spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, stated that “pledging
allegiance (mubaya‘a) and giving assistance to the caliph (khalifa) […] has
become incumbent upon all Muslims.”[1] Such pledges of allegiance (bay‘a) have
since been given by numerous radical Islamist groups from around the world,
including in Afghanistan/Pakistan[2], the Sinai desert[3], North Africa[4] and
Nigeria[5] as well as others[6]. Some pledges have been announced on the Internet,
others in the real world.[7] IS has also publicly accepted some of these
pledges as signs of its expansion[8], although they appear to be carefully
vetted and are therefore not always (immediately) approved by al-Baghdadi.[9]
Such expressions
of allegiance to IS may give the impression that bay‘a is something radical
Muslims agree upon. This is not the case, however. Given the long roots of the
concept in Islamic tradition and the controversial claim by IS to be a
caliphate, the pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and his group is a contested
issue among radical Islamists. Based on secondary literature and IS ideologues’
own writings, this paper analyses IS’s claims of validity in their calls for
allegiance to “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This topic has briefly been dealt
with by Cole Bunzel in his analysis of IS’s claim to be a caliphate[10], but it
merits further attention because much of the discussion on IS’ legitimacy
partly hinges on this concept. In what follows, I will first deal with the meaning
and application of the concept of bay‘a in classical and modern Islam and then
show how the Islamic State legitimises the pledge of allegiance to its supposed
caliph. As we will see, much of the discussion on bay‘a pivots around the
question of whether or not IS is a legitimate caliphate. Moreover, although its
critics are in favour of a caliphate in theory, they seem to shy away from it
in practice.
Bay‘a in
Classical and Modern Islam
The meaning of
the term “bay‘a” is not entirely clear. It is said to refer to the Arabic verb
ba‘a-yabi‘u (to sell), which would denote a sort of sale of one’s allegiance to
somebody else. Others claim it is rooted in the physical act of clasping
someone’s hand known as “bay‘a”, which was used to indicate the conclusion of an
agreement between people and was based on an ancient Arab custom. This latter
meaning is said to have been applied to the election of and submission to a
leader, which similarly involved the clasping of a person’s hand and was
therefore naturally also labelled “bay‘a”.[11] It is in the latter sense that
early Muslims seem to have used the concept. Milton tells the story of
believers pledging allegiance to the Prophet by physically touching Muhammad
through the holding of hands. This allegedly led to the revelation of Qur’an
48:18[12], which states that “God was well pleased with the believers when they
were swearing fealty to thee (idh yubayi‘unaka).”[13]
Bay‘a and the
Caliphate
Broadly
speaking, this pledging of allegiance to a person of authority has become the
practical meaning of the term “bay‘a” in Islam. It was first and foremost
applied to the Prophet but, after his death, also to other leaders of the
Muslim community, primarily the caliph, the successor to the Prophet in
political affairs and in upholding Islamic rule. This pledge of allegiance to a
caliph would ideally take place through his election, but it could also happen
through appointment by his predecessor. According to ‘ulama’ (Muslim scholars),
the caliph himself had to satisfy several conditions, including ruling on the
basis of justice (‘adala), possessing knowledge (‘ilm) of Islamic tradition and
law, having physical and mental fitness, being courageous and determined,
waging jihad and being a descendant of the Quraysh tribe, which the Prophet
Muhammad himself also belonged to.[14]
The bay‘a of a
caliph thus constituted a contract (‘ahd or ‘aqd) in which not only the latter
was involved as the person receiving fealty, but also those voluntarily
expressing the wish to obey their leader. The ‘ulama’ differ, however, on the
number of people required to pledge allegiance by electing the caliph (ahl
al-ikhtiyar) for the bay‘a to be legitimate, ranging from all “upright men” in
Muslim empires to a single person. In practice, the actual electors were mostly
officials with senior positions in the caliphate referred to generally as the
“people of loosening and binding” (ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd), whose oaths of
fealty were seen as binding upon themselves and the larger Muslim community,
particularly since they were not just undertaken towards the caliph, but – by
extension – also towards God. As such, scholars saw violating the bay‘a as
punishable by death, unless the caliph did not live up to his duty to uphold
the rules and regulations of Islam, in which case those who pledged allegiance
were freed from their obligations towards the ruler.[15]
The seriousness
with which (a violation of) the bay‘a was treated by the ‘ulama’ is a
reflection of the strong tradition of obedience (ta‘a) to the caliph that had
developed in the Sunni Islamic tradition.[16] On the one hand, this can be
ascribed to the supposed Qur’anic basis of the caliphate[17], which is said to
be found in verses such as Q. 2:30 (“And when thy Lord said to the angels, ‘I
am setting in the earth a viceroy (inni ja‘il fi l-ard khalifa)’”)[18], as well
as the Qur’an’s call on believers to express obedience to such rulers, as in Q.
