By Murli Menon Indian Air Force Veteran and Former Air Advisor, Indian High Commission, Islamabad , Pakistan As I writ...
By Murli Menon
Indian Air
Force Veteran and Former Air Advisor, Indian High Commission, Islamabad ,
Pakistan
As I write
this piece sitting in Singapore on 27 Jul 2015, the TV breaks the news of
a terrorist attack along the Indo
–Pakistani border in Gurdaspur in Indian Punjab.Three to four terrorists in Army uniform have
carried out multiple attacks on a police station, a state transport bus and the
Gurdaspur- Pathankot railway line. They had earlier commandeered a Maruti car
and drove in it to the targets, there after barricading themselves inside the
police station. There are casualties and the attack smacks of the 26-29 Nov
2008 Lashkar – e- Toiba attack on Mumbai
, but on a smaller scale and of course with different targeting. It remains to be seen as to how the Modi
government reacts.
Going on seven
decades post its independence from British shackles, India has been criticized
the world over for its generally
pacifist mindset and world view out of
sync with its huge size and emerging economic power status. This erstwhile land of “ milk n’ honey”( in
the era before the British yoke plundered most of its material wealth), found
itself adopting a reactionary approach to national security and war , the
very first challenge coming in 1948 in Jammu & Kashmir. The strategic
brains of the supposedly astute Kautilya’s successors have shown themselves to
be essentially defensive in nature - a Hindu view of life perhaps- opting in
all its wars so far to hit back only
after it had been hit first.When the
Pakistani Razakars overran Kashmir
India's just-about timely reposte managed to save two thirds of Jammu &Kashmir from the Pakistani
marauders. Come 1962 the Chinese
intruded into Ladakh with disastrous consequences for India's national pride and sovereignty.The
story was similar in 1965 when Pakistani troops overran the Rann of Kutch and
India’s reactionary efforts only brought about a stalemate.Even in 1971 , with
a clear military supremacy followed by a massive surrender of Pakistan's
Eastern Army, India waited for its adversary to carry out a preemptive
strike on its airfields in the West before reacting. The happy outcome of the
war for India was mainly on account of the decimation of enemy forces in the
East and not so much due to any kudos it achieved in the Western sector.And of course all the
bonus of a huge 93000 POW bank was frittered away by Madame Gandhi
at Shimla! This reactionary military policy has never stood India in good
stead.However times appear to be changing now. India's new found
confidence , brimming from its existing economic and human resource clout has
led to a sea change in the
country's world view and the aspirations of its 60 % of people
younger than 35 years of age. The recent
military preemption by the Indian Army and Air Force against Indian militant outfits camped across the border in Myanmar needs to
be seen in this backdrop and though it created quite a furore in diplomatic circles, the event marked a
significant turn around in India's politico- military posture. Though the the Modi government initially attempted to show this mainly as a
significant change in national military strategy, the fact remains that India
has had such capabilities for eons now, though the intent for strong counter
terror action had been found wanting. Yes the government perhaps could take credit for a timely decision, but like in all such” special operations” credit should
go to the military and its combat elements.Special operations are naturally
conditioned by elements such as surprise, intelligence and weather , training
and audacity also being important
ingredients .
Cases in point
such as the Osama raid by the U.S. In Abbotabad on 2 May 2011 or the Entebbe
raid by Israel on 4 July 1976 indicate
the out-of-proportion impact of Special Operations. These operations are done
by most militaries come war, but very few establishments have the temerity to
undertake them during peace time or as part of "Operations Other Than
War" (OOTW) or indeed during proclaimed no-war situations. A country’s
international standing is a big factor in such recourses, viz countries such as
the U.S. or Israel. India now finds itself established as a “responsible”
democratic entity in the comity of
nations , known for its worldwide international and U N commitments besides
being a proven secular multi ethnic
polity. Strong leadership as perhaps evident presently gives India the
political option for preemption,a much needed option especially against terror-
sponsoring nation states or non-state actors.
The danger in
a preemptive strategy, for India as the dominant power in the region , is to be seen as a
"regional hegemon" , impacting
on its prolonged efforts at regional peace and cooperation, such as the SAARC.
Where possible therefore India must take the host government into confidence,
as was ostensibly done in the Myanmar instance. But in other cases, such as the
state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan ,the modus operandi has to be much more
nuanced , timely and appropriate.Terror acts, especially when funded and
orchestrated from outside the target country need to be countered with a slew
of measures, both in terms of soft kill and hard kill options, else the
innocent target country, invariably the one with a more democratic outlook,
finds itself in the zone of diminishing returns in countering terrorist acts.
