What are Indian and Japanese reactions to China's rise in economic, political and military terms? According to realist tradition, their option would be between balancing and bandwagoning. Applying Stephen Walt's balance of threats approach, this work aims to analyze Indian and Japan responses to an increasingly powerful China; its conclusions point to an evolving relationship between India and Japan, in military terms, especially after 2005.
By Amorim Wellington & Antonio Henrique Lucena da Silva
INTRODUCTION
Asia is becoming the most dynamic economic region in the world and also
faces important changes in military power. Especially due to recent Chinese
rise in economic and military terms, countries of Asia-Pacific region are
constantly aware about Chinese movements. Japan and India, which are the
largest economies in the Asia-Pacific besides China, are powers sensitive with
Chinese behavior. It is important to note that Indian, Chinese and Japanese
relations have been "uneasy" since the 19th Century, especially in
the case of Japan and China, which have been at war more than once. As to
India, which regained independence in 1947, war broke out with China in 1962
with China's invasion of Indian Territory in the Himalayas. India's military
suffered a humiliating defeat-6,000 men dead, wounded or taken prisoner (idem).
The 1962 war changed the Indian perception about China, causing profound
impacts on doctrinal, strategic, operational and tactical issues, which can be
seen nowadays.
Since 1949, with the establishment of People's Republic of China (PRC),
the country steadily expanded its military control over nearby regions (Tibet,
1959) and strengthened the ability to prevent invasion on the mainland (Gill
2005, 125). China is on its trajectory to be one of the foremost military
powers in East Asia-building a capacity to deter Japan and, perhaps in the
future, USA itself. Her continuously economic strength and growing nationalism
led to an increasing arms build-up and weapons development. Other countries, as
India and Japan, see China as a reference in preparing their armed forces to a
hypothetical confrontation.
This paper will address the following questions: What are the main
patterns of security and defense cooperation between Japan and India? Are Japan
and India building an "informal alliance"? The objective of the paper
is to identify the key elements of a balancing dynamic in relation to China.
Using variables such as military spending, military modernization, cooperation
arrangements, we will shed light to answers to these questions. The paper is
organized as follows. In the first part, covering the theoretical approach, we
describe, in the realist tradition, the concepts of balancing, bandwagoning and
the sources of threat according to Stephen Walt's definition. The second part
is a case study of India and its strategic movements. In the third part, another
case study, this time about Japan, highlights its military expenditures,
military modernization, as well the changes in military policies, including
cooperative agreements with other countries. In the fourth part, actions of
India's and Japan's governments are analyzed together in order to shed light to
this question: if both countries aim balancing China, is there a
"correspondence between their government's policies and their citizen's
attitudes"? At the concluding remarks we expose the main findings of the
paper.
Theoretical approach
In the realist tradition, balancing is one of the most used terms. Walt
defines balancing as "allying with others against the prevailing
threat" (1987, 17). Instead of bandwagoning (aligning with the source of
danger), states "join alliances to protect themselves from states or
coalitions whose superior resources pose a threat" (ibid., 18). Moreover,
Walt defines four sources of threat (ibid., 22-6):
- Aggregate power (for example, variables as population size, industrial and military capability, and technological prowess).
- Geographic Proximity;
- Offensive Power;
- Aggressive Intentions;
As
to aggregate power, it is very difficult to measure. Nevertheless, items such
as population, economy, territory, industrial and military capability, as well
as technological level, all converge to the sustainability (or not) of the
influence of an specific country in international terms. More, this (rising)
influence can easily turn into a perceived threat by its neighbors or even
rivals from afar.
Geographic
proximity is an important issue due to the fact that "the ability to
project power declines with distance" (Walt 1987, loc. cit.). Therefore,
perceived threats from a nearby state are usually taken more seriously than
from a distant one. In fact, "regional states are more sensitive to
threats from other regional powers." (ibid., 158). Also, the number of
bordering states (and if these borders can be easily trespassed) is an
important issue in molding any state's foreign policy.1
Offensive
power is "the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity
of another state as an acceptable cost" (ibid., 24). Usually this kind of
threat triggers a balancing strategy or, if the menacing state is too close and
powerful to a quick victory, a bandwagoning option.
Aggressive
intentions are the final kind of threat and, in many cases, are determinant to
establish a balancing process; bandwagoning with states which are extremely
aggressive many times is not a safe option for the weakest states.
Therefore,
Walt concludes that the balance of threat framework (where imbalances of threat
cause alliances against the most threatening state) subsumes balance of power
theory (where imbalances of power cause alliances against the strongest state),
"since aggregate power is an important component of threat, but not the
only one." (ibid., 264-265).
Paul
deepens the meaning of balancing, presenting three types and respective
strategies (2004, 13):
Hard
balancing - Open arms buildup, formal alliances or both.
Soft
balancing - Limited arms buildup. Informal, tacit or ad hoc security
understandings among affected states, within or outside international
institutions. Preventive strategy.
Asymmetric
balancing - Non-state actors and their state sponsors pursue asymmetric
strategies.
As
already mentioned, buck-passing is another option; in that case, the whole or
partial burden of containing the threatening state is passed to a third one
(Mearsheimer 2001, 13).
In
this study, we will analyze Indian and Japanese behavior towards regional
security and if their patterns converge to balancing against a perceived threat
(China). We will also analyze what kind of balancing does occur, and if
buck-passing is happening.