4:59 (“Oh believers, obey God (ati‘u llah), and obey the Messenger (wa-ati‘u
l-rasul) and those in authority among you (wa-uli l-amr minkum)”).[19] On the
other hand, such obedience was also inspired by the belief that almost anything
(even an unjust and oppressive ruler) was preferable to fitna (chaos, strife)
and civil war among Muslims in the absence of powerful leadership, which might
cause the entire Islamic empire to collapse.[20]
At the same
time, however, it was clear that in practice, bay‘a could not be expressed to
the caliph by every single Muslim, even if the process of pledging allegiance
was not confined to a private oath by a limited number of dignitaries (bay‘at
al-khassa) and a variable number of subsequent public fealty-swearing occasions
(bay‘at al-‘amma) was added.[21] Moreover, the Muslim world may have been
nominally ruled by a caliph, but local leaders soon emerged whose actual power
was sometimes greater than that of the ruler himself, further complicating the
direct bay‘a from the people to the caliph. Given that in classical Islamic
political thought, all power flows down from the caliph and other sources of
political authority cannot exist[22], a solution had to be found for this.
Muslim scholars
such as al-Mawardi (974-1058) solved the contradiction – between theoretically
only having one caliph who enjoys everyone’s allegiance and practically having
several actual rulers – by describing local leaders as at least theoretically
subservient to the caliph and dependent on the latter’s approval.[23] Later
‘ulama’ tended more towards the recognition of the authority of non-caliphal
rulers in and of themselves, besides the caliph.[24] In the writings of
al-Ghazali (1058-1111), the actual person in power – the sultan – must still
pledge allegiance to the caliph, but he is also the one who gets to decide who
the caliph should be.[25] The role of the sultan was further increased at the
expense of the caliph by the scholar Ibn Jama‘a (1241-1333), who added the
usurpation of caliphal power to the other two ways of attaining the caliphate –
election and appointment – as a legitimate way of becoming caliph.[26] Under
the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923), sultans even came to claim the title of caliph
entirely for themselves, taking the usurpation of the caliphate to what could
be described as its logical conclusion.[27]
Bay‘a after the
Fall of the Caliphate
The above makes
clear that the way the power and position of the caliph was legitimised by
Muslim scholars shifted quite dramatically from absolute ruler to nominal
leader. Subsequently, so did the means of making a pledge to his successor,
changing from bay‘a through election of a new caliph or allegiance after the
appointment by the previous caliph to implied loyalty to a usurping ruler. The
development of Muslim thinking on these issues was greatly influenced by the
actual practice of Islamic rule in their time, incorporating political reality
into the theory of what constituted a valid bay‘a.[28] Thus, it was not a great
surprise that the Ottoman sultans, who were clearly not descendents of the
Quraysh tribe and therefore did not fulfil one of the conditions of the
caliphate, nevertheless made use of the classical bay‘a ceremony whenever a new
ruler became sultan.[29]
With the
annulment of the caliphate by the newly formed Turkish republic in 1924, the
whole idea of bay‘a to the caliph became obsolete. Given the flexible
application of the concept, whose use was seemingly always partly a reflection
of political considerations and power relations, it was only natural that the
rulers of the states that arose in the Middle East after the demise of
colonialism would use the concept of bay‘a again to legitimise their own
rule.[30] Moreover, in the perceived absence of truly Islamic states, Muslim
groups and organisations have sometimes also used bay‘a to indicate the
relationship between their leaders and followers. This has been particularly
the case with radical Islamist groups, including al-Qa‘ida[31], whose belief
that the rulers of the modern-day Muslim world are “apostates” only strengthens
their desire to provide an alternative to them.[32]
Muslim scholars
opposed to political parties and certainly radical or violent groups, such as
quietist Salafi scholars, reject the application of bay‘a to organisational
leaders[33] and claim instead that such a pledge should only be given to the
ruler, by which they usually mean the king or president of their country.[34]
Yet the terms they associate with this pledge – ta‘a, wali l-amr (ruler) and,
