China’s proposed rules for platform workers address pay protections, algorithmic accountability, human review, and social security coverage.
For a delivery rider in China, a suspended app account can mean an abrupt loss of access to work and earnings. A proposed regulation now open for public comment would require platforms to review workers’ objections concerning account bans, pay, working hours and performance ratings within 48 hours. Article 38 of the draft Measures for the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment (《新就业形态劳动者权益保障办法（征求意见稿）》) requires platforms to verify such objections, provide a human response within that period and correct errors where the objections are substantiated. Although narrow in scope, the provision illustrates the broader ambition of the 54-article draft. Rather than automatically classifying platform workers as employees, the proposed rules seek to make companies accountable for the workplace conditions their rules and algorithms create.
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS; 中华人民共和国人力资源和社会保障部) published the draft on October 8, 2026, with comments open until November 8. According to the ministry’s notice and drafting explanation, the draft was prepared jointly with the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the National Health Commission (NHC; 中华人民共和国国家卫生健康委员会), the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR; 国家市场监督管理总局), the National Healthcare Security Administration (NHSA; 国家医疗保障局) and the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC; 国家互联网信息办公室). It is a draft departmental rule, not law in force. Article 54, the commencement clause, still reads "effective from [blank] year, month, day." A Xinhua report carried by the Ministry of Justice's legal information portal describes it as an unprecedented use of a ministerial rule to bring workers who are managed by companies but do not fully meet the criteria for an employment relationship within the scope of the labor-law system.
The population at stake is usually given as 84 million, a figure that needs care. It comes from the All-China Federation of Trade Unions' (ACFTU; 中华全国总工会) ninth national survey of the workforce, published in early 2023, which counted 84 million "workers in new forms of employment" within a reported workforce of approximately 402 million employees. The federation's own summary lists truck drivers first, followed by ride-hailing drivers, couriers and food-delivery riders. The figure represents a broad workforce category measured in an earlier survey, not a current count of app-based workers. The draft's scope is also wider than delivery and ride-hailing: its drafting explanation includes online live-streamers and other workers whose labor is managed through platforms.
Coverage under the draft turns on a definition rather than an occupation. Article 3 defines a covered worker as someone who relies on an internet platform and "provides labor according to platform labor rules, instructions and so on" in return for pay. Article 26 then treats algorithms as one form of those labor rules, defining an algorithm as the set of decision rules and instructions a platform uses to dispatch, monitor, evaluate and incentivize workers. The legal significance is that algorithms become an explicit subject of regulatory oversight because they form part of the rules governing labor. By treating algorithmic systems as part of the rules that organize work, the draft links platform decision-making to requirements for worker consultation, explanation and advance notice. Article 27 requires platforms to consult workers before changing rules, explain which suggestions they have adopted, and publish the changes at least seven days before they take effect.
On algorithmic accountability, the draft moves beyond general principles by specifying what platforms must explain, while stopping short of requiring source-code disclosure or full access to their decision systems. Article 28 obliges companies to explain to workers the "basic principles, influencing factors, purposes and main operating mechanisms" of algorithms that affect their rights. It also bars the use of "significantly abnormal" data or data relating to violations as general performance benchmarks. The clause appears aimed at the practice of setting delivery targets using unusually high individual performance as a benchmark. It also gives government departments the power to "review and assess the reasonableness" of algorithms. The draft does not require platforms to disclose their source code to workers. Wang Tianyu, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS; 中国社会科学院) Institute of Law, told Xinhua that the provisions address public concerns about workers being "trapped in the algorithm".
Human review is the draft's sharpest instrument. Article 29 prohibits algorithmic discrimination in access to tasks and pay and states that decisions to stop dispatching orders, ban accounts or impose large compensation claims must be checked by a person against "the relevant facts and basis" and may not be made automatically. The exception applies to "major emergencies involving public safety or the public interest," in which an automated decision must be followed promptly by human review. The effectiveness of this safeguard will depend on whether reviewers can access the underlying data, consider workers’ evidence, reverse automated decisions where warranted, and document their reasoning for any subsequent arbitration. Article 38’s 48-hour response requirement should therefore be distinguished from substantive redress: a timely reply does not, by itself, demonstrate that the disputed decision has been independently reviewed or corrected.
