By Group Captain Murli Menon (Retd.)
Indian Air Force (IAF)
The last week announcement by Shri. Manohar Parikkar in Goa that the Government of India (GoI) was about to clear the appointment
of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the Indian armed forces, indeed a very
welcome news. Besides this indicating a maturity in our polity regarding
the viability and uncalled for
insecurity surrounding this "Five Star" assignment, the CDS would also be a harbinger
for transitioning the Army, Navy and the Air Force into a truly
Integrated Defense Force.
Needless to say, this is surely the way to go in
today's era and given India’s unique threat spectra across widely dispersed
frontiers on air, land and sea. India already has three single service and a
joint doctrine in place. The IAF’s Basic Air Power Doctrine has an updated 2012 version, which incorporates
the constituents of modern combat power and its several Combat
Enabling Elements. Also included in this compact 151-page seminal work are some unique aspects such as Information warfare, Aerospace warfare, sub conventional warfare, joint operations,
nation building, aerial diplomacy and perception management .The latest "Air Power Doctrine" has also been
declassified unlike its fore-bearers in 1995 and 2007. The idea being to
improve the understanding of aerial warfare aspects amongst all three services
and indeed the discerning public at large.
India is well equipped to foster jointmanship considering that the major chunk
of its officer cadre in all three services train together for three years, in their budding years, at Khadakvasla’s National Defence Academy. This fosters a natural penchant
amongst officer comrades to understand
the typicalities of each separate service , something which India can be
justifiably proud of , being perhaps the only major power that has such a
unique training establishment. It has always been disheartening for the professional or the veteran,
therefore, to see age old entrenched misgivings once again crop up amongst the three
services occasionally, at various discussion forum and the media.
A
recent editorial piece by an illustrious Army veteran talked of the need for the IAF to be given
additional funds by the government so that dedicated Fighter Ground Attack aircraft such as the A-10/ SU-34 and stand
off Precision Guided Munitions could be acquired. The author’s argument was
that the Close Air Support mission is paramount to facilitate the Army’s tactical battle palns. Whilst it is condescending
of this author to advocate the Air Force’s wish list , it is indeed sad that he
does not understand the difference
between a "balanced Air Force", that the IAF aspires to be rather than a "tactical Air Force", which it has absolutely no inclination to be. This was
precisely the main reason why the Indian Air Force chose to articulate its
first Air Power Doctrine, much ahead of the articulation of the Army/ Navy
Doctrine Manuals. My worry is that,
much like our concern during earlier Air
Force days, the senior Indian Army leadership appears to be still fixated on Close Air Support !
The first Air
Power Doctrine Manual IAP 2000, understandably had a first chapter titled “ the
need for a doctrine”. It was meant to
provide all air warriors with a “ mission statement “ and for everyone else
dealing with the IAF, to understand the uniqueness of a nation’s air power.
Suffice to state that air power with its innate speed, reach, lethality,
precision and flexibility offers our government a cutting edge option to
prosecute war. In any future integrated battle scenario our military commanders have to understand the
unique strengths and vulnerabilities of each combat arm. We cannot have
premier service institutions (or its erstwhile leadership for that matter)
articulate concepts in the national media displaying an utter lack of
understanding of the intricacies of air aspects and air power .I distinctly
recall a speech some years ago by a civilian US Secretary for the Air Force, Ms. Sheila Widnall in fact, indicative of a very deep understanding of air power matters.
With the advent of the CDS and perhaps an Integrated Ministry of Defence down
the line, the day is not far off when our senior military leadership would be
called upon to testify on military matters in Parliament. Top end
professionalism and clarity on all elements of national power would be the
order of the day.
National
security demands two criteria for it to be viable. Firstly, the government of
the day has to be prepared in any contingency to use its military in
furtherance of national objectives.Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the
military itself needs to be honed and developed during peace
time . As they say , "the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed
in war". In this context all
practitioners of the operational art need to recognize that good joint military
operations would revolve around interoperability amongst constituent forces and an
atmosphere sans dogmatic approaches to war fighting.
A democratic
polity such as ours could well be tempted to adopt a defensive approach to
waging war. Especially, in today's terror threat scenarios involving non state
actors, air power offers the policy makers uniquely viable options. It has to
be in the forefront of a nation’s
options in the counter terror campaign, as has been amply demonstrated recently in Yemen,
Syria, Iraq and of course in
Sri Lanka a while earlier. Our leaders, both military and civilian, need to
be reminded that all air campaigns including combat and combat support, are important
for the nation. Air power of a nation is capable of going it alone, leading or
following as the nation’s air war
strategy dictates.
About the Author:
Group Captain (Retd.) Murli Menon served in
Indian Air Force for 32 years, transiting it tactical, operational, strategic
and conceptual appointment spectra with credit. He was India’s Air Advisor to
Indian High Commission at Islamabad, Pakistan (2000-2004). In his second
avatar, he served for 8 years with India’s Cabinet Secretariat, including a
stint as Consular at Ankara, Turkey from 2008-2011.
He was one of
the pioneers in the IAF’s Doctrine Think Tank – “Air War Strategy Cell” that
produced India’s first Air Power Doctrine, the IAP 2000 in 1995. His interests
include strategic studies and since post retirement he contributes to various
think-tanks based out of New Delhi, India.