India
Since
its independence in 1947, India tried to steer its foreign policy towards the
need for a peaceful coexistence. The principles of Panchsheel became the
cornerstone for its foreign policy, especially after 1954. Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru adopted as a foreign policy of state the rejection of the use
of force to solve disputes (Hoyt 2007, 22). He changed this orientation after
the Himalayan War of 1962 with China and a humiliating defeat. Since then, the
new guidelines have been to accumulate power, and new military and diplomatic
strategies are based in principles of geopolitics (Kapur 2006, 206). Military
expenditure doubled after the war in consequence to the perceived threat of
China and the necessity to improve and buy new weapons to counter that country.
Nevertheless,
since independence India has used military power in foreign conflicts and
interventions, when needed. It began with the first conflict for Kashmir
(1947-1948), the absorption of Hyderabad (1948), the conquest of Goa (1961),
the Himalayan War with China (1962), Kutch (1965), the second war in Kashmir
(1965), the secession of Bangladesh (1971), intervention in Maldives (1988),
peace operation in Sri Lanka (1987-1990) and the Kargil conflict (1999).
Regional disputes stimulated the development of nuclear weapons. A nuclear India
was, at a first moment, a response to China. When China became a nuclear power
in 1964, and its pro-Pakistan policy became more obvious, India reacted
developing its own nuclear devices. The dissipation of Nehruvian principles and
the belief in China's friendship was replaced by a policy of mistrust and
confrontation (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 256-265).
The
governments in Pakistan-civilian or military-have formulated national defense
strategies in terms of a perceived threat by India. Pakistan views India as a
hegemonic state and its continuous rise in defense budget as a factor of
concern (Sakhuja and Mohanty 2009, 211). Disputes over the Kashmir region
remain a major problem for India and Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, the
country has used the issue about the region to gain public support for high
military expending and avoiding cuts in its defense budget. The Pakistani
military has the total control to formulate defense budget with no peer
competition (judiciary or legislative branches) and its implementation (ibid.).
Indian strategic contention goals in the region are Pakistan, followed by
China, with the possibility of using its military power in the whole region,
especially against non-state actors (Bello and Gebrewold 2010, 210). Indian
military power must be understood in this context of a potential
"call" to arms (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, XII).
During
the BJP/Prime Minister Vajpayee's government India accelerated the process of
nuclear and military modernization, embracing defense and deterrent as pillars
of military strategy (Kapur 2006, 201). India has demonstrated that there is a
need to improve its power capabilities to deal with international questions, a
very different approach compared to its stance in the first fifteen years of
Independence.
United
States relations with India had a moment of redefinition when George W. Bush
government changed its perception about the region. India has a strategic
importance to the United States (clearly defined by Condoleezza Rice): India is
an important factor in the strategic calculus of the American government. For
the US, considering India in the regional environment is important, leaving the
disputes over Kashmir aside, because the country is becoming a Power and this
should be taken in account by the American foreign policy (Pant 2008, 21).
Washington recent position towards India and Barack Obama's support to the
country claims for a permanent seat in the UNSC2 shows clear goals: India is an
important actor to counter China. According to 2010 US Quadrennial Report, the
US administration will continue to improve bilateral relations as
"inherent recognition" of India's place in the world and the
demonstration of strength and potential. The text is very clear about India's
impact:
As
the economic power, cultural reach, and political influence of India increase,
it is assuming a more influential role in global affairs. This growing
influence, combined with democratic values it shares with the United States, an
open political system, and a commitment to global stability, will present many
opportunities for cooperation. India's military capabilities are rapidly
improving through increased defense acquisitions, and they now include
long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction,
and strategic airlift. India has already established its worldwide military
influence through counter piracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and
disaster relief efforts. As its military capabilities grow, India will
contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in Indian Ocean and beyond.
(DOD 2010, 60).
Therefore,
the mentioned text shows more clearly the shift in the American position
towards the Western Pacific and identifies India as a major player, with a
greater role in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
As
noted above, Indian's commitment to improve its defense dated since 1962.
Recently, Indian leadership is supportive in building a strong and modern
military in order to: 1) safeguard national security; 2) serve as a deterrent
and 3) supply a force to India commensurate with its size and interests. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh assured the Indian military that, if the economy
continues to grow at 8% a year, defense budget will remain at 3% of the GDP
(Sakhuja and Mohanty 2009, 230). Indian Strategy acknowledges the importance of
the sea routes. Defense minister George Fernandes stated that "India's
area of interest extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China
Sea."3
India's
growing military expenditures (see Table 1) reflect economic prowess and
strategic vision to improve the Armed Forces towards state-of-art. The
resources spent with PAK-FA program and the choice of 4th generation Rafale
fighter to equip Indian Air Force4 aim to achieve specific strategic ambitions
which take into consideration a record of more than 60 years of belligerence
with Pakistan and a Treaty of Peace and Tranquility boundaries signed with
China which is not a confidence-building measure completely trustable (as seen
in the recent dispute, in April 2013, involving Aksai Chin). The Indian Army is
also engaged in questions of internal security responsibilities in Kashmir and
Northeast India.