of course, bay‘a itself – are all strongly linked to the caliph. Thus, while
they clearly apply the caliphal mandate to their country’s rulers in practice,
they are quite vague about this in theory and have apparently not allowed bay‘a
to make the theoretical leap from caliph to king. This ambiguity is at least
partly kept alive by their use of the term amir al-mu’minin (leader of the
faithful), which is a title applied to the caliph but has also been used to
describe other rulers. As a consequence, some scholars’ practical application
of bay‘a to contemporary kings seems to be an acceptance of reality framed in classical
Islamic terms, rather than a new theoretical dimension of an age-old
concept.[35] This ambiguity towards the modern-day applicability of bay‘a,
combined with the claim by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to be the new caliph according
to at least some of the norms of classical Islam, makes IS’ call for allegiance
seem at least somewhat plausible. This, in turn, has hampered critics of IS in
their efforts to refute the validity of the Islamic State’s bay‘a, to which we
must now turn.
Bay‘a in IS’s
Discourse and its Radical Islamist Critics
The supporters
of the Islamic State now label their organisation a caliphate and its leader
has assumed the title of caliph. This was not always the case, however, since
IS used to be known under various other names, including “the Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham” (ISIS). Even when the group did not claim to be a caliphate,
however, the concept of “bay‘a” played a significant role in its discourse in a
way that sometimes seemed to lay the groundwork for the foundation of the
caliphate that was still to come.
Preparing for
the Caliphate
One of the most
prominent scholars involved in the debate on bay‘a of IS (and, before 29 June
2014, ISIS) was the Mauritanian scholar Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, a prolific
scholar about whom little is known other than his early support for ISIS. He
stated in early 2013 that founding an Islamic state is important because in it
lies “a reminder to the Muslims of the absent caliphate.”[36] This theme of
having a caliph or imam[37] was developed further in a different document
written by al-Shinqiti, in which he stated that appointing such a leader is
actually a duty for all Muslims.[38] In fact, al-Shinqiti even stated that “its
delay is disobedience (ma‘siya) through which all Muslims sin”[39], a sentiment
that was echoed by other scholars sympathetic to ISIS in early 2014.[40]
The duty to
appoint a caliph is followed, according to al-Shinqiti, by the equally
necessary act of bay‘a to a leader who fits all the criteria of such a ruler.
Objecting to this, he states, is forbidden and he lists examples from early
Islamic history of Muslims rushing to perform bay‘a to make his point.[41]
Al-Shinqiti also explicitly called on other jihadi movements in Iraq and Syria
to pledge allegiance to ISIS and stated that maintaining one’s independence
from that group is not allowed.[42] This is even the case, he claimed, if ISIS
can be accused of making mistakes. “Despite that”, al-Shinqiti maintained, “the
state remains the state. It is entitled to the legitimate pledge (al-bay‘a
al-shar‘iyya) and listening to it and obeying it (al-sam‘ wa-l-ta‘a la-ha) is a
duty.”[43] This need to be obedient to ISIS was also stressed in other
writings, with one ISIS-supporting scholar going so far as to state that this
group supersedes all other jihadi organisations and that not joining it will
result in corruption (fasad) and the division of Muslims (tafriq
al-muslimin).[44] It is therefore not surprising that, in early 2014, the
Jordanian scholar ‘Umar b. Mahdi Al Zaydan called on Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani,
the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra – which had been founded by ISIS but later turned
against it – to stick to his previous bay‘a to al-Baghdadi, adding that he was
the one that sent al-Jawlani to Syria on his behalf in the first place.[45]
To his
supporters, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was more than worthy of people’s bay‘a. The
Bahraini scholar Turki al-Bin‘ali (also known as Abu Humam al-Athari)[46]
praised al-Baghdadi’s Qurashi descent, piety, knowledge, jihad experience,
leadership, and cooperation skills.[47] Al-Baghdadi’s supporters rejected
possible obstacles to pledging fealty to al-Baghdadi, such as the argument that
ISIS had not settled in enough territory to justify bay‘a to its leader. The
technical expression for this idea is that ISIS lacks tamkin (empowerment).
