By Theodore Baird A number of scholars, journalists, and activists have argued that we may be witnessing the development of a ‘se...
By Theodore Baird
A number of scholars, journalists, and activists have argued that we may
be witnessing the development of a ‘security-industrial complex’ in Europe
which resembles the earlier ‘military-industrial complex’ of the Cold War. The
border security-industrial complex refers to the relations between military,
security, and private industry within a global market for the design and
implementation of border security technologies. The main actors are
governments, suppliers of security technologies, and security forces demanding
use of new technologies for controlling and managing state borders. The types
of industrial actors which supply border security technology range from general
and specialized equipment providers (small and medium enterprises primarily) to
larger systems integrators (transnational defence firms such as Thales,
Finmeccanica, Sagem, Airbus, Indra Sistemas, BAE Systems, among others). The
larger companies have experience as defence firms working to develop military
and aerospace capabilities. Customers are primarily governments (and their
associated security apparatuses), as the industry is dependent on economies of
scale (from smaller, local economies of police or gendarmerie units to larger,
regional economies such as the European Union). Many companies re-purpose
military technology for use in border control and surveillance, even when the
effect of such ‘dual-use’ technologies on civilian mobile populations is
unknown.
The global market for border management (including only land and maritime
borders) was worth approximately 29.33 billion USD in 2012, with North America
possessing the highest expenditure.2 The European market for land border
security had an estimated value of 4.5-5.5 billion EUR in 2009, while the
aviation and maritime security sectors of Europe have a market value of
approximately 1.5-2.5 billion EUR each.3 The scale of the market for border
security is expanding in Europe and the world, with total growth expected to
exceed 56.52 billion USD for land and maritime borders by 2022.4 Even with the
growth in markets for border security, the social effects of such practices and
technologies are underexplored, raising a number of political and ethical
concerns.
Transparency and Deliberative Democracy
As the industry for border security expands, and EU integration
continues, relations between the EU institutions, EU Member States, academia,
consultancies, industry, and industrial lobbyists are being forged into policy
networks. Security industrial lobbies such as the European Organization for
Security (EOS) are expending resources to influence the EU institutions, and
large defence corporations may be having an impact on migration politics in
ways which we must be critically aware of.
A major political question surrounding the border management industry has
been the question of transparency and accountability of democratic institutions
tasked with designing security, establishing norms, and executing law. With recent
accusations that Airbus has engaged in corrupt dealings in their border
surveillance contracts in Romania and Saudi Arabia, we must be attuned to the
lack of transparency of industry in their dealings with states and the
potential distortions this causes to democratic politics and European
integration.
Accountability and Rights Protections
In parallel, a number of questions are raised concerning the
accountability of private industry when abuse against migrants is committed.
The functions of deterring migration at the border, interning migrants in
detention centers, and deporting migrants have each been partially or fully
privatized. A number of abuses involving private contractors have been recorded
in detention centers (e.g. Yarl’s Wood in the UK) and during deportation (the
case of Jimmy Mubenga and G4S).
Militarizing and privatizing EU borders has little effect in deterring
migration, but has important consequences for human rights. In an environment
of limited transparency and emerging legal norms, it may be difficult to hold
abusive actors accountable for abuse. The privatization of migration control
means distancing the state from liability for harms and abuse against those
subject to control functions. “Lifting the corporate veil,” by creating institutions
tasked with monitoring corporations and holding them to account for human
rights abuses, may provide us a first step at increasing accountability for
harms and abuse.5
Other abuses may occur at the border – such as push-backs and violations
of the principle of non-refoulement – which may involve technologies or
practices of military defence firms – raising questions about the
accountability of private companies who produce technology for border control
but may be distant from abuse at the border. Recent missions in the
Mediterranean (such as Mare Nostrum or Operation Triton) and ongoing anti-human
smuggling operations raise some of these questions.