In 2010, India's Minister of External Affairs,
Nirupama Rao, noted that:
The
rise of China is of course observed with close attention in our region. China's
demonstrable economic strength and its growing military capabilities are a
matter of fact and we must incorporate such factors into our calculus of the
emerging 21st century scenario in the Asia Pacific. This is where a mature and
evolving dialogue between India and the United States will be of considerable
relevance in clarifying approaches to the regional situation and the policy
approaches of roles of our two countries in these new circumstances.5
Considering
the regional level, India has many still have many concerns about China's rise.
Flemes and Vaz (2010) point that the achievement of strategic balance has been
persistently approached by India sustaining investment in defense capabilities.
The modernization of India's armed forces, especially naval and air force, aims
to support its status of emerging power and preserve its supremacy in the
Indian Ocean (Dördrechter 2010). On the other hand, at the global level, India tends
to make alignments with other countries seeking long terms arrangements as
BRICs formation (with Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa as partners)
(Scott 2011, 278). As has been noted by Ollapally, in the new global system
each country feels it is necessary to diversify its relationships. In the case
of BRICS, India has a long tradition of ties with Russia, mainly due to the
purchase of arms. Nowadays, the logic of international system makes
partnerships and coalitions more tactical in nature offering a case to case
analysis (2009, 208). Russia is also important to India because of its energy
resources. Sustainable Indian economic growth is important to maintain the
economy in a fast track. Brazil does not have the same strategic importance to
India as Russia and China.
It
is still an open question, in diplomatic terms, about the BRICS real capacity
to constitute a homogeneous bloc capable of a significant influence in the
process of building a new international order.6 As to India and China, Miller (2013)
points the problems that India has to face in order to counter an ambitious
China in the near future, stressing that countries which aspire to great-power
status usually look beyond tactical challenges. According to the author, India
did not yet develop a long term strategy for its growing power, in a sharp
contrast with China, which has clear strategies about its power. Furthermore,
the international community shows some signs towards empowering India, as the
support for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council and
Washington's efforts so that New Delhi would operate as a counterweight to
China. As we demonstrated in this part of the paper, Indian issues have a big
focus on its regional relations. Efforts are being made to attenuate these
questions. New relations and interests on higher levels may shape Indian
preferences.
Japan
After
the defeat in World War II, Japan faced two basic problems: how to adapt itself
to a world liberal order steered by the US and, shortly after, the impact of
the Cold War. At Yalta, American strategists had foreseen two spheres of
influence, the US over Japan and Soviet Union in Northeast Asia. China would
constitute a "grey area," balancing the two superpowers (Pyle 2007,
217). With this in mind, an American-imposed Constitution was given to Japan
which stated that, besides renouncing "war as an instrument of the
State," the country would repudiate the "maintenance of military
forces." (Samuels 2007).
With
the perception that CCP (Chinese Communist Party) would win the Chinese Civil
War, the US began to give another focus to Japan. In 1948, George Kennan warned
that Japan was in danger of falling in Soviet sphere, if the Occupation did not
foster the Japanese to "a position where they would be better able to
shoulder the burden of independence" (Pyle 2007, 221). In fact, in few
years Japan was to be transformed "from bitter wartime enemy to the
lynchpin, the key ally, in the new US security structure in Cold War Asia"
(ibid., 225).
But
Japan did not rearm itself. Branding the argument of Article 9 of the
Constitution, Japanese government stated that Japan could not take part in any
foreign conflict. Withstanding several demands by the US, in 1954 Japan
established the Japan Defense Agency, with self-defense forces of 152 thousand
men (ibid., 229-236). Therefore, a "minimum force" (which could not
be sent abroad7) was institutionalized, with the basic goal of protecting the
country.
Almost
twenty years later, Japan formulated the policy of the "Three Principles
of Army Exports," which banned those exports to Communist countries, to
countries blacklisted by UN embargoes or to countries involved or likely to be
involved in armed conflicts. Afterwards, the ban was extended to all countries
(Pyle 2007, 253-254). At the same time, the National Defense Program Outline,
in 1976, formalized the 1 percent of GNP ceiling as to military expenditures.8
During
the Cold War, Yoshida Doctrine came to be seen as very useful, since Japan
recovered from the defeat in WWII and became one of the biggest economic
powers, while been protected by the US (the so-called "nuclear
umbrella"). But, with the end of the Cold War, the premises for that
strategy were shaken.9
The
Gulf War, in 1991, also highlighted some important issues; first, the need to
intense modernization, as US victory showed the state-of-art technology in
military affairs. Second, although there was an intense debate about
"collective security," the Cabinet Legislation Bureau stuck to its
interpretation that "dispatch of SDF troops to join the coalition in any
form was constitutionally prohibited." Even the sending of a medical team
of hundred specialists came to nothing, since only twenty volunteers stood up
to the call and soon returned home (Pyle 2007, 290-291). In the end, Japan's
contribution came to US$ 13 billion, which only worsened its position among the
other countries in the coalition; Japan's initiative came to be criticized and
labeled as "checkbook diplomacy" (ibid., loc. cit.).
After
the Gulf War, the debate about military forces in Japan deepened. The United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill, approved in 1992, allowed
sending SDF troops abroad to give logistical and humanitarian support for UN
missions; the first one consisted of 700 personnel going to Cambodia.