Tamkin, however, is not a prerequisite for bay‘a, pro-ISIS scholars argued,
because Muhammad himself did not control any territory and he was nevertheless
given the pledge by his followers.[48] Moreover, they pointed out that ISIS
does have territory under its control.[49] The same reasoning applied to ISIS’s
power (shawka), which it needs to be able to qualify as a force to be reckoned
with (and pledged allegiance to).[50]
The scholars
supporting ISIS similarly pointed out that having few bay‘as from people is not
an objection to being viewed as legitimate. As long as a small number pledge
allegiance, that suffices.[51] Also, they dismissed the idea that al-Baghdadi
should be well known to deserve the bay‘a and cite the aforementioned medieval
scholar al-Mawardi to point out that a ruler need only be known to those
directly involved in electing him.[52] Given the flexible rules on how bay‘a
should be given (through election, by appointment or after usurpation), citing
al-Mawardi here does not seem out of place, in fact. For similar reasons, the
pro-ISIS scholars claimed that the permission of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd or
the consultation (shura) of the scholars is not strictly necessary and only
advisable.[53] Moreover, al-Athari claimed that al-Baghdadi did consult ‘ulama’
and that they agreed with him.[54]
IS’s
Post-Caliphate Bay‘a
Given the case
pro-ISIS scholars made for the bay‘a to al-Baghdadi, the founding of a
caliphate was perhaps only a matter of time. When it was announced, however,
there was a lot of criticism from radical Islamist scholars who supported
al-Qa‘ida but found the newly announced IS a bridge too far. Some radical
Islamist critics point out that they do not object to a caliphate as such, of
course, but that IS has created divisions with its caliphate by leaving the
overarching framework formed by al-Qa‘ida, and they advise its leaders to
correct their mistakes and return to that organisation.[55] Others refer to
stricter conditions for a bay‘a-worthy caliphate by pointing out that only
succession and election through the majority of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd are
valid forms of giving allegiance to the caliph.[56]
More interesting
than this general criticism is the argument that there already was a caliph:
Taliban leader Mullah ‘Umar. As Bunzel has shown, after the announcement of the
caliphate by IS, al-Qa‘ida – clearly aware of IS’s challenge to its previously
almost undisputed role of jihadi king of the hill – began promoting the view
that its first leader, Osama bin Laden, had pledged a “supreme bay‘a” to Mullah
‘Umar, thereby indicating that he was the caliph and that al-Baghdadi’s claims
were null and void. Although this line of thinking was muddled somewhat by the
fact that the current leader of al-Qa‘ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had apparently
been less unambiguous in his bay‘a to Mullah ‘Umar, the organisation stuck to
this defence of their “own” caliphate.[57]
Al-Qa‘ida’s line
of defence against IS’s rival caliphate was supported – surprisingly – by one
of the staunchest supporters of ISIS: Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti. The latter
stated in July 2014 that bay‘a had been given to Mullah ‘Umar and even if his
rule was not generally portrayed as a caliphate, this was nevertheless the case
because of this pledge. The fact that “unbelievers” were now governing
Afghanistan did not diminish Mullah ‘Umar’s bay‘a since, in an echo of an
argument he had used earlier to defend ISIS, controlling territory is not
strictly necessary for a bay‘a to be valid. All bay‘as, al-Shinqiti maintained,
are subservient to the one given to Mullah ‘Umar, who is the legitimate imam
whether people call him that way or not, and one therefore cannot simply found
a second caliphate.[58] The fact that Mullah ‘Umar does not have Qurashi origins
is not a problem, al-Shinqiti claimed, since people have already given bay‘a to
him on the basis of the conditions of being an imam and have based their pledge
on these.[59] The reality of the bay‘a to Mullah ‘Umar, al-Shinqiti seemed to
say, supersedes any claims that al-Baghdadi might have.
