An Academic Case Study of Proactive Defense Infrastructure at Two Lakshadweep Islands (Minicoy and Suheli Par)
Proactive Defense Infrastructure Planning of Indian Island Territories
A Conceptual Case Study of Lakshadweep (Minicoy and Suheli Par Islands)
By Rear Admiral Dr S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), Indian Navy
and Rahul Guhathakurta, IndraStra Global
The strategy
for coastal and offshore security has been articulated in the document
“Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy” of the Indian Navy.
The strategy envisages ‘to reduce, counter and eliminate the threat of armed
attack by sub-conventional groups, and also influx of arms and infiltration by
armed attackers from the sea, against coastal and offshore assets’.
The chapter
“Strategy for Conflict’ covers the actions for coastal and offshore defense.
Essentially the operations will be carried out by the Indian Navy in synergy
with the Indian Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and other security agencies.
Defending
India’s Coast, Offshore Assets, EEZ and Island Territories.
India has a
formidable naval force with both blue water and littoral capabilities; it also
has a credible Coast guard, which would work in unison with the Indian Navy in
times of war. Further India has put in place a powerful template for marine
domain awareness, intelligence and protection of the coastal and offshore
areas, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of 26 Nov 2008. Some of the
measures include; setting up of Multi Agency Centres (MAC) for intelligence
inputs and reports; registration of fishing vessels by states; placing in orbit
Indian Regional Navigation Seven Satellite System and satellite GSAT 7 ;
setting up of a coast wide radar chain; raising Marine Police force, Marine
Commandos Rapid Reaction Force and a Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB);setting up layered
patrolling; putting in place The National Command Control Communication and
Intelligence network (NC3IN) etc.
Prominent Gaps
in Coastal and Offshore Defence
Thus, the
layered defence of Indian coast and its offshore areas consists of Indian Navy,
the coast guard, the marine commando & Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) and the
marine police. All these are info-linked for maximum advance knowledge and in a
way form a net worked coalition. However, there apparently is a gap as far as
setting up the coastal and offshore area defences per se is concerned. It lacks
the delay, denial, disruption, and demoralizing (D4) capability, which is
essential in today’s environment. This capability should be acquired by
leveraging the perceived threats presented by the submarine, mines, small craft
and cruise missiles.
The defence plan should be an asymmetric and proactive approach to defence with defining it as a zone that comprises two segments of the defence environment:-
The defence plan should be an asymmetric and proactive approach to defence with defining it as a zone that comprises two segments of the defence environment:-
- Seaward- the area from the shore to the open ocean, which must be defended to thwart expeditionary forces at sea.
- Landward- from the shore to the area inland that can be supported and defended directly from the shore.
The existing
gap in Indian defences can be obviated with very potent defence elements by
including:-
- Comprehensive assessment of threats from expeditionary forces to ports/ harbors.
- Procurement of midget/ miniature submarines with torpedoes and mine laying capability along with arrays of underwater sensors for environment, intrusion information, navigation and communication.
- Procurement of UAVs/USVs with intelligent software for remote operations as swarms.
- Procurement of Unmanned Underwater Sensor and Weapon Carriers capable of transmitting integrated underwater picture to fixed or mobile stations, firing torpedoes and laying mines.
- Procurement and laying of cable controlled mine fields, other mine fields across various depths zones.
- Coastal extended reach anti ship cruise missile batteries.
- Coastal gun batteries with ability to carry out precision attack on surface ships at ranges greater than 50 km.
- All systems networked for an ironclad protection of the Indian Coast and offshore assets and territories.
- Development of weapons specific for use in coastal areas and
- Development of systems for collection of oceanographic information.
A robust
Indian coastal and offshore defense plan and its implementation is an essential
element of economic wellbeing of India, as it would ensure security of sea
trade, shipping, fishing, marine resources, and offshore assets as well as
security of the EEZ.
Rights of a
Coastal State w.r.t. EEZ
Within its
EEZ, a coastal state has sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting,
conserving, and managing natural living and non-living resources of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and its sub soil. Further, it can exploit and explore
production of energy from water, winds, and currents. The EEZ remains an open
zone with freedom of innocent passage for all. The EEZ legal regime is
different from that governing territorial waters and high seas, and contains
certain characteristics of both.
However, in a
recent judgment regarding the Enrica Lexie (Italian marines) case, the Supreme
Court of India has declared the region between the contiguous zone and the 200
nautical miles in to the sea as ‘High Seas’. The Supreme court has said that
Article 97 of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is not
applicable as shooting was a criminal action and not a navigation accident.
