By Brig. Gen. (res.) Moni Chorev
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Image Attribute: IDF Soldiers in Gaza, 2014 / Source: Wikipedia
Mideast
Security and Policy Studies No. 115
In this new
monograph, Brig. Gen. (res.) Moni Chorev of the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies calls for the development of a strategic theory and military
doctrine suitable for “deterrence operations,” within the context of a
strategic campaign of extended attrition.
Over the
thirty years that have passed since the first Lebanon War, Israel has not
conducted any wars aimed at achieving a decisive victory. With the exception of
Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, all of the IDF’s operations and campaigns
have been directed at achieving limited goals. The basic strategic
understanding that has informed all of these operations is that Israel is
currently engaged in an extended period of attritional warfare against
asymmetric opponents, as part of a conflict that is insoluble for the
foreseeable future.
The military
operations conducted over this period have all sought to bolster and renew
deterrence, so as to allow a return to routine and provide a reasonable level
of security. Israel has accrued a great amount of operational experience over
the course of these conflicts. However, the attempts to operationalize
this combat approach paint a picture that indicates gaps and inconsistencies in
logic and in the patterns of military force activity, as well as in the integration
of additional strategic efforts at a national level in a way that accords with
policy goals.
Deterrence
operations need to be conducted as integrated inter-agency efforts at a
national level, in which military action must be conducted in synchronization
with additional strategic efforts, in support of the defined aims and goals.
The experience gained to date has underlined the importance of coordinating
military action with diplomacy, economic activities, home front preparedness,
public awareness, and media efforts, in order to provide the necessary
framework for effectively waging the campaign.
Although
deterrence campaigns have in recent decades been the leading mode of combat
pursued by Israel, and in spite of the limitations of the military to serve as
the sole effective tool for achieving strategic goals in campaigns of this
kind, in all this time no coherent theory has been developed that draws
together the various other national level components into a unified strategic
approach. The lack of such an approach, and of the mechanisms needed to realize
it, leads to a continued reliance on the military effort, despite its
significant limitations.
In terms of
the military effort, this paper analyzes the operational conceptual framework
which is based on the “decisive victory” concept, and calls for the development
of a strategic theory and military doctrine suitable for deterrence operations,
within the context of a strategic campaign of extended attrition. Achieving
fundamental conceptual clarity is a necessary foundation for developing a
coherent operational approach, one that is consistent with overall national
goals. The attempt to develop these ideas and a doctrine of this kind should
influence the planning and operational processes in these campaigns, as well as
the IDF force development process.
The paper
begins with a review of the opponent in the Gaza Strip, including aspects of
the opponent’s ideological approach, strategic logic, and operational approach
to conducting extended attritional warfare. The second chapter discusses the
Israeli approach to deterrence operations at a strategic-national level, over
the course of a continued, ongoing attritional conflict. The third chapter
focuses on the military level, making use of case studies of deterrence operations
in Gaza in recent years, in order to present the principal combat efforts, the
difficulties faced, the lack of doctrinal clarity, and the distortions created
during the planning and management of these operations.
The final
chapter contains recommendations for the creation of a clear deterrence concept
and theory, which will be a basis in the future for conducting operations in a
more coherent and effective manner, across the range of activities forming the
broader national-level campaign.
Download The Monograph - LINK
About The Author:
Brig. Gen.
(res.) Chorev served as head of the IDF Southern Command Thinking and Planning
Team. He commanded a division, and was commander of the Givati infantry
brigade.
This introduction to monograph was first published at BESA Center Website, March 20, 2016 and is
republished at IndraStra.com with Original Publisher's Permission.
All Rights
Reserved by BESA Center.