Therefore,
the post-Cold War brought new challenges to Japan and clearly Yoshida Doctrine
had to be somewhat revised. Changes were slow, but seen in a wider perspective,
significant. The most important threats were "a) a rising China; b) a
miscreant regime in North Korea; c) the possibility of abandonment by the
United States; d) relative decline of the Japanese economy." Samuels
points that Japan has responded to each threat with an adaptation of its
strategy and, more important, "each of these threats have been used to
justify the modernization of Japan's military" (Samuels 2007, 4-5).
For
example, the launching of a North Korean three-stage ballistic missile over
Japan, in 1998, prompted Japanese developing of its own surveillance satellite
and BMD (ballistic missile defense), but with interoperability with US forces
(ibid., 104-105).
The
strengthening of the operational capability of the Japanese Coast Guard is also
striking. In 2005, it had a fleet with as much as 65% of the total tonnage of
China's surface fleet (Samuels 2007, 70). Since the JCG is not one of the Self
Defense Forces, its expenditures are not within the budget ceiling of 1% of
GNP, usually applied to military expenditures.
The
creation of the Ministry of Defense, in January 2007, elevating the prior Japan
Defense Agency and coordinating all three Self Defense forces, represented the
institutionalization of a new approach to security. With that, Japan has had
talks with several countries in order to foster more solid ties as to regional
security, besides the US, as Australia, South Korea, India, Indonesia and
Vietnam (Nids 2012, 259).
But
Japan's biggest concern is China's constant growth, not only for historical
reasons, since both countries have still to erase the traumas of their last
mutual conflict, but also for maritime disputes that constantly erupt,
regarding some islands and reefs. Those places are not important per se, but
the sovereignty over them grants the respective country the rights over the
surrounding Exclusive Economic Zone.
In
1995, the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) did not mention China
explicitly, although pointed to nuclear arsenals in neighboring states. But
National Program Defense Guidelines (NPDG) in 2004 was "the first national
security document to openly identify a potential threat from PRC, [...] that
was modernizing its forces and expanding its range at sea"(Samuels 2007,
69). There was a shift in military focus from Hokkaido and northern Honshu
southward, "where assets could be more easily deployed against perceived
Chinese threats" (ibid., 65, our emphasis).
As
the latest Japan White Paper points, in its Introduction, "The security
environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly harsh, due to challenges
such as acts of provocations, including North Korea's launching of the missile,
which it called "Satellite" and the nuclear test, and the rapid
expansion and intensification of activities by China in the waters and airspace
around Japan, including intrusion into Japanese territorial waters and
airspace" (Mod 2013). When analyzing specific threats, China is
highlighted, with Japan stressing the several conflicting events over
territorial waters which Japan claims as its own.
As
already mentioned, Japan cannot be totally sure about US intentions.
Nevertheless, the strategic focus in Asia ("Asian pivot"), as
announced by President Obama, is a reassurance of both countries' alliance
(since Japan is fundamental to its success), at least in the near and medium
term, as well as the strengthening of other partners, as Australia and India.
In
terms of military expenditures, albeit the ceiling of 1% of the GNP, Japan's
position in world ranking is sixth, after the US, China, Russia, France and
United Kingdom, but not very distant from the last two (Sipri 2013). As it can
be seen comparing Tables 1 and 2, even with the ceiling of 1% Japan's military
expenditures are higher than India's (which comprise almost 3% of the GDP).
India/Japan
In
the Cold War, and even a decade further, diplomatic relations between India and
Japan were, according to Laurence, "cordial, as might be expected from two
democracies." (2007, 195).
In
2000, both countries decided the establishment of "Global Partnership
between Japan and India" (Mofa 2012a). Among other broad issues, Japan and
India "talked about institutionalizing a dialogue between the ministries
of defense and foreign affairs for coordinated actions on security and foreign
policy related issues, such as the security of sea-lanes, joint naval exercises
to combat piracy and disaster management."(Baruah 2010). Such an alliance,
in an Indian perspective, could "help offset the deleterious effects for
New Delhi of the long-standing Sino-Pakistan nexus." (Chelaney 2010, 205).
As to Japan, it diversified her security partners, therefore avoiding an
excessive dependency on the US, as well as enhancing a more assertive posture
as a "normal" power.
A
year later, in July, the first meetings of the Japan-India Security Dialogue
and the Japan-India Military-Military Consultation took place. In December of
the same year, Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Vajpayee signed the
India-Japan Joint Declaration, which highlighted the pledge to cooperation in
many issues, including the safety and security of maritime traffic and
fostering defense exchange (Baruah 2010).:
The
next inflexion in both countries' relationship came in 2005, after many
incidents in China against Japan's efforts to secure a permanent seat in UN
Security Council (Chelaney 2010, 204; Sudo 2007, 51-52; Kokubun 2007, 137-142).
In April, both Prime-Ministers (Koizumi and Singh) produced "the joint
statement "Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic
Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership," as well as an Action Plan
called the "Eight-fold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-India Global
Partnership." The action plan emphasized the security cooperation with:
"a) further developing dialogues and exchanges, including through full
utilization of existing consultation forums; b) strengthening
service-to-service exchanges between defense establishments of the two
countries; c) working to ensure the safety and security of maritime traffic
through joint exercises against piracy and the annual Japan Coast Guard-Indian
Coast Guard talks; and d) building up cooperation between the Maritime Self
Defense Force (MSDF) and the Indian Navy in recognition of the importance of
maritime security."(Baruah 2010).
