Understanding the relationship between the ISI and the Taliban requires a deeper sociological perspective; particularly in showing how such supposedly diametrically opposed actors actually demonstrate a symbiotic relationship.
By Shaul M. Gabbay
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, USA
Image Attribute: Pakistan Flag / Source: Wikimedia Commons
Understanding
the relationship between the ISI and the Taliban requires a deeper sociological
perspective; particularly in showing how such supposedly diametrically opposed
actors actually demonstrate a symbiotic relationship. In order to conceptualize
this paradox, it is necessary to look from the ground up, rather than the top-
down, as many in the field have attempted to do.
To begin,
Pakistan finds its roots in tribal society. In this society there are two key
aspects that take primacy above all else: religion and family. Both are
products of socialization, meaning that from birth, an individual is given the
tools to develop individual and collective identities. This includes teachings
from parents, educators, and from religious leaders as well. Additionally,
individuals are heavily influenced by their surroundings and culture. It is
here that we begin to see how society, on a macro level, operates, and how we
are able to enforce our understandings of right and wrong, just and unjust.
From an early age, we are taught to develop networks. Indeed, the core family
is a network in and of itself, where individuals (fathers, mothers, sisters,
brothers) learn their roles within the network. The network extends, of course
to other close relatives, including grandparents, aunts and uncles, and
cousins. These can be referred to as natural networks, as they are “built in”
to an individual’s life upon birth.
As we grow and
interact with society, we begin to enhance our natural networks with the in the
inclusion of friends, fellow students, fellow members of our religious
congregation, and so forth. It is then that informal networks, not unlike
natural networks are developed. As argued in the author’s previously published
paper, “Engineering Social Capital in the Middle East: Rebuilding Trust” [1]
, trust is essential to building these networks, which eventually translates
into accumulating social capital. The author argued that the existence of trust
allows for the buildup of productive ties, while the absence of trust
significantly diminishes the possibility of cooperation. Once trust is
established—through systematic cooperation and the building of meaningful ties,
organizations on a broader scale can begin to solidify.
Based on the
solidification of trust, informal networks and organizations are established
and become fluid. In his analytically sound piece, “The Utility of Informal
Networks to Policy-Makers”, Alexander Evans points to the nature of informal
networks, and how they lead to trust building and lead into the establishment
of cohesive social organizations [2]
. He argues that it is impossible to understand how governments and societies
operate without first grasping the nature of informal networks. Evans writes:
Informal
networks, and unofficial ways of doing things, are all around us. Culture, as
much as rules, shape organizations and the incentives that apply to people
within them… Informal networks and cultures guide the way in which
organizations function; in particular how information is transmitted within
them. Power, prestige, influence and trust are all strongly influenced by the
nature of organizational culture; social norms are powerful, and although not
unchanging, can provide significant insights into where power is located and
how decisions are reached. Informal networks take many forms, but often draw on
ties of kinship, friendship, or social obligation [2]
.
Turning our
attention to the specific case of Pakistan, Evans points to sifarish (meaning
“recommendation”). In Pakistan, sifarish is a system akin to nepotism, where
individuals holding positions in high places (including in government and
business) are “obligated”, due to their informal networks, to offer open
positions first to members of their kinship group and loyal friends. Sifarish
is also tied to biraderi. Meaning brotherhood, biraderi provides the basis for
the larger kin group in Pakistani society. In essence, all men that can trace
their ancestry to one common male ancestor are known to belong to the same
biraderi. Biraderi is essentially a combination of natural networks (associated
with birth) and informal networks, grounded in an expansion of natural
networks. Biraderi, given its ties to ancestry, is not beholden to
internationally recognized borders. For example, a Pakistani individual living
in the United States will always be tied to his/her biraderi and others within
it, no matter where they reside.