China has been
maintaining its right to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ, as it
feels that it has the right to prevent any activity that threatens its economic
interests or security. It also asserts that its domestic laws have jurisdiction
in its EEZ. The Chinese law requires foreign entities to obtain prior approval
to carryout resource exploitation, fishing, and marine research. As far as
military activities are concerned, it holds them as prejudicial to ‘peaceful
purposes’ provision of the Laws of the Seas Convention. This interpretation has
led to a number of minor standoffs between it and the United States of America.
India is also
one of the countries, which mandate prior permission before any maintenance, or
repairs are carried out to the submarine cables running on the floor of its
EEZ.
With respect
to military activities by foreign militaries in the EEZ, India along with
Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Uruguay require
obtaining of prior permission. North Korea has prohibited any such activity
within 50 nm of its territory and Iran has completely prohibited the same.
As far as
oceanographic surveying is considered, again some countries require prior
permission, in fact, China registered protests against the activities of USNS
Bowditch and India against HMS Scott and USNS Bowditch, which were gathering
military data by undertaking oceanographic survey. Coupling the above with
increased proliferation of submarines in the region, the instances of
clandestine underwater and ASW surveys would only increase. There are bound to
be incidents involving intruder submarines in future and states would therefore
be monitoring activities in their EEZs diligently.
EEZ Security
Components
Two essential
components of effective EEZ security management comprise of surveillance and
deterrence. Some of the drawbacks of EEZ surveillance systems in use today
include; inability of patrol boats to carry out surveillance, since their
missions are area denial, SAR or interdiction; UAV’s have much better sensor
packages but need a large infrastructure for 24/7 surveillance; HF radars are
affordable but need very large areas for installation; Microwave radars suffer
from limited horizon; and patrol aircraft incur huge costs. Since radars have
difficulty in automatically identifying unknown and devious small vessels and
the electro optic systems are heavily weather dependent, there is requirement
for add on sensors to carry out effective monitoring of EEZ. In fact, a
complete EEZ surveillance system should be able to cater to all the facets of
EEZ activity be it , terrorism, drug and human trafficking, piracy, smuggling,
coastal security, Search and rescue, sea traffic control, pollution control,
illegal fishing, illegal arms supply and exploitation of natural resources of
solar, air, wave, minerals, oil and gas. For such an extensive requirement a
cooperative, synergetic and system of systems approach between various agencies
involved would be paramount.
The
surveillance platforms would include the following:-
- Unmanned undersea vehicles, sonar arrays, patrol submarines, and other under water sensors.
- Remotely operated vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, offshore platforms, sensors for activity monitoring, and patrol boats.
- Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS), communication networks, control centers, pollution monitoring centers, surface and navigation radars, and electro-optic systems.
- Unmanned Ariel Vehicles, patrol aircraft, helicopters, aerostats, and sensors.
- Observation and communication satellites.
Coming to the
deterrence capability in the EEZ, it has to be a non-military option during
peacetime, which brings the discussion to deployment of Non Lethal Weapons
(NLW) and the need to develop them for the EEZ environment. Conflicts in the
EEZ are definitely going to be unconventional and it would be difficult to
distinguish the adversary from the neutrals or friendly vessels. This may lead
to conflicts where use of lethal weapons may not be permissible. Non-lethal
weapons would provide tactical as well as strategic benefits to the EEZ
protection force in the global commons. NLW would enable options for de-escalation
of conflicts, avoid irretrievable consequences of using lethal options, and
result in deterring activity without loss of lives and damage to material. NLWs
have to be cost effective and easy to operate, as different varieties in
varying numbers would be required. However to ensure a calibrated approach,
across the spectrum of conflict, there is also a need for NLWs to be
doctrinally integrated with the regular naval forces to enable them to tackle a
developing situation in the EEZ.
Defense of
Island Territories
The defence of
the Island territories has to be structured as a mix of the Coastal and EEZ
defence plans. The defence plan in case of the Islands should be an asymmetric
and proactive approach to defence with defining it as a zone that comprises
three segments of the defence environment:-
- Seaward- the area from the shore to the open ocean, which must be defended to thwart expeditionary forces at sea.
- Landward- from the shore to the area inland that can be supported and defended directly from the shore.
- From the Sea- from the sea by warships and submarines in case, an incursion has already been made on an unprotected/ inadequately protected island. As well as drawing from offensive infrastructure at the islands in the vicinity.
The surveillance
and defense components have to be drawn from the coastal and EEZ defense plans
and augmented by use of warships and submarines at sea.
"Even if
Chinese naval ships and submarines appear regularly in the Indian Ocean, so
what?" he asked. "As the largest trading nation in the world,
maritime security in the Indo-Pacific cannot be more important for China. The
Chinese navy has to protect its overseas interests such as the safety of
personnel and security of property and investment. Much of these are along the
rim of the Indian Ocean."
