ASEAN's South China Sea Code of Conduct faces unresolved disputes over scope, legal force and enforcement as the Manila summit approaches.
That gap is what leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) carry into Manila. The 49th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits will be held on November 16–18 at the Philippine International Convention Center, and Malaysia's Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan, who co-chairs the talks with China, said in July that the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) was expected to be finalized at that summit. The three-year timeline that ASEAN and China set for themselves in Jakarta in July 2023 ran out this July. In early November, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) declined to say whether a deal would be reached during or after the summit, reiterating that all parties remained committed to the 2023 guidelines, while a November 4 report indicated that the code is not expected to conclude in Manila. The weaker outcome for ASEAN would not be one more missed date. It would be a document announced as the code that still cannot say where it applies or whether it binds. Such a text would carry the 2002 declaration's weaknesses under a new name and use up the pressure the deadline has created. If the hard clauses are not ready, the region is better served by saying so and adopting a time-bound package of risk-reduction measures than by celebrating a code in name only.
The often-quoted measure of progress is older than it looks. Mohamad told Malaysia's lower house on January 22 that nearly 70 percent of the content had been agreed, adding that careful negotiation was still needed to protect national sovereignty. By July, after six more months of talks, he acknowledged that several key paragraphs still required the agreement of all countries involved. No updated share has been published since. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., interviewed in Singapore in October, said it was very hard to say the code would be finished by November, when Manila hands the gavel to Singapore, while insisting that a great deal of progress had been made. Negotiators have met every month since January, up from once every three months, which is evidence of effort. The missing 30 percent is still where the code's meaning sits.
The calendar of the talks shows how often a date has stood in for a decision, and the table below traces it from the 2002 declaration to the Manila summit.
Date | Step | What it settled, and what it left open |
|---|---|---|
November 4, 2002 | ASEAN and China sign the DOC in Phnom Penh | Self-restraint, voluntary notice of military exercises, and a pledge to work "towards the eventual attainment" of a code. Not legally binding. |
July 12, 2016 | Arbitral tribunal rules in Philippines v. China | No legal basis for China's claim to historic rights within the "nine-dash line"; Scarborough Shoal generates no exclusive economic zone. China rejects the award. |
August 2018 | Single draft negotiating text agreed under Singapore's chairmanship | A working text exists. Scope, binding status, banned activities and dispute handling still contested. |
November 13, 2018 | Premier Li Keqiang says China hopes to finish within three years | The implied 2021 target passes without a code. |
July 13, 2023 | Jakarta guidelines to accelerate an "effective and substantive" code | Three-year timeline set; contents of the guidelines not published. |
January–October 2026 | Monthly negotiating rounds under the Philippine chairmanship | About 70 percent agreed, by Malaysia's January count; scope, legal nature and the link to the DOC still open in July. |
July 2026 | Three-year window lapses; 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting targets conclusion "within this year" | Joint communiqué makes no mention of the 2016 award. |
November 16–18, 2026 | 49th ASEAN Summit, Manila | Target named by Malaysia's foreign minister; DFA declines to preempt any announcement. |
Table 1: Two decades of deadlines, and the same open questions. Sources: DOC text; Permanent Court of Arbitration press release, July 12, 2016; ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, November 15, 2018; Xinhua, November 13, 2018; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 14, 2023; Joint Communiqué of the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting; Bernama, January 22 and July 22, 2026. Data cut-off: November 10, 2026.
Set side by side, the 2018 and 2026 agendas are close to identical, which says more about the talks than any percentage. When Li Keqiang offered his three-year horizon, the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute listed the contentious issues as the geographical scope of the agreement, whether it should be legally binding or voluntary, which activities should be prohibited and how disputes arising from the code should be handled. Eight years and two deadlines later, Lazaro's list of unfinished business covers most of the same ground. Faster meetings have produced more text. They have not yet produced the political choices that the text depends on.