In
terms of a wider strategy, the signing of the Indian-Japanese "Global
Partnership" coincided with the nuclear deal between India and the US,
unveiled in July 2005 (Chelaney 2010, 206-207) and with Japan's effort to
include India as a member of EAS (East Asian Summit).10 According to Simon,
"Other ASEAN members plus Japan, however, fearing China's possible
domination, pressed for invitations to Australia, New Zealand and India"
(2008, 209).
In
2007, "a joint naval exercise was conducted by Japan, India, Australia,
Singapore and the United States in September 2007" (Emmott 2008, 133).
"Malabar" exercises, usually with Indian and American forces, were
expanded in terms of other participating countries.
Aside
from the Japanese participation in Malabar 2009, this time in the eastern side
of Okinawa, in April, the idea of a Defense Action Plan (DAP) was conceived,
including a "2 plus 2" dialogue framework at senior official level of
external affairs and defense ministries and "an annual strategic dialogue
at the foreign minister level" (Baruah 2010). The so-called
"2+2" framework, in Japanese foreign policy terms, means an extremely
high level of consultation and strategic stature.
In
2011, due to the Fukushima nuclear accident, Japan did not take part in Malabar
naval exercise. In November, India's Defense Minister met with Japanese Defense
Minister and they decided to "to carry out bilateral exercise between the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy."
In
January 2012, both Coast Guards conducted exercises on anti-piracy, search and
rescue missions, etc., as has been happening since 2000.11 There was no
official statement about Japan missing Malabar 2012; two seem to be the basic
reasons. One is the emphasis in bilateral naval exercises,12 as put forth in
the 2011 Summit, and the other the full alert due to North Korea's satellite
launching, mobilizing a sizeable part of Japan's maritime SDF and Coast Guard.
In
April, India held the sixth India-Japan Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue.
One of the issues highlighted was that "cooperation between Japan and
India in the field of maritime security had been steadily deepened, referring
to joint exercises between the Japan Coast Guard and the Indian Coast Guard,
bilateral cooperation on anti-piracy activities, as well as a joint naval exercise
between Maritime Self-Defense Force and Indian Navy scheduled to be held in
that same year." (Mofa 2012b).13
Also,
"regarding the joint industrial activities on rare earth materials, the
two Ministers shared the view that they should work toward an early realization
of the activities." It should be noted that, amid a Senkaku/Diaoyutai
incident in 2010, Chinese reaction included the embargo in rare earth materials
export to Japan. Therefore, Japanese incentive to Indian rare earth production
is not a random choice. The emphasis on strengthening relations between Indian
Navy and Japan MSDF, as well as the cooperation concerning rare earth
materials, was reinforced in the Prime Ministers' meeting in November 2012.
India
and Japan are also increasing their ties in the defense industry. Japan has
relaxed its arms exports policy (Murayama 2011); the Indian Navy is evaluating
the acquisition of Shinmaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft; "a short take-off
and landing (STOL) amphibious aircraft that can take off from either land or
from water with 18 tons of load. Its range of 4,700 kilometers reaches across
vast tracts of ocean, performing multiple tasks: humanitarian aid, disaster
relief, search and rescue, as well as military logistical activities."
(Shukla 2012). In Prime Minister Singh's visit to Japan, in May 2013, both
governments decided to improve joint maritime exercises and the establishment
of a Joint Working Group on the US-2 amphibian aircraft (Mofa 2013a; Kesavan
2013).
Therefore,
Indian-Japanese ties in the security field have been deepened significantly,
since 2000. According to Hemant Kumar Singh, a former India's ambassador to
Japan, "there are three drivers of Tokyo's decisive turn towards New
Delhi: India's economic rise; India's growing ties with the US; and Japan's
fear of a rising China" (Shukla 2012). Those three drivers have reinforced
each other, along the years, exemplified by the five meetings of the
"India-Japan-United States trilateral dialogue," with issues such as
"as maritime security and regional situations," since December 2011
(Mofa 2013b).
A
last point to be analyzed about India and Japan strategic movement towards
China would be the following: if both countries aim balancing China, is there a
"correspondence between their government's policies and their citizen's
attitudes"? We will use a similar approach to Chang (2010), in analyzing
if East Asian countries were balancing against China.
Not
surprisingly, due to historical reasons (including Japanese expansion in
Chinese territory after 1894 Sino-Japanese War and way into 20th Century's
first half), continuous rivalry and especially territorial disputes (for
example, Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands), Japan views about China have not been
positive, in average, according to the world poll sponsored by BBC and
conducted by the international polling firm GlobeScan, together with the
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland.
In fact, the net result (difference between mainly positive and mainly negative
views) is persistently negative, since 2008 (year when Japanese began being
interviewed), with an average of -39%.14
As
to India, according to the poll, the views about China have been worsening
steadily, going from a net result of +46 in 2005 to -27 in 2011 (Table 3). The
reduction of the negative views in 2012, which nevertheless was insufficient to
turn the net result to positive, was due to the Chinese support among the BRICS
group to an Indian (and Brazilian and South African) permanent seat in the
UNSC. When the 2013 views come to light, the impact of the military incident at
Aksai Chin in April should be taken into consideration, with the possibility of
a new worsening of Indian perception about China. So, economic and geopolitical
rivalry (for example, fighting for the bigger influence in Myanmar),
territorial disputes (as in the cases of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh),
political issues like Tibet, etc., all summed up to radically change the
average perception of China in India, since 2005.15
The previous remarks show that a balancing strategy by India and Japan finds support in both populations.
