"To challenge a technologically superior adversary, such as the United States, Iranian doctrine emphasizes aspects of asymmetric warfare that play to Iran’s strengths, including geography, strategic depth and public willingness to accept casualties." - Michael Connell
By Michael Connell
Overview:
Iranian
military doctrine constitutes a unique hybrid of western (especially U.S.)
military concepts coupled with ideological tenets, including martyrdom and
revolutionary zeal. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranian military doctrine has
continued to evolve and adapt with the regime’s shifting threat perceptions and
regional political developments.
Iran’s
armed forces have tailored their war-fighting strategies to counter
technologically superior adversaries, such as the United States. Tacitly
acknowledging it has little chance of winning a conventional force-on-force
conflict, Iran has opted for deterrence-based model of attrition warfare that
raises an opponent's risks and costs, rather than reducing its own. The goal is
to inflict a psychological defeat that inhibits an enemy’s willingness to fight.
Asymmetric
warfare plays a central role in Iranian military theory. Iran’s armed forces
appear to be focusing on the development of niche capabilities that play to
Iranian strengths—manpower, strategic depth and a willingness to accept
casualties—while exploiting the weaknesses of Iran’s adversaries, who are
regarded as risk averse, casualty sensitive and heavily dependent on technology
and regional basing facilities for access.
Doctrine Evolution:
The
basis of Iranian military doctrine was developed during Iran’s long and
traumatic war with Iraq (1980-1988). Most senior officers are veterans of the
“imposed war,” which has had a major influence on Iranian strategic thinking.
Concepts such as self-reliance, “holy defense,” and export of the revolution
first entered the military lexicon during the Iran-Iraq War and were codified
as doctrine in the early 1990s. These ideas mingled with concepts from
pre-revolutionary doctrine, which was heavily influenced by the United States,
to form a unique hybrid that distinguished modern Iranian military doctrine
from its largely Soviet-inspired counterparts in the Arab world.
After
the war, Tehran gradually scaled back its efforts to export its revolution. As
its foreign policy goals shifted, Iran’s national security strategy also became
more defensive. Iranian military strategists began to pay more attention to the
principles of modern maneuver warfare, such as combined and joint operations.
In the mid-1990s, there was even talk about merging the IRGC with the regular
military, the Artesh, to alleviate the command and control-related problems of
having two parallel military services operating in tandem. Iran’s military
capabilities still lagged behind its doctrine, but by the end of the decade,
its forces were gradually evolving into professional, Western-style militaries.
The
9/11 attacks and U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan led Tehran to
reconsider the trajectory of its armed forces. The regional security
environment had changed drastically. Ba’athist Iraq and Taliban Afghanistan—two
of Iran’s main rivals—were no longer a threat. But the United States suddenly
had troops positioned along both its western and eastern flanks. This
confluence of events, coupled with rumblings in Washington about opportunities
for regime change, led Tehran to reassess its national security strategy. Iran’s
armed forces began to tailor their strategies specifically to counter the
perceived U.S. threat.
Land Warfare Doctrine:
In
2005, the IRGC announced that it was incorporating a flexible, layered defense
—referred to as a mosaic defense—into its doctrine. The lead author of this
plan was General Mohammad Jafari, then director of the IRGC’s Center for
Strategy, who was later appointed commander of the IRGC.
As
part of the mosaic defense, the IRGC has restructured its command and control
architecture into a system of 31 separate commands—one for the city of Tehran
and 30 for each of Iran’s provinces. The primary goal of restructuring has been
to strengthen unit cohesion at the local level and give commanders more
latitude to respond to potential threats—both foreign and domestic. But the new
structure would also make it difficult for hostile forces to degrade Iranian
command and control, a lesson the Iranian military has learned by analyzing
U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.
The
mosaic defense plan allows Iran to take advantage of its strategic depth and
formidable geography to mount an insurgency against invading forces. Most of
Iran’s population centers and major lines of communication are spread out
within the interior of the country. Iran’s borders are ringed by rugged
mountain ranges that serve as natural barriers to invasion. As enemy supply
lines stretched into Iran’s interior, they would be vulnerable to interdiction
by special stay-behind cells, which the IRGC has formed to harass enemy rear
operations.