Al-Shinqiti’s
words seemed to contradict his own earlier statement about ISIS: “…the ahl
al-hall wa-l-‘aqd who pledged allegiance to the leader of the state of Islam
(i.e., ISIS) called it a ‘state’. They did not call it an ‘organisation’.
Therein lies the clear proof that their bay‘a is a bay‘a on the basis of the
supreme imamate (al-imama al-‘uzma), not on the basis of the smaller imamate
(al-imama al-sughra).”[60] Although al-Shinqiti had, in fact, indicated more
than a year before the announcement of IS’s caliphate that he believed Mullah
‘Umar was “the leader of the faithful”[61], supporters of IS were quick to
point out his inconsistency.[62] Some of them argued that the Taliban cannot
represent the caliphate because of their supposedly deviant religious
views[63]; others pointed out that according to al-Qa‘ida itself, the bay‘a to
Mullah ‘Umar did not represent allegiance to the supreme imamate, but only to a
partial one.[64] Still others stated that the bay‘a is a contract of which both
parties involved want to know the conditions: “How can Mullah ‘Umar be caliph
when nobody has known that until now!”[65] Another point of disagreement
concerned the validity of the bay‘a to a supposed caliph of non-Qurashi descent.
IS supporters insisted that this is a strict condition for the caliphate and
thus also for the legitimacy of the bay‘a.[66] The validity of the latter
concept, even though it is claimed by scholars who are ideologically largely
alike and is derived from classical Islam, thus remains highly contested.
Conclusion
The concept of
bay‘a in classical Islam refers to a reciprocal contract between the ruler and
the ruled, with the latter giving his allegiance to the leader – usually the
caliph – in exchange for protection and political and military leadership. It
has its roots in the Qur’an, but mostly also in the practice of medieval Muslim
rule, which ensured that the process of bay‘a – while ideally done through an
election of a caliph – developed into a concept that could also be embodied by
the appointment of a ruler or even the usurpation of his power. This increasing
influence of what could be termed a “might makes right philosophy” was also
discernable in the early jurists’ conditions for bay‘a to the caliph,
especially his required Qurashi descent, which was often flouted by rulers.
Although various
caliphs, modern-day kings and Islamic groups have used the bay‘a in ways that
perhaps deviate from the concept’s classical meaning, the theoretical link with
the caliph was always maintained. This made it relatively easy for IS to
justify its invitation to Muslims to pledge allegiance to its newly founded
caliphate in 2014. The fact that IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed to be a
caliph seemed to make at least part of the tradition of bay‘a applicable to him
and put the group one step ahead of its radical Islamist critics. It is
therefore not surprising that IS’s jihadi opponents, in their efforts to
dispute the validity of bay‘a to al-Baghdadi, focused mostly on questioning his
claim to be a caliph.
Given the
relatively wide-ranging bay‘a tradition, which is quite tolerant of oppressive
and usurping rulers and within which IS seems to fit fairly neatly, the
unwillingness of the Islamic State’s radical Islamist critics to accept the
group’s claims is interesting. To be sure, there are real and important
ideological differences between IS and its critics. Yet with regard to bay‘a,
IS’s arguments resemble quite closely the theories that its jihadi opponents
themselves claim to adhere to. Although the latter take their inspiration from
early Islam and far less so from the theories that developed afterwards, it
sometimes appears as if they have idealised the caliphate to such an extent
that they find its reality as represented by IS hard to swallow. If that is
indeed the case, it may be easier for them to postpone the announcement of an
actual caliphate, to render it largely theoretical and to equate it with a
romanticised ideal that might just come about one day.
