The disagreement between ASEAN member countries is actually unfavorable for regional security, and as argued by Emmers, has reduced the strategic benefits which are provided by US re-balancing strategy in Southeast Asia
By Lidya C. Sinaga
Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI), Indonesia
Image Attribute: Guided-missile
destroyer U.S.S. Halsey and the guided-missile cruiser U.S.S. Antietam
participate in a maneuvering exercise in the South China Sea on October 23,
2014. Source: U.S. Pacific Fleet’s flickr photostream, used under a creative
commons license
“We do not
have a position on the legal merits of the competing sovereignty claims to the
islands, but we do have a position under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea on the potential maritime claims.” [1]
It has been
argued that 2009 was not only a turning point regarding China’s assertiveness
in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute, but also a turning point regarding the US
position in this dispute. On 23 July 2009, Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of
State, signed TAC at the Sixteenth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This was the US ‚Pivot‛,
the starting point for the ‚back to Asia‛ policy. The Obama administration wished
to enhance US presence in Southeast Asia.[2] The US policy on the SCS was made clear
one year later, when Hillary Clinton attended the Seventeenth ARF in Hanoi, Vietnam.
Clinton clearly declared that the United States has a national interest in the freedom
of navigation in the South China Sea.[3]
However, this
was not the first time that the United States declared an interest in the SCS.
On 10 May 1995, the United States issued a US Department of State Daily Press
Briefing, which stated that maintaining freedom of navigation in the region is
a fundamental interest of the United States. The United States clarified its
position by saying that:
“The US takes
no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the
various island, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South China Sea‛. The United
States would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim or
restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent
with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.”[4]
The United States
has consistently used the issue of freedom of navigation as its primary reason
for showing interest in the South China Sea. Since the ‘pivot’ in 2009, the
United States consistently has raised this issue at annual ARF Meetings. In
2011, at the first East Asia Summit (EAS) attended by US President Barack
Obama, the US restated its previous position that it takes no position in the
dispute, but that freedom of navigation is its core interest.[5]
However,
according to Fravel, the US has two principal interests in the South China Sea.
First is the freedom of navigation. Here the US refers to Articles 87 of the
UNCLOS, which declares that ‚The high seas are open to all States, whether
coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international
law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a)
freedom of navigation; ...‛.[6] The US asserts it has legitimate economic and
military interests in freedom of navigation in the SCS. According to Glaser,
more than US 1 trillion dollars’ worth of the US trade comes through the SCS
every year.[7] In addition, US naval vessels from the US West Coast and Japan
pass through the South China Sea on their way to the Indian Ocean and Persian
Gulf. The second principal US interest is peace and stability in Southeast Asia
region. This relates to trade and economic development – any disruption to the
security of sea-lanes in the SCS would affect cross-border trade and
investment.[8]
The United
States has raised these principal interests in the SCS since it poses several
security threats. According to Fravel, since the 2001 incident in which a US
reconnaissance plane and a Chinese jet fighter collided [9], China has tried to
restrict US military activities in this zone, especially regarding surveillance
and reconnaissance. Furthermore, the modernization of the PLA Navy poses a
challenge to US Naval vessels in the SCS. [10] Accordingly, in light of these
security threats in the SCS, Fravel also argued that the US has to maintain
three interests: ‚its commitments to allies in the region, its stable and
cooperative relations with China, and finally its neutrality regarding the sovereignty
of land features‛. [11]
Therefore, the
US’s support to the Philippines can be put in the context of the US commitment
to its ally. The Philippines, one of the claimant states in the South China Sea
dispute, is a US ally based on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. Article VI
provides the mechanism for the two countries to respond if there is an armed
attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific, or on its armed forces,
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.[12] Although there is debate about
whether the South China Sea is a part of the US obligation under the treaty[13],
President Obama seemed to make it clear on his visit to the Philippines in May
2014 when he stated that: "… our commitment to defend the Philippines is
ironclad and the United States will keep that commitment, because allies never
stand alone."[14] Moreover, the US and the Philippines signed the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014 which updated and upgraded their
defense commitments.[15]
Since the US
declared its renewed interest in the South East Asian region, the SCS dispute
has been mentioned in other ARF and EAS participants’ statements. Initially
China did not expect the international exposure of the SCS dispute, but since
Vietnam and Indonesia chaired the ASEAN in 2010 and 2011 respectively, ongoing
exposure is inevitable. However, in 2012, when ASEAN was chaired by Cambodia, a
close economic partner of China, ASEAN failed to issue a joint communique
regarding the SCS dispute. This was because Cambodia refused to incorporate the
April 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident into the final document of ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting. At the ASEAN Summit of November 2012, ASEAN and China also
failed to negotiate a multilateral Code of Conduct (CoC) for the SCS. ASEAN has
not yet reached a consensus on a multilateral code as four of the six SCS
claimants were ASEAN member states. Indeed China insists on negotiating
bilaterally with ASEAN members.