The pay provisions establish a minimum floor rather than guarantee a particular level of income. Article 12 provides that remuneration for "normal labor" must not fall below the local minimum-wage threshold after accounting for the "reasonable cost" of tools and equipment supplied by workers themselves, such as electric scooters or cars. Article 13 requires itemized pay statements, payment in money rather than points or vouchers, a settlement cycle of no more than one month and no fee for withdrawing earnings on the agreed schedule. Article 14 "encourages" positive incentives and prohibits the "abuse" of fines, rating downgrades and account bans. Article 18 promises "reasonable remuneration higher than" normal pay on statutory holidays without specifying a rate, a gap Zhejiang University (ZJU; 浙江大学) social-security scholar He Wenjiong and others commentators have identified in early coverage. The unresolved question is how “normal labor” will be calculated for workers who use multiple apps, work irregular hours or supply their own vehicles and equipment. Without a clear measurement method, the minimum-wage provision may be difficult to apply consistently across different forms of platform work.
The draft adopts a three-tier classification framework, described by the drafters as "classified regulation." Under Article 31, a platform that exercises "dominant labor management" (支配性劳动管理) over a worker who meets the conditions for an employment relationship must sign a labor contract, and the same obligation falls on a labor-service partner company that recruits and manages the worker. Where the relationship does not meet that threshold, the platform must sign a written work agreement with the worker before the worker undertakes any task. If the platform and a partner company jointly manage the worker, the agreement must involve all three parties. Article 33 lists eleven mandatory terms for those agreements, including rest, personal information processing, account bans and complaint handling. Article 53 excludes people who use platforms to run their own businesses or freelance. Article 42 then gives arbitration committees a list of factors for disputed cases: the worker's autonomy over hours and workload, the degree of control over the work process, whether the worker must follow labor rules, the continuity of the work, and whether the worker can set or change the price. The practical consequence is that contractual labels alone will not determine a worker’s legal status in a dispute. The degree of control exercised over working time, task allocation, performance and pricing will help determine whether the relationship belongs in the employment tier or remains under the work-agreement framework.
Anti-evasion clauses target the layered contracting that dominates delivery logistics. Article 34 requires platforms to select legally qualified partners, supervise them, and assume employer responsibility when a partner lacks the required qualifications. Article 36 states that using third parties to pay wages or file taxes does not shift the employer's duties, and forbids companies to "induce or force" workers to register as individual industrial and commercial households (getihu, 个体工商户) or sign independent-contracting agreements, or to evade obligations through "multilayer subcontracting, illegal subcontracting or split management." Under Article 41, workers may name both the platform and the partner as joint parties in a dispute. The provisions target arrangements that use intermediaries to evade responsibility, rather than subcontracting itself. Their practical effect will depend on whether regulators and dispute-resolution bodies can identify who actually recruits, directs, pays and disciplines workers across a layered contracting structure. Delivery station operators and fleet companies perform real management functions, and the draft treats them as possible employers in their own right. In the Xinhua report cited above, Shen Jianfeng, a law professor at the Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE; 中央财经大学), identified unclear agreements and uncertainty over employer identity as principal sources of disputes in the sector.
Rules on working time and safety vary in precision. Article 16 requires companies to set and publish maximum daily and weekly working hours and to define task deadlines and limits on parallel orders, but leaves the specific limits to the companies. Article 17 bans inducing excessive work and requires "appropriate rest" after four consecutive hours. Article 19 requires at least two safety and occupational-health training sessions a year, and Article 20 bars companies from forcing workers into outdoor work that endangers health in severe weather, with high-temperature allowances paid by reference to national rules. These provisions appear more directly suited to location-based delivery work than to online streaming or long-haul freight, where working patterns, fatigue and occupational risks differ. Their practical adequacy will therefore depend partly on how sector-specific transport, postal and other regulatory requirements interact with the general framework.
