The surprise announcement by the Russian Federation to withdraw its military forces from within the Syrian Arab Republic does little to change any dimension in the relationship between the Russian President (Mr Putin) and the Syrian leader (Bashar Al Assad).
By Phillip Dennis BA (Hons)
The surprise announcement by the Russian
Federation to withdraw its military forces from within the Syrian Arab Republic
does little to change any dimension in the relationship between the Russian
President (Mr Putin) and the Syrian leader (Bashar Al Assad). The withdrawal, as suggested, is of course a
partial withdrawal and not the full military drawdown the public have been led
to believe. Military forces are set to remain in key strategic areas such as: the naval base in Tartus and the air base in
Khmeimim. Perhaps more importantly was
an announcement made On March 23rd 2016 by a commander of the Russian
contingent in Syria (Aleksandra Dvornikov) who clarified Russian special forces
were indeed operating in Syria.
On March 23rd REF/L quoted Aleksandra Dvornikov
and further stated;
“President Vladimir Putin last week ordered a
pullout of some Russian warplanes from Syria, but said that strikes against the
Islamic State (IS) group and the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Nusra Front will
continue.”
(Source RFE/R, 2016)
So is it really a question of retreating out of
Syria, or a matter of being able to stay there unseen, in a long drawn out
occupation while the conditions of the Geneva communiqué and peace plan further
develop?
Russian Special Forces in Syria
On the surface it would appear that the Russian
Federation has changed its role as military occupier to a more subtle
peacekeeping insurgent by downsizing its military hardware and claiming that
the operation has made significant differences in the fight against terrorist
organisations. However, one could argue,
that the inclusion of special forces and remaining strategic military hardware
merely endorses the relationship between President Putin and President Assad. A recent article published by Dmitry Gorenburg
and Michael Kofma suggested there is no Russian withdrawal and Russian special
forces will still play a major role in Syria,
to the extent that Russian military will continue to support the Syrian
army in regaining control. Moreover, existing military equipment is being
replaced by more compact and advanced equipment, e.g., Ka-52 and Mi-28N
helicopters, with the capability to support the Assad forces in combat. (Gorenburg D & Kofman M, 2016)
However, Professor Mark Galiotti of New York
University, a distinguished expert in the field of Russian affairs, also
published an article in March 2016 which explained the role special forces are
playing in Syria: in particular the Russian Spetsnaz.
In his article, “ The Three Faces of Russian
Spetsnaz in Syria”, professor Galiotti
outlines the most important factor in the sudden Russian retreat.“To minimise its exposure in this messy
bloody war.” (Galiotti, M, 2016)
The article states;
“As the Russian drawdown from Syria continues,
more information continues to emerge about the forces Moscow had committed to
shoring up the Assad regime. One telling aspect is how involved Russia’s
Spetsnaz special forces were in the deployment. They were involved in two of
their three core missions — reconnaissance and special security missions — but
not the third, direct combat operations. The implication is that from the
outset of the deployment, Moscow planned to minimize its exposure in this messy
and bloody war.”
(Galiotti, M, 2016)
The Hybrid Force in Syria
The Russian special force Spetsnaz is one of
several forces operating in Syria. In
2013 Spetsnaz was handed to the control of the Russian Intelligence Service the
Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (main intelligence service) or GRU. The reformed Spetsnaz GRU operate in four key
fields of expertise; special reconnaissance, direct action, assassination and
sabotage.
Combined with their counterparts; the KGB, MVD for
internal affairs, and special operations command (often referred to as the KSO)
they form a potent hybrid force not only in the field of combat but also in the
field of intelligence, with a network of experts, computer systems, imint,
sigint, mathematics and science.
On Jan 13th 2016 The Russian Defence Policy
published a list of candidates to replace the late GRU Chief General-Colonel
Igor Sergun. The successor, it was a announced, will be one of the military
intelligence directorate’s current deputy chiefs: Vyacheslav Kondrashov, Sergey Gizunov, Igor
Lelin, or Igor Korobov.