The previous
remarks show that a balancing strategy by India and Japan finds support in both
populations.
Conclusion
In the first part of our paper, we described the basic
theoretical approach which would be applied to the analysis. In the second,
strategic movements of India were considered. Pakistan is still a major concern
for India's foreign policy but China, as a rising power, poses many security
risks for the country. India's military expenditure continues steady while
Chinese economic growth allows that more resources keep up flowing for China's
military modernization. China's rise demanded a more focused strategy to
counter any further problem that India may face. In the third part we described
Japan's perception of China. Despite the Japanese constitution imposing serious
restrictions to the country forces, other measures such as improving the coast
guard are a clear evidence that Japan will use further measures to ensure a
defense capability ready to face strategic problems in the Asia-Pacific region.
In the fourth part we described the convergence of interests among India and
Japan. It is important to emphasize the several United States movements towards
India and China. The recent support to an Indian permanent seat in the United
Nations Security Council, by Obama's administration, it is a view of a rising
India and its growing importance in the region. Therefore, not allowing a
growing asymmetry of power between India and China became part of the American
foreign policy.
Our work has also shown that Japan and India have been
strengthening their security dialogue, since 2000, especially after 2005. Does
this process fit into Walt's analytical framework of balance of threats?
As to Walt's geographic, rising power and offensive
power issues, all of them are clearly present in India's and Japan's
relationship with China (and are not subjective). And the fourth one,
aggressive intentions? China does not position itself as an aggressive power.
But, as Mearsheimer (2010, 383) points,
Unfortunately, states can never be certain about each
other's intentions. They cannot know with a high degree of certainty whether
they are dealing with a revisionist state or a status quo power. [...] But even
if one could determine China's intentions today, there is no way to know what
they will be in the future. After all, it is impossible to identify who will be
running the foreign policy of any country 5 or 10 years from now, much less
whether they will have aggressive intentions. It cannot be emphasized enough
that we face radical uncertainty when it comes to determining the future
intentions of any country, China included.
Even today, Chinese reactions to some incidents, as
the aforementioned one at the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, in September 2010, or
denying visas to Indian citizens who were born in Arunachal Pradesh (a disputed
area with India), turn Indian and Japanese perceptions cloudy as to a potential
threat presented by China.
And, since one of the issues which can trigger an
alliance, according to Walt, is a perceived threat, Indian and Japanese
responses have been in the direction of finding a common ground against that
threat.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that their
relationship would represent a "soft balancing" approach, or as
pointed by Paul (2013, 13), "Limited arms buildup; Informal, tacit or ad
hoc security understandings among affected states, within or outside
international institutions. Preventive strategy."
In fact, India is also a partner with China in some
groups, like RIC and BRICS, and uses that partnership to enhance their
diplomatic position in the world, as gaining support to a permanent seat in the
UN Security Council.16 But the fact still remains that India's defense policy
still puts China as one of the major worries, alongside Pakistan.
In tandem, Japan has sought to establish firmer ties
with China, in economic terms (for example, the efforts towards the Trilateral
Summit with South Korea, China and Japan, which has already produced an
Investment Treaty among the three countries, as well as the establishment of a
formal Secretariat and talks about a Free Trade Zone). Nevertheless, Japan's
defense policy also puts China as one of the main sources of threat, in
security terms.
That approach by both countries is also stimulated by
the US, which also tends to "contain" China's rise. The importance of
Japan to balance against China had already been envisioned by Spykman in 1942,
even at the apex of World War II (2007, 468-470). Therefore, it is not
fortuitous at all that the relationship between India and Japan has taken a
boost since 2005, when US and India began sharing common interests in terms of
a new strategic partnership.17
As Japan seems to overcome most of the economic
problems derived from the Fukushima incident, a more assertive position in
security issues has been highlighted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. On the other
hand, India's growth continues to be one of the biggest in the emerging
economies. As we exposed in this paper, Japan and India are "getting
closer" because both have a convergent focus, as to security: China's
rise. Yet it should be stressed that the Asia-Pacific region is not in a full
"security dilemma" which would drive the region through a dangerous
(and out of control) arms race. China continues to modernize its military and,
as noted above, Japan and India are in a soft balancing strategy towards China.
Chinese intentions are difficult to preview but it is a fact that her strategic
movements became reference for other countries with spin-offs as the building
of "informal alliances" like Japan and India aligning in security
affairs. The 21st century, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, will observe
a steady disparity of power between China and the other countries, if recent
trends continue. Allying with others seems to be one of the paths to be pursued
in order to fulfill the gap created by China's ascension.
This research paper was first published at Revista Brasileira de PolÃtica Internacional under creative commons license.
