Since old times, an analogy has been drawn between politics and a chess game in which winning or losing are both a function of correct and timely movements of pieces. What Russians did in the Syria chess game, especially through their military presence and withdrawal from the armed conflict in the war-torn country, clearly proved that they are skillful and smart politicians and chess players.
By Mohammad
Khajouei
Senior Middle East Analyst
Image Attribute: A Russian Fighter Jet at a Syrian Airport, TASS Russia
Since old
times, an analogy has been drawn between politics and a chess game in which
winning or losing are both a function of correct and timely movements of
pieces. What Russians did in the Syria chess game, especially through their
military presence and withdrawal from the armed conflict in the war-torn
country, clearly proved that they are skillful and smart politicians and chess
players.
Six months
ago, when Russians entered the Syrian war theater, they knew that their first
experience of military engagement beyond their borders following the collapse
of the former Soviet Union could turn into their Achilles’ heel and a cause of
dishonor, or on the contrary, project a new image of Russia’s power to the
world.
However,
Russians’ pragmatism caused major goals of this war to be objective,
small-scale and quite resilient on the basis of what was possible and existing limitations,
so that, Syria would not turn into a quagmire for the Russian forces.
Although for
many people the order issued by the Russian President Vladimir Putin for the
withdrawal of the main body of the country’s military forces from Syria seemed
untimely and weird, a comparison between conditions that exist today and six
months ago would clearly prove that Russia has achieved the main and important
goals that it pursued through this military campaign and, at least, as long as
new conditions do not undergo any serious change, there would be no
justification for further presence of Russian forces in Syria.
The main goal
of Russia is to maintain its strategic position in the region and guarantee its
own future presence in political and security environment of Syria, and on a
larger scale, in the entire Middle East.
To achieve
this goal, sometimes war and sometimes stopping war and initiating the peace
process can be the most effective steps to be taken under appropriate
conditions.
Six months ago
and before Russia launched its military campaign in Syria, the course of
developments in that country was not favorable for Russians. At that time, the
Syrian opposition had the upper hand and the country’s army was practically
worn out. Therefore, peace talks under those conditions could not have possibly
been beneficial to the government of Syria and, of course, Russia.
Under those
conditions, Putin’s historical decision to enter the Syria war militarily
turned the table. Of course, Russians mentioned fighting against Daesh as the
main reason behind their military action in Syria, but their most important
goal was to change equations on the ground in favor of the Syrian government
and this goal has been achieved.
It was through
the support provided by Russian forces that Syria’s government forces managed
during past months and weeks to wrest important and strategic swathes of Syrian
territory out of the opposition’s control and change the equation in their own
favor. However, Russia’s support for Syria in the battlefield has not been, and
still is not, unquestioning and unlimited. In other words, Russia did not, and
does not, want the Syrian government to end the game through military means
because it has been proved to Russia that the solution to the crisis in Syria
is not through war, but should be sought through peace negotiations. In better
words, Russians consider the war not as an end, but as a means. It was for this
reasons that just on the first day of the new round of Syria peace talks in the
Swiss city of Geneva, Putin announced withdrawal of his forces from Syria.
The fact that
the Syrian government can now take part in the peace talks more strongly due to
recent achievements in the battlefield is considered as enough and suitable by
Russia because this situation can serve as a good ground for a balanced and
intermediate agreement. On the other hand, withdrawal of Russian forces from
Syria can have a positive effect on Russians’ relations with Syrian opposition
groups and those countries which support them and this will open up more
options to Moscow in order to further play a role in the country. In fact, the
pendulum-like measures taken by Russians on Syria chessboard have helped Russia
become the focal and axial point of developments related to the case of Syria
and this was exactly the strategic objective sought by the Kremlin.
Another
important outcome of Russia’s military operations in Syria was a show of power
by Russia as a major global actor. By entering a war beyond its borders, Russia
once again proved its seriousness and power to other international actors.
Without a doubt, the memory of Russia’s military operations in Syria will
linger in people’s minds and this can have an effect on the calculations of
countries with regard to other issues and crises that may come about in the
future.
Libya was a
bitter and of course didactic experience for Russia. In that development,
Russia practically found itself trapped in the game designed by the West and
the United States. Its agreement with the resolution passed to defend civilians
in Libya practically benefitted the West, which aimed to use that resolution as
a means to achieve its main goal, which was overthrowing the country’s former
ruler, Muammar Gaddafi.
In Syria,
however, Russia tried to design a game of its own, instead of playing the game
planned by the West or even regional countries. As if Moscow believed that in
such a state, it would have everything under its control and would be able to
enter into interaction or even a deal with other involved parties, including
the United States, from an active and powerful position.
Of course,
there are other reasons, which may have affected Russia’s recent decision to
withdraw its troops from Syria. Increasing security threats along Russia’s
borders and rising activities by various terrorist groups in Central Asian
countries, which call for more concentration on the part of Russia to contain
these crises, were among those reasons. On the other hand, economic problems
and reduction in Russia’s foreign exchange revenues as a result of the
plummeting oil prices were further factors, which may have prompted Russians to
cut short their military activities in the Middle East.
Of course, the
above explanation is based on the existing equations. Syria is the land of quicksand
and equations there are constantly changing. Therefore, it is not unlikely that
unpredictable developments may further change Russians’ decision, especially
taking into account that they are running two active bases in Syria – one in
the port city of Tartus and the other one in Hmeimim – which can pave the way
for more military moves by Russians.
In the short
run, however, one can hope that withdrawal of Russia’s military forces from
Syria and continuation of the cease-fire will have a positive effect on the
process of peace talks. This is especially true because the withdrawal can
bring positions of foreign parties that influence domestic conditions in Syria
closer together as a result of which the government and opposition may reach an
agreement to put an end to this bloody war, which has been overshadowing Syrian
people’s lives for more than five years.
Key Words: Russia,
Military Presence, Syria, Outcome, Pragmatism, Vladimir Putin, Strategic
Position, Daesh, Withdrawal of Forces, Peace Talks, Syrian Opposition Groups,
Oil Prices, Foreign Parties, Khajouei
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