Keywords: Jihadism, ISIS, ideology, theology, allegiance
About the Author:
Joas Wagemakers is an Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies at Radboud
University Nijmegen. He would like to thank Thomas Hegghammer, Nelly Lahoud,
and Will McCants for their useful comments on an earlier version of this
article.
Notes
[1] Abu Muhammad
al-‘Adnani, Hadha Wa‘d Allah, online at: http://www.gulfup.com/?3D7MKR, n.d.
(accessed 25 May 2015), 7.
[2] Don Rassler,
“Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan,” CTC Sentinel 8, no.
3 (March 2015): 7-11.
[3] Nelly
Lahoud, “The Province of Sinai: Why Bother with Palestine if You can be Part of
the ‘Islamic State’?” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3 (March 2015): 12-4.
[4] Geoff D.
Porter, “What to Make of the Bay‘a in North Africa?” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3
(March 2015): 15-6.
[5] Jacob Zenn,
“A Biography of Boko Haram and the Bay‘a to al-Baghdadi,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3
(March 2015): 20-1.
[6] See
www.ctc.usma.edu/isil-resources (accessed 25 may 2015).
[7] Philipp
Holtmann, The Different Functions of IS Online and Offline Plegdes [sic!]
(bay‘at): Creating a Multifaceted Nexus of Authority, online at
http://jihadology.net/2014/11/15/guest-post-the-different-functions-of-is-online-and-offline-plegdes-bayat-creating-a-multifaceted-nexus-of-authority/,
published 15 November 2014 (accessed 25 May 2015).
[8] “Remaining
and Expanding,” Dabiq, no. 5 (Muharram 1436 [October/November 2014]): 22-33,
esp. 25.
[9] Daniel
Milton, “Pledging Bay‘a: A Benefit or Burden to the Islamic State?” CTC
Sentinel 8, no. 3 (March 2015): 4-7.
[10] Cole
Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,
Analysis Paper no. 19 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Center for
Middle East Policy, 2015), 32-4; id., Al-Qaeda’s Quasi-Caliph: The Recasting of
Mullah ‘Umar, online at: http://www.jihadica.com/al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-quasi-caliph-the-recasting-of-mullah-%E2%80%98umar/,
published 23 July 2014 (accessed 28 May 2015). Bunzel’s blog post provided me
with many of the sources used in this paper, for which I would like to thank
him.
[11] Ella
Landau-Tasseron, The Religious Foundations of Political Allegiance: A Study of
Bay‘a in Pre-Modern Islam, Research Monographs on the Muslim World 2, no. 4
(Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2010), 1; E. Tyan, “Bay‘a,” in
Encyclopaedia of Islam – New Edition, Vol. I, ed. H.A.R. Gibb, J.H. Kramers, E.
Lévi-Provençal, J. Schacht, B. Lewis and Ch. Pellat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986
[1960]), 1113.
[12] All
Qur’anic quotations are from A.J. Arberry, trans., The Koran Interpreted (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996 [1955]), but with the Egyptian
verse-numbering.
[13] Milton,
“Pledging,” 2.
[14] E.I.J.
Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline
(Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2009 [1958]), 29-30, 35-6, 40-41.
[15] Antony
Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the
Present (New York: Routledge, 2001), 84-5; Rosenthal, Political, 44-5; Tyan,
“Bay‘a,” 1113-4.
[16]
Landau-Tasseron, Religious, 6-7.
[17] See also
Landau-Tasseron, Religious, 5-6.
[18] The
surrounding verses appear to indicate that this verse refers to Adam.
[19] Rosenthal,
Political, 26.
[20] Black,
History, 84, 103-4;
[21]
Landau-Tasseron, Religious, 9; Rosenthal, Political, 31; Tyan, “Bay‘a,” 1113.
[22] Rosenthal, Political,
22-3.
[23] Black,
History, 85-90.
[24] Ibid., 94.
[25] Ibid.,
103-4; Rosenthal, Political, 39-41.
[26] Black,
History, 143-4; Rosenthal, Political, 43-4. Scholars such as Ibn Hanbal
(780-855) also legitimised the rule of successful usurpers of power a few
centuries earlier. See Black, History, 84; Landau-Tasseron, Religious, 13.