About The Authors:
Amorim Wellington, University La Salle Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
Antonio Henrique Lucena da Silva, Department of Political Science, Fluminense Federal University, Niterói, RJ, Brazil
Bibliographic References:
ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto (2010). O Bric e a substituição
de hegemonias: um exercÃcio analÃtico (perspectiva histórico-diplomática sobre
a emergência de um novo cenário global). In: BAUMANN, R., Ed. O Brasil e os
demais BRICs: Comércio e PolÃtica. BrasÃlia: IPEA. [ Links ]
AMORIM, Wellington & COELHO, Carlos Frederico
(2012). Useful Tool or Shallow Acronym? Foreign Policy Coordination Amongst
BRICS countries. Paper presented at ISA Annual Convention, San Diego. [ Links ]
BARUAH, Pranmita (2010). Changing Contours of the Japan-India
Defense Relations. Available at: http://globalpolitician.com/print.asp?id=6267.
Retrieved in April 30, 2012. [ Links ]
BBC (2013). World Service Country Rating Poll.
Available at:
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/717.php?lb=btvoc&pnt=717&nid=&id=
Retrieved in 11/08/2013. [ Links ]
BELLO, Valeria & GEBREWOLD, Belachew, Ed. (2010).
A Global Security Triangle: European, African and Asian Interaction. London:
Routledge. [ Links ]
BLACK, Jeremy (2005). Introduction to Global Military
History: 1775 to the present day. New York: Routledge. [ Links ]
BUSH, Richard C. (2010). The Perils of Proximity:
China-Japan Security Relations. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. [
Links ]
CHAN, Steve (2010). An odd thing happened on the way
to balancing. International Studies Review, vol. 12, issue 3. [ Links ]
CHELLANEY, Brahma (2010). Asian Juggernaut: the rise
of India, China and Japan. New York: Harper. [ Links ]
COHEN, Stephen P.; DASGUPTA, Sunil (2010). Arming
without aiming: India's Military Modernization. Washington: Brookings
Institution Press. [ Links ]
DOD (2010). Quadriennal Defense Review Report.
Available at: http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
Retrieved in: May 6, 2013. [ Links ]
DÖRDRECHTER, Stefan et al. (2010), Aufrüstung neuer
Mächte: China, Indien, Brasilien und Iran, GIGAFocus Global, 1, Hamburg: GIGA
German Institute of Global and Area Studies. [ Links ]
EMMOTT, Bill (2008). Rivals: how the power struggle
between China, India and Japan will shape our next decade. Orlando: Harcourt. [
Links ]
FLEMES, Daniel; VAZ, Alcides Costa (2011). Security
Policies of India, Brazil and South Africa - Regional Security Contexts as
Constraints for a Common Agenda. GIGA Working Papers nº160. Hamburg: German
Institute of Global Area Studies. [ Links ]
FRAVEL, M. Taylor (2008). Strong borders, secure
nation: cooperation and conflict in China's territorial dispute. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. [ Links ]
GILL, Bates (2004). China as a regional military
power. In: BUZAN, Barry; FOOT, Rosemary, Ed. Does China matter? A Reassessment.
London: Routledge. [ Links ]
GOSWAMI, Namrata (2012). China ups the ante in
Arunachal Pradesh. IDSA Comment. Available at:
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinaupstheanteinArunachalPradesh_NamrataGoswami_170112.
Retrieved in March 5, 2012. [ Links ]
HOYT, Timothy D. (2007). Military Industry and
Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq, and Israel. New York: Routledge. [ Links
]
KAPUR, Ashok (2006). India - From Regional to World
Power. New York: Routledge. [ Links ]
KESAVAN, K.V. (2013). The imperial impetus behind
Indo-Japanese relations. East Asia Forum. Available at:
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/05/the-imperial-impetus-behind-indo-japanese-relations/.
Retrieved in: 11/05/2013. [ Links ]
KOKUBUN, Ryosei (2007). Changing Japanese Strategic
Thinking Toward China. In: ROZMAN, Gilbert, TOGO, Kazuhiko & FERGUSON,
Joseph S., Ed. Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan. [ Links ]
LAURENCE, Henry (2007). Japan's proactive foreign
policy and the rise of the BRICs. Asian Perspective, vol. 31, nº 4 Available
at: http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-a.pdf. Retrieved in February
13, 2012. [ Links ]
MEARSHEIMER, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics. Norton: New York. [ Links ]
______. (2010). The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge
to US Power in Asia. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3. [
Links ]
MILLER, Manjari Chaterjee (2013). India's Feeble
Foreign Policy: A would-be great power resists its own rise. Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2013. Available at:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139098/manjari-chatterjee-miller/indias-feeble-foreign-policy
Retrieved in 11/08/2013. [ Links ]
MOD (2010). SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
GUIDELINES for FY 2011 and beyond. Available at:
, accessed
on May 20, 2012. [ Links ]
______. (2013). DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2013 (Annual White
Paper). Available at: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2013.html. Retrieved
in 11/08/2013. [ Links ]
MOFA (2012a). Japan-India Relations. Available at
, accessed on May 4, 2012.