The data provisions offer limited but practical protections. Article 23 requires platforms to maintain accurate work records that workers can view and download through the app. These records must be retained for at least two years after a worker leaves. Article 24 limits the processing of workers' personal information to what is lawful, proper, necessary and in good faith, "limited to what is necessary for labor management," echoing the Personal Information Protection Law. For a worker challenging an account deactivation or pay deduction, the right to download work records may be more useful in practice than an explanation of system design, because those records can provide evidence for arbitration.
For social protection, the draft relies substantially on schemes established under separate regulatory frameworks. Article 22 says platforms "shall participate in occupational injury protection in accordance with regulations," while pension and medical coverage are conditional: if a worker joins the employee basic pension or medical insurance schemes, companies must bear "corresponding" responsibilities under national rules. The occupational-injury pilot referenced in the first clause began on July 1, 2022, with seven platforms in seven provinces, and charged premiums per order rather than per worker. It expanded to 17 provinces and 11 platforms in 2025 and was extended nationwide on July 1, 2026. On October 10, MOHRSS Vice Minister Li Zhong said cumulative enrollment had reached 37.27 million by the end of September. Cumulative enrollment measures the total number of workers enrolled over time, rather than the number actively covered at a particular moment. It is therefore not directly comparable with the survey estimate of 84 million workers in new forms of employment. However, the trend suggests that the scheme is evolving from an experimental initiative into established infrastructure.
Recent corporate and judicial developments provide context for this conditional language. JD.com said in March 2025 that it had signed labor contracts with more than 10,000 full-time riders and would pay the full cost of their social insurance and housing fund. Meituan piloted a 50 percent pension-contribution subsidy in six provinces before extending the arrangement nationwide to all riders beginning in November 2025. The subsidy supports workers’ own pension contributions and does not, by itself, establish an employment relationship. The Supreme People's Court's second judicial interpretation on labor disputes, which took effect on September 1, 2025, invalidates agreements through which employees waive social-insurance obligations. Its application, however, is tied to the existence of an employment relationship. The draft does not extend that rule to the middle tier; it leaves pension coverage for those workers dependent on voluntary enrollment and company policy.
Compared with earlier policy guidance, the draft translates several existing principles into more specific regulatory obligations. The 2021 guiding opinion issued by MOHRSS and seven other bodies, commonly referred to as Document No. 56, introduced an intermediate regulatory category between conventional employment and independent work. The SAMR-led guidance for food-delivery platforms the same month told platforms not to use the "strictest algorithm" and to set targets through "algorithmic moderation" (算法取中), the phrase the new draft adopts. The CAC's provisions on algorithm recommendations, which took effect in March 2022, included requirements concerning worker pay and rest under Article 20. MOHRSS's February 2024 guidelines on rest, remuneration and rule publication already set out a seven-day notice period. The International Labour Organization's (ILO) Digital Labour Platform Tracker entry for China dated 2026 describes a different document: non-binding guidance from the General Offices of the Communist Party's Central Committee and the State Council on services for "new employment groups," which called for expanding the injury pilot. The MOHRSS draft represents a more specific regulatory instrument that could give practical effect to elements of that broader policy direction. What is new is enforceability: Articles 45 to 52 provide for labor-inspection orders, warnings and penalties under the existing Labor Contract Law in connection with pay, recordkeeping, platform rules and work-agreement obligations.
The obligations differ in their degree of enforceability and in the conditions attached to them. Mandatory duties, phrased with "shall" (应当) or "must not" (不得), include the minimum-wage floor, the one-month pay cycle, human review of major decisions, algorithm explanation, written agreements, record retention, injury-protection participation and the bans on forced getihu registration and layered subcontracting. Conditional duties include pension and medical contributions, which depend on worker enrollment, while the holiday-pay provision requires higher remuneration without specifying a rate. Encouraged or permissive provisions include positive incentives, skills certification and collective consultation, which workers "may" pursue through unions or representatives. Penalties also differ. Under Article 50, the CAC, MOHRSS, transport authorities and market regulators are to handle algorithm-related violations within their respective remits, but the provision does not specify a new sanction. Several other obligations may be enforced through orders requiring violations to be corrected.
The international comparison clarifies the draft’s regulatory design without implying that one system is inherently superior to the others.