- Zhou Bo,
honorary fellow, Academy of Military Science, Beijing, Jul 2015
An Academic
Case Study of Proactive Defense Infrastructure at Two Lakshadweep Islands
(Minicoy and Suheli Par)
The
Lakshadweep islands lie between 8° - 12 °3' N latitude and 71°E - 74°E
longitude about 225 to 450 km from the Coast of Kerala. There are 12 atolls, 3
reefs, and five submerged banks. In all, there are 36 Islands, with a total
land area of 32 sq km; Lakshadweep islands have a lagoon area of 4200 sq km and
20,000 sq km of territorial waters. It provides a large swath of 4, 00,000 sq
km of Exclusive Economic Zone.
Map 1: Proximity Analysis of Minicoy Island and Suheli Par with respect to SLOCs
Minicoy
Minicoy is the
southernmost island in the Lakshadweep. It lies between 8° 15’ to 8° 20’ N and
73° 01’ to 73° 05 E with an area of 4.4 sq km including the Viringli islet.
Minicoy is separated from the rest of Lakshadweep by the nine-degree channel
and from the Maldives by the 8° channel. It is an independent oceanic island
that does not belong to either the Maldives or the Lakshadweep bank.
Map 2: Minicoy Island Naval Air Station: The Concept
Suheli Par
It is located
at 10°05′N 72°17′E / 10.083°N 72.283°E / 10.083; 72.283, 52 km to the SW of
Kavaratti, 76 km to the south of Agatti, 139 km to the west of Kalpeni and 205
km to the NNW of Minicoy, with the broad Nine Degree Channel between them.
There are two uninhabited islands, Valiyakara at the northern end with a
lighthouse ARLHS LAK-015, and Cheriyakara on the southeastern side. These two
islands have a long sandbank Suheli Pitti between them.
Map 3: Suheli Par Naval Air Station: The Concept
As a purely
academic exercise, a proactive defense infrastructure has been studied for
placement on Minicoy and Suheli Par using GIS and other architectural tools
available as open source. The primary study is based upon the following
documents:
- Draft Approach Paper For The 12th Five Year Plan (2012‐2017), Earth System Science Organization Ministry of Earth Sciences
- Notification under section 3(1) and section 3(2)(v) of the environment (protection) act, 1986 and rule 5(3)(d) of the environment (protection) rules, 1986 declaring coastal stretches as coastal regulation zone (CRZ) and regulating activities in the CRZ. New Delhi, the 19th February 1991(as amended up to 3rd October 2001)
- Report of the Working Group on Improvement of Banking Services in the Union Territory of Lakshadweep by RBI, 12 May 2008
- Socioeconomic Dimensions And Action Plan For Conservation Of Coastal Resources Based On An Understanding Of Anthropogenic Threats. Minicoy Island – UT Of Lakshadweep Project Supervisor: Vineeta Hoon. Centre for Action Research on Environment Science & Society, Chennai. 2003.
- Report on Visit to Lakshadweep – a coral reef wetland included under National Wetland Conservation and Management Programme of the Ministry of Environment & Forests. 30th October – 1st November 2008
- Report on BSLLD (Urban) Pilot in Lakshdweep, 2014. Directorate of Planning and Statistics, Lakshadweep.
- CZMAs and Coastal Environments- Two Decades of Regulating Land Use Change on India’s Coastline. Center for Policy Research, 2015.
- Integrated Island Management Plan (IIMP) for Minicoy island.
- Lakshadweep Development Report
Criterion for
selection of the island of Minicoy and Suheli par
Some of the criterion for selection of the islands of Minicoy and Suheli par are:
Minicoy and
Suheli Par would synergistic-ally straddle the 9-degree channel, one of the most
important SLOC not only for India, but also for the Indo-Pacific region and
also for China. The security of the SLOC would be ensured pro-actively by
developing the defense structure at both islands.
- Minicoy is inhabited and Suheli Par is not, thus providing two distinct classes of islands.
- Minicoy is geologically different from other islands in the Lakshadweep.
- Both have large lagoons.
- Both need to be developed for prosperity and connectivity of the region with main land.
- Both have poor connectivity with mainland.
- Both can provide security structures for EEZ and its regulation
The main
features of the conceptual structures include:
- Airstrips for use by tourists as well as defense.