The intelligence directorate continued to
write:
“Ten days
ago an ukaz indicating President Putin’s choice was expected “soon,” but no
sign of it yet........Kommersant’s Ivan Safronov made the point that the GRU
has been busy because of Russia’s operation in Syria. Its IMINT and SIGINT systems, not to mention
its human agent networks, have been working overtime to support Russian
military and political decision makers.”
(Source :The Russian Policy 2016)
Such a statement directly connects the hybrid
forces to the decision making process and activities within the Syrian Arab
Republic. Forces which are, without
doubt, less visible than the existing military hardware employed by Russia in
an effort to tackle the Islamic State, Al Jabhat Al Nusra, and the Al Qaeda networks.
Concerns to the Peace Process
Arguably, the existence of remaining Russian
forces in Syria raises questions to the aspects of democratic transition. The Geneva communiqué map a direction for
political change in Syria by way of the Syrian population. Any change of government must therefore come
in the form of legitimate democracy. However, Russian Spetsnaz and other
forces, as pointed out by professor Galiotti, have been installed in Damascus
for the purpose of contingency to any government collapse. (Galiotti, M,
2016) In this instance it is clear that
the Russian Federation have a distinct intention to protect and support the
existing regime.
It is possible, therefore, that the GRU in Syria
would be an established un-seen presence, and, with the KSO forces operating,
it may be a concern for elements of the peace plan at the local level if they
disrupt local groups who oppose Assad. Especially given its implementation is
based on stability to encourage an election and formally decide the tenure of
the Syrian leader.
Conclusion:
The motive behind the sudden announcement of the
Russian Federation to withdraw from Syria is clear. It is without doubt a scale
down rather than a withdrawal, with the potential to re-install full military
operations at any given time. What is
also clear is the intention for some form of force to remain, including
established hybrid forces with the capability to conduct less visible
operations.
The Geneva agreement does clearly state a desire
for no external intervention in the Syrian crisis, and the Russian drawdown
could arguably be directed at placing
them at a better stand point for
international negotiation of the transition process. The same, it could be
said, applies to the Syrian president.
With the installation of special GRU forces in Damascus, self
preservation is a growing but transparent mandate for Bashar Al Assad, with
strong backing from his Russian supporters.
What appears to be a Russian drawdown for the
benefit of the peace process, could turn
out to be a long drawn out tactic with the Assad-Putin bond over-riding issues
in an effort to maintain a status quo for the existing regime.
A situation
which will require careful monitoring as events unfold.
About The Author:
Phillip Paul Dennis (C-1610-2016)
is an inspector, combining academic and office skills with practical work based
skills which enabled him to attain First Article Inspector status.
Formally educated at Portsmouth
University, reading geography and geographical science, he graduated with
honour, and successfully completed an independent research dissertation in
geopolitics by conducting a geographical enquiry into the social contract theory
and the development of nation-states. In 2010 he achieved a UK-TEFL Cert
at Cambridge UK, and was previously awarded distinction by the London City and
Guilds Institute for computer aided engineering in 1992.
In 2013 he was part of the university alumni
networking group, attending events & functions, and has represented
geography & geographical science as a delegate for a reception evening
at the House of Lords, in Westminster, London.
Cite This Article:
Dennis, P.P. "ANALYSIS | The Russian Retreat from Syria – Drawdown or Drawn Out?" IndraStra Global 02, no. 03 (2016):
0089.
http://www.indrastra.com/2016/03/ANALYSIS-Russian-Retreat-from-Syria-Drawdown-or-Drawn-Out-002-03-2016-0089.html| ISSN 2381-3652 |
Endnotes:
[1] Information supplied by Chatham House ,
Russia’s withdrawal from Syria: Five things you should know, March 17th,
2016
[2]Gorenburg D & Kofman M, War on the rocks, There is No Russian
Withdrawal from Syria, March 2016
[3] Galeotti,M, The Three Faces of Russian Spetsnaz in Syria, War on the
Rocks, March 2016
[4] The Russian policy, Sttill
Awaiting New GRU Chief, January
23rd 2016
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