Post 9/11 there has been a change in focus by most countries as far as war
priorities are concerned. Conventional
large scale wars have almost become passé , with some exceptions such as
the ongoing Russian misadventure in
Ukraine. Most nations including the U.S &U K have reoriented their
war strategies around Counter Terrorism. Traditional “ bad boys” such as North
Korea and Iran have been eclipsed , in
terms of world attention , to terrorist entities such as Al Qaeda and ISIS.Even in the subcontinent, an all out war between
India and Pakistan has become increasingly unlikely, given the nuclear
overhang. Border skirmishes and counter
terror operations would increasingly assume centre stage .
We shall first
look at the terror threat spectrum starting with India’s smaller neighbors , before
considering the case of its “enfante
terrible” , Pakistan .
Nepal , Bhutan
& Maldives
These are the neighbors that , comparatively , do
not have any substantial offensive military capabilities , nor do they harbor aggressive politico- military designs
against India. Bhutan is land locked and virtually a protectorate of India vide
existing security protocols. Thus no terrorist havens obtain there and not are
they likely to materialize in the
foreseeable future. India has organizations in place such as the Indian
Military Training Team (IMTRAT) which could easily be adapted for conduct of
special ops should the need arise .Maldives once again does not pose any
terrorist threat , though some LTTE -sponsored terrorist elements did seek to take
over that country in 1988 and the
government there sought India’s help
in neutralizing them, which was successfully done during “ Op
CACTUS “ .
Nepal on the
other hand is a Hindu nation and the considerable goodwill its citizens have
for India has been bolstered by India’s unflinching assistance rendered during
the recent earth quake calamity there. Nevertheless there are chances of
undesirable terror groups seeking havens there, possibly with Chinese collusion
.Given the historically excellent ties India enjoys with Nepal India should be
able to convince That country to undertake its own counter terror ops , if need
be with Indian collaboration . Indian
air power capabilities along with the fighting spirit of the Gurkha would be a
force to reckon with for any probable terrorist havens there.
Bangladesh
With
Bangladesh relations have come a long way under the ruling Sheikh Hasina regime
compared to what they were a few years ago under the Khaleda Zia regime.The
hardliners in Bangladesh (BD) Army / Directorate General Forces Intelligence
(DGFI) are expected to have been substantially
marginalized by now.Operational cooperation between The Border Security
Force of India and BD Rifles has considerably improved. But BD does have some
air power capabilities (including a few MiG 29s) and some Naval holdings.
A sizable Army too exists , whose
leadership fortunately is no more anti –
India, having been trained in India rather than the earlier lot trained in
Pakistan .For any trans – border
operations against terrorist elements of the HUJI group or Indian underground
groups in the Chakma Hill Tracts or
similar regions close liaison
with BD military, BD Rifles and of
course civil leadership India's special
forces experience during the BD liberation war in support of the Mukti
Bahini would come in handy of course.
Sri Lanka
This again is
a neighbor where India has had military experience in. The hard lessons learnt
during Op Pawan 11-25 Oct 1987 where
India went in to neutralize the LTTE( having earlier trained them
covertly!)would help it to undertake any counter terror operation there in
future. Sri Lankan armed forces have once again had Indian training( besides
from Pakistan )and this would help in
collaborating with them.
China
Whilst no immediate
terror threat exists across the border and Line of Actual Control with China, India could well envisage future border skirmishes against that country
. Air power would play a big role here, especially by way of employment of transport aircraft
and helicopters in switching forces along multiple axes. The IAF is decidedly
more capable along the Indo- China border and in any future scenario triggered
by water dispute or boundary issues , India would be well advised to employ air
power optimally, much as it refused to do during the 1962 Chinese debacle.
Pakistan
India’s biggest bugbear in terrorism has of course been Pakistan..
Unfounded alarmist fears by many an
analyst about the nuclear threshold being a demotivator for any future
Indo-Pak conventional confrontation have been amply disproved during the Kargil Conflict. Indeed this sector , along the
International Border and the Line of Control would pose the biggest challenge
for Indian security planners seeking to adopt preemption as a politico-
military strategy.
Military
& Organisational Capabilities
Essentially
what India needs for preemption are military forces( special forces troops and
aircraft both fixed wing & helicopters/ / UAVs), a strong intelligence
capability ( both HUMINT & TECHINT)and sensors to enable safety of the strike elements during ingress and egress(
such as AWACS/AEW and adequate Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), by way of hard kill and soft kill options.