Geographic scope is the first of those choices, and it is a question about maps before it is a question about law. Antonio Carpio, the former Philippine Supreme Court justice who helped build Manila's arbitration case, has said that the Philippines wants Scarborough Shoal covered and the 2016 ruling reflected, Vietnam wants the Paracel Islands included, and China opposes those positions. That is one well-placed observer's account, not a published negotiating record, and it deserves that caution. It fits Beijing's conduct on the ground. China declared territorial-sea baselines around Scarborough Shoal in November 2024, and its State Council approved a national nature reserve there in September 2025, a step Manila called illegitimate and unlawful. A government that treats a disputed feature as territory under its administration has little incentive to accept a regional code imposing rules on its conduct there.
The map below shows why scope cannot be left vague without hollowing out the agreement.
Map 1: Scope is a map question: three groups of features where positions on coverage reportedly diverge. Sources: positions as described by former Justice Antonio Carpio (Inquirer.net, July 24, 2026); State Council of China, September 10, 2025; coast guard statements as reported in July and October 2026. Land: Natural Earth. No maritime claim lines are shown. Data cut-off: November 10, 2026.
If the Paracels and Scarborough Shoal fall outside the code, it would leave out two of the most contested parts of the sea. If the text stays silent on scope, each party will read the code as covering whatever its own claims imply, which is close to having no common scope at all. Either way, the places where the code is most needed would be the places where its meaning is least settled. Map 2, later in this piece, shows that these features lie close to the shipping lanes between the Strait of Malacca and the Luzon Strait.
Legal force is the second choice, bound up with a ruling the parties do not share. Carpio's summary is blunt: "The PH wants the COC to be legally binding. China does not want it to be legally binding." China's Foreign Ministry said on July 10 that the 2016 award is "illegal, null and void," adding that "The 'award' has absolutely no relevance to the COC." Manila calls the same award final and binding. ASEAN itself has stepped around the dispute: the 59th foreign ministers' communiqué asks for an "effective and substantive COC" in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) "within this year" and does not mention the award, which ASEAN has left out of its joint statements since 2016. A code that claims to rest on UNCLOS but leaves its relationship with the arbitral award undefined would allow each side to interpret the text as supporting its own legal position.
Described in public, the open issues line up as follows, alongside what each would settle.
Open issue | What is reportedly on the table | What it would decide |
|---|---|---|
Geographic scope | Philippine push to cover Scarborough Shoal; Vietnamese push to cover the Paracels; Chinese opposition (Carpio account). | Whether the code applies where incidents actually occur. |
Legal nature | Philippine preference for a binding instrument; Chinese resistance, including to binding dispute settlement. | Whether a breach carries a legal consequence or only a diplomatic cost. |
Link to the DOC | Unsettled, per Lazaro; China frames the code as "part and parcel" of implementing the DOC. | Whether the code replaces the 2002 commitments or merely restates them. |
The 2016 award | Manila treats it as final and binding; Beijing calls it null and void and irrelevant to the code. | Whether UNCLOS, as interpreted by the tribunal, anchors the text. |
Outside parties | 2018 Chinese proposals on exercises and energy cooperation with countries from outside the region; United States says no outcome may undermine its interests. | Whether the code constrains claimants' conduct or their choice of partners. |
Table 2: What the remaining text has to decide. Sources: Inquirer.net, July 24, 2026; S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, September 7, 2026; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 10, 2026; ISEAS Perspective 2019/57. Data cut-off: November 10, 2026.
The last row of that table exposes a risk that a rushed text could carry, because legal force need not apply evenly across a document. A 2019 analysis by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute identified two provisions in China's proposed text: that the parties not hold joint military exercises with countries from outside the region unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection, and that oil and gas development in disputed waters be carried out by littoral states and not with companies from outside the region. Whether those clauses survive in today's draft has not been made public. Their logic still matters. The 2002 declaration asks only for notice of exercises "on a voluntary basis." A code that turned that courtesy into a veto would bind Southeast Asian states on their choice of partners while leaving conduct at sea governed by voluntary rules. US Ambassador to ASEAN Kevin Kim has already said that any outcome "must not undermine the interests of the United States."
