AUSA 2026 highlights how drone warfare, counter-drone defenses and robotic logistics are reshaping tank survivability and modern armored warfare.
One of the most striking exhibits at this year's Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and Exposition was not a main battle tank (MBT). On the opening morning, October 12, GM Defense rolled out an uncrewed ground vehicle built on a Chevrolet Silverado 3500HD chassis, pitched for "silent logistics and casualty evacuation" and fitted on the show floor with a counter-drone laser. A few minutes’ walk away, in a tent on 9th Street, Ukrainian companies were showing interceptor drones, jammers and robotic carriers that their own military units order in large quantities. A fashionable reading follows: the main battle tank is finished, and the future belongs to light trucks, robots and swarms.
That reading confuses a change in where survivability comes from with the disappearance of a platform. The evidence from Ukraine, from US Army testing and from the exhibition itself points to a narrower and more demanding conclusion. Survivability on a battlefield monitored by large numbers of inexpensive sensors can no longer depend primarily on armor thickness. It increasingly depends on the formation as a whole: protection, mobility, concealment, dispersion, electronic resilience, active protection, counter-drone defenses, logistics and uncrewed systems must work together. The force that emerges combines tanks, protected four-wheel-drive vehicles, tracked carriers, ground robots, first-person-view (FPV) drones and counter-drone layers, each covering gaps in the others. The more consequential question is whether armies can redesign their combined-arms formations quickly enough to preserve the tank's battlefield utility.
Any assessment of AUSA must distinguish what a defense exhibition demonstrates from what it merely suggests. The 2026 meeting, held October 12–14 at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center in Washington, advertised more than 750 exhibits and over 40,000 attendees, and for the first time added an outdoor exhibit area across 9th Street. A concept displayed at an exhibition reveals what a company believes the Army may want to acquire; it does not establish operational performance, affordability or the likelihood of procurement. The distinction between demonstration, adoption, repeat procurement and production at scale runs through everything that follows.
The outdoor area housed the event's clearest symbol of that gap. Organized by the US firm Fenicks Group, the Ukrainian Defense Tech Pavilion was advertised as showcasing 17 Ukrainian companies. The official exhibitor listing included additional entities, among them Ukraine's Third Army Corps, a military formation rather than a commercial company. Reporting from the pavilion recorded the range on offer. TENCORE displayed its TerMIT uncrewed ground vehicle, which the company says can carry up to 400 kilograms, travel approximately 40 kilometers at a maximum stated speed of 15 kilometers per hour. On October 13, TENCORE signed a memorandum with Canada's Dominion Dynamics to integrate an autonomy stack and target Canadian production from 2027. TarGun reported that it had built more than 2,800 ground vehicles this year. Phantom Defense displayed jammers and interceptor drones, Unwave and Kvertus displayed electronic-warfare and detection systems, and Stellarion said it produces more than 40,000 drones a month, according to an account from the show floor. These production figures are company-reported claims and should not be treated as independently audited output. Several firms said openly that they had come for partners, investors and US contracts. The sponsor of the pavilion's reception, SPARC AI, used its own announcement to promote a navigation and targeting product for GPS-denied conditions.
What the pavilion did show credibly is the operating environment those products were built for. The term "transparent battlefield" describes an environment in which reconnaissance drones, electronic intelligence, commercial satellite imagery and acoustic sensors make concealment more difficult and expose movements to persistent observation. Drones comprise several distinct weapon and support categories. Small reconnaissance quadcopters locate targets and support artillery adjustment; first-person-view (FPV) drones conduct one-way attacks; heavier bomber drones deliver munitions and, in some configurations, supplies; and fixed-wing one-way attack drones can reach targets deeper behind the front. Fiber-optic FPVs receive control signals through a physical cable, making them resistant to conventional radio-frequency jamming, although they remain vulnerable to other countermeasures. A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) study published in October 2025 describes how this layering creates a belt of persistent attrition many kilometers deep in which surveillance and strike systems make daytime movement particularly hazardous.