- Small harbor facilities
- Submarine piers
- Mini/midget pens
- Staging facilities
- Coastal gun and missile batteries
- Mooring Buoys
- Off Shore ammunition storage
- Air defense capability
- Radar and underwater sensors
- Strategic Oil Storage Facility
- Command, Communications, and Control Center for Indian Navy
- Strategic Communication facility
- Storm Warning and Fisheries information center
- Ocean Surveillance stations and cabled Oceanic Information Observatories
- Floating sun power panels
- Offshore Desalination plants
- Facilities for Tourists
Linkages with
MDA, ODA, and OICZ
It is
important that any academic exercise for development of a proactive defense
infrastructure of island territories consider concepts of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Oceanic Domain Awareness (ODA), and Ocean Information Consciousness Zones (OICZ). MDA focuses upon the maritime security environment
specific to naval operations; the ODA focuses upon the overarching oceanic
environment. Both are technology intensive and require sophisticated sensors
and computational capabilities.MDA has tactical, regional, and strategic
components whereas the ODA is strategic knowledge based architecture. Both
require elaborate data and information fusing interface with myriad of
interconnected agencies. The MDA primarily needing vast inputs from commercial,
intelligence and security agencies and the ODA from advanced research, academic
and scientific communities. The ODA is conceptualized as a comprehensive 3D+
knowledge zone up to India’s EEZ, the OICZ on the other hand is a collaborative
approach at sharing oceanic information, processing it as required and
archiving it for use at a later date. ODA can be established by a country
individually, but OICZ requires transfer / sharing of scientific knowledge and
technology between nations. Benefits of ODA accrue to the nation whereas OICZ
would empower the region. Both are strategic in nature.
The usage of "geo-spatial tools" behind the "Conceptual
Proactive Defense Infrastructure Plan" for Minicoy and Suheli Par
In the field
of geopolitical studies, spatial analysis driven by various geographic
information system (GIS) technologies helps strategic experts in computing
required and desired solutions. In this analysis of Minicoy Island and Suheli
Par, Google My Map API is used to perform a variety of geo-spatial calculations
by using a set of easy to use function calls in the data step. In layman’s
term, a layer-by-layer computational analysis of geographic patterns to finding
optimum routes, site selection, and advanced predictive modeling to
substantiate this analysis has been carried out. These concepts are formulated
by considering the land reclamation factors and available details of Integrated
Island Management Plan of Government of India (GoI) for Lakshadweep Islands.
However, there are certain limitations associated with this analysis with
respect to bathymetric data, which has not been considered for evaluation
purpose due to lack of availability of such data in open/public domain.
Further, these interactive custom maps can be easily exported into KMZ format
and can also be embedded seamlessly with other websites for further
distribution.
Considering
all the factors discussed hitherto the maps are embedded in this article, depicting the proactive
defense infrastructure plan for Minicoy and Suheli Par have been developed.
Conclusion
India’s EEZ
and island territories face threats of disruption of energy supplies, piracy,
and acts of terrorism, in addition to the fact that other nations are keen to
poach in to the fisheries and seabed wealth. The security of the EEZ and island
territories is therefore a matter of India’s national interest and need exists
for boosting the surveillance and augmenting security arrangements of EEZ’s and
island territories. Even though, an ambitious plan for coastal security and
maritime domain awareness has been put in place, it needs to be further
strengthened and stitched together so that the security of EEZ and Island
territories functions as a comprehensive entity with synergies across the
various agencies involved.
The academic
exercise undertaken above in respect of Minicoy and Suheli Par islands
demonstrates that it is feasible to provide effective SLOC protection, achieve
maritime dominance in a limited area of interest, provide support to second
strike capability and utilize space and oceans for surveillance, intelligence,
science, and communications purposes.
Time for a
proactive approach to plan the defense of EEZ and island territories is now!
About The Authors:
Rear Admiral Dr S. Kulshrestha: The author
RADM Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY, holds expertise in quality
assurance of naval armament and ammunition. He is an alumnus of the NDC and a
PhD from JNU. He superannuated from the post of Dir General Naval Armament
Inspection in 2011. He is unaffiliated and writes in defence journals on issues
related to Armament technology and indigenisation.
Rahul Guhathakurta: He is the founder of IndraStra Global and a seasoned supply chain management professional with 8+ years experience in trade route optimization and planning through various GIS applications.
Cite this Article:
Kulshrestha, S,
Guhathakurta, R "ANALYSIS | Proactive Defense Infrastructure Planning of
Indian Island Territories - A Conceptual Case Study of Lakshadweep (Minicoy and
Suheri Pal Islands)” IndraStra Global 002, no. 04 (2015): 0015. http://www.indrastra.com/2016/04/ANALYSIS-Proactive-Defense-Infrastructure-Planning-of-Indian-Island-Territories-Lakshadweep-Minicoy-Suheli-Par-002-04-2016-0015.html |ISSN 2381-3652| http://dx.doi.org/ 10.6084/m9.figshare.3119692
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