The positions of the main governments, compared below, show how much of this divide is already in the open.
Government | Public position on the code, 2026 |
|---|---|
Philippines (ASEAN chair) | Wants a binding code under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that respects third-party rights; treats the 2016 award as final and binding. President Marcos calls the code "very, very important" but would not promise a November finish. |
Malaysia (coordinator with China) | Views the code as a framework for behavior and confidence-building, not for settling overlapping claims; named the Manila summit as the target. |
Vietnam | Spokesperson says ASEAN and China affirmed efforts to complete a "substantive and effective" code in 2026 under UNCLOS; urges full implementation of the DOC. Wants the Paracels covered, according to Carpio. |
Indonesia | "Our people have waited 24 years for rules at sea. They should not wait for another year." |
Singapore (2027 chair) | Non-claimant; supports an effective code under UNCLOS that safeguards all parties' rights. |
China | Committed to an "early conclusion"; considers the code part of implementing the DOC and maintains that the 2016 arbitral award "has absolutely no relevance." |
United States (not a party) | Respects the negotiations; says the outcome must not undermine US interests and that it will continue to sail in international waters. |
Table 3: Where the governments stand. Sources: Newswatch Plus, July 23, 2026; GMA News, October 2026; Daily Tribune, October 11, 2026; Bernama; Viet Nam Foreign Ministry briefing, July 23, 2026, as reproduced; Jakarta Globe, July 21, 2026; Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2026; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 10, 2026. Data cut-off: November 10, 2026.
While diplomats trade drafts, the water has kept supplying reasons for urgency, and the incident record is itself contested. On July 20, the day before ASEAN foreign ministers met in Manila, the Philippine military reported that a China Coast Guard officer struck a Filipino sailor with a baton at Second Thomas Shoal; the China Coast Guard said Filipino personnel attacked first. On October 8, the Philippine Coast Guard said a Chinese vessel's water cannon and its refusal of an agreed meeting point stretched a medical evacuation from the BRP Sierra Madre to nearly 10 hours; Beijing denied obstructing the evacuation and accused Manila of distorting the facts. Days before the Manila summit opens, it is not possible to settle these accounts from public evidence. Their pattern is plain enough. The ASEAN communiqué recorded concern from "some Ministers" over land reclamations and "serious incidents in the area", and Marcos put the stakes in personal terms at a business conference in Singapore: "My greatest fear is that some seaman, some soldier, just makes a mistake. And that mistake turns into something that goes out of control."
That fear supplies the strongest argument against the case made here, and it deserves a full hearing. Even a non-binding code, the reasoning goes, would give the negotiating governments a shared text, a reference point for judging conduct and a platform for crisis talks. Mohamad has made a version of this case, saying that once a code is in place, ASEAN can use its own platform "should anything happen". Writing for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Rommel Banlaoi argued that insisting on a fully binding treaty risks deadlock, and that a modest agreement that builds risk reduction into regular practice could be a real step forward. Marcos sounded close to that view when he said Manila was "resigned to just being able to manage the problem." Hotlines and encounter rules can save lives, and they are worth having whatever the code is called.
The weakness of that argument is in what it would actually deliver. The region has had a non-binding instrument since 2002, and it did not prevent the conduct the 2016 tribunal described when it found that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision by physically obstructing Philippine vessels. A second voluntary text would add a title, not an obligation. What it would remove is leverage. The deadline is the one source of collective pressure ASEAN has managed to build, and declaring the code concluded would end the monthly rhythm of talks and settle the label before the substance. Tang Siew Mun, a former director at the ASEAN Secretariat, warned in October that a signing should not be celebrated automatically without examining its substance and the compromises involved. Banlaoi drew the same line in plainer words: "A symbolic conclusion without substance would be a hollow diplomatic victory." The case for risk reduction is sound. It argues for an honest interim instrument, not for calling an unfinished text a code.