The
Artesh, a mix of armored, infantry and mechanized units, would constitute
Iran’s initial line of defense against invading forces. IRGC troops would
support this effort, but they would also form the core of popular resistance,
the bulk of which would be supplied by the Basij, the IRGC’s paramilitary
volunteer force. The IRGC has developed a wartime mobilization plan for the
Basij, called the Mo’in Plan, according to which Basij personnel would augment
regular IRGC units in an invasion scenario.
IRGC
and Basij exercises have featured simulated ambushes on enemy armored columns
and helicopters. Much of this training has been conducted in an urban
environment, suggesting that Iran intends to lure enemy forces into cities
where they would be deprived of mobility and close air support. Iran has
emphasized passive defense measures—techniques used to enhance the battlefield
survivability —including camouflage, concealment and deception.
Naval Doctrine:
Tehran
views maritime combat operations much the same way as it views land-based
operations. Iranian naval doctrine is geared toward confronting a
technologically superior adversary—often assumed to be the U.S. Navy—with a
form of guerrilla warfare at sea. The bases of this doctrine were developed
during the Tanker War (1984-1988), during which Iran used aircraft, speedboats,
sea mines and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles to attack civilian tanker
shipping in the Persian Gulf. After a U.S. frigate, the Samuel B. Roberts, was
badly damaged by an Iranian mine, the U.S. Navy retaliated with Operation
Praying Mantis (1988), destroying two Iranian oil platforms and sinking several
Iranian surface vessels, including a corvette, a guided missile patrol craft
and smaller gunboats.
After
Operation Praying Mantis, Iran apparently determined that its maritime forces
would not be as effective in a conventional force-on-force naval conflict with
adversaries such as the United States. Incorporating lessons learned from the
Tanker War, the IRGC Navy (IRGCN) and, to a lesser degree, the regular Navy
(IRIN) developed an asymmetric strategy based on avoiding direct or sustained
confrontations at sea. It instead relies on surprise attacks, ambushes and
hit-and-run operations. Rather than inflict a decisive defeat, Iran’s maritime
forces would seek to inflict enough causalities to raise the cost of victory to
an unpalatable level.
Iran’s
naval doctrine relies on a layered defense and massing of firepower,
integrating multiple sea, land and air-based weapons simultaneously to
overwhelm and confuse adversaries. As Iran’s naval doctrine has matured, the
Iranians have acquired a large inventory of naval materiel suitable for
asymmetric warfare. This includes naval mines, which can be covertly deployed
using small boats or commercial vessels; land and sea-based anti-ship cruise
missiles; small fast-attack craft, which can engage in swarming operations or
suicide attacks; and submarines, including three Russian-supplied KILO-class
diesel-electric submarines and numerous North Korean and domestically produced
midget submarines, which can be used in the Gulf’s shallow areas.
Geography
is a key element in Iranian naval planning. The Gulf’s confined space, which is
less than 100 nautical miles wide in many places, limits the maneuverability of
large surface assets, such as aircraft carriers. But it plays to the strengths
of Iran’s naval forces, especially the IRGCN. The Gulf’s northern coast is
dotted with rocky coves ideally suited for terrain masking and small boat
operations. The Iranians have also fortified numerous islands in the Gulf that
sit astride major shipping lanes.
Iran
has developed a strategy to deny hostile navies access to the Persian Gulf that
focuses on the strategically sensitive Strait of Hormuz. This strategic
maritime chokepoint is only 29 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point.
Iranian officials have hinted that they might close the strait during a
conflict, thereby temporarily cutting off as much as 30 percent of the world’s
oil supply. But closing the strait would also cause tremendous economic damage
for the Iranians, so they are not likely to undertake such a measure lightly.
Given the strait’s importance, however, disrupting maritime traffic in it or
even threatening to do so would be an effective tool for Iran to pressure
neighbors and intimidate foes.