Loss figures are among the most frequently cited—and most easily misinterpreted—indicators of this shift. Ukraine's commander-in-chief, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, said in February 2025 that 66 percent of Russian equipment disabled in January had been put out of action by strike drones, with FPVs accounting for 49 percent of hits. In December 2025 he said drones carried out around 60 percent of strikes on frontline targets and that units had destroyed or damaged 81,500 targets in November. These are official claims from a belligerent and are based on military reporting rather than independent verification. Their interpretation also requires care because "hit," "damaged," "disabled" and "destroyed" describe different outcomes. The independent Oryx database records equipment losses supported by visual evidence, providing a count of documented cases rather than a complete inventory. Such records do not always establish the weapon responsible. Separately, CSIS, using visually confirmed data, counted approximately 1,865 Russian tank losses between January 2024 and mid-2025. RUSI provides a further qualification: Ukrainian analysts interviewed by the institute estimated that the number of Russian artillery pieces actually destroyed by drone strikes was approximately half the publicly claimed figure. They attributed the difference partly to equipment that was damaged and subsequently recovered or repaired.
Measure | Source and period | What it counts | Main limitation |
|---|---|---|---|
Share of Russian equipment disabled by strike drones: 66% | Gen. Syrskyi, January 2025 | Equipment “disabled,” per Ukrainian unit reports | Belligerent claim; “disabled” undefined; not independently verified |
Share of frontline strikes by drones: about 60% | Gen. Syrskyi, November 2025 | Strikes, not losses | Measures activity, not effect |
Visually confirmed equipment losses | Oryx, 2022 to present | Destroyed, damaged, abandoned, captured items with photo or video | Undercount; cause of loss often unknown |
Russian artillery destroyed by drones vs. claimed: about 50% | Ukrainian analysts cited by RUSI, 2025 | Ratio of confirmed destruction to claims | Interview-based; artillery only |
Russian tanks detected within 70 km of the front: 23 (August 1–24, 2025) vs. 470 on one axis (May 2023) | Ukrainian ISR survey cited by RUSI | Presence, not losses | Reflects Russian choices as well as drone threat |
Interpreting drone-era loss figures: reported claims, visually documented losses and observed force presence measure different aspects of battlefield activity. Periods and definitions vary by source.
Even discounted for those limits, the evidence supports a narrower conclusion: inexpensive airborne weapons account for a substantial share of reported vehicle damage in Ukraine, while the distinction between a mission kill and the permanent destruction of a vehicle has become operationally important. A tank that loses its tracks, optics or engine in a drone attack may be removed from combat even if its crew survives and the vehicle can eventually be repaired. Comparing purchase prices misleads, which is why CSIS has urged the Pentagon to judge drones by price per mission: the true cost of an FPV includes operators, training, radios and the many drones lost to jamming before reaching a target, while the cost of a damaged vehicle includes recovery, repair time and the operation it was meant to enable. On this basis, the economic exchange may still favor the drone in many circumstances, although the advantage depends on mission success, target value, repair requirements and the availability of replacement systems.
Steel has not stopped mattering, but each layer of protection now carries a price in weight and mobility. Passive armor and explosive reactive armor (ERA) remain important protective layers. RUSI documented a Ukrainian tank platoon operating captured Russian tanks that reportedly sustained between two and 12 hits per operation and remained serviceable after their armor packs were replaced. Improvised screens and so-called "cope cages" can provide limited protection against some top-attack threats but are not uniformly effective. Ukrainian officers interviewed by RUSI argued that Russia's fully enclosed "turtle tanks" were counterproductive because their protective structures restricted turret movement. Active protection systems (APS), which detect and intercept incoming munitions, were designed mainly against missiles and rockets, and adapting them to slow, small and numerous drones remains an engineering problem. Although onboard jammers can disrupt radio-controlled drones, they are largely ineffective against fiber-optic-guided systems. Meanwhile, additional protective equipment increases vehicle weight, potentially reducing the mobility and fuel endurance required for dispersed operations.
The heavy-armor case deserves its full weight here. Tanks remain among the most capable ground platforms for combining protected direct fire and shock action in a vehicle designed to support assaults against defended positions. Nothing displayed at AUSA demonstrated that lighter vehicles or uncrewed systems could replace this combination across the full range of combat tasks. CSIS military fellows reported in 2025 that Ukrainian commanders were "adamant" tanks remain crucial for seizing and holding ground with infantry, and RUSI found Ukrainian brigades still field an armor company each and consider platoon-sized armor "indispensable" for clearing positions and drawing fire away from infantry. What has changed is the operational context: tanks are increasingly employed in smaller groups and for shorter periods of exposure, within a broader protective system. Ukrainians told RUSI they prize mobility, endurance and repairability, and see Western tanks as too heavy and hard to repair.