Outside the claimant states, the stakes run through the shipping lanes shown below, which link the Indian Ocean to the economies of Northeast Asia.
Map 2: The features in dispute sit astride the lanes that carry Asia's trade. Sources: Benden, P. (2022), Global Shipping Lanes v1, georeferenced from the US Central Intelligence Agency's Map of the World's Oceans (2012); feature coordinates from published gazetteer entries; land from Natural Earth. No maritime claim lines or sea boundaries are shown. Data cut-off: November 10, 2026.
The trade figures behind those lanes give the dispute its global weight, though the most cited number is outdated. The Center for Strategic and International Studies' ChinaPower project estimated that about US$3.4 trillion of trade passed through the South China Sea in 2016, roughly 21 percent of global trade, and that the waterway carried trade worth 30.6 percent of India's total goods trade that year. Although these estimates date from 2016, they illustrate why Japan, Australia, India and the United States follow the negotiations closely despite not being parties to them. For them, the clauses on outside parties matter as much as the rules on conduct.
What follows Manila depends on which of a small set of outcomes the summit produces; the four sketched below carry no odds.
Outcome | What it would look like | What to watch |
|---|---|---|
A code in name | Leaders announce a concluded code, but scope and legal nature are deferred to later instruments or expressed in ambiguous language. | Whether the text identifies the geographical area it covers and explicitly states that it is "legally binding"; how Manila, Hanoi and Beijing each characterize the outcome afterward. |
Progress and a new date | The chair's statement reports "substantial progress" and sets a new target under Singapore's 2027 chairmanship. | Whether a timetable and a list of outstanding issues are published. |
Interim package plus calendar | Risk-reduction measures are adopted under the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), such as hotlines, safe-encounter rules and search-and-rescue coordination, while negotiations continue. | Whether the measures include reporting obligations and scheduled review dates. |
Stall after an incident | A confrontation at sea hardens negotiating positions, leaving the talks continuing formally without a substantive breakthrough. | Coast guard statements in the days surrounding the summit and whether China's premier attends. |
Table 4: Four ways Manila could end. Sources: IndraStra Global analysis drawing on the Philippine DFA, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Manila Times commentary, November 3, 2026. No probabilities are assigned. Data cut-off: November 10, 2026.
Those outcomes point to specific choices for the governments in the room, starting with the chair. Manila's strongest move would be a chair's statement that names the outstanding issues plainly and attaches a negotiating calendar running into 2027, so that Singapore, which takes the chair on January 1, 2027 and helped broker the 2018 draft, inherits a task list rather than a slogan. Alongside it, leaders could adopt the interim measures that a column published in Manila in early November proposed, including working hotlines and safe-encounter rules, explicitly as a stopgap under the 2002 declaration. Inside ASEAN, Tang's proposal to restore an internal caucus so that members meet China with a clean draft and a single position would address a weakness that monthly meetings have not cured. For claimant states, any compromise on scope needs explicit language that coverage does not prejudice sovereignty claims, so that leaving a feature out cannot later be read as conceding it. Partners outside the region, India among them, would do well to read any final text for what it says about exercises and energy cooperation with outsiders, because those clauses would shape their own access.
The summit will be judged on its wording, and the test is narrow. A chair's statement that uses "concluded" without saying where the code applies, or "effective and substantive" without saying "legally binding," would have repeated the compromise of 2002, when the parties settled for a declaration in part because they could not agree that a code should bind. The declaration was meant to lead to a code. Signing a second document of the same kind under the code's name would not move the region forward. It would only reset the clock that has made this deadline matter.
Apple News, Google News, Feedly, Flipboard, and WhatsApp Channel
COVER IMAGE: The cover image is AI-generated and is used for illustrative purposes only. It does not depict actual people, places, or events.