The
disagreement between ASEAN member countries is actually unfavorable for
regional security, and as argued by Emmers, has reduced the strategic benefits
which are provided by US re-balancing strategy in Southeast Asia, something
that is not desirable for the US from its greater involvement in the Southeast
Asia region since regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia is one of the
principal US interests in the SCS.
Cite This Article:
Sinaga, Lidya C.: China's Assertive Foreign Policy
in South China Sea Under Xi Jinping: Its Impact on United States and Australian
Foreign Policy. In: Journal of ASEAN Studies 3 (2015), 2, pp. 133-149. URN:
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-461429 / Download the Paper - LINK
Publication Details:
Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2015),
pp. 133-149 ©2015 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association
for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic
This document is made available under a CC
BY-NC Licence (Attribution-NonCommercial).
For more Information see: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
Endnotes:
[1] US
Department of State, ‘U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing’, 10 May
1995, retrieved 10 May 2015,
[2] Manyin,
ME, Garcia, MJ, Morrison WM, ‘U.S. Accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC)’, CRS Report for Congress, 5 May 2009, retrieved 21 May 2015,
[3] R Emmers,
‘The US Rebalancing Strategy: Impact on the South China Sea’, National Security
College, retrieved 21 May 2015, .
[4] US
Department of State, op.cit
[5] R Emmers,
op.cit. 41 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
[6] B S
Glaser, ‘Armed Clashes in the South China Sea’, New York, Council on Foreign
Relations, 2012, p. 4
[7] M T
Fravel, ‘US Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995’,
Policy Report, March 2014, p. 2.
[8]Incident
happened when a US EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a China’s F-8 fighter jet
collided near Hainan Island.
[9]M T Fravel,
op.cit.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Yale Law
School, ‘Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of
the Philippines’, 30 August 1951, retrieved 10 May 2015,
[12] Some in
the Philippines refer to the 1999 diplomatic letter from the U.S. Ambassador to
the Philippines, Thomas Hubbard, to the Philippines' Foreign Secretary Domingo
Siazon, which affirmed William Cohen’s statement that the South China Sea is considered
as part of the Pacific area, to ensure that it is part of the treaty. Fonbuena,
C, ‘Old letter of US envoy details US pledge to defend West PH Sea’, 14 May
2014, retrieved 21 May 2015,
[13] Fonbuena,
C, ‘Obama: U.S. commitment to PH 'ironclad'’, 29 April 2014, retrieved 21 May
2015,
[14] US
support for the Philippines is increasingly evident with the signing of the
Improved Defense Treaty, the ten-year agreement that allows the US military
greater presence in the Philippines signed on 28 April 2014 between the
Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, and US Ambassador to the
Philippines, Philip Goldberg , a few hours before Obama's arrival in the
Philippines.
[15] R Emmers, op.cit, p. 43
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