Illustrative scenario, not a real operation: a dispersed armored team in which tanks with active protection fight under counter-drone cover alongside protected 4x4s, decoys and drone teams, with ground robots and dispersed nodes handling resupply. Fictional terrain; simplified APP-6-style symbols. Graphic: IndraStra Global
The US Army's own tank program already reflects that critique. When the Army announced the M1E3 Abrams in September 2023, it canceled the planned SEPv4 upgrade on the grounds that "the Abrams Tank can no longer grow its capabilities without adding weight" and that Ukraine had shown the need for protection "built from within instead of adding on." According to the Congressional Research Service, General Dynamics Land Systems delivered the first prototype in December 2025, and the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood is due to receive a platoon of prototypes this fall for soldier testing through March 2027, while the Army has requested US$474 million in fiscal 2027 development funding to accelerate the program. Public descriptions cite an integrated APS, an autoloader enabling a three-person crew, a hybrid-electric drive, a smaller logistics footprint and integrated counter-drone capability; the Army has not published a weight target, and reported figures of about 60 tons remain unofficial. Prototypes reportedly fired live rounds in early October, but no results have been released. No public report found the M1E3 itself on the AUSA floor. The Army's approach, in effect, is to develop a tank designed to operate within a network of integrated protection and support systems.
The same institution has also been cutting vehicle programs once considered modern. Under a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth dated April 30, 2025, the Army launched its Army Transformation Initiative (ATI). Chief of Staff General Randy George's letter to the force announced an end to procurement of the AH-64D Apache, the Gray Eagle drone and "excess ground vehicles like the HMMWV and JLTV," and in June 2025 the Army terminated production of the M10 Booker, a light tank built for infantry divisions. Those decisions undercut any simple story in which the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) inherits the tank's role. The Army's decision to stop procuring the JLTV should not be interpreted as evidence that protected trucks have become the new decisive platform. The Army's procurement priorities differ from those of the Marine Corps, which continues to procure the vehicle and has pursued measures to address supplier and delivery concerns.
The genuine rise of light vehicles lies in what they carry and how cheaply they can be replaced. Protected 4X4 transport infantry, counter-drone teams and supplies across a dispersed front, and RUSI found protected mobility "even more critical" to Ukrainian units than tanks, because fragments and top-attack strikes threaten every movement. Ukrainians increasingly prefer locally built vehicles with modular armor that can be repaired near the front. Unprotected and lightly protected trucks such as the Army's Infantry Squad Vehicle trade protection for speed, which suits airborne and light formations but not assault. The limits of the category are plain: a four-by-four cannot breach a defended position, carries little protection against artillery or anti-tank weapons, and is as visible to a drone as any other vehicle. Its value lies in making dispersed operations more affordable.
Ground robots extend that logic to the most dangerous jobs. GM Defense's Silverado concept, which the company says uses drive-by-wire controls, a 100-kilowatt-hour battery, an 8,000-pound payload and an autonomy stack from Scout AI, is a demonstrator in development: the company is aiming to have a technology demonstrator ready by June 2027 and has no scheduled delivery for Army testing, according to reporting from the launch. Ukraine offers the more mature evidence. RUSI observed that most units now prefer to evacuate wounded soldiers by ground robot, staging vehicles two to five kilometers behind forward positions and driving them remotely from the brigade rear, with evacuation often taking two to three hours. In this context, robots complement rather than replace armor. They can reduce personnel exposure during high-risk logistics and casualty-evacuation missions, freeing protected vehicles and soldiers for tasks that require their capabilities.
Ukraine's procurement system shows how quickly use can turn into buying. On the government-run Brave1 Market, units spend points earned for confirmed combat results, and the Ministry of Defense reported in September 2026 that troops had ordered more than 590,000 drones in the first nine months of the year, with interceptor drones now the largest category ahead of FPVs; delivery runs through the DOT-Chain Defence logistics platform. This sequence of combat feedback, product evaluation, repeat orders and scaled procurement is difficult for Western armies to replicate.