Militarizing the Prohibition of Migrant Smuggling
In early May 2015 the European Union asked the U.N. Security Council
(UNSC) to approve a multi-phase military mission to ‘combat’ migrant smuggling
networks in Libya. The so-called EUNAVFOR Med mission is modelled on
anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, which is a strategic error: migrant
smugglers are not pirates, and are not organized nor act as such. Both of
Libya’s competing governments (the Tripoli-based General National Congress and
the Tobruk-based Council of Deputies) are opposed to the EU’s proposal. The
Libyan Air Force (controlled by the internationally recognized government in
Tobruk) has even warned that EU vessels entering Libyan waters will be targeted
by airstrikes.6 Rather than search for protection solutions or peaceful
alternatives to migration, the EU is trying to heat things up through
aggression.
In mid-June 2015 the EU launched the first phase of EUNAVFOR Med, which
involves surveillance and does not need approval from the UNSC, but sets the
stage for future combat. The shared costs of EUNAVFOR Med are around 12 million
EUR for the first two months and lasting for a 12 month mandate.7 A number of
military assets will be used, including five warships, two submarines, three
reconnaissance planes, three helicopters, and two drones.8 Militarizing
anti-smuggling operations is unprecedented, as most anti-smuggling operations
are led by civilian police forces. Actively engaging smugglers with military
practices and technologies will have unknown and paradoxical effects which will
likely be harmful to migrants and local fishing communities on the Libyan
coast, and may escalate into outright conflict with the two Libyan governments.
Resisting the EU Border Security Industrial Complex
The EU’s response to increased migration in the Mediterranean has been to
prevent migration and attack migrant smugglers with the support of technologies
and systems designed by a robust and growing border security industry. However,
those displaced by conflict or climate change will continue to be forced to
migrate to safer areas, and the militarization of migration control will only
serve to exacerbate problems of forced displacement rather than ameliorate
them. Rather than investing in new security and surveillance technologies or
taking an aggressive, militant stance against migrant smugglers, the EU should
devise new legal avenues for migration and create innovations in protection
solutions which value human dignity, rights, and sustainability over
surveillance, industrialized control, and aggression.
This article was first published at The Broken Rifle / WRI-IRG.org on Sep 1, 2015
About The Author:
Theodore Baird is a postdoc at VU University Amsterdam. He currently
researches issues of border security and surveillance in Europe as part of the
project "The Human Costs of Border Control." You can read his current
commentaries published at openDemocracy.
References:
1 Some parts of this article will appear in Italian in Trasformazione in
October 2015. http://www.intrasformazione.com/index.php/intrasformazione
2 Frost & Sullivan (2014) Global Border and Maritime Security Market
Assessment, by Frost & Sullivan. M965-16, February 2014. Available online
at:
http://images.discover.frost.com/Web/FrostSullivan/GlobalBorderandMaritimeSecurity.pdf.
[Last accessed 27.05.2015]
3 Ecorys Research and Consulting (2009) Study on the Competitiveness of
the EU security industry, Framework Contract for Sectoral Competitiveness
Studies – ENTR/06/054, Client: Directorate-General Enterprise & Industry,
Brussels, 15 November 2009. Available online at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/study_on_the_competitiveness_of_the_eu_security_industry_en.pdf.
[Last accessed 27.05.2015]
4 Frost & Sullivan, supra
5 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. (2013) “The rise of the private border guard:
Accountability and responsibility in the migration control industry,” in T.
Gammeltoft-Hansen & N. N. Sorensen (eds.) The Migration Industry and the
Commercialization of International Migration, Routledge: Abingdon and New York.
6 Reuters (2015) “Libya’s air force warns Europe over naval plan for
migrants,” Reuters, 23 June 2015. Available online at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/23/us-europe-migrants-libya-idUSKBN0P312B20150623.
[Last Accessed 24.06.2015]
7 Council of the European Union (2015) “Council launches EU naval
operation to disrupt human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean,”
Press release 482/15, 22 June 2015. Available online at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/22-fac-naval-operation/.
[Last accessed 24.06.2015]
8 Neuger, J. (2015) “EU to Deploy Drones, Warships Against Human
Traffickers,” Bloomberg Business, 22 June 2015. Available online at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-22/eu-to-deploy-drones-warships-against-mediterranean-traffickers.
[Last accessed 24.06.2015]
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