[ Links ]
______. (2012b). Visit to India by Minister for
Foreign Affairs Koichiro Gemba. Available at
,
accessed on May 10, 2012. [ Links ]
______. (2012c). Japan-India Summit Meeting. Available
at , accessed
on May 5, 2013. [ Links ]
______. (2013a). Visit to Japan by Dr. Manmohan Singh,
Prime Minister of India and Mrs. Gursharan Kaur. Available at:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page6e_000071.html. Retrieved in: 11/08/2013. [
Links ]
______. (2013b). The 5th meeting of the trilateral
dialogue. Available at:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000076.html. Retrieved in:
11/14/2013. [ Links ]
MURAYAMA, Yuzo (2011). A review of the three
principles on arms exports. Available at:
http://nippon.com/en/currents/d00016/. Retrieved in 05/04/2012. [ Links ]
NIDS (2012). East Asian Strategic Review. Available
at: http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2012.html. Retrieved
in 05/12/2012. [ Links ]
OLLAPALLY, Deepa (2009). India and Russia: Renewing
the relationship. In: PANT, Harsh, Ed. Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar
World. New Delhi: Routledge. [ Links ]
PANT, Harsh V. (2008). Contemporary debates in Indian
foreign and security policy: India Negotiates Its Rise in the International
System. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. [ Links ]
PAUL, T.V. (2004). Introduction: the enduring axioms
of balance od power theory and their contemporary relevance. In: PAUL, T.V.,
WIRTZ, James. J. & FORTMANN, Michel, Ed. Balance of Power: Theory and
Practice in the 21st Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press. [ Links ]
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2013). Global Attitudes Project.
Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/country/100/response/Unfavorable/.
Retrieved in 11/09/2013. [ Links ]
PYLE, Kenneth B. (2007). Japan rising: the resurgence
of Japanese power and purpose. New York: Public Affairs. [ Links ]
SAKHUJA, Vijay; MOHANTY, Deba R. (2009). Globalization
and defence economy in South Asia: Two views. In: TILL, G; CHEW, E.; HO,
JOSHUA, Ed. Globalization and Defence in the Asia-Pacific: Arms across Asia.
New York: Routledge. [ Links ]
SAMUELS, Richard J. (2007) Securing Japan: Tokyo's
grand strategy and the future of East Asia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. [
Links ]
SCOTT, David (2011). India's relations with the USA.
In: SCOTT, David, (Ed.) Handbook of India's International Relations. London:
Routledge. [ Links ]
SHUKLA, Aijai (2012) India, Japan to talk on
cooperation in Asia-Pacific. Available at:
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com.br/2012/04/india-japan-to-talk-on-cooperation-in.html.
Retrieved in 04/30/2012. [ Links ]
SIMON, Sheldon (2008). ASEAN and the New Regional
Multilateralism: the Long and Bumpy Road to Community. In: SHAMBAUGH, David
& YAHUDA, Michael, Ed. International Relations of Asia. Plymouth: Rowan and
Littlefield. [ Links ]
SIPRI (2013). The SIPRI Military expenditure database.
Available at: http://milexdata.sipri.org/. Retrieved in 11/08/2013. [ Links ]
SPYKMAN, Nicholas J. (2007). America's strategy in
World Politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. [ Links ]
SUDO, Sueo (2007) It takes two to tango. In: HSIUNG,
James C. (ed.) China and Japan at odds: deciphering the perpetual conflict. New
York: Palgrave MacMillan. [ Links ]
WALT, Stephen (1987). The origins of alliances.
Cornell: Cornell University Press. [ Links ]
1 As an example, the fact of China having 14
neighboring states adds complexity layers to its foreign policy.
2 Obama backs permanent seat for India on Security
Council. Available at
,
accessed on 10/11/2010.
3 India challenges China in South China Sea. In: Asian
Times. Available at ,
accessed on April 27, 2000.
4 France Jet Rafale bags US$ 20 billion IAF fighter
order, India's 'brief' losing European countries. Available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-02-01/india/31012278_1_rafale-mmrca-project-french-air-force
5 Ministry of External Affairs, India. "The
United States and India: Chartering the Future Course", Speech in India
Initiative of the Centre for New and American Security and the ASPEN Institute
India. Available at: Scott (2011). India's Relations with the USA. In: Scott,
David. Handbook of India's International Relations. London: Routledge.
6 Almeida (2010,136)
7 For example, while South Korea sent more than 300
thousand men to the Vietnam War, Japan sent none, according to Pyle (2007,
254).
8 Since the 1960s the ceiling had been informally
applied, according to Pyle (2007, 254).
9 In fact, even Yoshida Doctrine was criticized,
during the Cold War. For an overview of the Japanese political debate over the
issue, see Samuels (2007, 38-59)
10 EAS original members were: all of ASEAN countries
plus China, South Korea, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand. Russia and
the US have been added, since then.
11 Ibid.
12 As already mentioned, Malabar exercise is comprised
basically of Indian and US navies participation.
13 JIMEX 12 (Japan India Maritime Exercises) came to
happen in June 2012.
14 In Pew Research Center (2013), China is seen in
unfavorable way by 95% of the Japanese, while 5% see her in a favorable way,
according to a 2013 poll.
15 This big drop in the net result for China coincides
with a great surge upward in the net result for Indian views toward United
States, going from - 6 in 2008 to + 17 in 2012. Incidentally, the same trend
can be found in Japan views toward United States, going from - 17 in 2008 to +
14 in 2012. See BBC (2012) for further details.
16 According to Amorim and Coelho (2012), "BRICS
seem much more a 'Resonance Chamber' for revisionism."
17 This US incentive could be interpreted as a sort of
minor "buck-passing."