The former would include attack heptrs and fighters and the latter Electronic
Warfare elements, AEW, UAVs, besides suitable close in and stand off weaponry suited to the operational scenario. Most of these India already possesses ,
except perhaps numbers of Special Forces which are vital to hold territory and
neutralize the opposition and the targets. Pending acquisitions such as Apache AH-64 helicopters
and Boeing Chinook CH 47 troop carrier helicopters need expedition. Presently
India has nine battalions of Para Commando Special Forces with its Army. This needs to be beefed
up adequately( at least doubled in numbers . Indian Army has another 7200
commando troops attached to its 359 infantry battalions which could be
reorganized ) to cater for preemption options on all sectors without and within
the country. In this context a big
handicap has been the lack of an Integrated
Defence Force as most leading militaries have. India has allowed inter -service rivalries
and turf wars to impact its capabilities. What is needed is a truly tri-service
approach and an effective pooling of resources. So too for the Special Forces
capability: Indian Navy’s Maritime Commandos (MARCOS), Border Security Force
(BSF)'s Commandos, the National Security Guards - around 15000 well equipped
troops meant mainly for VIP
security, and the various state Police commando battalions all need to be
integrated to meet the terror threat optimally depending on the location,
terrain and potency of enemy forces. Currently there has been talk of setting
up a Special Operations Command a la the
U S SOCOM. Protagonists argue that this would perhaps force the Government to
provide adequate funding for the Special Forces, which is not the case now.
Command and Control being vital for any such operation adequate coordination
between the ministries of Home , Defence and External Affairs would be a must.
Besides the
force structure India direly needs to adapt its military strategy to one of
preemption.
What the
Future Portends
Traditionally
the subcontinent has had a war history dominated by India and Pakistan fighting
over Kashmir. Not having reconciled to a bigger and secular India post
partition in 1947 and then again the rankling it faced over losing its Eastern
wing in 1971, Pakistan’s attempt has been to destroy India “ through a thousand
cuts”. Kashmir was a convenient excuse to build this animosity around. But 9/11
changed things dramatically. American and NATO campaigns in Afghanistan called
Pakistan’s bluff as a state sponsor of terror. It finds itself , virtually, in
a two – front situation with a hot border along the Durand line with
Afghanistan and its traditional for India to the East. The world has tired of
Pakistan’s antics on Kashmir , it's nuclear proliferation and its lack of a
democratic polity.
With the NATO
withdrawal from Afghanistan Pakistan will attempt to refocus its India policy
around its “ strategic assets”, viz home grown terror groups. Whilst some token
military effort would go towards countering elements such as the TTP, it's
Army’s survival would depend on a hot border with India.Recent reports of extra
constitutional human rights violations by the Pak Army on TTP suspects would do
little to dissuade its Army from highhandedness, given its vast corporate
interests in the country.
India will
need to re-balance its armed forces around the new world threat phenomena such
as terrorism, sea piracy and actions of a few “rogue” states. Essentially this
would mean “ a lean and mean” armed forces. This would involve having mainly
precision hard kill capabilities and back up conventional military wherewithal
such as armor/ artillery/ infantry and air power sea power assets for a
deterrent conventional conflict. Army's 49% of Defence budget share at 99000
crore rupees and its around 30% of the Defence Capital budget would have to be
re-prioritised so as to give more funds for Special Forces modernization.
Pending big ticket accruals such as the 24 AH-64 Apache gunships and 15 Chinook
CH-47 F troop carriers worth 2.6 billion $ would need to be expedited. Nuclear
capabilities would need to be maintained at optimum levels to counter Pak/ China nuclear postures.Optimizing the
force structure is just one part of the re-balancing of forces, the more
important follow – ons such as supporting doctrines and related training being
equally vital.
Hard kill
options with R&AW
Taking a leaf
out of the CIA experience in its Drone Wars in Afghanistan & Yemen
India needs to consider rendering its external intelligence agency R&AW
with a hard kill capability comprising UAVs and Special Forces. Presently hard
kill UAVs are only available with the Americans , not even with the Israelis.UK
too has American Reaper drones but no hard kill capability with Hell Fire
missiles. An important element in a preemptive scenario is deniability. The
government should be able to keep the operations entirely secretive , with a
suitable decision matrix including the executive political authority, in
India’s case it's Prime Minster. Of course the Parliament needs to empower the
PM with such authority( somewhat akin to the Nuclear Launch Command authorization)hard
kill UAVs would come India’s way sooner than later, with Attack heptrs or ground attack fighters substituting
until then.if such capabilities exist with the country's intelligence agencies
the much touted international norm of “ deniability” could be achieved.