Counter-drone defense has become the hinge connecting heavy and light forces, and the US Army's recent record shows both progress and continuing capability gaps. A Center for Army Lessons Learned report in September 2025 found counter-drone training at the National Training Center hampered by systems incompatible with engagement simulation, restrictions on GPS jamming and a culture that treated the task as secondary to maneuver. Since then, testing has accelerated. In April 2026 Army engineers demonstrated fire-control software enabling a remotely operated weapon station to engage small drones while its vehicle is moving. In May, Joint Interagency Task Force 401 applied common test standards for the first time during Project Flytrap 5.0 in Lithuania, which evaluated more than 20 systems. A C5ISR Center event at Fort A.P. Hill in the same month pitted 17 industry teams' lasers, jammers and interceptors against more than a dozen drone types, with a fiber-spooled drone among the threats. General Dynamics Land Systems showed a truck-based microwave counter-drone vehicle at AUSA. Fiber-optic drones expose a limitation of conventional radio-frequency jamming because their control signals travel through a physical cable. CSIS has reported ranges of approximately 10 kilometers for this category, although performance varies by system. Countering these drones requires detection and other defensive measures, including guns, interceptors and potentially directed-energy systems.
Logistics determines whether system-level survivability can be sustained. RUSI describes Ukrainian artillery operating as dispersed single guns, resupplied by ground robot, with ammunition stored away from the weapon. Supply runs are planned by day and executed at night, with drop-off points offset so a tracked robot does not reveal infantry positions. CSIS fellows warned that large supply hubs have proved vulnerable to precision strikes and that logistics must be disaggregated, then quickly reaggregated where needed. A tank company that cannot be refueled, rearmed and repaired under persistent surveillance will struggle to sustain combat effectiveness, regardless of its armor protection.
Illustrative scenario, not a real operation: night resupply and casualty evacuation in a dispersed force, with ground robots moving between staging areas and offset drop points under drone overwatch and counter-drone route cover, and split ammunition caches and forward repair. Fictional terrain; simplified symbols. Graphic: IndraStra Global.
Army budgeting now tries to fund both ends of this mix. Through its Transformation in Contact (TiC) effort, it has been fielding drones, counter-drone systems and electronic warfare to deployed brigades and adjusting units in contact with real equipment. Its fiscal 2027 request, as reviewed by the Congressional Research Service, includes US$349.6 million for a family of small drones and US$168.8 million for one-way attack drones, alongside the M1E3 acceleration, the XM30 infantry vehicle and continued counter-drone procurement. The same review notes the absence of a dedicated drone career field, training and doctrine gaps, and high US unit costs relative to Ukrainian drones; hardware acquisition is advancing faster than the training, doctrine and organizational adaptation needed to use it effectively.
The industrial implications follow directly. A force built around expendable drones, interceptors and robots needs production at a scale that may reach hundreds of thousands of units annually in some categories, cheap and replaceable components, rapid software updates and repair close to the front. Heavy armor needs low-rate, high-value production and depot-level repair, the model for which Western industry is mainly organized. Ukrainian companies at AUSA were seeking co-production partners, reflecting the importance of translating battlefield experience into scalable manufacturing. The Army's proposed "Sky Foundry" initiative similarly highlights the need for additional production capacity and more responsive manufacturing arrangements.
Several limits should temper the lessons. RUSI's Justin Bronk argued in August 2025 that Ukraine's drone dependence partly reflects shortages of artillery and anti-tank missiles, and that Russian defenses stop most drones short of their targets. Ukraine is a war of two forces with comparable drone saturation, large-scale artillery, extensive minefields and relatively static lines; a campaign with air superiority, rapid maneuver or very different terrain could shift the balance back toward armored mass. Israel's operations in Gaza have relied heavily on tanks and heavily armored personnel carriers in dense urban terrain, even as they confronted drones and anti-tank teams. Given incomplete data and rapidly evolving countermeasures, any fixed ratio between drone expenditure and armored-vehicle losses risks becoming obsolete as tactics and technology evolve. The hypothesis that best fits the available evidence is functional redistribution: reconnaissance, a growing share of strike and much of the most dangerous logistics are moving to uncrewed and cheaper platforms, while assault, breaching and protected maneuver remain with armored vehicles operating inside a denser web of sensors, jammers, interceptors and robotic support.
On its closing day, AUSA 2026 offered a snapshot of the technologies and organizational capabilities increasingly required to sustain an effective armored force. The decisive challenge is organizational: training crews to operate under counter-drone protection, dispersing logistics without sacrificing coordination, acquiring inexpensive systems at the pace of battlefield feedback and designing armored vehicles for maintainability, integrated protection and networked operations. The tank may well keep its place on the battlefield. A heavy vehicle can no longer be expected to survive on its armor alone, without support from the wider formation.
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