Mechanism | China: MOHRSS draft (October 2026, not in force) | European Union: Directive (EU) 2024/2831 | Singapore: Platform Workers Act 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
Legal status | Draft departmental rule; comment period to November 8, 2026; no commencement date | Adopted October 23, 2024; member states must transpose by December 2, 2026 | In force since January 1, 2025 |
Classification | Three tiers: labor contract where “dominant labor management” meets employment test; written work agreement below threshold; independent operators excluded | Rebuttable legal presumption of employment where facts indicate direction and control; platform bears burden to rebut | Separate statutory category of platform worker; not employees |
Automated decisions | Human review required for order stoppage, account bans, large compensation claims, except public-safety emergencies | Decisions to restrict, suspend or terminate accounts must be taken by a human; human oversight and review rights | No equivalent algorithmic-management chapter |
Transparency | Explain basic principles, factors, purposes and main mechanisms; seven-day notice of rule changes | Information on automated monitoring and decision systems; written explanation and review on request | Not a core focus |
Social protection | Injury-protection participation mandatory; pension and medical conditional on enrollment | Follows from employment status where presumption applies | Work-injury compensation equivalent to employees; pension contributions for younger workers |
Collective voice | Collective consultation permitted via unions or representatives | Information and consultation of worker representatives on algorithmic systems | Registered platform work associations may represent workers |
The European directive establishes a rebuttable presumption of employment where the relevant facts indicate direction and control. Article 11 also requires a written response to a request for review within two weeks. China’s draft seeks to address some of the same concerns about account bans through a different regulatory approach: rather than relying primarily on employment classification, it imposes specific conduct obligations directly on platforms. Singapore created a statutory category of platform workers with injury and pension protections, but fewer provisions addressing algorithmic management. The differences partly reflect distinct institutional starting points. European developments have been shaped by national litigation over worker classification; China has built on administrative guidance and pilot insurance schemes; and Singapore adopted legislation following tripartite consultation.
Several potential effects can be identified, although they remain hypotheses rather than established outcomes. Mandatory written agreements and download rights could make arbitration more tractable by creating documents where there were none. The ban on inducing getihu registration could push platforms to formalize relationships with station operators rather than leave risk with small subcontractors. Conversely, the minimum-wage-after-costs rule could encourage platforms to tighten log-in controls or limit "normal labor" to defined shifts, narrowing the flexibility the draft is meant to preserve. If the middle tier is less costly than formal employment, platforms may have an incentive to structure their management practices to remain below the "dominant labor management" threshold. This makes the factors listed in Article 42 central to determining whether the intermediate category provides meaningful protection or creates an incentive for regulatory arbitrage.
Enforcement will decide the draft's significance. Chinese labor inspections have concentrated on wage arrears, and auditing dispatch logic would be a new task. Under Article 37, platforms must report employment data to MOHRSS, and Article 5 assigns algorithm oversight to the CAC while asking departments to build cross-regional coordination. Evidence of effective implementation would include published inspection decisions concerning algorithmic rules, arbitration awards applying Article 42, data on the proportion of intermediate-category workers covered by written agreements, and statistics on compliance with the 48-hour complaint-response requirement. Huang Kun, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Labour and Social Security Sciences (CALSS; 中国劳动和社会保障科学研究院), told Xinhua the provisions would push platforms to supervise partner firms and stations. Whether these changes materialize will become clearer once the final text is issued, its commencement date is specified, and implementation evidence becomes available.
The draft offers a provisional answer to the broader question of whether a government can hold platforms accountable for the working conditions they shape without treating every flexible working arrangement as conventional employment. Its answer is yes, but only if the rules are effectively administered and enforced. It links platform obligations to the actual degree of control rather than contractual labels, gives workers access to work records and human review, and makes pension coverage dependent on enrollment. If inspectors, arbitrators and the CAC use the powers and enforcement mechanisms available to them, China could establish an intermediate status with substantive protections. If enforcement falls short, however, the intermediate category could become a mechanism for avoiding employment obligations, with the 48-hour response requirement remaining its most visible safeguard.
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