Taking
sifarish and biraderi into consideration, we can begin to understand the
paradoxical relationship between the ISI and groups such as the Taliban and
al-Qaeda. The issue really becomes a question of loyalty. We remember that
individuals within Pakistani society are loyal first to their religion (Islam)
and their kinship group. Government and public society are secondary, and
loyalties to such organizations are still conditioned by trust and how an
individual can benefit from each of the competing organizations. In his
analysis of tribal groups in Pakistan entitled “Honor the Baloch, Buy the
Pushtun”, Paul Titus examines the quasi-state of the tribal regions and how the
government has to take into consideration the power of networks in dealing with
them. Titus argues, “People approach new situations with the cultural
categories and institutions with which they are familiar and with which they
have had success in the past. Thus features of social life that gave rise to
particular generalizations about Pushtun and Balaoch in the colonial era
persist today” [3] .
In brief,
Titus argues that cultural, historical, and even individual ties are important
to understanding how groups cooperate or come into conflict. Individuals
naturally gravitate to what is comfortable with him or her, and groups that
support their worldviews. Therefore, we often times see that for some, the
Pakistani government offers the best possibility to enhance security as well as
individual and collective goals. At the same time however, groups such as the
Taliban and al-Qaeda present a front that is attractive in terms of local
stability and groups that are in line with religious needs. These needs are not
lost on the Pakistani government and the ISI. As members of the community
themselves, they realize the importance of informal and formal networks, which
is why they have historically attempted to co-opt both the Taliban and
al-Qaeda, in order to put forth a united front, as well as to preserve power.
This was the case during the Zuia ul-Haq regime, as well as the Musharraf
regime.
Both
governments, as well as the current government could not overlook the public
sympathy for organizations such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, particularly when
these groups were more in line with their needs, and provided benefits to their
own networks that the government simply could not supply. In his piece
entitled, “Passive Supporters of Terrorism”, Daniel Byman discusses the general
respect Pakistanis had for Osama bin Laden. Byman argues:
Bin Laden and
his followers enjoyed genuine popular support in Pakistan. Many poorer
Pakistanis saw him as a modern-day Robin Hood, a man who combined both faith
and action. Many middle- and upper-class Pakistanis also support al-Qaeda,
seeing it as one of the few Muslim movements that successfully stands up to the
United States. Reflecting this popularity, pilgrims visit the sites where
al-Qaeda members died, and those who cooperate with the Pakistani government
against the organization are often ostracized [4]
.
Byman’s
account concerning bin Laden and the support he received in greater Pakistani
society should not be minimized. From a sociological perspective, it helps us
to constantly remember that every individual is beholden to various, often
seemingly conflicting networks, ranging from familial, to political, to
spiritual. Based on these networks, individuals must choose where to place
their loyalties. In the case of bin Laden, many Pakistanis sought him out (and
his mission) as a way to fulfill multiple needs that were not necessarily
conflicting with their spiritual convictions and political ideologies. All the
while, they were also able to uphold their honor in terms of societal respect,
as the “Bin Laden movement” and the ideology it promoted spanned across
multiple networks. On the other hand, we had individuals within government that
outwardly opposed bin Laden and his actions. As Byman notes, these individuals made
the difficult choice of standing against bin Laden, while justifying their
decision in the face of becoming outcasts from their greater communities.
Publication Details:
Networks,
Social Capital, and Social Liability: The Case of Pakistani ISI, the Taliban
and the War against Terrorism
Shaul M.
Gabbay
Josef Korbel
School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA
Email: shaul.gabbay@du.edu
Copyright ©
2014 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.
This work is
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
Endnotes:
[1] Gabbay, S.M.
and Leenders, R.T. (2001) Social Capital of Organizations. JAI, Amsterdam.
[2] Evans , A.
(2010) Terrorism, Security, and the Power of Informal Networks. Edward Elgar
Publishing, Northhampton, 13-14.
[3] Titus , P.
(1998) Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pushtun: Stereotypes, Social Organization and
History in Western Pakistan. Modern Asian Studies, 32,
657-687.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X98003023
[4] Byman, D.
(2005) Passive Sponsors of Terrorism. Survival, 47, 117-144.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330500433399
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