[27] Black,
History, 203-7.
[28] Rosenthal,
Political, 31, 33, 38.
[29] Elie Podeh,
“The Bay‘a: Modern Political Uses of Islamic Ritual in the Arab World,” Die
Welt des Islams 50, no. 1 (2010): 125-7.
[30] Id.,
127-48.
[31] Kévin
Jackson, The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications, online at:
http://jihadology.net/2012/07/27/guest-post-the-pledge-of-allegiance-and-its-implications/,
published 27 July 2012 (accessed 27 May 2015).
[32] One group
in Jordan even had the term “bay‘a” in its name, although this was not used by
the members of the group itself. See Joas Wagemakers, “A Terrorist Organization
that Never Was: The Jordanian ‘Bay‘at al-Imam’ Group,” Middle East Journal 68,
no. 1 (2014): 63-4.
[33] Sa‘ud b.
Muluh b. Sultan al-‘Anzi, “Al-Bay‘a bayna l-Dawabit al-Shar‘iyya wa-l-Tanzimat
al-Hizbiyya,” Al-Asala 8, no. 41 (15 Safar 1424 [18 April 2003]): 34, 36-42;
‘Ali Hasan ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Hamid [al-Halabi], Al-Bay‘a bayna l-Sunna wa-l-Bid‘a
‘inda l-Jama‘at al-Islamiyya (Amman: Al-Maktaba al-Islamiyya, 1985), 9, 24-5.
[34] Several
quietist Salafi scholars from Jordan have indicated that they are willing to
pledge allegiance to King ‘Abdallah II if asked to do so, for instance.
Interviews with Muhammad b. Musa Al Nasr, Amman, June 2012; Basim b. Faysal
al-Jawabira, Amman, June 2012.
[35] Al-‘Anzi,
“Al-Bay‘a,” 34-6; al-Halabi, Al-Bay‘a, 17-22, 28-30.
[36] Abu
l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, Mata Yafqahuna Ma‘na l-Ta‘a? Allahu Akbar: Nusra
li-I‘lan Dawlat al-Islam, online at http://justpaste.it/2dmr, published 9 April
2013 (accessed 25 March 2014).
[37] These two
words are often used synonymously.
[38] Id., Fusul
fi l-Imama wa-l-Bay‘a, online at: http://www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=28121305, published
10 December 2013 (accessed 2 January 2014), 3-13.
[39] Ibid., 8.
[40] Abu
Muhammad al-Azdi, Ahwal al-Mu‘aridin li-Dawlat al-Muslimin, online at:
http://www.facebook.com/1algharibi/post/624591034258357, n.d. (accessed 26
March 2014), 11-3; Abu Sufyan Turki b. Mubarak al-Bin‘ali, Al-Qiyafa fi ‘adam
Ishtirat al-Tamkin al-Kamil li-l-Khilafa, online at
http://www.gulfup.com/?Vh0uaJ, published 30 April 2014 (accessed 28 July 2014),
1-3.
[41]
Al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 26-8.
[42] Id., Raf‘
al-Malam ‘an Junud Dawlat al-Islam, online at: http://www.gulfup.com/?YilPpd,
published 2014 (accessed 28 July 2014)), 3-4, 23.
[43] Id., Fatawa
bi-la Tayyar..! online at: http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=345664,
published 8 January 2014 (accessed 12 February 2014), 12.
[44] Abu l-Hasan
al-Azdi, Mujibat al-Indimam li-l-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi l-‘Iraq wa-l-Sham,
online at: http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?519239, published 2013 (26
March 2014), 11-21, 29-30;
[45] ‘Umar b.
Mahdi Al Zaydan, Al-Naqd li-Qawl Man Ja‘ala l-Khilafa al-Islamiyya min Din
al-Rafd, online at: http://wp.me/p2hUtu-dm, published 2 January 2014 (accessed
12 February 2014), 2.
[46] For more on
him, see Cole Bunzel, The Caliphate’s Scholar in Arms, online at:
http://www.jihadica.com/the-caliphate%E2%80%99s-scholar-in-arms/, published 9
July 2014 (accessed 28 May 2015).