Air and Air Defense Doctrine:
Iranian
air and air defense doctrine is focused on defending Iranian airspace and
deterring aggression, although certain Iranian aircraft, such as the Su-24
fighter-bomber, can be used in an offensive capacity. Surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) and interceptor aircraft—most of which belong to the regular Islamic
Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)—both play an important role in this effort.
Iran’s pilots are among the best trained in the region. They continue to use
U.S. training manuals and employ U.S. tactics—a legacy of U.S.-Iranian military
exchanges during the shah’s rule.
The
IRIAF and the Air Defense Force, a separate command within the Artesh, face
numerous challenges in defending Iranian air space. In this case, geography is
a limiting factor, given the size of Iran and its mountainous terrain, which
tend to produce gaps in radar coverage. For the IRIAF, aging and outdated
equipment remains another problem. Many aircraft in the IRIAF’s inventory,
including mainstays such as the F-14A and the F-4D, were supplied by the United
States before the 1979 revolution. Some of these platforms have been kept
running, either by cannibalizing parts from other aircraft or procuring spare
parts on the black market, but IRIAF readiness levels are assumed to be low due
to maintenance issues.
Iran
has managed to acquire several batteries of the advanced Tor-M1 medium altitude
SAM system from the Russians, but its air defense capabilities remain limited.
As of mid-2010, efforts to buy the advanced long-range SA-300 SAM from the
Russians had failed. Iran also lacks an integrated air defense network or the
ability to engage air-to-air targets beyond visual range.
As a
result of these challenges, Iran’s military has opted to use its limited air
and air defense assets to protect high-value point targets, including Tehran
and the country’s nuclear facilities. Iranian pilots have been trained to
compensate for the limitations of their aircraft, avionics and weapons systems
by using advanced tactics, such as terrain masking, to ambush enemy aircraft
without being detected. Iran’s air and air defense forces have also attempted
to augment the survivability of their units with passive defense measures,
including asset dispersion and the use of forward operating bases, hardened
shelters and hidden installations.
Ballistic Missile Doctrine:
Iran’s
ballistic missile program dates back to the middle of the 1980s, during the
Iran-Iraq War. For Tehran, Iraq’s use of ballistic missiles against Iranian
strategic targets highlighted a critical vulnerability in Iran’s defenses; it
also demoralized Iran’s civilian population. To deter Iraq from attacking its
population centers and strategic industries, Iran initiated its own ballistic
missile program, beginning with the initial shipment of a limited number of
SCUD-B missiles from Libya. By the end of the war, Iran had launched over 100
ballistic missiles at Iraqi targets in what would become known as the “War of
the Cities.”
Iran’s
strategic missile forces are now key to its deterrence strategy, in part
because they are implicitly linked to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction
programs. In 2010, Iran had the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
Middle East. The IRGC, which has operational control over Iran’s missile
forces, continues to extend the range and improve the performance of its
ballistic missiles, several classes of which can range Israel and the Gulf
countries. Their limited accuracy suggests they would not be useful in a
conventional counter-force role. Instead, they are probably intended for
strategic targets such as cities, oil production and export facilities, ports
and water desalinization plants.
The Future:
- Iranian military doctrine is primarily defensive in nature and based on deterring perceived adversaries. Iran is therefore unlikely to seek a direct, force-on-force confrontation with the United States.
- However, there is ample room for miscommunication between Iranian and U.S. forces at the tactical and operational levels. The recent push to decentralize command and control within the IRGC could have unintended consequences in terms of escalation, especially in the Persian Gulf.
- For the foreseeable future, lack of coordination between the IRGC and the Artesh is likely to remain a key weak point in terms of Iranian military planning, due to underlying structural issues and institutional rivalries.
About the Author:
Michael Connell is Director of Iranian Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, a
non-profit institution that conducts research and analysis in Washington D.C.
This research article was first published at The Iran Primer Project Site.The views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the
authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States
Institute of Peace or the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. And, our thoughts are very much aligned with the original publishers.