Constitution
of Strike Package
Depending on
the setting the military preemptive package could be configured differently. A
single service force , a bi service one or a tri-service mission could be envisaged.The exact numbers
and constitution would of course depend on the threat scenario and opposition
expected, a “hot zone “demanding elements for suppressing air defences,
electronic warfare, AEW, fighter
cover,Combat Search & Rescue,
special forces and the like. A sea ward operation on the other hand may perhaps
only call for the Indian Naval assets to be deployed. Likewise there could be
scenarios for only doing a preemptive air strike.special forces insertion and
extraction would need air power support such as Heliborne Forces and even C
130J type of integration.Casualty evacuation missions could also be envisaged ,
a la “ BLACK HAWK DOWN”. Surprise and
total surprise at that , being vital training including realistic scenario
training is inescapable. The elaborate work up done for raids such as the
Entebbe and Osirak nuclear raid by the
Israelis need to be factored in.
Preemption
needs Good Diplomatic / Media Support
It is widely
established that a big contributor to India’s Kargil victory was its powerful
media strategy. Embedded journalists ( perhaps employed for the first time in
this manner)along with daily tri-service briefings organized by the Ministry of
External affairs virtually put paid to
Pakistan’s claims of the intruders being non- state actors rather than the Northern
Light Infantry troops that their IDs indicated. For preemption to carry home
its advantages the media has to be
carefully orchestrated.
Conclusion
India was
traditionally accused of not having any worthwhile military strategy as a
nation . Nevertheless it then went through five decades of creating a balanced
armed forces designed to fighting a
conventional campaign against Pakistan and China. Then came the era of
asymmetric warfare involving militant organizations fighting in cities and in
other terrains against regular troops of USA and its allies.be it lone wolf
operations or coordinated attacks such as the Mumbai carnage by the Lashkar –e-
Toiba the civilized world has become increasingly vulnerable to terrorist
forces. Western nations have sought to fight terror via the NATO medium. For
India the change in threat spectrum has been gradually evolving but surely so.
With China involved in military modernization whilst consolidating its economy,
its close ally Pakistan has been tumbling down the abyss of an
uncertain political future as a viable democratic nation, India's threat would
increasingly revolve around terrorism- centric attacks on innocent populace.
This coupled with indigenous disgruntled elements such as Maoists and the
militant groups of the North East , there is a clear need for India to rehash
its politico – military strategy , if it
is to be able to provide security to its citizens. Accretion of military
capabilities by militant groups would call for reorientation of size able
elements of standing armed forces into highly mobile, technologically advanced
precision stoke forces. This would involve force structure changes and reads oration
of doctrines and training. The nature of threat posed by militant organizations
would increasingly call for preemption as an option. This has to be dovetailed
with astute leadership, strong media support and intelligence sensitive attack
options. In India's case this would pose peculiar challenges , given the lack
of integrated military organization , paucity of Special Forces and hitherto
lack of political will. The recent cross border raid carried out by the Indian
military against indigenous terror groups havens in Myanmar augurs well for the
country to dramatically overhaul its military
responses to state-sponsored , indigenous and other terror threats over
land and sea. Preemption is not necessarily a bully's choice but a contemporary
strategy available to democratic, secular, stable polities such as India. That
would be the way forward for correct political signaling to ill- meaning
adversaries and entities. India has suffered enough from terror and the
tolerance limit is well past. A strategy of preemption would give the country
the option to selectively target terrorist hide outs and training camps across
borders, incrementally ratcheting up the pain inflicted on the adversary ,
making it un-affordable for him to use terror as a convenient tool in nefarious statecraft.it is high time India
re-balanced its military to give it more special forces capabilities and a
viable preemptive military option against states and groups sponsoring terror
across the borders into India.
About The
Author:
Group Captain (Retd.) Murli Menon served in Indian Air Force for 32 years, transiting it
tactical, operational, strategic and conceptual appointment spectra with
credit. He was India’s Air Advisor to Indian High Commission at Islamabad,
Pakistan (2000-2004). In his second avatar, he served for 8 years with India’s
Cabinet Secretariat, including a stint as Consular at Ankara, Turkey from
2008-2011.
He was one of
the pioneers in the IAF’s Doctrine Think Tank – “Air War Strategy Cell” that
produced India’s first Air Power Doctrine, the IAP 2000 in 1995. His interests
include strategic studies and since post retirement he contributes to various
think-tanks based out of New Delhi, India.
References
- India: Foreign policy & Government guide, International Business Publications May 2001 ISBN 979-0-7397-8298-9
- Mumbai Attacks: The bureaucracy of India's Marine Commandos, The Guardian 6 Dec 2008
- Garuds: IAF’s Commando force takes off, Rediff, Press Trust of India 6 Feb 2004
- India's Special Forces: History and future of Special Forces, Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd., ISBN 978-93-82573-97-5
- Elite Commando Units of India: MARCOS, COBRA, NSG & more.