[47] Abu Humam
Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari, Madd al-Ayadi li-Bay‘at al-Baghdadi
(www.tawhed.ws/r?i=05081301, 2013 (accessed 20 August 2013)), 3-11. See also
Joas Wagemakers, Al-Qaida Advises the Arab Spring: The Case for al-Baghdadi,
online at: http://www.jihadica.com/al-qaida-advises-the-arab-spring-the-case-for-al-baghdadi/,
published 21 September 2013 (accessed 28 May 2015).
[48] Al-Athari,
Madd, 15; al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 14; id., Raf‘, 7.
[49] Al-Athari,
Madd, 15; Bin‘ali, Al-Qiyafa, 4; al-Shinqiti, Raf‘, 7.
[50] Al-Bin‘ali,
Al-Qiyafa, 4; al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 17; id., Raf‘, 7.
[51] Al-Athari,
Madd, 11-2; al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 29-33.
[52]
Al-Shinqiti, Raf‘, 6-7.
[53] Al-Athari,
Madd, 16-7; al-Shinqiti, Fusul, 22-5.
[54] Al-Athari,
Madd, 17.
[55] ‘Abdallah
b. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shinqiti, Al-Khilafa laysat Hiya l-Khilaf, online at:
http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=16081402, published 10 August 2014 (accessed 18 August
2014), 2-5. See also
[56] Muhammad b.
Salih al-Muhajir, Al-Khulasa fi Munaqashat I‘lan al-Khilafa, online at:
http://www.tawhed.ws/dl?i=29081402, published 29 August 2014 (accessed 29
August 2014), 2-7.
[57] Bunzel,
Paper, 32-4; id., Al-Qaeda’s.
[58] Abu
l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, I‘lan al-Khilafa fi l-Mizan al-Shar‘i, online at:
http://justpaste.it/kil-mon, published 18 July 2014 (accessed 28 July 2014), 1.
[59] Ibid., 7.
[60]
Al-Shinqiti, Raf‘, 6.
[61] Abu
l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, Man Huwa Amir al-Mu’minin al-Yawm? Wa-Hal Yajibu Tahqiq
Shart al-Qurashiyya fi l-Khalifa? online at:
http://www.tawhed.ws/FAQ/pr?qid=5924, published 25 May 2013 (accessed 28 May
2015).
[62] See, for
example, Ahmad Bawadi, Izhar al-Hujaj wa-Ibtal Ma fi Maqal al-Shinqiti min
Lujaj, online at: http://ahmadbawadi.blogspot.com/2014/07/abawadi_19.html, n.d.
(accessed 28 July 2014); Abu Khubab al-‘Iraqi, Tahqiq al-Mizan fi I‘lan
Khilafat Dawlat al-Islam, online at: http://www.gulfup.com/?Ln2aG2, published
2014 (accessed 28 July 2014); Abu Salma al-Shinqiti, Al-Maqal al-Tafsili fi
l-Tashkik bi-Ma Nasaba li-l-Shaykh Abi l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, online at:
http://www.gulfup.com/?S6LN7V, published 21 July 2014 (accessed 24 July 2014).
[63] Abu Maysara
al-Shami, Khilafa ‘ala Minhaj al-Nubuwwa am “Khilafa” Qutriyya… , online at:
http://platformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?p=297363, n.d. (accessed 28 July
2014).
[64] Id., Radd
‘ala l-Fattan al-Maftun Wara’ al-Kuwalis, online at: http://wp.me/p2hUtu-m3,
n.d. (28 July 2014).
[65] Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman
‘Ubayda al-Athbaji, Waqfat Muhadhdhir min Kalam Abi l-Mundhir, online at:
http://www.gulfup.com/?ttP7Jp, n.d. (accessed 28 July 2014), 6.
[66] Al-Athbaji,
Waqfat, 7; Abu ‘Umar al-Kuwayti, Tanbīh al-Mujāhid al-Mustanfir min Takhlīṭ
al-Shinqīṭī Abī l-Mundhir, online at: http://justpast.it/gate, n.d. (accessed
28 July 2014), 1-2.
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